Sylvester and Rachel live together on an island with two goods, food and shelter. Food is a private good and shelter is a public good. The utility function of Sylvester is U= Fs+ 2(Zs+ Zr) where Fs is the amount of food he buys, Zs is the amount of shelter he buys and Zr is the amount of shelter Rachel buys. Similarly, the utility function of Rachel is U= Fr+ Zs+ Zr where Fr is the amount of food she buys. Suppose the price of food is 10 and both Sylvester and Rachel have 100 to spend. Suppose also that it is not possible for Sylvester and Rachel to reach any kind of agreement. a. Determine the quantity of shelter they will buy and the efficient quantity of shelter if the price of shelter is 5? (Enter your answer in whole number.) Quantity of Shelter: Efficient 120 units b. What is the quantity of shelter they will buy if the price of the shelter is 15? (Round your answer Quantity of Shelter: Not Efficient 30 units 2 decimal places (e.g., 32.16).) What is the quantity of shelter they will buy if the price of the shelter is 25? (Enter your answer as a whole number.) Quantity of Shelter: (Click to select) units

Sylvester and Rachel live together on an island with two goods, food and shelter. Food is a private good and shelter is a public good. The utility function of Sylvester is U= Fs+ 2(Zs+ Zr) where Fs is the amount of food he buys, Zs is the amount of shelter he buys and Zr is the amount of shelter Rachel buys. Similarly, the utility function of Rachel is U= Fr+ Zs+ Zr where Fr is the amount of food she buys. Suppose the price of food is 10 and both Sylvester and Rachel have 100 to spend. Suppose also that it is not possible for Sylvester and Rachel to reach any kind of agreement. a. Determine the quantity of shelter they will buy and the efficient quantity of shelter if the price of shelter is 5? (Enter your answer in whole number.) Quantity of Shelter: Efficient 120 units b. What is the quantity of shelter they will buy if the price of the shelter is 15? (Round your answer Quantity of Shelter: Not Efficient 30 units 2 decimal places (e.g., 32.16).) What is the quantity of shelter they will buy if the price of the shelter is 25? (Enter your answer as a whole number.) Quantity of Shelter: (Click to select) units

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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4. Aaron and Burris have the following utility functions over two goods, x and y. Aaron’s utility function: UA(xA, yA) = min{xA/3, yA} Burris’s utility function: UB(xB, yB) = 9xB + 3yB Aaron’s endowment is eA = (2, 4). Burris’ endowment is eB = (10, 8). In an Edgeworth Box diagram, show which allocations are in the core. Solve for the set of Pareto optimal allocations (i.e. the contract curve) in the Edgeworth Box. Illustrate the contract curve in an Edgeworth Box diagram. Let good y be the numeraire (i.e. set py = 1 and let px = p). Solve for the Walrasian competitive equilibrium allocation and price ratio.
Suppose that Romeo in Problem 8 has the utility function U= S° RS2, and Juliet has the utility function U= S2RS5, where SRis Romeo's spaghetti consumption and Sj is Juliet's. They have 42 units of spaghetti to divide between them. Juliet would want to give Romeo some spaghetti if she has more than 28 a) units. Romeo would want to give Juliet some spaghetti if he has more than 26 units of spaghetti. C) Romeo and Juliet would never disagree about how to divide the spaghetti. d) Romeo would want to give Juliet some spaghetti if he had more than 21 units of spaghetti. Juliet would want to give Romeo some spaghetti if she has more than 30 units e) of spaghetti.
Extend the model of the jungle to the case in which the number of houses is smaller than the number of agents. In this case, an allocation is a function from the set of agents to the set H U {homeless} with the property that no two agents are assigned to the same house. Each agent has a preference ordering over H U {homeless}. Assume that this ordering is strict; assume also that every agent prefers to be allocated any house than to be homeless. Define an equilibrium for this extended model and show that it always exists.
= 5. Consider an economy with a single (representative) agent with utility function u(x, lc) = x¹/514/5 and an endowment of 0 units of x and 10 units of time, which the agent can use as leisure (c) or labor (L) (i.e., L + lc = 10). The agent owns a firm that produces good x using L as an input, with technology of production given by x(L) = 3√L. Let the price of x be p = 1 and let w denote the price of time (i.e., the price of leisure and the wage). Find the competitive price of time w and the competitive allocation.
5.18 In a two-good, two-consumer economy, utility functions are u¹ (x₁, x₂) = x₁(x₂)², u² (x₁, x₂) = (x₁)²x₂. Total endowments are (10, 20). (a) A social planner wants to allocate goods to maximise consumer 1's utility while holding con- sumer 2's utility at u² = 8000/27. Find the assignment of goods to consumers that solves the planner's problem and show that the solution is Pareto efficient. (b) Suppose, instead, that the planner just divides the endowments so that e¹ = (10, 0) and e² = (0, 20) and then lets the consumers transact through perfectly competitive markets. Find the Walrasian equilibrium and show that the WEAs are the same as the solution in part (a).
Suppose there are two consumers, A and B. There are two goods, X and Y. There is a TOTAL of 8 units of X and a TOTAL of 8 units of Y. The consumers' utility functions are given by: UA(X,Y) = 2X + Y UB(X,Y) = X*Y2 Which of the following allocations is Pareto Efficient? None of the other answers are Pareto Efficient. Consumer A gets 3 units of X and 8 units of Y, and Consumer B gets 5 units of X and O units of Y. Consumer A gets 4 units of X and 4 units of Y, and Consumer B gets 4 units of X and 4 units of Y. Consumer A gets 1 units of X and 4 units of Y, and Consumer B gets 7 units of X and 4 units of Y. Consumer A gets 8 units of X and 8 units of Y, and Consumer B gets 0 units of X and O units of Y.
Consider the pure exchange economy with 2 goods, good 1 and good 2, and two consumers, consumer A and consumer B. The consumers have the following utility functions: UA(X1A,X2A)=X1A+3x2A; UB(X1B,X2B)=x1B +X2B. Consumer A is initially endowed with 4 units of good A and no unit of good 2, that is, consumer A's initial endowment is (W1A,W2A)=(4,0). Consumer B is initially endowed with 3 units of good 2 and no unit of good 1, that is, (WIB,W2B)=(0,3). In order to implement the allocation (x1A,X2A)=(0,1), (x1B,X2B)=(4,2) as a Walrasian equilibrium, what transfer of wealth should we make between the consumers if good 1 is the numeraire, that is, if p1 =1? O a. An amount 7 of wealth should be transferred from consumer A to consumer B. O b. None of the other answers. An amount 3 of wealth should be transferred from consumer A to consumer B. O c. d. An amount 3 of wealth should be transferred from consumer B to consumer A. An amount 7 of wealth should be transferred from consumer B to consumer…
Marbella has 101 residents. All wear the same fancy clothes and each has the same utility function, u(m, b, B) = m + 14b − b2 − B/50, where m is the amount of macaroni (in kilograms) that he or she eats per day, b is the number of hours that he or she spends on the beach per day, and B is the total number of person-hours spent per day on the beach by other residents of Marbella. Each has an income of $10 per day and macaroni costs $1 per kilogram. The city council is considering a law that would limit the amount of time that any person can spend on the beach. How many hours per day should they allow in order to maximize the utility of a typical Marbellite? A. 6 B. 9 C. 7 D. 10 E. They could not possibly be made better off by legislation that limits their freedom to choose.
Consider the pure exchange economy with 2 goods, good 1 and good 2, and two consumers, consumer A and consumer B. The consumers have the following utility functions: UA(X1A,X2A)=X1A+3X2A; UB(X1B,X2B)=X1B +X2B. Consumer A is initially endowed with 4 units of good A and no unit of good 2, that is, consumer A's initial endowment is (w1A,W2A)=(4,0). Consumer B is initially endowed with 3 units of good 2 and no unit of good 1, that is, (w1B,W2B)=(0,3). In order to implement the allocation (x1A,X2A)=(0,1), (x1B,X2B)=(4,2) as a Walrasian equilibrium, what transfer of wealth should we make between the consumers if good 1 is the numeraire, that is, if p1 =1? An amount 7 of wealth should be transferred from consumer A to consumer B. O a. O b. None of the other answers. O c. An amount 3 of wealth should be transferred from consumer A to consumer B. O d. An amount 3 of wealth should be transferred from consumer B to consumer A. e. An amount 7 of wealth should be transferred from consumer B to…
Suppose there are two consumers, A and B, and two goods, X and Y. Consumer A is given an initial endowment of 3 units of good X and 5 units of good Y. Consumer B is given an initial endowment of 5 units of good X and 3 units of good Y. Consumer A's utility function is given by: UA(X,Y)= X + 4Y, and consumer B's utility function is given by UB(X,Y)= MIN (X, 2Y). If the prices are Px = 1 and Py = 3, if each consumer sells her initial endowment and buys back her optimal bundle, which of the following statements is true? Group of answer choices Both Markets are in Equilibrium There is Excess Demand in the Market for Good X = 2.4 There is Excess Demand in the Market for Good Y = 0.8 There is Excess Supply in the Market for Good Y = 1.6 There is Excess Supply in the Market for Good X = 1.6 E
Bob and Ray are thinking of buying a sofa. Bob's utility function is Ug(S, MB) = (1 + S) Mg and Ray's utility function is UR(S, MR) = (4 + S)MR, where S= 0 if they don't get the sofa and S = 1 if they do and where MB and MR are the amounts of money they have respectively to spend on their private consumptions. Bob has a total of $800 to spend on the sofa and other stuff. Ray has a total of $4,000 to spend on the sofa and other stuff. The maximum amount that they could pay for the sofa and still arrange to both be better off than without it is $1,200. $2,200. $650. $1,800. $1,000.
Assume your apartment complex decides to build new open access common area for its residents. Each individual has value for using the common area represented by the following value function: V= 40-0.5Q where Q represents the number of individuals using the common area. The marginal value function is: MV= 40-Q Assume each individual’s opportunity cost of time is $8 [e.g. MC=8] A) How many people use the common are at the social optimum? B) Calculate the net value (NV) at this social optimum. C) What characteristic of the good must be changed in order to avoid over use of the common area?