1.8. Consider a population of voters uniformly distributed along the ideological spectrum from left (x = 0) to right (x = 1). Each of the candidates for a single office simultaneously chooses a cam- paign platform (i.e., a point on the line between x = 0 and x = 1). The voters observe the candidates' choices, and then each voter votes for the candidate whose platform is closest to the voter's position on the spectrum. If there are two candidates and they choose platforms x1 .3 and x2 .6, for example, then all voters to the left of x = .45 vote for candidate 1, all those to the right vote for candidate 2, and candidate 2 wins the elec- tion with 55 percent of the vote. Suppose that the candidates = 11 =

1.8. Consider a population of voters uniformly distributed along the ideological spectrum from left (x = 0) to right (x = 1). Each of the candidates for a single office simultaneously chooses a cam- paign platform (i.e., a point on the line between x = 0 and x = 1). The voters observe the candidates' choices, and then each voter votes for the candidate whose platform is closest to the voter's position on the spectrum. If there are two candidates and they choose platforms x1 .3 and x2 .6, for example, then all voters to the left of x = .45 vote for candidate 1, all those to the right vote for candidate 2, and candidate 2 wins the elec- tion with 55 percent of the vote. Suppose that the candidates = 11 =

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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