Consumers know that some fraction x of all new cars produced and sold in the market are defective. The defective ones cannot be identified except by those who own them. Cars do not depreciate with use. Consumers are risk-neutral and value nondefective cars at $30,000 each. New cars sell for $15,000 and used ones for $7,500. (Note that since buyers are risk-neutral, the price of a new car reflects the expected value of purchasing a car that may or may not be defective.) What is the fraction x? Instructions: Enter x as number rounded to two decimal places. For example, if x = 1/3, then enter 0.33.

Consumers know that some fraction x of all new cars produced and sold in the market are defective. The defective ones cannot be identified except by those who own them. Cars do not depreciate with use. Consumers are risk-neutral and value nondefective cars at $30,000 each. New cars sell for $15,000 and used ones for $7,500. (Note that since buyers are risk-neutral, the price of a new car reflects the expected value of purchasing a car that may or may not be defective.) What is the fraction x? Instructions: Enter x as number rounded to two decimal places. For example, if x = 1/3, then enter 0.33.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6MC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

A drug dealer knows whether his supply is high quality (@ = H), mediocre (@ = M), or low quality (@ = L). He values his product at $30 if it is high quality, $20 if it is mediocre, and $10 if it is low quality. A potential buyer values the drugs at $30 + x if they are high quality, $20 + x if mediocre, and $10 + x if low quality, where 0 < x < $5. The buyer does not know the quality of the product - he only knows that each quality is equally likely : Pr(@ = H) = Pr(@ = M) = Pr(@ = L) = 1/3. The buyer offers a price p for the drugs, which the dealer can either accept or reject. Assume if the dealer is indifferent, then he accepts. 1. In equilibrium, which drug qualities are sold, and at what price? 2. Now, suppose Pr(@ = H) = Pr(@ = L) = 1/4, while Pr(@ = M) = 1/2. Find the values of x for which mediocre drugs will be sold?
You are in the market for a used 2006 Honda Accord. You know that half of the 2006 Accords are lemons and half are peaches. If you could be assured that the Accord you were buying were a peach, you would be willing to pay up to $10,000. On the other hand, you would only be willing to pay $2,000 for a lemon. You have no ability to discern whether any particular Accord is a lemon or a peach. Sellers of Accords, on the other hand, are likely to know whether their particular car is a lemon or a peach. Suppose sellers of lemons will sell their cars for $1,500 or more and peach sellers will be willing to sell their cars for $8,500 or more. Over time the price in the market for 2006 Accords will and will be traded. O A. be between $8,500 and $10,000; only peaches O B. be between $1,500 and $2,000 for lemons; only lemons OC. be between $8,500 and $10,000 for peaches and between $1,500 and $2,000 for lemons; both lemons and peaches O D. be between $1,500 and $10,000; both lemons and peaches
Juanita is deciding whether to buy a suit that she wants, as well as where to buy it. Three stores carry the same suit, but it is more convenient for Juanita to get to some stores than others. For example, she can go to her local store, located 15 minutes away from where she works, and pay a marked-up price of $129 for the suit: Store Travel Time Each Way Price of a Suit (Minutes) (Dollars per suit) Local Department Store 15 129 Across Town 30 86 Neighboring City 60 63 Juanita makes $50 an hour at work. She has to take time off work to purchase her suit, so each hour away from work costs her $50 in lost income. Assume that returning to work takes Juanita the same amount of time as getting to a store and that it takes her 30 minutes to shop. As you answer the following questions, ignore the cost of gasoline and depreciation of her car when traveling. Complete the following table by computing the opportunity cost of Juanita's time and the total…
Assume you have your car broken down just before the weekend. You value your weekend trip as much as v and if you have to stay home you get the zero utility. There are two dealerships in your town. At the beginning of the day they simultaneously choose a price for repair. Dealers know that when you come to one of them and observe the price, you can always call to another dealer to make an inquiry about his price. The call is costless. The other dealer, however, can be occupied for this day. Assume, this happens with probability a which is a common knowledge (but the dealers do not know whether the other dealer is occupied or not). Assume zero repair cost for the dealer and find a symmetric equilibrium of the game.
Firm A is planning to rollout a new nationwide wireless telephone service next month. Its potential customers are either light users or regular users and these exist in equal proportion in the population. The firm must decide between offering a plan with 300 minutes, 600 minutes, or offering both plans. Each of these options costs the firm $10 to provide, and consumers’ willingness to pay is given below: (Image Attached) Each potential customer calculates the net payoff (benefit minus price) that he would get from each of the plans and buys the plan that gives the highest net payoff, so long as the payoff is nonnegative. Assume that if both plans give an equal, non-negative payoff the customer buys the 600 minute plan. a) What prices should the firm set if it wants to offer both plans, such that light users purchase the 300 minute plan and regular users purchase the 600 minute plan? b) How much higher is a regular user’s payoff under the scenario in part (a) above than if the firm…
Please answer fast please arjent help please answer fast
Please refernece attachment. See image below.
M8
1) A key difficulty facing insurance companies is that people know more about their health than do insurance companies, and that those people who are seriously ill are the most likely to want to obtain health insurance. What is this phenomenon called? A) moral hazard B) economic irrationality C) asymmetric information D) adverse selection 2) An insurance company is likely to attract customers like Clancy who want to purchase insurance because he knows better that the company that he is more likely to make a claim on a policy. What is the term used to describe the situation above? A) moral hazard B) adverse selection C) asymmetric information D) economic irrationality 3) The term that is used to refer to a situation in which one party to an economic transaction has less information than the other party is A) inefficient market hypothesis. B) moral hazard. C) information disparity. D) asymmetric information. 4) Which of the following parties is…
Your own a chocolate producing company which can advertise on both television (T) and internet(I). The effect of TV and online commercials on sales is again given byS(T,I) = 500 + 48T−6T2+ 112I−6I2+ 4TI. You have a budget of $25 that you can spend on T and I. The price of aTV commercial is $12per unit and the price of an online commercial is also $12 per unit. 1. Determine the optimal level of TV commercials T and online commercials I if you have to spend all of your budget. You should provide two methods to solve this, by direct substitution and by setting up the Lagrangian. Is the Lagrange multiplier positive or negative? Give an intuitive interpretation of why this is the case? 2. Now determine the optimal level of TV commercials T and online commercials I if you DO NOT have to spend all of your budget. Do you obtain the same answer as subquestion 5.1? What is the Lagrange multiplier equal to in this case? Discuss.
In Hayward, there are 100 people who want to sell their used cars. The problem is that nobody except the original owners know which are which. Owners of lemons will be happy to get rid of their cars for any price greater than $200. Owners of peaches will be willing to sell them for any price greater than $1,500 but will keep them if they can't get $1,500. There are a large number of buyers who would be willing to pay $2,500 for a peach but would pay only $300 for a lemon. When these buyers are not sure of the quality of the car they buy, they are willing to pay the expected value of the car, given the knowledge they have. What is the minimum probability for a used car to be a peach such that peaches stay in the market? Ő O 0.33 0.67 0.55 0.5
14.4. ADVERTISING AND BRAND SWITCHING. Empirical evidence suggests that the proba- bility of a household switching to a different brand of breakfast cereal is increasing in the advertising intensity of that brand. However, the effect of advertising is significantly lower for households who have previously tried that brand.21 What does this suggest about the nature of advertising expenditures (persuasion vs. information)?