3) Amazon and Target both sell the new Xbox, and have a choice whether to charge a high price or a low price. The payoff matrix identifies the profit either store can expect to make (in millions of dollars). Walmart High Price Low Price High Price b. Identify the Nash Equilibrium. 3,6 5,5 Amazon Low Price 2,8 4,3 a. Identify the Dominant Strategy for either player, or write "none" if there isn't one,

3) Amazon and Target both sell the new Xbox, and have a choice whether to charge a high price or a low price. The payoff matrix identifies the profit either store can expect to make (in millions of dollars). Walmart High Price Low Price High Price b. Identify the Nash Equilibrium. 3,6 5,5 Amazon Low Price 2,8 4,3 a. Identify the Dominant Strategy for either player, or write "none" if there isn't one,

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Player 2 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy 1 (1,4) (2,3) Player 1 Strategy 2 (6,5) (5,4) Consider the game depicted in the table above. The payout for player 1 is given first in parenthesis, with Player 2's payout second. What is the Nash equilibrium in this game? Strategy 1 and Strategy A Strategy 2 and Strategy A Strategy 2 and Strategy B This game does not have a Nash equilibrium
Samsung Expensive Cheap Apple Expensive Cheap 2,6 3,3 4,4 6,2 Apple and Samsung control the majority of the Smart Phones. Suppose the diagram above represents their strategic options, either to offer an expensive or a cheap phone in the market. If both firms offer an expensive phone, they will each earn 4 billion dollars. If Samsung offers a cheap phone, while Apple offers only an expensive phone, Samsung will earn $6 billion and Apple will earn $2 billion, and vice versa. If they both offer a cheap phone, they will each earn $3 billion. What are the profits in the Nash Equilibrium? Both firms earn $4 billion. Samsung earns $2 billion and Apple earns $6 billion. Samsung earns $6 billion and Apple earns $2 billion. Both firms earn $3 billion.
Dairy King Advertise Doesn't Advertise Advertise 7,7 12, 3 Creamland Doesn't Advertise 3, 12 10, 10 For example, the upper right cell shows that if Creamland advertises and Dairy King doesn't advertise, Creamland will make a profit of $12 million, and Dairy King will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Creamland and Dairy King are both profit-maximizing firms. If Creamland decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of not advertise. million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of million if Dairy King does If Creamland decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of does not advertise. million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of million if Dairy King If Dairy King advertises, Creamland makes a higher profit if it chooses If Dairy King doesn't advertise, Creamland makes a higher profit if it chooses Suppose that both firms start off not advertising. If the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? ◇ Creamland will…
1. Find all pure AND mixed strategy Nash Equilibria in the following games L R R (0,1) (4,1) (1, 2) (3, 3) (2, 2) (3,1) T B L (1,2) (0,2) T B
Up ооооо Down Player 1 Up No EFFICIENT equilibrium exists Down Up Down Player 2 P1 gets $120 P2 gets $5 P1 gets $100 P2 gets $10 P1 gets $95 P2 gets $95 In the game above, what is/are the EFFICIENT sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium? (up,up) (up,down) (down, up) (down, down) P1 gets $15 P2 gets $25
2. Consider the two-by-two bimatrix game listed below: Left Right (2,-2) (1,-1) Up Down (3,-3) (-1,1) where the player "Row" chooses the action "up" or "down" and the player "Column" chooses the action "left" or "right". Describe a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium for this game.
4. Two firms face the following payoff matrix, where each is choosing whether to charge a low or high price: Firm 1 Low (2,0) (0,7) High Firm 2 Low (1,2) High (6,6) Is there any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? What is the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?
M7
1. Consider the following normal form game: Player 2 Player 1 U (2,2) (1,6) Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, supposing that this is a simultaneous non- repeated game.
Solve the attahment.
Firm A a. Low Price High Price Both firms will earn 0 C. Firm B Low Price 0,0 -10, 50 What is the payoff for each firm in this simultaneous game? High Price 50, -10 d. Both firms will earn 25 25, 25 b. Firm A will earn 50 and firm B will earn -10 Firm A will earn -10 and firm B will earn 50