Hedonic wage studies indicate a willingness to pay $40 per person for a reduction in the risk of a premature death from an environmental hazard of 1/100,000. If the exposed population is five million people, what is the implied value of a statistical life? To answer this question, first you find that the number of saved lives is Also, find that the total willingness to pay is $ use thousands separators. Thus, the implied value of a statistical life is $ . Hint: Don't

Hedonic wage studies indicate a willingness to pay $40 per person for a reduction in the risk of a premature death from an environmental hazard of 1/100,000. If the exposed population is five million people, what is the implied value of a statistical life? To answer this question, first you find that the number of saved lives is Also, find that the total willingness to pay is $ use thousands separators. Thus, the implied value of a statistical life is $ . Hint: Don't

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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