please answer all including ones that may have already been selected. Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone.Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table.Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300 on a cell phone and Kenji chooses to contribute $300 to the public park, Eric would still receive the $270 of benefit from Kenji's generosity. In other words, if Eric decides to keep the $300 for a cell phone and Kenji decides to contribute the $300 to the public project, then Eric would receive a total benefit of $300+$270=$570$300+$270=$570, Kenji would receive a total benefit of $270, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the lower left cell of the first table. In the second photo, for the last problems, the two drop down options are: to contribute or to not contribute. The last drop down options are: The free-rider problem, the creation of a positve externality, why markets are efficient, the Tradgety of the commons. Complete the following table, which shows the combined benefits of Eric and Kenji as previously described.KenjiContributes Doesn't contributeContributes$1,080$EricDoesn't contribute$840$Of the four cells of the table, which gives the greatest combined benefits to Eric and Kenji?When both Eric and Kenji contribute to the public parkWhen neither Eric nor Kenji contributes to the public parkWhen Eric contributes to the public park and Kenji doesn't, or vice versaNow, consider the incentive facing Eric individually. The following table looks similar to the previous one, but this time, it is partially completed withthe individual benefit data for Eric. As shown previously, if both Eric and Kenji contribute to a public good, Eric receives a benefit of $540. On theother hand, if Kenji contributes to the public park and Eric does not, Eric receives a benefit of $570.Complete the right-hand column of the following table, which shows the individual benefits of Eric.Hint: You are not required to consider the benefit of Kenji. Now, consider the incentive facing Eric individually. The following table looks similar to the previous one, but this time, it is partially completed withthe individual benefit data for Eric. As shown previously, if both Eric and Kenji contribute to a public good, Eric receives a benefit of $540. On theother hand, if Kenji contributes to the public park and Eric does not, Eric receives a benefit of $570.Complete the right-hand column of the following table, which shows the individual benefits of Eric.Hint: You are not required to consider the benefit of Kenji.KenjiContributeDoesn't contributeContribute$540, --EricDoesn't contribute$570, --2$If Kenji decides to contribute to the public park, Eric would maximize his benefit by choosingto the public park. On the otherhand, if Kenji decides not to contribute to the public park, Eric would maximize his benefit by choosingto the public park.These results illustrate

Public goods are those goods that are non-rival and non-excludable which implies that utilization of…

Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone. Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300 on a cell phone and Kenji chooses to contribute $300 to the public park, Eric would still receive the $270 of benefit from Kenji's generosity. In other words, if Eric decides to keep the $300 for a cell phone and Kenji decides to contribute the $300 to the public project, then Eric would receive a total benefit of $300+$270=$570$300+$270=$570, Kenji would receive a total benefit of $270, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the lower left cell of the first table. In the second photo, for the last problems, the two drop down options are: to contribute or to not contribute. The last drop down options are: The free-rider problem, the creation of a positve externality, why markets are efficient, the Tradgety of the commons.

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter6: Population Health

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8QAP

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please answer all including ones that may have already been selected.

Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone.

Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table.

Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300 on a cell phone and Kenji chooses to contribute $300 to the public park, Eric would still receive the $270 of benefit from Kenji's generosity. In other words, if Eric decides to keep the $300 for a cell phone and Kenji decides to contribute the $300 to the public project, then Eric would receive a total benefit of $300+$270=$570$300+$270=$570, Kenji would receive a total benefit of $270, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the lower left cell of the first table.

In the second photo, for the last problems, the two drop down options are: to contribute or to not contribute. The last drop down options are: The free-rider problem, the creation of a positve externality, why markets are efficient, the Tradgety of the commons.

Complete the following table, which shows the combined benefits of Eric and Kenji as previously described.
Kenji
Contributes Doesn't contribute
Contributes
$1,080
$
Eric
Doesn't contribute
$840
$
Of the four cells of the table, which gives the greatest combined benefits to Eric and Kenji?
When both Eric and Kenji contribute to the public park
When neither Eric nor Kenji contributes to the public park
When Eric contributes to the public park and Kenji doesn't, or vice versa
Now, consider the incentive facing Eric individually. The following table looks similar to the previous one, but this time, it is partially completed with
the individual benefit data for Eric. As shown previously, if both Eric and Kenji contribute to a public good, Eric receives a benefit of $540. On the
other hand, if Kenji contributes to the public park and Eric does not, Eric receives a benefit of $570.
Complete the right-hand column of the following table, which shows the individual benefits of Eric.
Hint: You are not required to consider the benefit of Kenji.

Now, consider the incentive facing Eric individually. The following table looks similar to the previous one, but this time, it is partially completed with
the individual benefit data for Eric. As shown previously, if both Eric and Kenji contribute to a public good, Eric receives a benefit of $540. On the
other hand, if Kenji contributes to the public park and Eric does not, Eric receives a benefit of $570.
Complete the right-hand column of the following table, which shows the individual benefits of Eric.
Hint: You are not required to consider the benefit of Kenji.
Kenji
Contribute
Doesn't contribute
Contribute
$540, --
Eric
Doesn't contribute
$570, --
2$
If Kenji decides to contribute to the public park, Eric would maximize his benefit by choosing
to the public park. On the other
hand, if Kenji decides not to contribute to the public park, Eric would maximize his benefit by choosing
to the public park.
These results illustrate

Definition Definition Degree to which financial markets incorporate all available information into the prices of assets. In a more efficient market, the prices reflect the available information more than that in a weak efficient market. It is difficult for investors to outperform the market in a strong efficient market. This is because all the available information is already discounted in the asset's price. However, in a weak-form efficiency, the market does not reflect all information in the asset's price. As a result, it becomes easier to generate better returns in a weak form or an inefficient market.

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