Complete the following sentence with all that apply:If a seller has an item with a value that varies independently and unobservably acrosspotential buyers,| first and second price auctions will produce the same expected revenue if buyersare risk neutralsecond price sealed bid auctions result in risk averse buyers revealing theirprivate valuesbuyers have the potential to earn rents from their private informationrevenues from auctions are always higher than fixed pricesealed bid auctions result in truthful revelation of values

If the seller item is variable across different buyers, then sellers would be interested to know the…

If a seller has an item with a value that varies independently and unobservably across potential buyers, first and second price auctions will produce the same expected revenue if buyers are risk neutral O second price sealed bid auctions result in risk averse buyers revealing their private values

If a seller has an item with a value that varies independently and unobservably across potential buyers, first and second price auctions will produce the same expected revenue if buyers are risk neutral O second price sealed bid auctions result in risk averse buyers revealing their private values

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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