What amount does each bidder bid in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a 2nd price auction? The expected value of the second highest bidder. One half of the expected value of the second highest bidder. Their own value. One half of their own value.

What amount does each bidder bid in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a 2nd price auction? The expected value of the second highest bidder. One half of the expected value of the second highest bidder. Their own value. One half of their own value.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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(The All-Pay Auction). The seller has an item for sale. The valuations of the bidders are independently and identically distributed on R+ with a c.d.f. F. Find the symmetric equilibrium of an auction with two bidders in which both bidders pay their own bids but only the highest bidder wins the object. Show that each bidder’s expected payment is the same in this auction and in the first-price auction.
Suppose there are two bidders for a single object. Each bidder has a value for the object, v1 and v2, which is randomly drawn uniformly from 0 to 80. (Note that this means the probability that a value is 25 or lower is 25/80, and more generally, the probability that a value is k or lower is k/80). Bidders see their own values but not the values of their rival bidders. Consider a first price sealed bid auction where the winner of the object is the bidder who submits the highest bid and pays the price that he bid. Suppose that you are bidder 1 and you believe that your rival always bids a constant fraction α of his value. (For example, if bidder 2’ value is 15, he will bid 15α.). 1. What is your expected winning probability of the auction from any given bid b1? (Hint, you win the auction when your bid amount b1 is greater than your opponent’s bid). 2. What is your expected payoff from any given bid, b1? (You need to write your answer as a function of v1, b1, and α). 3. Compute your best…
Exercise 1.8. Consider the following "third-price" auction. There are n≥ 3 bidders. A single object is auctioned and Player / values the object $v,, with V, > 0. The bids are simultaneous and secret. The utility of Player / is: 0 if she does not win and (v-p) if she wins and pays $p. Every non-negative number is an admissible bid. Let b, denote the bid of Player i. The winner is the highest bidder. In case of ties the bidder with the lowest index among those who submitted the highest bid wins (e.g. if the highest bid is $120 and it is submitted by players 6, 12 and 15, then the winner is Player 6). The losers don't get anything and don't pay anything. The winner gets the object and pays the third highest bid, which is defined as follows. Let be the winner and fix a Player j such that b₁ = max({b,,...,b,}\ {b}) [if GAME THEORY - Giacomo Bonanno 39 max({b,...,b}\{b;}) contains more than one element, then we pick one of them]. Then the third price is defined as max({b₁,...,b}\{b,,b;}).…
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Why do sellers generally prefer a Vickrey auction to a regular sealed bid if sellers don’t receive the highest bid in the Vickrey auction? Sellers only have to sell their item if the bid is the highest-price bid. The second-highest bid in a Vickrey auction is generally higher than the highest bid in a regular sealed-bid auction. The second-highest bid is about the same in both auctions. Sellers prefer the final price is not revealed to all bidders. Sellers would never prefer Vickrey auctions.
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