Finu all ue purt"3truto5Ja fair mechanism for allocating cookies? Explain why or why not.U13. (Optional) Construct the payoff matrix for your own two-player gamethat satisfies the following requirements. First, each player should havethree strategies. Second, the game should not have any dominant strat-egies. Third, the game should not be solvable using minimax. Fourth.should have exactly two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Provideyour game matrix, and then demonstrate that all of the above conditionsthegameare true.

Given information 2 players Each player has 3 strategy There should not be saddle point solution

(Optional) Construct the payoff matrix for your that satisfies the following requirements. First, e= three strategies. Second, the game should not ha egies. Third, the game should not be solvable u the game should have exactly two pure-strategy your game matrix, and then demonstrate that all are true.

(Optional) Construct the payoff matrix for your that satisfies the following requirements. First, e= three strategies. Second, the game should not ha egies. Third, the game should not be solvable u the game should have exactly two pure-strategy your game matrix, and then demonstrate that all are true.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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