Questions 9-13 Refer to Table 8-1.Consider the small village of Axisville with only three residents, Xavier, Yola, and Zachary. Thethree residents are trying to determine how large, in acres, they should build the public park.The table below shows each resident's willingness to pay for each acre of the park (i.e., theirmarginal willingness to pay, NOT total).Table 8-1Marginal willingness to pay for acres of a public parkAcresXavierYolaZachary12526017 020Refer to Table 8-1. Suppose the cost to build the park is $24 per acre (total, not per person).How many acres should the park be to maximize total surplus from the park in Axisville?34$10863.1$241814864$6543

The total cost formula is used to mix the variable and fixed costs of giving goods to compute a…

small village of Axisville with only three residents, Xavier, Yola, and Zacha nts are trying to determine how large, in acres, they should build the publi low shows each resident's willingness to pay for each acre of the park (i.e. ingness to pay, NOT total). willingness to pay for acres of a public park Xavier Yola Zachary $10 8 6 3 1 $24 18 14 8 6 $6 5 4 3 2

small village of Axisville with only three residents, Xavier, Yola, and Zacha nts are trying to determine how large, in acres, they should build the publi low shows each resident's willingness to pay for each acre of the park (i.e. ingness to pay, NOT total). willingness to pay for acres of a public park Xavier Yola Zachary $10 8 6 3 1 $24 18 14 8 6 $6 5 4 3 2

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2MC

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Acres Sophia Amber Cedric 1 $12 $24 $6 8. 18 6. 3 10 4 3 3 4 1 2 Consider the town of Springfield with only three residents, Sophia, Amber, and Cedric (see the Table). The three residents are trying to determine how large, in acres, they should build the public park. Suppose the cost to build the park is $12 per acre and that the residents have agreed to split the cost of building the park equally. If the residents vote to determine the size of park to build, basing their decision solely on their own willingness to pay (and trying to maximize their own surplus), what is the largest park size for which the majority of residents would vote "yes?" 1 acre 3 acres 2 acres 4 acres Question 25 of 25 A Click Submit to complete this assessment.
Acres Sophia Amber Cedric 1 $12 $24 $6 2 8 18 3 10 4 3 8 3 1 6. 2 6 4 1 7 2 Consider the town of Springfield with only three residents, Sophia, Amber, and Cedric (see the Table). The three residents are trying to determine how large, in acres, they should build the public park. Suppose the cost to build the park is $12 per acre and that the residents have agreed to split the cost of building the park equally. If the residents vote to determine the size of park to builo basing their decision solely on their own willingness to pay (and trying to maximize their own surplus), what is the largest park size for which the majority of residents would vote "yes?" 1 acre 2 acres 3 acres 4 acres
Suppose there are only five people in a society and each favors one of the five highway construction options in Table 16.2 (include no highway construction as one of the options). Explain which of these highway options will be selected using a majority paired-choice vote. Will this option be the optimal size of the project from an economic perspective?
Externalities and Public Goods – End of Chapter Problem In 2018, a wind farm developer was ordered by the Iowa state appeals court to dismantle its newly constructed wind turbines after adjacent residents filed a lawsuit complaining that they never consented to the loud noise and visual obstructions of the turbines. How could the wind farm developer have utilized insights from the Coase Theorem to avoid its legal troubles and ultimately wasting millions of dollars on wind turbines it never got to operate? Select all situations that would apply. The developer could have asked the government to set a quota on electricity generation for the wind farm so there would be down time from the noise. The developer could have petitioned the local and state government to fund the wind farm. The developer could have invested in improved infrastructure for power generation to lower residents' electricity costs as well as to promote the use of wind farms. The developer could have paid people living…
please answer all including ones that may have already been selected. Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone. Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300…
A local college is deciding whether to conduct a campus beautification initiative that would involve various projects, such as planting trees and remodeling buildings, to make the campus more aesthetically pleasing. For the students of the college, the visual appearance of the campus isnonrival andnonexcludable . Thus, the visual appearance would be classified as a public good. Suppose the college administrators estimate that the beautification initiative will cost $61,110. To decide whether the initiative should be undertaken, administrators conduct a survey of the college's 2,240 students, asking each of them their willingness to pay for the beautification project. The average willingness to pay, as revealed by the survey, is $20. The benefit of the beautification initiative, as suggested by the survey, is . Because the estimated benefit is than the cost, the college administrators undertake the beautification initiative. The calculation of the benefit of…
Consider the town of Springfield with only three residents, Sophia, Amber, and Cedric. The three residents are trying to determine how large, in acres, they should build the public park. The following table shows each resident's willingness to pay for each acre of the park. Acres 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sophia 0 acres O1 acre 2 acres 10 8 6 3 1 O3 acres 0 Willingness to Pay (Dollars) Amber Refer to Table 11-1. Suppose the cost to build the park is $24 per acre and that the residents have agreed to split the cost of building the park equally. If the residents vote to determine the size of park to build, basing their decision solely on their own willingness to pay (and trying to maximize their own surplus), what is the largest park size for which the majority of residents would vote "yes?" 24 18 14 8 6 4 2 Cedric 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Celia and Venya can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Quantity (Gallons) 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 Price (Dollars per gallon) 36 33 c. 0 gallons d. 240 gallons 30 27 24 21 18 15 12 9630 Total Revenue and Total Profit (Dollars) 0 1,3201 2,400 3,240 3,840 4,200 4,320 4,200 3,840 3,240 2,400 1,320 0 Refer to Table 17-1. What is the socially efficient quantity of water? Ⓒa. 280 gallons b. 480 gallons
Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Celia and Venya can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Quantity Price Total Revenue and Total Profit (Gallons) (Dollars per gallon) (Dollars) 36 33 30 27 24 21 40 1,320 2,400 3.240 3,840 4,200 4,320 4,200 3,840 3,240 2,400 1,320 80 120 160 200 240 18 280 15 320 12 360 400 6. 3 440 480 Refer to Table 17-1. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Celia and Venya from operating as a monopoly. What will be the price of water once Celia and Venya reach a Nash equilibrium? O a. $12 O b. $15 O. $9 O…
Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Celia and Venya can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Price Quantity Total Revenue and Total Profit (Gallons) (Dollars per gallon) (Dollars) 36 40 33 1,320 2,400 3,240 3,840 4,200 80 30 120 27 160 24 200 21 240 18 4,320 4,200 280 15 3,840 3,240 2,400 320 12 360 9 400 440 3. 1,320 480 Refer to Table 17-1. If Celia and Venya operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, how many gallons of water will be produced and sold? O a. 240 O b. 280 OC 480 Od.0
Van and Amy each rent one unit of a two-unit apartment building. The building has two separate furnaces located between the two apartments. The renters each control and pay for the heat their furnaces generate and would choose to increase the temperature of their apartments by 45 degrees if the other never turned on their furnace, given that the marginal private benefit (MB) of the 45th degree is equal to the marginal cost (MC) of 1 degree of heat (assume that the MC of heat is constant and that the MB of heat is decreasing). However, each degree of heat paid for by one not only raises the temperature in that apartment by a degree but also raises the temperature in the other apartment by half a degree. As a result, if Amy were to buy 40 degrees of heat, then Van would need to purchase only benefit of the final degree was equal to the marginal cost. Use the blue line (circle symbol) to plot Van's best-response function (BRF) on the following graph, with the total amount of heat he will…
-- 49. Table 11-4 There are four homes along Belmont Circle, which surrounds a small plot of land. The land currently has no trees, and the 4 homeowners - Adams, Benitez, Chen, and Davis -- are considering the idea of contributing to a pool of money that will be used to plant up to 4 trees. The table represents their willingness to pay, that is, the maximum amount that each homeowner is willing to contribute toward each tree. Adams Chen $100 First tree Second tree Third tree Fourth tree A. 3 B. 2 C. 1 50 D. 4 20 10 Benitez $115 110 100 50 $120 110 80 40 Davis $90 Refer to Table 11-4. Suppose the cost to plant each tree is $90. How many trees should be planted to maximize the total surplus of the four homeowners? 50 30 O