There are two firms, A and B emitting sulfur dioxide. In total, they emit 100 tons of sulfur dioxide. The EPA wants to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 60 tons so that the final level of emissions in only 40 tons. The table below shows the emissions and cost of abatement for each firm. If the EPA were to issue 40 tradeable pollution permits, 20 to each firm, where each pollution permit allows 1 ton of emission, what would the final allocation of permits across the two firms be if they traded permits with each other? Company sO, Emission Cost per ton of so, reduction Firm A 30 tons $1,000 per ton Firm B 70 tons $800 per ton Total Emissions 100 tons Select an answer and submit. For keyboard navigation, use the up/down arrow keys to select an answer. Each firm will have 20 permits. a Firm A will have all 40 permits. Firm A will have 30 permits and Firm B will have 10 permits. Firm A will have 10 permits and Firm B will have 30 permits.

There are two firms, A and B emitting sulfur dioxide. In total, they emit 100 tons of sulfur dioxide. The EPA wants to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 60 tons so that the final level of emissions in only 40 tons. The table below shows the emissions and cost of abatement for each firm. If the EPA were to issue 40 tradeable pollution permits, 20 to each firm, where each pollution permit allows 1 ton of emission, what would the final allocation of permits across the two firms be if they traded permits with each other? Company sO, Emission Cost per ton of so, reduction Firm A 30 tons $1,000 per ton Firm B 70 tons $800 per ton Total Emissions 100 tons Select an answer and submit. For keyboard navigation, use the up/down arrow keys to select an answer. Each firm will have 20 permits. a Firm A will have all 40 permits. Firm A will have 30 permits and Firm B will have 10 permits. Firm A will have 10 permits and Firm B will have 30 permits.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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This is an end-of-chapter problem that I'm struggling with! thanks!
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