uppose two Bertrand competitors, F1 and F2, make identical products for a market with inverse demand P = 600 – 0.5Q. Both firms have the same costs Ci = 20qi, and each firm has sufficient capacity to supply the entire market. a. What prices will the firms choose? How much might each produce and what profit would they make? Is the result a Nash equilibrium? Explain. b. Suppose F1 improves its efficiency, reducing its cost to C1 = 16q1. What will happen in this market? Explain.
Suppose two Bertrand competitors, F1 and F2, make identical products for a market with inverse
a. What prices will the firms choose? How much might each produce and what profit would they make? Is the result a Nash equilibrium? Explain.
b. Suppose F1 improves its efficiency, reducing its cost to C1 = 16q1. What will happen in this market? Explain.
c. Assume now that the firms have their original identical costs, but that F1 has only 100 units of capacity and F2 has only 200 units of capacity. What prices will the firms choose now? Explain why neither firm will want to decrease its
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