3. In the second example, we will consider the case where the insurance contract involves a deductible this is an amount which is deducted from the final pay-out of the insurance firm in the case of a loss. In other words, the consumer bears this part of the loss herself. For this problem, assume a risk-averse, expected utility maximizing consumer with initial wealth wo who faces a potential loss of size L which will occur with probability p. Her utility-of-final-wealth function is denoted by u(.). Suppose that the consumer can purchase insurance coverage of C > 0 units of wealth from a perfectly competitive insurance firm at a premium of T per unit of coverage, but that the firm charges an additive deductible: if C units of insurance is purchased, the insurance firm pays out (C – d) if the loss occurs, where d >0 is a fixed amount independent of C. (a). For this problem, state the consumer's expected utility function. (b). Set up the consumer's utility maximization problem and find the optimal choice of C*. (c). If the price per unit of insurance is actuarially fair, i.e. if 7 = p, will the consumer choose to fully insure or under-insure? Provide reasons for your answer
3. In the second example, we will consider the case where the insurance contract involves a deductible this is an amount which is deducted from the final pay-out of the insurance firm in the case of a loss. In other words, the consumer bears this part of the loss herself. For this problem, assume a risk-averse, expected utility maximizing consumer with initial wealth wo who faces a potential loss of size L which will occur with probability p. Her utility-of-final-wealth function is denoted by u(.). Suppose that the consumer can purchase insurance coverage of C > 0 units of wealth from a perfectly competitive insurance firm at a premium of T per unit of coverage, but that the firm charges an additive deductible: if C units of insurance is purchased, the insurance firm pays out (C – d) if the loss occurs, where d >0 is a fixed amount independent of C. (a). For this problem, state the consumer's expected utility function. (b). Set up the consumer's utility maximization problem and find the optimal choice of C*. (c). If the price per unit of insurance is actuarially fair, i.e. if 7 = p, will the consumer choose to fully insure or under-insure? Provide reasons for your answer
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
![3. In the second example, we will consider the case where the insurance contract involves a
deductible this is an amount which is deducted from the final pay-out of the insurance
firm in the case of a loss. In other words, the consumer bears this part of the loss herself.
For this problem, assume a risk-averse, expected utility maximizing consumer with initial
wealth wo who faces a potential loss of size L which will occur with probability p. Her
utility-of-final-wealth function is denoted by u(.).
Suppose that the consumer can purchase insurance coverage of C > 0 units of wealth from
a perfectly competitive insurance firm at a premium of 7 per unit of coverage, but that
the firm charges an additive deductible: if C units of insurance is purchased, the insurance
firm pays out (C – d) if the loss occurs, where d 20 is a fixed amount independent of C.
(a). For this problem, state the consumer's expected utility function.
(b). Set up the consumer's utility maximization problem and find the optimal choice of C*.
(c). If the price per unit of insurance is actuarially fair, i.e. if T = p, will the consumer choose
to fully insure or under-insure? Provide reasons for your answer](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F87b53351-2067-4a4d-a81c-a5cf0ffaa5a8%2Faf6b1e99-9480-484d-9949-87a81f26d213%2Fy0ahf2l_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:3. In the second example, we will consider the case where the insurance contract involves a
deductible this is an amount which is deducted from the final pay-out of the insurance
firm in the case of a loss. In other words, the consumer bears this part of the loss herself.
For this problem, assume a risk-averse, expected utility maximizing consumer with initial
wealth wo who faces a potential loss of size L which will occur with probability p. Her
utility-of-final-wealth function is denoted by u(.).
Suppose that the consumer can purchase insurance coverage of C > 0 units of wealth from
a perfectly competitive insurance firm at a premium of 7 per unit of coverage, but that
the firm charges an additive deductible: if C units of insurance is purchased, the insurance
firm pays out (C – d) if the loss occurs, where d 20 is a fixed amount independent of C.
(a). For this problem, state the consumer's expected utility function.
(b). Set up the consumer's utility maximization problem and find the optimal choice of C*.
(c). If the price per unit of insurance is actuarially fair, i.e. if T = p, will the consumer choose
to fully insure or under-insure? Provide reasons for your answer
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