Bill owes Bob $36. Just before Bill pays him the money, he gives Bob the opportunity to play a dice game to potentially win more money. The rules of this game are as follows: If Bob rolls doubles (probability 1/6), Bill will pay Bob double ($72). If he misses doubles on the first try, he can try again or settle for half the money ($18). If he makes doubles on the

Bill owes Bob $36. Just before Bill pays him the money, he gives Bob the opportunity to play a dice game to potentially win more money. The rules of this game are as follows: If Bob rolls doubles (probability 1/6), Bill will pay Bob double ($72). If he misses doubles on the first try, he can try again or settle for half the money ($18). If he makes doubles on the

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

2. Kier, in The scenario, wants to determine how each of the 3 companies will decide on possible new investments. He was able to determine the new investment pay off for each of the three choices as well as the probability of the two types of market. If a company will launch product 1, it will gain 50,000 if the market is successful and lose 50,000 if the market is a failure. If a company will launch product 2, it will gain 25,000 if the market is successful and lose 25,000 if the market will fail. If a company decides not to launch any of the product, it will not be affected whether the market will succeed or fail. There is a 56% probability that the market will succeed and 44% probability that the market will fail. What will be the companies decision based on EMV? What is the decision of each company based on expected utility value?
A clothing manutacturer must decide which of two clothing lines to emphasze for the spring season, her usual line or a budget line Her success with each line depends on the sta Budget Line Usual Line Strong Economy 15,000 35,000 In-between Economy 18,000 28,000 Weak Economy 27,000 10,000 Economists believe that there is a 5% chance of a strong economy next year, a 75% chance of a weak economy, and a 20% chance of an in-between economy Use the payoff m O A. Emphasize the usual line O B. Wait and see O C. Emphasize the budget line
Tom, Mary and Jill have apartments in the same building. A security system for their building costs $750. Tom is willing to pay $100 for the security system, Mary is willing to pay $300 and Jill is willing to pay $300. They have a meeting to vote on whether to pay $250 each for the security system. At least two of them must vote for the system to be installed before the vote is passed. The efficient outcome is to have the security system installed. After the meeting the security system will, which illustrates_____________________. Question 1 options: be installed, the free rider problem not be installed, the free rider problem be installed, a negative externality not be installed, a negative externality
suppose you pay 25 dollars to enter into a raffle with a 400 dollar prize. if you have a 5% chance of winning, the expected value of winning is?
Suppose that the point spread for a particular sporting event is 10 points and that with this spread you are convinced you would have a 0.60 probability of winning a bet on your team. However, the local bookie will accept only a $1000 bet. Assuming that such bets are legal, would you bet on your team? (Disregard any commission charged by the bookie.) Remember that you must pay losses out of your own pocket. Your payoff table is as follows: STATE OF NATURE DECISION ALTERNATIVES YOU WIN YOU LOSE BET $1000 -$1000 DON’T BET $0 $0 What decision does the expected value approach recommend? What is your indifference probability for the $0 payoff? (Although this choice isn't easy, be as realistic as possible. It is required for an analysis that reflects your attitude toward risk.) What decision would you make based on the expected utility approach? In this case are you a risk taker or a risk avoider? Would other individuals assess the same…
Consider the St. Petersburg Paradox problem first discussed by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. The game consists of tossing a coin. The player gets a payoff of 2^n where n is the number of times the coin is tossed to get the first head. So, if the sequence of tosses yields TTTH, you get a payoff of 2^4 this payoff occurs with probability (1/2^4). Compute the expected value of playing this game. Next, assume that utility U is a function of wealth X given by U = X.5 and that X = $1,000,000. In this part of the question, assume that the game ends if the first head has not occurred after 40 tosses of the coin. In that case, the payoff is 240 and the game is over. What is the expected payout of this game? Finally, what is the most you would pay to play the game if you require that your expected utility after playing the game must be equal to your utility before playing the game? Use the Goal Seek function (found in Data, What-If Analysis) in Excel.
Question D2. An Aggressor country is threatening to attack another victim country. The victim country has allies who will come to their defence if they are attacked, however, the amount of troops the ally sends can be either small or large. The victim knows how many troops will be sent but the aggressor does not, the aggressor believes the probability the force is large is p. The game faced by the countries is depicted below. Victim "Large force" Defend Capitulate Aggressor Attack (-50,-20) (100,-50) Don't Attack (0,-10) (0,0) Victim "Small force" Defend Capitulate Aggressor Attack (50,-80) (100,-50) Don't Attack (0,-10) (0,0) a) Define what it means for a game to have incomplete information and explain how a game with unknown payoffs can be thought of as such a game. b) Write down a combined payoff matrix that includes strategies for the victim that are conditional on their type and use this to work out the Bayesian-Nash Equilibria for this game.
Player 2 Y1 1,4 3,5 5,3 X1 Y2 Y3 Player 1 8,4 7,4 6,2 X2 4,5 3,5 2,2 X3 For the game given above, ((p1.p2,p3).(q1.q2.q3) is a mixed strategy: The first triplet is Player 1's probability allocations to X1, X2. X3. The second triplet is Player 2's probability allocations to Y1, Y2. Y3. Which of the following is true? O a. There are only pure NEs in this game O b. ((p1,p2.p3).(q1.q2.q3))- ((1/3,1/3,1/3)(1/3.0.2/3) is a mixed NE Oc (pt.p2.p3).(q1.q2.q3))- ((1/3.2/3,0)(1/3,1/3,1/3)) is a mixed NE O d. No action is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy 到

A crime is witnessed by 3 citizens. Every citizen would like the police to be informed about the crime, but prefers that someone else reports it (filing a report is a hassle). Each of the three citizens chooses simultaneously (and independently) whether to call the police or not. When no one makes a call, every citizen receives payoff 0. If at least one citizen calls the police, citizens who call get payoff 5, and those who don't call get payoff 9. (a) Find all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (b) Compute a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (i.e., an equilibrium in which every citizen calls with the same probability p E (0, 1)). (c) Does the game have a Nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies different from those you identified in (a) and (b)? If yes, construct one. If not, argue why not.
Which of the above 4 statements is CORRECT?
A reserve price is a minimum price set by the auctioneer. If no bidder is willing to pay the reserve price, the item is unsold at a profit of $0 for the auctioneer. If only one bidder values the item at or above the reserve price, that bidder pays the reserve price. An auctioneer faces two bidders, each with a value of either $39 or $104, with both values equally probable. Without a reserve price, the second highest bid will be the price paid by the winning bidder. The following table lists the four possible combinations of bidder values. Each combination is equally likely to occur. On the following table, indicate the price paid by the winning bidder with and without the stated reserve price. Bidder 1 Value Bidder 2 Value Probability Price Without Reserve? Price with $104 Reserve Price? ($) ($) ($) $39 $39 0.25 $39 $104 0.25 $104 $39 0.25 $104 $104 0.25 Without a reserve price, the expected price is…
Game Theory Consider the entry game with incomplete information studied in class. An incumbent politician's cost of campaigning can be high or low and the entrant does not know this cost (but the incumbent does). In class, we found two pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria in this game. Assume that the probability that the cost of campaigning is high is a parameter p, 0 < p < 1. Show that when p is large enough, there is only one pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. What is it? What is the intuition? How large does p have to be? Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.