Transcribed Image Text: COMPANY Case
Target: From "Expect More"
to "Pay Less"
slowdown, posting quarterly increases in same-store sales of dose to
5 percent along with substantial jumps in profits.
When you hear the term discount retail, two names that usually
come to mind: Walmart and Target. The two have been compared
so much that the press rarely covers one without at least mention-
ing the other. The reasons for the comparison are fairly obvious.
These corporations are two of the largest discount retailers in the
United States. Category for category, they offer very similar mer-
chandise. They tend to build their stores in close proximity to one
another, even facing each other across major boulevards.
But even with such strong similarities, ask consumers if there's a
difference between the two, and they won't even hesitate. Walmart
is all about low prices; Target is about style and fashion. The "cheap
chic" label applied by consumers and the media over the years per-
fectly captures the Íong-standing company positioning: "Expect
More. Pay Less." With its numerous designer product lines, Target
has been so successful with its brand positioning that for a number
lof years it has slowly chipped away at Walmart's massive market
Chare. Granted, the difference in the scale for the two companies
has always been huge. Walmart's most recent annual revenues of
$408 billion are more than six times those of Target. But for many
years, Target's business grew at a much faster pace than Walmart's.
In fact, as Walmart's same-store sales began to lag in the mid-
2000s, the world's largest retailer unabashedly attempted to become
more like Target. It spruced up its store environment, added more
fashionable clothing and housewares, and stocked organic and gour-
met products in its grocery aisles. Walmart even experimented with
luxury brands. After 19 years of promoting the slogan, "Always Low
Prices. Always." Walmart replaced it with the very Target-esque
tagline, "Save Money. Live Better." None of those efforts seemed to
speed up Walmart's revenue growth or slow down Target's.
But oh what a difference a year or two can make. As the global
recession began to tighten its grip on the world's retailers in 2008, the
dynamics between the two retail giants reversed almost overnight. As
unemployment rose and consumers began pinching their pennies,
Walmart's familiar price "rollbacks" resonated with consumers, while
Target's image of slightly better stuff for slightly higher prices did not.
Target's well-cultivated "upscale discount" image was turning away
customers who believed that its fashionable products and trendy ad-
vertising meant steeper prices. By mid-2008, Target had experienced
three straight quarters of flat same-store sales growth and a slight dip
din store traffic. At the same time, Walmart was defying the economic
SAME SLOGAN, DIFFERENT EMPHASIS
In fall 2008, Target acknowledged the slide and announced its in-
tentions to do something about it. Target CEO Gregg Steinhafel
succinctly summarized the company's new strategy: "The cus-
tomer is very cash strapped right now. And in some ways, our
greatest strength has become somewhat of a challenge. So, we're
still trying to define and find the right balance between 'Expect
More. Pay Less.' The current environment means that the focus is
squarely on the 'Pay Less' side of it."
In outlining Target's new strategy, company executives made it
clear that Walmart was the new focus. Target would make certain
that its prices were in line with Walmart's. Future promotions
would communicate the "pay less" message to consumers, while
also highlighting the fact that Target is every bit the convenient
one-stop shopping destination as its larger rival.
The new communications program included massive changes
to in-store signage. Instead of in-store images and messages high-
lighting trendy fashion, store visitors were greeted with large signs
boasting price points and value messages. Similarly, weekly news
paper circulars featured strong value headlines, fewer products,
and clearly labeled price points. In fact, Target's ads began looking
very much like those of Walmart or even Kmart. Further recogniz-
ing the consumer trend toward thriftiness, Target increased the
emphasis on its own store brands of food and home goods.
While making the shift toward "Pay Less," Target was careful
to reassure customers that it would not compromise the "Expect
More" part of its brand. Target has always been known for having
more designer partnerships than any other retailer. From the
Michael Graves line of housewares to Isaac Mizrahi's clothing line,
Target boasts more than a dozen product lines created exclusively
for Target by famous designers. Kathryn Tesija, Target's executive
vice president of merchandising, assured customers that not only
would Target continue those relationships but also add several
new designer partnerships in the apparel and beauty categories.
MOUNTING PRESSURE
Although Steinhafel's "Pay Less" strategy was aggressive, Target's
financials were slow to respond. In fact, things initially got worse
with sales at one point dropping by 10 percent from the previous
year. Target's profits suffered even more. It didn't help matters that
Walmart bucked the recessionary retail trend by posting revenue
increases. When confronted with this fact, Steinhafel responded