Suppose that speeding imposes externalities on other people resulting in a social cost of $50. A town is considering hiring an extra police officer to give out speeding tickets. If we want to maximize social welfare (absent enforcement costs), which 13. of the following statements are true? (Assume risk neutral drivers.) If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a a) speeding ticket should cost $55. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a b) speeding ticket should cost $500. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 100%, then no one will speed. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 90%, then a speeding ticket should cost $59 None of the above c) d) e)

Suppose that speeding imposes externalities on other people resulting in a social cost of $50. A town is considering hiring an extra police officer to give out speeding tickets. If we want to maximize social welfare (absent enforcement costs), which 13. of the following statements are true? (Assume risk neutral drivers.) If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a a) speeding ticket should cost $55. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a b) speeding ticket should cost $500. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 100%, then no one will speed. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 90%, then a speeding ticket should cost $59 None of the above c) d) e)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Could Question 13 be answered?