As of May, 2021; 40% of the COVID-19 vaccines administered globally have gone to people in 27 wealth nations that represent only 11% of the global population. Amidst this vaccine inequality in the backdrop of the pandemic in the world, every country should have the right to make its own vaccine. That's the principle, underpinning the campaign to temporarily waive Intellectual Property (IP) protection on coronavirus vaccines. (a) Suppose the IP is waived (the know-how is available to everyone) and Bangladesh can make its own vaccine. Using the theories of demand-supply and market, discuss the impact of this scenario on the price, quantity, profit margins of the vaccine producing firms, consumers' surplus, producers' surplus in the COVID-19 vaccine market of Bangladesh. (b) Suppose the Government of Bangladesh imposes a per-unit tax on the vaccines sold by "B". Who will bear most of this tax burden and why? (c) If the IP is not waived and only one company "B" is approved for producing the vaccine in Bangladesh, how will it affect the price, quantity, and social welfare in the vaccine market?

As of May, 2021; 40% of the COVID-19 vaccines administered globally have gone to people in 27 wealth nations that represent only 11% of the global population. Amidst this vaccine inequality in the backdrop of the pandemic in the world, every country should have the right to make its own vaccine. That's the principle, underpinning the campaign to temporarily waive Intellectual Property (IP) protection on coronavirus vaccines. (a) Suppose the IP is waived (the know-how is available to everyone) and Bangladesh can make its own vaccine. Using the theories of demand-supply and market, discuss the impact of this scenario on the price, quantity, profit margins of the vaccine producing firms, consumers' surplus, producers' surplus in the COVID-19 vaccine market of Bangladesh. (b) Suppose the Government of Bangladesh imposes a per-unit tax on the vaccines sold by "B". Who will bear most of this tax burden and why? (c) If the IP is not waived and only one company "B" is approved for producing the vaccine in Bangladesh, how will it affect the price, quantity, and social welfare in the vaccine market?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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