Consider the marginal cost and marginal benefit of reducing air pollution illustrated in the figure to the right Suppose the reduction in air pollution is currently 3 million tons per year. In private bargaining, what is the minimum amount polluters would have to be paid to be willing to reduce air pollution by an additional 2 million tons to 5 million tons? million (Enter a numeric response using an integer) In private bargaining, what is the maximum amount the parties who benefit from pollution reduction would be to pay to pollution by an million (Enter a numeric response using an integer) What would be the net benefit to society of reducing air pollution by another 2 million tons? Cost or benet (doilars per ton) 350 300 250 200 150 100- 50 Marginal Cost Reductions in air pollution i Marginal Dent tons)

Consider the marginal cost and marginal benefit of reducing air pollution illustrated in the figure to the right Suppose the reduction in air pollution is currently 3 million tons per year. In private bargaining, what is the minimum amount polluters would have to be paid to be willing to reduce air pollution by an additional 2 million tons to 5 million tons? million (Enter a numeric response using an integer) In private bargaining, what is the maximum amount the parties who benefit from pollution reduction would be to pay to pollution by an million (Enter a numeric response using an integer) What would be the net benefit to society of reducing air pollution by another 2 million tons? Cost or benet (doilars per ton) 350 300 250 200 150 100- 50 Marginal Cost Reductions in air pollution i Marginal Dent tons)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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