Consider the following table of three politicians (Mowgli, Baloo and Kaa) ranking out of three political projects (renovate the bowling alley; build a theater; improve public transportation). The table illustrates which project each politician would like to see completed in the first place, in the second place as well as third-hand. Each politician has one vote and there are two voting rounds. In a first round, two alternatives are pitted against each other. The alternative that receives a majority of the votes moves on to the second round and faces the third 3 option there. The project that wins round two is conducted thereafter. Now suppose you are Kaa. If you have the power to decide about the voting order, how would you do? Första hand Andra hand Tredje hand Mowgli Bowlinghall Teater Kollektivtrafik Baloo Teater Kollektivtrafik Bowlinghall Kaa Kollektivtrafik Bowlinghall Teater

Consider the following table of three politicians (Mowgli, Baloo and Kaa) ranking out of three political projects (renovate the bowling alley; build a theater; improve public transportation). The table illustrates which project each politician would like to see completed in the first place, in the second place as well as third-hand. Each politician has one vote and there are two voting rounds. In a first round, two alternatives are pitted against each other. The alternative that receives a majority of the votes moves on to the second round and faces the third 3 option there. The project that wins round two is conducted thereafter. Now suppose you are Kaa. If you have the power to decide about the voting order, how would you do? Första hand Andra hand Tredje hand Mowgli Bowlinghall Teater Kollektivtrafik Baloo Teater Kollektivtrafik Bowlinghall Kaa Kollektivtrafik Bowlinghall Teater

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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