Make sure you clearly write your name andsubmission:.1. Consider the 2-player, zero-sum game "Rock, Paper, Scissors". Each player choosesone of 3 strategies: rock, paper, or scissors. Then, both players reveal their choices.The outcome is determined as follows. If both players choose the same strategy,neither player wins or loses anything. Otherwise:• "paper covers rock": if one player chooses paper and the other chooses rock,the player who chose paper wins and is paid 1 by the other player.• "scissors cut paper": if one player chooses scissors and the other chooses paper,the player who chose scissors wins and is paid 1 by the other player.• "rock breaks scissors": if one player chooses rock and the other player choosesscissors, the player who chose rock wins and is paid 1 by the other player.We can write the payoff matrix for this game as follows:rock paper-101rock0paper1scissors -1(a) Show that this game does not have a pure Nash equilibrium.1X3(b) Show that the pair of mixed strategies x¹ = (,,) and y¹ = (3) togetherare a Nash equilibrium.10 Coursework Questions.2. Suppose now we alter the game so that whenever Colin chooses "paper" the loserpays the winner 3 instead of 1:scissors1-10rock01rockpaperscissors -1paper scissors1-30-130X(a) Show that x¹ = (3) and y¹ = (3) together are not a Nash equilibriumfor this modified game.MTH5114 (Spring 2023)

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1. Consider the 2-player, zero-sum game "Rock, Paper, Scissors". Each player chooses one of 3 strategies: rock, paper, or scissors. Then, both players reveal their choices. The outcome is determined as follows. If both players choose the same strategy, neither player wins or loses anything. Otherwise: • "paper covers rock": if one player chooses paper and the other chooses rock, the player who chose paper wins and is paid 1 by the other player. • "scissors cut paper": if one player chooses scissors and the other chooses paper, the player who chose scissors wins and is paid 1 by the other player. plr brooks coiccors" if one player chooses rock and the other player chooses

1. Consider the 2-player, zero-sum game "Rock, Paper, Scissors". Each player chooses one of 3 strategies: rock, paper, or scissors. Then, both players reveal their choices. The outcome is determined as follows. If both players choose the same strategy, neither player wins or loses anything. Otherwise: • "paper covers rock": if one player chooses paper and the other chooses rock, the player who chose paper wins and is paid 1 by the other player. • "scissors cut paper": if one player chooses scissors and the other chooses paper, the player who chose scissors wins and is paid 1 by the other player. plr brooks coiccors" if one player chooses rock and the other player chooses

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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