1\2 L M R 1,-1 | 5,0 0,0 4,4 0,0 0,0 3,3 C 0,5 В 0,0 1. Find all set of rationalizable strategies (Hint: We are allowed to eliminate a pure strategy, if it is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy). 2. Find all set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. 3. Is there a dominant strategy equilibrium for this game?

1\2 L M R 1,-1 | 5,0 0,0 4,4 0,0 0,0 3,3 C 0,5 В 0,0 1. Find all set of rationalizable strategies (Hint: We are allowed to eliminate a pure strategy, if it is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy). 2. Find all set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. 3. Is there a dominant strategy equilibrium for this game?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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