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You are a duopolist producer of a homogeneous good. Both you and your competitor have zero marginal costs. The market demand curve is P=24-Q where Q=Q₁ +Q₂ Q₁ is your output and Q₂ is your competitor's output. Your competitor has also read this book. Total revenue (TR) for your firm will be and total revenue for your competitor's firm will be In turn, marginal revenue (MR) for your firm will be and marginal revenue for your competitor's firm will be TR₁ = (24-Q₁-Q₂)Q₁ TR₂=(24-Q₁-Q₂)Q₂. MR₁ = 24-2Q₁-Q₂ MR₂ = 24-Q₁-2Q₂.

You are a duopolist producer of a homogeneous good. Both you and your competitor have zero marginal costs. The market demand curve is P=24-Q where Q=Q₁ +Q₂ Q₁ is your output and Q₂ is your competitor's output. Your competitor has also read this book. Total revenue (TR) for your firm will be and total revenue for your competitor's firm will be In turn, marginal revenue (MR) for your firm will be and marginal revenue for your competitor's firm will be TR₁ = (24-Q₁-Q₂)Q₁ TR₂=(24-Q₁-Q₂)Q₂. MR₁ = 24-2Q₁-Q₂ MR₂ = 24-Q₁-2Q₂.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Is announcing first an advantage or a disadvantage? Explain briefly. It is an advantage to move ⒸA. second because profit when moving second is higher than profit when moving first. O B. first because cost when moving first is lower than the cost when moving second. O C. first because the price when moving first is higher than the price when moving second. O D. first because profit when moving first is higher than profit when moving second. O E. second because the firm that moves second produces more output. How much would you pay for the option of announcing either first or second? You would be willing to pay for the option of moving first instead of second. Suppose instead that you are to play the first round of a series of 10 rounds (with the same competitor). In each round, you and your competitor announce your output at the same time. You want to maximize the sum of your profits over the 10 rounds. How much will you produce in the first round? How much do you produce in the tenth round? In the ninth round? Explain briefly. If you play a series of 10 rounds of this game with the same competitor, then you should O A. produce 12.00 units of output in each round because collusion is not possible in finite games. O B. produce 8.00 units of output in each round because collusion is not possible in finite games. O C. produce 6.00 units of output in the first round and 8.00 units of output in the last nine rounds because collusion is only possible in the first period. O D. produce 6.00 units of output in each round because collusion is not possible in finite games. O E. produce 6.00 units of output in each of the first nine rounds and 8.00 units of output in the tenth round because collusion is not possible in the last period. Once again you will play a series of 10 rounds. This time, however, in each round your competitor will announce its output before you announce yours. How will your answers change? If you play a series of 10 rounds of this game with your competitor moving first, then you should O A. behave irrationally by producing 12.00 units after your competitor produces 12.00 units until both you and your competitor instead produce 8.00 units of output. O B. behave irrationally by producing 8.00 units after your competitor produces 12.00 units until both you and your competitor instead produce 8.00 units of output. O C. produce 12.00 units of output in each period and your competitor should produce 6.00 units of output in each period. O D. produce 6.00 units of output in each period and your competitor should produce 12.00 units of output in each period. O E. produce 6.00 units of output in each period and your competitor should produce 8.00 units of output in each period.
Transcribed Image Text:Is announcing first an advantage or a disadvantage? Explain briefly. It is an advantage to move ⒸA. second because profit when moving second is higher than profit when moving first. O B. first because cost when moving first is lower than the cost when moving second. O C. first because the price when moving first is higher than the price when moving second. O D. first because profit when moving first is higher than profit when moving second. O E. second because the firm that moves second produces more output. How much would you pay for the option of announcing either first or second? You would be willing to pay for the option of moving first instead of second. Suppose instead that you are to play the first round of a series of 10 rounds (with the same competitor). In each round, you and your competitor announce your output at the same time. You want to maximize the sum of your profits over the 10 rounds. How much will you produce in the first round? How much do you produce in the tenth round? In the ninth round? Explain briefly. If you play a series of 10 rounds of this game with the same competitor, then you should O A. produce 12.00 units of output in each round because collusion is not possible in finite games. O B. produce 8.00 units of output in each round because collusion is not possible in finite games. O C. produce 6.00 units of output in the first round and 8.00 units of output in the last nine rounds because collusion is only possible in the first period. O D. produce 6.00 units of output in each round because collusion is not possible in finite games. O E. produce 6.00 units of output in each of the first nine rounds and 8.00 units of output in the tenth round because collusion is not possible in the last period. Once again you will play a series of 10 rounds. This time, however, in each round your competitor will announce its output before you announce yours. How will your answers change? If you play a series of 10 rounds of this game with your competitor moving first, then you should O A. behave irrationally by producing 12.00 units after your competitor produces 12.00 units until both you and your competitor instead produce 8.00 units of output. O B. behave irrationally by producing 8.00 units after your competitor produces 12.00 units until both you and your competitor instead produce 8.00 units of output. O C. produce 12.00 units of output in each period and your competitor should produce 6.00 units of output in each period. O D. produce 6.00 units of output in each period and your competitor should produce 12.00 units of output in each period. O E. produce 6.00 units of output in each period and your competitor should produce 8.00 units of output in each period.
You are a duopolist producer of a homogeneous good. Both you and your competitor have zero marginal costs. The market demand curve is P=24-Q where Q=Q₁ +Q₂. Q₁ is your output and Q₂ is your competitor's output. Your competitor has also read this book. Total revenue (TR) for your firm will be and total revenue for your competitor's firm will be In turn, marginal revenue (MR) for your firm will be and marginal revenue for your competitor's firm will be TR₁ = (24-Q₁-Q₂)Q₁ minus TR₂ = (24-Q₁-Q₂) Q₂. MR₁ = 24-2Q₁-Q₂ MR₂ = 24-Q₁-2Q₂- Suppose you will play this game only once. If you and your competitor must announce your outputs at the same time, how much will you choose to produce? (Enter all numeric responses rounded to two decimal places.) You will produce units of output. What do you expect your profit to be? Explain. Profit will be $, from Suppose you are told that you must announce your output before your competitor does. How much will you produce in this case, and how much do you think your competitor will produce? You will produce units of output and your competitor will produce units of output. What do you expect your profit to be? Profit for your firm should be $
Transcribed Image Text:You are a duopolist producer of a homogeneous good. Both you and your competitor have zero marginal costs. The market demand curve is P=24-Q where Q=Q₁ +Q₂. Q₁ is your output and Q₂ is your competitor's output. Your competitor has also read this book. Total revenue (TR) for your firm will be and total revenue for your competitor's firm will be In turn, marginal revenue (MR) for your firm will be and marginal revenue for your competitor's firm will be TR₁ = (24-Q₁-Q₂)Q₁ minus TR₂ = (24-Q₁-Q₂) Q₂. MR₁ = 24-2Q₁-Q₂ MR₂ = 24-Q₁-2Q₂- Suppose you will play this game only once. If you and your competitor must announce your outputs at the same time, how much will you choose to produce? (Enter all numeric responses rounded to two decimal places.) You will produce units of output. What do you expect your profit to be? Explain. Profit will be $, from Suppose you are told that you must announce your output before your competitor does. How much will you produce in this case, and how much do you think your competitor will produce? You will produce units of output and your competitor will produce units of output. What do you expect your profit to be? Profit for your firm should be $
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