Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone. Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300 on a cell phone and Kenji chooses to contribute $300 to the public park, Eric would still receive the $270 of benefit from Kenji's generosity. In other words, if Eric decides to keep the $300 for a cell phone and Kenji decides to contribute the $300 to the public project, then Eric would receive a total benefit of $300+$270=$570$300+$270=$570, Kenji would receive a total benefit of $270, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the lower left cell of the first table. In the second photo, for the last problems, the two drop down options are: to contribute or to not contribute. The last drop down options are: The free-rider problem, the creation of a positve externality, why markets are efficient, the Tradgety of the commons.
Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone. Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300 on a cell phone and Kenji chooses to contribute $300 to the public park, Eric would still receive the $270 of benefit from Kenji's generosity. In other words, if Eric decides to keep the $300 for a cell phone and Kenji decides to contribute the $300 to the public project, then Eric would receive a total benefit of $300+$270=$570$300+$270=$570, Kenji would receive a total benefit of $270, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the lower left cell of the first table. In the second photo, for the last problems, the two drop down options are: to contribute or to not contribute. The last drop down options are: The free-rider problem, the creation of a positve externality, why markets are efficient, the Tradgety of the commons.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone.
Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table.
Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300 on a cell phone and Kenji chooses to contribute $300 to the public park, Eric would still receive the $270 of benefit from Kenji's generosity. In other words, if Eric decides to keep the $300 for a cell phone and Kenji decides to contribute the $300 to the public project, then Eric would receive a total benefit of $300+$270=$570$300+$270=$570, Kenji would receive a total benefit of $270, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the lower left cell of the first table.
In the second photo, for the last problems, the two drop down options are: to contribute or to not contribute. The last drop down options are: The free-rider problem, the creation of a positve externality, why markets are efficient , the Tradgety of the commons.
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