2 questions refer to the games above. (Fun fact, as an aside: the payoffs reflect the frequencies of the letter pairs formed by the names of the strategies in the English language, per 10,000 words.) iiiRow PlayerO ORow PlayerECONGON4,92106, 60G15, 280,27, 2392,4Column PlayerA24, 1816, 1Column PlayerA110,031, 3316,140, 181M47, 680,148, 297,2S9,428, 57R169, 13311, 1084, 553, 16H35, 111, 49In game ii, strategy C is dominated for Row by strategy...O E.Oo.ON.O and N, when they are mixed so that each is played with probability 1/2.In game ii, strategies G and M are dominated for Column by strategy...O A only.O R only.O S only.OR or S.S115, 741, 1728, 5733, 10

Method of iterated elimination of dominated strategy. Sometimes we can get Nash equilibrium by the…

Row Player E C O N G 15, 28 0,2 7,23 92,4 Column Player A 110,0 31, 33 16, 1 40, 181 M 47,68 0, 1 48, 29 7,2 R 169, 133 11, 10 84, 55 3, 16 S 115, 74 1, 17 28, 57 33, 10 In game ii, strategy C is dominated for Row by strategy... E. O. N. O and N, when they are mixed so that each is played with probability 1/2. In game ii, strategies G and M are dominated for Column by strategy... A only. R only. S only. R or S.

Row Player E C O N G 15, 28 0,2 7,23 92,4 Column Player A 110,0 31, 33 16, 1 40, 181 M 47,68 0, 1 48, 29 7,2 R 169, 133 11, 10 84, 55 3, 16 S 115, 74 1, 17 28, 57 33, 10 In game ii, strategy C is dominated for Row by strategy... E. O. N. O and N, when they are mixed so that each is played with probability 1/2. In game ii, strategies G and M are dominated for Column by strategy... A only. R only. S only. R or S.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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QUESTION 1 We have two auto manufacturers, Tudor (initial monopolist) and Fordor (potential entrant). Tudor might try to use its price in the first stage of the game as a signal of its cost. Fordor's initial belief is that the probability of facing a low-cost Tudor is 40% and this matches the probability with which Tudor has the lower cost. The entry game between automakers is illustrated in the following game tree (The first number at each terminal node is Tudor's payoff): NATURE Tudor's cost low (Prob. 0.4) TUDOR Tudor's cost high (Prob. 0.6) TUDOR FORDOR Price low TUDOR FORDOR Price low Price high FORDOR In Bluff (LL) Out In Out In Out 100+69, 11-40 Honest (LH) 100+ 100,0 0+3,45-40 25+25,0 Converting the sequential game to a bimatrix form, fill in the blanks. 0+25,0 25+3,45-40 FORDOR Regardless (II) Conditional (OI)
Q-2. In order to fight for market share, two companies A and B each have the following strategies, company A has 4 strategies, namely Newspapers, Radio, TV and Social Media, while B has 3 strategies, namely Newspapers, Radio and TV. (percentage of market share.%) are as follows: Matriks Payoff: Asked: i A Koran Radio TV Sosmed B Koran Radio TV -2 1 2 3 -1 -2 -1 1 3 1 2 4 a. Does the game have a Saddle point? b. If not, determine Optimal strategy A and B
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