Moving to another question will save this response.Question 8High litigation costs for the Plaintiff (Victim) and Defendant (Injurer)O A. encourage too little precaution because the Injurers know that the litigation costs will discourage Victims from suingB. encourage too much precaution because the Injurers wish to avoid the high costs of litigationOC. either A or B could be correctOD. None of the above are correctQu2 poi

The correct answer is A. encourage too little precaution because the Injurers know that the…

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ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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For Pancreas Transplant, DRG code is 010. For DRG 010, Medicare pays fixed amountof $21,313.50. Outlier threshold for Medicare is $25,800.(a) John admitted hospital A for pancreas transplant. The charges for John'streatment was 128,000. Cost to charge ratio for Hospital A was 0.10. How muchpayment hospital A would get from Medicare?(b) Bryan admitted hospital B for pancreas transplant. The charges for Bryan'streatment was same as John, $128,000, but cost to charge ratio for Hospital Bwas 0.25. How much payment hospital B would get from Medicare?
3. Assume a single firm and a single consumer in a market. The firm's prod- uct may be either high or low quality and is of high quality with probability A. The consumer cannot observe quality before purchase and is risk neutral. The consumer's valuation of a high-quality product is UH; her valuation of a low-quality product is UL. The costs of production for high (H) and low (L) quality are CH and C₁, respectively. The consumer desires at most one unit of the product. Finally, the firm's price is regulated and is set at p. Assume that VH > P> VL > CH > CL. (a) Given the level of p, under what conditions will the consumer buy the product? (b) Suppose that before the consumer decides whether to buy, the firm (which knows its type) can advertise. Advertising conveys no information directly, but consumers can observe the total amount of money that the firm is spend- ing on advertising, denoted by A. Can there be a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium in which…
The difference between retrospective versus prospective reimbursement is that: a. Prospective reimbursement is cost-based and payments are based on each healthcare services/goods done or given; retrospective reimbursements are based on set standards such as DRGs in the case of hospitalizations. b. Retrospective reimbursement is cost-based and payments are based on each healthcare services/goods done or given; prospective reimbursements are based on set standards such as DRGs in the case of hospitalizations. c. Both payment systems practically mean the same thing since it is a way to reimburse providers of health care services on the services they have already given to patients. d. None of the choices are correct
9. Consider the following hypothetical three-stage screening test for a cancer with the following rates of detection and costs: Stage 2 3 Number of Cases Detected 100 110 125 135 Total $150,000 $180,000 $250.000 $310.000 A. Calculate the average cost per cancer detected in the three stages. B. Calculate the marginal cost per cancer detected in the three stages. C. Suppose that the marginal benefit per treated case is $4,600 per person. What would be the optimal screening, given the costs?
4. An incumbent chain store faces two different entrants E₁ (in the first market) and E2 (in the second market). The incumbent can choose to accommodate (A) or fight (F) in the first market. The second entrant E2 observes the outcome of first interaction before deciding whether to enter the second market (I) or stay out (O). Incumbent could be tough, wo. Other incumbent is normal, wn. In the second market, normal incumbent accommodates and tough fights. Conditional on entry in the first market, the resulting signaling game played between the incumbent and E2 is illustrated below. In the signaling game, Nature chooses the incumbent to be tough with probability . UI,UE UI,UE 4,-1 I' [P] F wo A [9] I 3,-1 6,0 O' Tough [2/3] 5,0 E2 E2 3,1 I' Normal [1/3] 4,1 1-p] F' Wn A'[1-9 5,0 6,0 (a) List out all of the strategies for the incumbent and E2. (b) Is there a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium? If so, find all the separating perfect Bayesian equilibria. If not, briefly demonstrate why.…
O $300 Question 11 3 pts Consumers are willing to pay a higher price for a brand-name product as opposed to a generic product because O they are willing to pay more for the privilege of watching the firm's commercials. O consumers maximize utility by purchasing the most expensive products. O a brand name provides a signal about a product's quality and reliability. O a brand-name product itself is always of higher quality. 3 pts Question 12 As competitors enter a market, demand becomes more meaning the demand curve
By 2030, Tesla is the dominant player in the market for self-driving cars, but it faces an entry threat by ACME Corporation. To examine its behavior toward competitors, suppose that Tesla produces q₁ and it incurs a cost of c₁ (91) = 69₁. ACME Corporation produces a self-driving car that is a perfect substitute for the Tesla vehicle, but its production costs are: c₂ (92) = 100+1292. Inverse demand for self-driving cars is given by p(Q) = 120-Q, where Q = 9₁ +92
For Pancreas Transplant, DRG code is 010. For DRG 010, Medicare pays fixed amount of $21,313.50. Outlier threshold for Medicare is $25,800. (a) John admitted hospital A for pancreas transplant. The charges for John’s treatment was 128,000. Cost to charge ratio for Hospital A was 0.10. How much payment hospital A would get from Medicare? (b) Bryan admitted hospital B for pancreas transplant. The charges for Bryan’s treatment was same as John, $128,000, but cost to charge ratio for Hospital B was 0.25. How much payment hospital B would get from Medicare?
Someone at a party pulls out a $100 bill and announces that he is going to auction it off. There are n=10 people at the partywho are potential bidders. The owner of the $100 bill puts forth the following procedure: All bidders simultaneously submit a written bid. Only the highest bidders pay their bid (assuming that the highest bid is positive). If m people submit the highest bid, then each receives 1/m of the $100. Each person’s strategy set is {0,1,2,...,1000}{0,1,2,...,1000} so bidding can go as high as $1,000. The payoff of a player bidding bi is:0 if bi < max{b1,b2,…,bn},and 100/m − bi if bi = max {b1,b2,…,bn}where,m is the number of bidders whose bid equals max{b1,...,bn}. How many pure-strategy Nash equilibria does this game have? 1) 0 2) 1 3) 4 4) More than 4.
Fig. A 250 Fig. C 200 $ (c) 40 O (d) 60 150 100 (e) 100 50 0 250 $ 200 150 0 100 50 CO 0 0 VMP=MRP LS=MFC 10 MRP LS-MFC 10 20 30 40 VMP 20 30 40 50 50 L Fig. B Fig. D 250 200 150 100 50 0 250 200 150 100 50 0 $ 0 $ 0 10 VMP=MRP MRP 10 20 VMP 20 30 40 44. If the firm is facing pure competition both when it buys labor and when it sells its product, what quantity of labor will it demand at a wage rate of $63? (a) 15 (b) 20 30 40 LS 50 LS 50 MFC MFC
7. John Nyman (2003) advanced an alternative reason why people desire medical insurance coverage. A. Briefly summarize his critiques on conventional insurance theory. B. Using the model described below illustrate the concepts of efficient and inefficient moral hazard, and explain what they are Price (p) P₁ MC 9₁ QN 9₂ 9⁰ (a)
F5 Price, Cost 200 6 120 40 0 Figure 1 Module....pptx -- ww 9 F6 40 MacBook Pro This question is based on the figure above, which describes cost and demand conditions in the widget industry. Assume that costs functions to not vary according to market structure (competition vs. monopoly, for example). The following questions are based on the diagram above: & 7 « P= 200-20 F7 MR 80 ▶11 tv 100 F8 MC = ATC Units per day www. F9 A ) F10 F11 +

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