2. Consider a two-player non-zero-sum game with payoff matrix given by(3, 4) (1,1)(-1,2) (7,3)(a) Determine the safety values for each of the players.(b) Now suppose that the players choose to collaborate in the given game.Sketch the payoff polygon, and show clearly the location of the statusquo point and the negotiation set.(c) Determine the Nash bargaining solution for the given game.

A payoff speaks to the result or remunerates that a player gets based on the combination of…

Answered: payoff matrix

Business

Economics

payoff matrix

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

A B C
What is a payoff matrix?
What term refers to the optimal action that a player can take, regardless of the opponents' actions? Oa Nash strategy a payoff strategy a cooperative strategy a dominant strategy
First Mover Advantage Read the overview below and complete the activities that follow. When to make a strategic move is often as crucial as what move to make. Timing is especially important when first-mover advantages and disadvantages exist. Under certain conditions, being first to initiate a strategic move can have a high payoff in the form of a competitive advantage that later movers cannot dislodge. Moving first is no guarantee of success, however, since first movers also face some significant disadvantages. Indeed, there are circumstances in which it is more advantageous to be a fast follower or even a late mover. Because the timing of strategic moves can be consequential, it is important for company strategists to be aware of the nature of first-mover advantages and disadvantages and the conditions favoring each type of move. The goal of this exercise is for you to understand when being a first mover, a fast follower, or a late mover is most advantageous. Companies…
Tinky Winky and Dipsy both choose to play an action, and the payoff from that choice is dependent on what the other player chooses. Both players choose their actions simultaneously and reveal their choice to each other at the same time. Tinky-Winky Jump Punch Tinky-Winky gets payoff Tinky-Winky gets payoff Kick Dipsy Dipsy gets payoff Dipsy gets payoff Tinky-Winky gets payoff Tinky-Winky gets payoff Duck 4. Dipsy gets Dipsy gets payoff payoff 10 Which of the following statements is true? O This game does not have any Nash equilibria. O There is more than one Nash equilibrium in this game. O The only Nash equilibrium of this game is Dipsy playing "Kick" and Tinky-Winky playing "Jump" O The only Nash equilibrium of this game is Dipsy playing "Duck" and Tinky-Winky playing "Punch O The only Nash equilibrium of this game is Dipsy playing "Kick" and Tinky-Winky playing "Punch" O The only Nash equilibrium of this game is Dipsy playing "Duck" and Tinky-Winky playing "Jump"
Consider the payoff matrix listed below: IS |1, -1 3, 0 |2, 1 0, 3 1, 2 |0, 0 3, 1 5, 3 2, 1 What is the Nash Equilibium of the game? a. (B, R) b. (U, Q) c. (B, S) d. (C, Q) M/2/6
Economics Two players are bargaining over a three period bargaining model as discussed in class with player 1 making offers in rounds 1 and 3. Player 2 makes an offer in round 2 only. Each player has a common discount factor delta. The two players are bargaining to split $20. They have three time periods available to them for their bargaining game. At the end of round 3, if no agreement has been reached then player 1 receives $2 and player 2 receives $1 and the rest of the money is destroyed. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in the finite horizon model in which the game ends after period 3.
Your teacher in Principle of Finance class told you that there will be no averaging of the grades or curve grading. It means that students will get the marks they received and there is no adjustment. This also means that every student has a possibility to get A grade because your grade does not depend on the performance of your classfellows. Therefore, Zainab decided to study 3 hours every day regardless of what your classfellows are doing. In the language of game theory what kind of strategy she is using. Please explain your answer.
6) You have been assigned to create a new TV game show, and you have an interesting idea that you call, “I WANT TO BE A MILLIONAIRE.” The basics are: 1) two contestants; 2) the show begins with each contestant being given $1 million (!); and then 3) they begin playing a game that can increase or decrease that $1 million. You worry that the initial outlay of $2 million will stun your producers, so you decide to prepare them with a simpler version of your game that you call: “I WANT $3.” There are four steps in this simpler game: There are two contestants/opponents (who do not know each other and cannot communicate with each other during the game). Each player is given $3 at the start of the game. Independently and simultaneously, each player must choose whether they want to add $0, $1, $2 or $3 to their initial stake of $3. Doing so reduces their opponent’s award by $0, $2, $4, or $6, respectively. Each player knows that their payoff at the end of the game is based on their initial…
Megan and Martha own competing hair salons that are in the same neighborhood. They are both considering offering their clients discounts in order to increase business. The payoff matrix shows their yearly incomes in thousands of dollars if they offer and do not offer discounts to their customers. Martha Megan Discount No Discount Discount $50, $75 $75, $60 No Discount $35, $90 $70, $85 If both Megan and Martha did not discount, what would each earn in yearly income? Megan would earn $50,000; Martha would earn $75,000. Megan would earn $75,000; Martha would earn $60,000. Megan would earn $35,000; Martha would earn $90,000. Megan would earn $70,000; Martha would earn $85,000. Megan would earn $35,000; Martha would earn $85,000.
Two discount stores (Megastore and Superstore) are interested in expanding their market share through advertising. The table below depicts the strategic outcomes (profits) of both stores with and without advertising. Superstore - Advertise Superstore - Don't Advertise Megastore - Advertise $95, $80 $305, $55 Megastore - Don't Advertise $65, $285 $165, $115 When the game does reach Nash Equilibrium, the payoffs for both stores will be a) Megastore $95 and Superstore $80 b) Megastore $305 and Superstore $55 c) Megastore $65 and Superstore $285 d) Megastore $165 and Superstore $115
Analyze the following game. Create payoff bimatrices consistent with the information given. Explain your choices. Then find the maximin moves, all dominated strategies for all players. Game: Adam, Bill, and Cindy are registering for a foreign language class independently and simultaneously. The available classes are ITA100 and FRE100. They d not care much which, but they care with whom they share the class. Bill and Cindy want to be in the same class, but want to avoid Adam. Adam wants to be in the same class as Bill or Cindy, or even better, both.