Consider the game in the figure at right about funding and construction of adam to protect a 1,000-person town. Contributions to the dam fund,once made, cannot be recovered, and all citizens must contribute $1,000 tothe dam in order for it to be built. The dam, if built, is worth $70,000 to eachcitizen.In this game, the strategy pair that paysOA. $0 to each player is the only equilibrium.B. ($0, $1,000) is the only equilibrium.C. $69,000 to each player is the only equilibrium.O D. (-$1,000, $0) is the only equilibrium.OE.$69,000 to each player and the strategy pair that pays $0 to eachplayer are equilibria.Contribute toDamOne CitizenContribute to Don't ContributeDamto DamOther 1 tizens$69K, $69K-$1,000, $0ADon'texmark ute $0, - $1,000$0, $0Lining: 01:09:17Next

An equilibrium in a game is a situation in which no player can improve their payoff by changing…

Consider the game in the figure at right about funding and construction of a dam to protect a 1,000-person town. Contributions to the dam fund, once made, cannot be recovered, and all citizens must contribute $1,000 to the dam in order for it to be built. The dam, if built, is worth $70,000 to each citizen. In this game, the strategy pair that pays

Consider the game in the figure at right about funding and construction of a dam to protect a 1,000-person town. Contributions to the dam fund, once made, cannot be recovered, and all citizens must contribute $1,000 to the dam in order for it to be built. The dam, if built, is worth $70,000 to each citizen. In this game, the strategy pair that pays

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.7P

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