**Game Theory Payoff Matrix Analysis**This table represents a payoff matrix for a strategic game involving two players, Player 1 and Player 2. The strategies available to each player are as follows:- **Player 1** can choose between "Up" and "Down."- **Player 2** can choose between "Left" and "Right."The payoffs for each combination of strategies are listed in the matrix, with the first number representing Player 1's payoff and the second number representing Player 2's payoff.### Payoff Matrix:| | **Player 2: Left** | **Player 2: Right** ||-------------|--------------------|---------------------|| **Player 1: Up** | P1: $15, P2: $15 | P1: $11, P2: $16 || **Player 1: Down** | P1: $12, P2: $18 | P1: $13, P2: $13 |### Analysis:Below the matrix is a checklist asking which strategies are dominant:- **Up is a dominant strategy for Player 1**- **Down is a dominant strategy for Player 1**- **Left is a dominant strategy for Player 2**- **Right is a dominant strategy for Player 2**- **There are no dominant strategies in this game**### Explanation:A strategy is dominant if it results in a higher payoff no matter what the other player chooses. The checklist invites the user to evaluate which (if any) strategies from the game exhibit this property.

Dominant strategy refers to the preferred outcome of a player over other options as the player…

Player 1 ооооо Up Down List all dominant strategies in the game shown above Up is a dominant strategy for player 1 Down is a dominant strategy for player 1 Left is a dominant strategy for player 2 Right is a dominant strategy for player 2 There are no dominant strategies in this game Player 2 Left P1: $15 P2: $15 P1: $12 P2:$18 Right P1:$11 P2: $16 P1: $13 P2: $13

Player 1 ооооо Up Down List all dominant strategies in the game shown above Up is a dominant strategy for player 1 Down is a dominant strategy for player 1 Left is a dominant strategy for player 2 Right is a dominant strategy for player 2 There are no dominant strategies in this game Player 2 Left P1: $15 P2: $15 P1: $12 P2:$18 Right P1:$11 P2: $16 P1: $13 P2: $13

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Topic is information economics
No written by hand solution
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