Why can't safe drivers get lower rates by telling insurance companies that they are less likely to have an accident? Select one: O a. because insurance companies don't want to cut rates for anyone O b. because unsafe drivers would make the same claim O c. because no one can really know if he or she is a safe driver O d. because accidents happen to everyone

Why can't safe drivers get lower rates by telling insurance companies that they are less likely to have an accident? Select one: O a. because insurance companies don't want to cut rates for anyone O b. because unsafe drivers would make the same claim O c. because no one can really know if he or she is a safe driver O d. because accidents happen to everyone

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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1. Indicate which of the following describes a moral hazard problem and which describes adverse selection: a. A person with a terminal illness buys several life insurance policies via the internet. b. A person rides carelessly because he has motorcycle insurance. c. A person who intends to burn down his house takes out a large fire insurance policy. d. A woman who anticipates having a large family takes a job with a firm that offers exceptional childcare benefits.
John is a 55-year-old male smoker, about 50 pounds overweight, who has high blood sugar and drinks to excess. Because of adverse selection in health insurance, Select one: O a. when John gets health insurance, he will be less likely to take care of himself. O b. if John doesn't have health insurance already, he will not be able to get it. O c. when John gets health insurance, he will be more likely to take care of himself. O d. John is more likely to buy health insurance than the average person since premiums are based on the average risk. O e. John is less likely to buy health insurance than the average personsince premiums are based on the average risk.
Suppose the market for auto insurance is made of up two types of buyers: high-risk and low-risk. Buyers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for auto insurance plans, and sellers’ willingness to accept (WTA) when selling plans to each type of buyer, are outlined in a photo (a) In a world with perfect information, would the market for insurance plans clear? If not, why? If yes, what are some prices that would a llow both markets to clear? The prices in each market are allowed to differ Assume now that there is asymmetric information and that insurance companies do not know how risky an individual buyer is. In the face of this uncertainty, they determine that the probability that a “walk-in” is high-risk is 0.75. What is the minimum price sellers are willing to accept when selling an insurance plan? At this price, will low- and high-risk buyers both be willing to purchase this insurance plan? Explain. Be sure the mention adverse selection in your answer.