2) An industry consists of three firms with identical total cost functions C(q) = 20q+q². Market demand is Q(P) = 140 - P. a) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity, price and profits for this industry. b) Suppose a monopolist controlled the three firms. What would its cost function be? c) What would be this monopolist's quantity, price and profits?

2) An industry consists of three firms with identical total cost functions C(q) = 20q+q². Market demand is Q(P) = 140 - P. a) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity, price and profits for this industry. b) Suppose a monopolist controlled the three firms. What would its cost function be? c) What would be this monopolist's quantity, price and profits?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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