nsurance buyers have more information about whether they are high-risk or low-risk than the insurance company does. This creates an asymmetric information problem for the insurance company because buyers who are high-risk tend to want to buy more insurance, without letting th insurance company know about their higher risk. How might this problem impact an insurance company? O The company will not be impacted. O The insurance buyers, not the company, will be impacted. As high risk buyers submit claims, they will use up the company's funds for that year, and since the company did not adjust for these high risk claims, once that money is used up, remaining claimants won't receive any coverage.

nsurance buyers have more information about whether they are high-risk or low-risk than the insurance company does. This creates an asymmetric information problem for the insurance company because buyers who are high-risk tend to want to buy more insurance, without letting th insurance company know about their higher risk. How might this problem impact an insurance company? O The company will not be impacted. O The insurance buyers, not the company, will be impacted. As high risk buyers submit claims, they will use up the company's funds for that year, and since the company did not adjust for these high risk claims, once that money is used up, remaining claimants won't receive any coverage.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Monty Burns, the owner of the Springfield Nuclear Power Plant, owns many real estate properties. His last acquisition is a house worth €1,000, 000. Monty Burns considers purchasing an insurance for this new property. With probability 0.1, he will face damage reducing his property' value to €640,000 while with probability 0.9 his property will not be damaged and thus will remain at its current value. Burns' vNM utility for wealth is given by u°(w) = Vw. Miss b runs an insurance company in Springfield and is willing to insure Monty Burns. The insurance contract says the following: if Burns' new property is damaged, she will pay an amount q (the coverage) to Monty Burns in exchange for a payment r (the premium) that is due independently from the occurence of the damage. Miss b's vNM utility over her income y is u°(y) = y.
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