4. Suppose co = 0 and c1 = 70, 000. Is insurance at coverage level z > 0 fair insurance? What coverage level z* would Fiona choose? Explain. 5. Suppose co = 100 and ci = 70,000. Is insurance at coverage level z > 0 fair insurance? What coverage level z** would Fiona choose? Explain. (Note that co = 100 is an "avoidable fixed cost" which is only paid if she chooses strictly positive insurance coverage. However, the "marginal cost" of additional insurance, c1 = 70, 000, is the same as in the previous part.) 6. Suppose co = 100 and cı = 72,000. Is full insurance, that is, coverage level z =1 optimal? Explain.

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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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I need 4,5,6 answered

Exercise 4: Insurance
Fiona has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(x) = VT and initial wealth 640, 000. She faces a
25% chance of losing L = 280, 000.
1. Is Fiona risk averse?
2. What is Fiona's utility if no loss occurs, what is her utility if the loss occurs? What is Fiona's expected
utility?
3. What is the cost of fair insurance against the possible loss?
Suppose Fiona is able to choose insurance with any coverage z E [0, 1] (i.e. 0 < z < 1). If she buys insurance
coverage at level z, she will get reimbursed z· 280, 000 if the loss occurs. Insurance coverage at level z costs
Co + z· C1
if
z > 0
C(2) =
if
z = 0
4. Suppose co
0 and ci =
70, 000. Is insurance at coverage level z > 0 fair insurance? What coverage
level z* would Fiona choose? Explain.
5. Suppose co =
100 and c1
70, 000. Is insurance at coverage level z > 0 fair insurance? What coverage
level z** would Fiona choose? Explain. (Note that co
100 is an "avoidable fixed cost" which is only
paid if she chooses strictly positive insurance coverage. However, the "marginal cost" of additional
insurance, c1 = 70,000, is the same as in the previous part.)
6. Suppose co =
100 and ci =
72, 000. Is full insurance, that is, coverage level z =
1 optimal? Explain.
Transcribed Image Text:Exercise 4: Insurance Fiona has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(x) = VT and initial wealth 640, 000. She faces a 25% chance of losing L = 280, 000. 1. Is Fiona risk averse? 2. What is Fiona's utility if no loss occurs, what is her utility if the loss occurs? What is Fiona's expected utility? 3. What is the cost of fair insurance against the possible loss? Suppose Fiona is able to choose insurance with any coverage z E [0, 1] (i.e. 0 < z < 1). If she buys insurance coverage at level z, she will get reimbursed z· 280, 000 if the loss occurs. Insurance coverage at level z costs Co + z· C1 if z > 0 C(2) = if z = 0 4. Suppose co 0 and ci = 70, 000. Is insurance at coverage level z > 0 fair insurance? What coverage level z* would Fiona choose? Explain. 5. Suppose co = 100 and c1 70, 000. Is insurance at coverage level z > 0 fair insurance? What coverage level z** would Fiona choose? Explain. (Note that co 100 is an "avoidable fixed cost" which is only paid if she chooses strictly positive insurance coverage. However, the "marginal cost" of additional insurance, c1 = 70,000, is the same as in the previous part.) 6. Suppose co = 100 and ci = 72, 000. Is full insurance, that is, coverage level z = 1 optimal? Explain.
Expert Solution
Step 1

4.  For any z>0, the cost of insurance is C(z)=70000z

The expected value of payout is given by

P(loss)*Payout=0.25*280000z=70000z=C(z)

Hence the insurance is fair.

Fiona maximizes her expected utility given by,

EU=0.75*640000-70000z+0.25*(280000z+360000-70000z), w.r.t. zFirst order condition0.75*-700002640000-70000z+0.25*2100002(280000z+360000-70000z)=0z=1

Hence she will fully insure.

 

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