In order to evaluate the relative advantages of taxes or emissions standards in the face of asymmetric information, suppose that the regulator has an imperfect estimate but cannot exactly observe the firm's abatement cost. More precisely, suppose that the marginal abatement cost estimated by the government is MCA = 2A but the actual marginal cost is MCA = 2A+10. Moreover, suppose that the marginal benefit of abatement MBA is known by the government. Consider the following two extreme scenarios: (i) MBA is vertical at A = 30 and (ii) MBA = 60 at every A (so it is horizontal at 60). For each one of these cases, obtain the Pigouvian Tax t⁰ and the Emissions Standard A⁰ that the government would impose based on estimated abatement costs, provide graphical representations, and calculate respective deadweight losses. Can you intuitively draw some conclusion about the type of industries in which taxes are preferred to standards and vice versa.
In order to evaluate the relative advantages of taxes or emissions standards in the face of asymmetric information, suppose that the regulator has an imperfect estimate but cannot exactly observe the firm's abatement cost. More precisely, suppose that the marginal abatement cost estimated by the government is MCA = 2A but the actual marginal cost is MCA = 2A+10. Moreover, suppose that the marginal benefit of abatement MBA is known by the government. Consider the following two extreme scenarios: (i) MBA is vertical at A = 30 and (ii) MBA = 60 at every A (so it is horizontal at 60). For each one of these cases, obtain the Pigouvian Tax t⁰ and the Emissions Standard A⁰ that the government would impose based on estimated abatement costs, provide graphical representations, and calculate respective deadweight losses. Can you intuitively draw some conclusion about the type of industries in which taxes are preferred to standards and vice versa.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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- In order to evaluate the relative advantages of taxes or emissions standards in the face of asymmetric information, suppose that the regulator has an imperfect estimate but cannot exactly observe the firm's abatement cost. More precisely, suppose that the marginal abatement cost estimated by the government is MCA = 2A but the actual marginal cost is MCA = 2A+10. Moreover, suppose that the marginal benefit of abatement MBA is known by the government. Consider the following two extreme scenarios: (i) MBA is vertical at A = 30 and (ii) MBA = 60 at every A (so it is horizontal at 60). For each one of these cases, obtain the Pigouvian Tax t⁰ and the Emissions Standard A⁰ that the government would impose based on estimated abatement costs, provide graphical representations, and calculate respective
deadweight losses. Can you intuitively draw some conclusion about the type of industries in which taxes are preferred to standards and vice versa.
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