Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone. Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300 on a cell phone and Kenji chooses to contribute $300 to the public park, Eric would still receive the $270 of benefit from Kenji's generosity. In other words, if Eric decides to keep the $300 for a cell phone and Kenji decides to contribute the $300 to the public project, then Eric would receive a total benefit of $300+$270=$570$300+$270=$570, Kenji would receive a total benefit of $270, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the lower left cell of the first table.   In the second photo, for the last problems, the two drop down options are: to contribute or to not contribute. The last drop down options are: The free-rider problem, the creation of a positve externality, why markets are efficient, the Tradgety of the commons.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone.
Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table.
Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300 on a cell phone and Kenji chooses to contribute $300 to the public park, Eric would still receive the $270 of benefit from Kenji's generosity. In other words, if Eric decides to keep the $300 for a cell phone and Kenji decides to contribute the $300 to the public project, then Eric would receive a total benefit of $300+$270=$570$300+$270=$570, Kenji would receive a total benefit of $270, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the lower left cell of the first table.
 
In the second photo, for the last problems, the two drop down options are: to contribute or to not contribute. The last drop down options are: The free-rider problem, the creation of a positve externality, why markets are efficient, the Tradgety of the commons. 
 
 
Complete the following table, which shows the **combined** benefits of Eric and Kenji as previously described.

|         | **Kenji**             |    
|---------|-----------------------|
|         | Contributes           | Doesn't contribute |
| **Eric**|                       |                     |
| Contributes | $1,080            |                     |
| Doesn't contribute | $840       |                     |

Of the four cells of the table, which gives the greatest combined benefits to Eric and Kenji?

- ⬜ When both Eric and Kenji contribute to the public park
- ⬜ When neither Eric nor Kenji contributes to the public park
- ⬤ When Eric contributes to the public park and Kenji doesn't, or vice versa

Now, consider the incentive facing Eric individually. The following table looks similar to the previous one, but this time, it is partially completed with the **individual** benefit data for Eric. As shown previously, if both Eric and Kenji contribute to a public good, Eric receives a benefit of $540. On the other hand, if Kenji contributes to the public park and Eric does not, Eric receives a benefit of $570.

Complete the right-hand column of the following table, which shows the **individual** benefits of Eric.

*Hint: You are not required to consider the benefit of Kenji.*
Transcribed Image Text:Complete the following table, which shows the **combined** benefits of Eric and Kenji as previously described. | | **Kenji** | |---------|-----------------------| | | Contributes | Doesn't contribute | | **Eric**| | | | Contributes | $1,080 | | | Doesn't contribute | $840 | | Of the four cells of the table, which gives the greatest combined benefits to Eric and Kenji? - ⬜ When both Eric and Kenji contribute to the public park - ⬜ When neither Eric nor Kenji contributes to the public park - ⬤ When Eric contributes to the public park and Kenji doesn't, or vice versa Now, consider the incentive facing Eric individually. The following table looks similar to the previous one, but this time, it is partially completed with the **individual** benefit data for Eric. As shown previously, if both Eric and Kenji contribute to a public good, Eric receives a benefit of $540. On the other hand, if Kenji contributes to the public park and Eric does not, Eric receives a benefit of $570. Complete the right-hand column of the following table, which shows the **individual** benefits of Eric. *Hint: You are not required to consider the benefit of Kenji.*
**Text:**

Now, consider the incentive facing Eric individually. The following table looks similar to the previous one, but this time, it is partially completed with the *individual* benefit data for Eric. As shown previously, if both Eric and Kenji contribute to a public good, Eric receives a benefit of $540. On the other hand, if Kenji contributes to the public park and Eric does not, Eric receives a benefit of $570.

**Complete the right-hand column of the following table, which shows the *individual* benefits of Eric.**

*Hint: You are not required to consider the benefit of Kenji.*

**Table:**

|            | Kenji Contribute | Kenji Doesn't contribute |
|------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| **Eric**   |                  |                          |
| Contribute | $540, --         | $, --                    |
| Doesn't contribute | $570, --  | $, --                    |

**If Kenji decides to contribute to the public park, Eric would maximize his benefit by choosing ____________ to the public park. On the other hand, if Kenji decides not to contribute to the public park, Eric would maximize his benefit by choosing ____________ to the public park.**

These results illustrate ____________.

**Explanation of the Table:**

The table represents Eric’s benefits under different scenarios of contribution to a public park by both Eric and Kenji:

- If both Eric and Kenji contribute, Eric receives a benefit of $540.
- If Eric doesn't contribute but Kenji does, Eric receives $570.
- The table has placeholders to be filled for scenarios where Kenji does not contribute.

**Questions to Consider:**

- Evaluate how Eric's decisions depend on Kenji’s actions to maximize his benefit.
- Analyze the implications of cooperation or defection in contributing to shared public goods.
Transcribed Image Text:**Text:** Now, consider the incentive facing Eric individually. The following table looks similar to the previous one, but this time, it is partially completed with the *individual* benefit data for Eric. As shown previously, if both Eric and Kenji contribute to a public good, Eric receives a benefit of $540. On the other hand, if Kenji contributes to the public park and Eric does not, Eric receives a benefit of $570. **Complete the right-hand column of the following table, which shows the *individual* benefits of Eric.** *Hint: You are not required to consider the benefit of Kenji.* **Table:** | | Kenji Contribute | Kenji Doesn't contribute | |------------|------------------|--------------------------| | **Eric** | | | | Contribute | $540, -- | $, -- | | Doesn't contribute | $570, -- | $, -- | **If Kenji decides to contribute to the public park, Eric would maximize his benefit by choosing ____________ to the public park. On the other hand, if Kenji decides not to contribute to the public park, Eric would maximize his benefit by choosing ____________ to the public park.** These results illustrate ____________. **Explanation of the Table:** The table represents Eric’s benefits under different scenarios of contribution to a public park by both Eric and Kenji: - If both Eric and Kenji contribute, Eric receives a benefit of $540. - If Eric doesn't contribute but Kenji does, Eric receives $570. - The table has placeholders to be filled for scenarios where Kenji does not contribute. **Questions to Consider:** - Evaluate how Eric's decisions depend on Kenji’s actions to maximize his benefit. - Analyze the implications of cooperation or defection in contributing to shared public goods.
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