Table A shows the pricing options for two drone operators, Andrew and Jasmine, as an oligopoly in a local market. Which of the following pricing strategy scenarios does Table 2 depict, when there are at least two pricing periods expected? Table A Drone Operator Jasmine LOW Price Drone Operator Jasmine HIGH Price Drone Operator Andrew LOW Price Andrew Low Jasmine Low Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $2,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Table 2 Pricing Strategy Scenario TABLE 2 First Period First Price Choice Period (High or Profit Low) Drone Operator Andrew HIGH Price $1,000 Low $1.000 Low Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $2,000 profit Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $1,500 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $1,500 profit Second Second Period Price Period Choice (High Profit or Low) $1,000 $1,000 Total Profit for both periods $2,000 $2,000

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Table A shows the pricing options for two drone operators, Andrew and Jasmine, as an oligopoly in
a local market. Which of the following pricing strategy scenarios does Table 2 depict, when there
are at least two pricing periods expected?
Table A
Drone
Operator
Jasmine LOW
Price
Drone
Operator
Jasmine
HIGH Price
Drone Operator Andrew
LOW Price
Andrew Low
Jasmine Low
Drone Operator Andrew
Charges LOW Price: gets
$1,000 profit Drone
Operator Jasmine Charges
LOW Price: gets $1,000
profit
Drone Operator Andrew
Charges LOW Price: gets
$2,000 profit Drone
Operator Jasmine Charges
HIGH Price: gets $0 profit
Table 2 Pricing Strategy Scenario
TABLE 2 First Period First
Price Choice Period
(High or
Profit
Low)
$1,000
$1,000
Drone Operator Andrew
HIGH Price
Drone Operator Andrew
Charges HIGH Price: gets
$0 profit Drone Operator
Jasmine Charges LOW
Price: gets $2,000 profit
Drone Operator Andrew
Charges HIGH Price: gets
$1,500 profit Drone
Operator Jasmine Charges
HIGH Price: gets $1,500
profit
Second
Second
Period Price Period
Choice (High Profit
or Low)
Low
Low
$1,000
$1,000
Total Profit
for both
periods
$2,000
$2,000
Transcribed Image Text:Table A shows the pricing options for two drone operators, Andrew and Jasmine, as an oligopoly in a local market. Which of the following pricing strategy scenarios does Table 2 depict, when there are at least two pricing periods expected? Table A Drone Operator Jasmine LOW Price Drone Operator Jasmine HIGH Price Drone Operator Andrew LOW Price Andrew Low Jasmine Low Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $2,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Table 2 Pricing Strategy Scenario TABLE 2 First Period First Price Choice Period (High or Profit Low) $1,000 $1,000 Drone Operator Andrew HIGH Price Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $2,000 profit Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $1,500 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $1,500 profit Second Second Period Price Period Choice (High Profit or Low) Low Low $1,000 $1,000 Total Profit for both periods $2,000 $2,000
O a) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat."
b) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine "cheats."
c) Jasmine "cheats" and Andrew "cheats."
d) Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Andrew "cheats."
Expecting only one pricing period, Jasmine chooses the Nash Non-cooperative Equilibrium
price strategy.
Transcribed Image Text:O a) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat." b) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine "cheats." c) Jasmine "cheats" and Andrew "cheats." d) Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Andrew "cheats." Expecting only one pricing period, Jasmine chooses the Nash Non-cooperative Equilibrium price strategy.
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