In the Nash equilibrium of a Cournot game with two firms who have identical marginal costs, each firm chooses to produce half of the quantity that would be produced by a monopolist, given the same aggregate demand and marginal cost.(a) True. (b) False.
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In the Nash equilibrium of a Cournot game with two firms who have identical marginal costs, each firm chooses to produce half of the quantity that would be produced by a monopolist, given the same aggregate
(a) True. (b) False.
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- Two organic emu ranchers, Bill and Ted, serve a small metropolitan market. Bill and Ted are Cournot competitors, making a conscious decision each year regarding how many emus to breed. The price they can charge depends on how many emus they collectively raise, and demand in this market is given by Q = 150 – P. Bill raises emus at a constant marginal and average total cost of $10; Ted raises emus at a constant marginal and average total cost of $20. Find the Cournot equilibrium price, quantity, profits, and consumer surplus. Suppose that Bill and Ted merge, and become a monopoly provider of emus. Further, suppose that Ted adopts Bill’s production techniques. Find the monopoly price, quantity, profits, and consumer surplus. Suppose that instead of merging, Bill considers buying Ted’s operation for cash. How much should Bill be willing to offer Ted to purchase his emu ranch? (Assume that the combined firms are only going to operate for one period.) Has the combination of the two…Most countries today have subsidised the provision of education. Consider an imaginary country, Gondolin. Gondolin pays a subsidy of $10 000 per year to each student enrolled in tertiary education.(a) Depict, with the help of a figure, the initial market for tertiary education in Gondolin, assume that: 1) education was left to the competitive free market; 2) the marginal private benefit is equal to the marginal social benefit; 3) the marginal private cost is equal to the marginal social cost. Now describe, using the help of the figure, the effect of the government subsidy on the price and quantity traded of tertiary education, where the X axis of the figure should be the quantity of students enrolled in tertiary education. You do not need to use actual numbers – focus on the direction of change in price and quantity traded caused by the subsidy.(b) Identify the area of the figure you drew in (a) that depicts the total size of the subsidy paid by the government to the students enrolled…Two firms are engaged in Cournot (simultaneous quantity) competition. Market-level inverse demand is given by P = 160 − 4Q Firm 1 has constant marginal costs of MC1 = 8, while Firm 2 has constant marginal costs of MC2 = 24. 1) Does there exist a low enough positive marginal cost for firm 1 such that firm 1 acts like a monopoly in this market, if so what is the MC if not why?
- Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The demand they face is P = 100-2Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q)= 40. In equilibrium, the deadweight loss is Multiple Choice $256. $512 $128 5394The demand function in a duopoly market is P(Q) = 300-0.3Q, where P is the price and Q is the total quantity demanded. Both companies have the same constant marginal cost, What is the deadweight loss if both companies maximize their profits and they are not allowed to cooperate? (MR is not MC since its not monopoly)Consider a game where a potential market Entrant is trying to decide whether or not to enter the market. An Incumbent monopolist is established and can choose to cut the price, maintain the price, or raise the price in hopes of deterring the Entrant from entering. Incumbent Entrant Enter Stay Out Cut Price -4,4 0,9 Maintain Price 4,6 0,12 Raise Price 5,5 0, 13 a) Suppose the Entrant and the Incumbent make their decisions simultaneously. Is there a pure strategy Nash equilibrium? If so, what is it? b) Suppose the players move sequentially, and that the Entrant moves first. Set up the game tree and solve for the equilibrium path. Can the Incumbent deter entry? Explain. c) Now suppose that the Incumbent moves first. Again, set up the game tree. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome now? Can the Incumbent deter entry now?
- Imagine any market divided by 2 Cournot oligopolists who have identical costs Marginal cost = Average cost = 200. About this market, ask yourself: a) If the demand curve for this market is given by Q = 1250 - 2.5P, where Q is the total quantity demanded in the market and P is the selling price, both given in units, what is the reaction curve of the oligopolists? b) What will be the quantity produced and the selling price of the oligopolists? c) A strategist considers that a good marketing campaign would be able to expand the Demand of this market to Q = 1,500 - 2.5P and that in this way, oligopolists could produce the same amount and make significantly greater profits. Such a campaign would generate a reduction in profits in the order of 70,000. Is it worth making this investment in marketing?All question are with regards to the following set up. There are two firms A and B. Firms compete in a Cournot Duopoly in Karhide. They set quantities qa and qB. Inverse demand is P(qA + qB) = 18 – qA – qB and costs are C(q) (in Karhide,) and firm A is a foreign firm (from Orgoreyn.) The government of Karhide engages in a strategic trade intervention by giving firm B a per unit subsidy of s. (That is, when firm B produces and sells qB units, firm B receives a payment of s * qB from the government.) You must show your work at each step, unless the questions is followed by "No work required." 3 * q for both firms. Firm B is a domestic firm (4) We now consider the government’s choice of s≥0. We can see from above thatprofits and outputs depend upon s. With that in mind, let πB(s) and qB(s) denote firm B’s profit and output as a function of the subsidy s. Let qA(s) denote firm A’s equilibrium output as a function of s. Let G(s) = πB(s) − s*qB(s) denote the government’s objective…QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)
- 40 36 32 28 24 20 16 12 8 47 0 P 4 Firm in oligopoly market MC 2 MR MC 1 D 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 40. Assuming MC2 to be the true marginal cost curve for this oligopoly firm, what price will this firm charge? (a) $8 Ⓒ (b) $12 (c) $15 (d) $20 QSuppose that two firms produce a particular (homogeneous) product. The inverse demand function for the product is P = 100 -Q. The firms have marginal cost equal to 10. (a) Derive the Cournot Nash equilibrium quantities, and the corresponding price and profits. Show all work. (b) Suppose that the current price is the Cournot price you derived in part (a). Using the hypothetical monopolist test and assuming a 5% threshold for the test, does the good in question represent an antitrust market? Show all work and explain your answer. There are different ways to answer this question and any correct approach will be accepted. (c) Suppose more generally that marginal cost is equal to c. For what values of c will this product represent an antitrust market? Show your work and explain your answer. Maximum size for new files: 400MB FilesTwo firms are engaged in duopoly competition in a market with demand Q = 120 - p and zero costs. The reaction function for firm i given firm j's output q i = 60 - 1 2 q j . What is the payoff to firm i if the two firms engaged in collusion to maintain monopoly output and prices. Assume that each firm gets half the monopoly profit.