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Consider a Bertrand duopoly. Market demand is P(Q)=41-3Q, and each firm faces a marginal cost of $4 per unit. How much is the sum of firms' total revenue in the Nash equilibrium?
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- SUB-SECTION B2 13 Electra and Luminux are the only two firms who provide electricity in a local market as a Cournot duopoly. The electricity provided by the two firms is identical and consumers are indifferent about which firm they will purchase electricity from. The market inverse demand for electricity is P = 100 - 2Q, where is the aggregate quantity of electricity produced by the two firms, qe qL. Electra has a marginal cost of 12, while Luminux has a marginal cost of 20. Assume that neither firm has any fixed costs. (a) Determine each firm's reaction curve and graph it. How much electricity will each firm produce in a Cournot equilib- rium? (c) What will the market price for electricity be? How much profit does each firm make? (e) Suppose now that the two firms move sequentially with one of them acting as a Stackelberg leader. Do you expect the outcome to the closer to perfect competition when Electra, or when Luminux, moves first? Explain your answer.Question 2 Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb=268-10Qb. The marginal cost for firm 1 is given by mc1= 6Q The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2=4Q (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $102 and firm 2 had a fixed cost of $104 What are the profits of firm 2? (hint 567.26) How much consumer surplus is created by industry transactions? (hint 1333.34) Full explain this question and text typing work only We should answer our question within 2 hours takes more time then we will reduce Rating Dont ignore this line ...Consider a market with two firms. Call them firm 1 and firm 2. The demand function describing the market is P = 216 – 0.4Q. Firms are initially identical, with the cost function C(q) = 140 + 40q. Calculate the total profits in the market. Under what conditions, the two firms may succeed to collude? How much would each firm earn if they could collude?
- The market demand function is Q=10,000-1,000p. Each firm has a marginal cost of m=$0.28. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. Compare your solution to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are: q1=___________ units and q2=____________units The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is: p=$_____________ Profits for the firms are profit1=$_______________ and profit2=$_______________ The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities are: q1=______________units and q2=______________units The Cournot-Nash equilibrium price is: p=$______________ Profits for the firms are profit1=$_____________ and profit2=$_______________The diagram below shows the demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost of a monopolist. 120 110- 100- 90- A 80- 70 60- 50- 40- 30- 20 10 O @_ 0 1 2 3 16 4 Profit-maximizing output: Profit-maximizing price: $ 5 7 units MR 6 MC T 7 8 a. What price and output would prevail if this firm's product was sold by price-taking firms in a perfectly competitive market? 9 Quantity D T 10 11 (11, 0) 14 15 b. Determine the profit-maximizing output and price for the monoplist. Price: $ 68 Output: 5 units c. Calculate the deadweight loss of this monopoly.QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)
- Consider two firms choosing quantities sequentially in a duopoly setting (i.e. the Stackelberg game). The two firms have identical products. Each firm has no fixed costs, and faces marginal costs equal to 5 plus the quantity it produces (i.e. MC = 5 + q). Market demand is given by Q = 46 - P, where Q is market quantity and P is market price. In equilibrium, how much will the firm that moves first produce?I have constructed a Bertrand game (competition in prices) and presented you with the reaction functions of each firm. P2 P1 = 12.5 + 4 P1 P2 == Use excel to draw the reaction functions. Solve for the Nash equilibrium + n INConsider a Bertrand oligopoly where two firms (Firms 1 and 2) sell goods that are imperfectsubstitutes and compete by choosing prices simultaneously. Their market demands areq!= 1,200 − 3/2p!+ 3/2p", q"= 800 − 2p"+ 1/2p!For simplicity, assume the marginal cost is zero for both firms (MC!= MC"= 0). Find the bestresponse curve of each firm. Which of the following alternatives is correct?(a) Firm 1’s best response curve is p!= 400 + 0.5p"(b) Firm 2’s best response curve is p"= 400 + 0.5p!(c) Firm 1’s best response curve is q!= 45 − 0.5q"(d) Firm 2’s best response curve is q"= 200 + 0.8p! Then, find the optimal price and quantity of each firm.Hint: Start by finding the Nash equilibrium, that is, the combination of mutual best responses.Which of the following alternatives is correct?(a) For firm 1, p!= $1,600/3 and q!= 800/3(b) For firm 1, p!= $800 and q!= 1,600/3(c) For firm 2, p"= $800 3⁄ and q"= 1,600/3(d) For firm 2, p"= $1,600 and q"= 800 key: !=1 "=2
- Consider a Bertrand duopoly where market demand is P(Q)=107-5Q. Each firm faces a marginal cost $18 and no fixed cost. what is one market price that can occur in a Nash equilibrium?Consider a Bertrand game between two firms. The demand for firm 1's product is given by q1 = 100 - 3p1 + 2p2. The demand for firm 2's product is given by q2 100- 3p2 +2p1. In terms of notation, p1 is the price of firm 1's product and pa is the price of firm 2's product. The two firms choose their prices simultaneously. For your calculations below, assume zero costs and that prices are measured in dollars per unit. Find the equilibrium prices. as b Derive the firms' best-response functions and explain whether the prices are strategic substitutes or complements in this game.Problem 5.1. The inverse market demand for printer paper is given by P = 400 – 2Q. There are two firms who compete to produce this paper, each with a marginal cost of production equal to c = 40 over a large range of output (ie, assume constant marginal cost). The two firms compete in quantities, in other words they each simultaneously choose a quantity to produce (Cournot competition). Derive the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this game. Please write final answers in the boxes, showing work in blank areas. (a) The reaction function for each firm. 91 (92): 92 (91) (b) Optimal output q for each firm. 92 = р = = π1 = (c) Market price (from demand curve). (d) Firm profits. 92 = π2 =