3. Consider a course allocation problem with strict and non-responsive preferences. Isthere a mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof? If so, state the mechanismand show that it satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness. {hint serial dictatorship and show using example}4. Consider a course allocation problem with responsive preferences and at least 3students. Is there a mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof that is not theSerial Dictatorship? If so, state the mechanism and show that it satisfies efficiencyand strategyproofness.5. Suggest a mechanism for allocating students to courses in a situation where preferences are non-responsive, and study its properties (efficiency and strategyproofness). Please be creative
3. Consider a course allocation problem with strict and non-responsive preferences. Is
there a mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof? If so, state the mechanism
and show that it satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness. {hint serial dictatorship and show using example}
4. Consider a course allocation problem with responsive preferences and at least 3
students. Is there a mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof that is not the
Serial Dictatorship? If so, state the mechanism and show that it satisfies efficiency
and strategyproofness.
5. Suggest a mechanism for allocating students to courses in a situation where preferences are non-responsive, and study its properties (efficiency and strategyproofness). Please be creative
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