Use the following setting for questions 4-8. Consider the following static Prisoner's Dilemma game. C D C 2,2-3, 3 D 3, -3 1, 1 For the following parts, suppose this game is played for infinitely many times with discount factor for both players & € [0, 1). Suppose 8 = 0. What is the maximum equilibrium payoff that player 1 can get in the first period in a SPNE of this game? (a) -3 (b) 0 (c) 1 (d) 2 (e) 3 Let both players adopt the following grim trigger strategy: start with cooperation; cooperate as long as no one has ever defected before; otherwise defect. What is the condition on 8 for this strategy profile to be a SPNE? (a) 8 >0 (b) 8 2 1/4 (c) 8 ≥ 1/3 (d) 8 > 1/2 (e) 6 ≤ 1/2
Use the following setting for questions 4-8. Consider the following static Prisoner's Dilemma game. C D C 2,2-3, 3 D 3, -3 1, 1 For the following parts, suppose this game is played for infinitely many times with discount factor for both players & € [0, 1). Suppose 8 = 0. What is the maximum equilibrium payoff that player 1 can get in the first period in a SPNE of this game? (a) -3 (b) 0 (c) 1 (d) 2 (e) 3 Let both players adopt the following grim trigger strategy: start with cooperation; cooperate as long as no one has ever defected before; otherwise defect. What is the condition on 8 for this strategy profile to be a SPNE? (a) 8 >0 (b) 8 2 1/4 (c) 8 ≥ 1/3 (d) 8 > 1/2 (e) 6 ≤ 1/2
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
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![Use the following setting for questions 4-8. Consider the following static Prisoner's Dilemma game.
C D
2, 2-3, 3
3, -3 1, 1
For the following parts, suppose this game is played for infinitely many times with discount
factor for both players & € [0, 1).
C
D
Suppose 8 = 0. What is the maximum equilibrium payoff that player 1 can get in the first
period in a SPNE of this game?
(a) -3
(b) 0
(c) 1
(d) 2
(e) 3
Let both players adopt the following grim trigger strategy: start with cooperation; cooperate
as long as no one has ever defected before; otherwise defect. What is the condition on & for
this strategy profile to be a SPNE?
(a) 8 >0
(b) 8 ≥ 1/4
(c) 8 > 1/3
(d) 8 ≥ 1/2
(e) 8 ≤ 1/2](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fdc2a1dfc-3dbf-4a9c-9ebe-e5b225f660e8%2F65c3c14d-14d1-4029-95c3-7bc0657640cf%2F4lyv6qx_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Use the following setting for questions 4-8. Consider the following static Prisoner's Dilemma game.
C D
2, 2-3, 3
3, -3 1, 1
For the following parts, suppose this game is played for infinitely many times with discount
factor for both players & € [0, 1).
C
D
Suppose 8 = 0. What is the maximum equilibrium payoff that player 1 can get in the first
period in a SPNE of this game?
(a) -3
(b) 0
(c) 1
(d) 2
(e) 3
Let both players adopt the following grim trigger strategy: start with cooperation; cooperate
as long as no one has ever defected before; otherwise defect. What is the condition on & for
this strategy profile to be a SPNE?
(a) 8 >0
(b) 8 ≥ 1/4
(c) 8 > 1/3
(d) 8 ≥ 1/2
(e) 8 ≤ 1/2
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