Ouline of Constitutional Law(完整版)(2)(1)
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001
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Political Science
Date
Oct 30, 2023
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191
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Contents
Class 1: The Constitution’s text, structure, origin, and rationale; Judicial review; Constitutional
interpretation
.......................................................................................................................................
7
1.
History led to the establishment of the U.S. Constitution
.....................................................
7
2.
Constitution
............................................................................................................................
7
3.
Federalist and Anti-federalist
.................................................................................................
8
4.
Judicial Review
......................................................................................................................
9
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
......................................................................................................
10
5.
Interpretation
........................................................................................................................
13
Class 2: Limits on the judicial power, Federalism and the powers of Congress
.............................
13
1.
Judicial Restraint (limits on the judicial power)
..................................................................
14
2.
Political question doctrine
...................................................................................................
15
Baker v. Carr: p257
.........................................................................................................
15
Impeachment: Nixon v. United States: p262
...................................................................
15
3.
Federalism and boundary between power of State and Federal States: police power- (10th
amendment and section 8 of the constitution)
..............................................................................
16
McCulloch v. Maryland
(p159 the case and p171 the note)
............................................
17
Class 3 & 4: The powers of Congress: The Commerce Clause, taxation and spending power,
preemption and the dormant commerce clause
................................................................................
18
I. Commerce clause
..........................................................................................................................
18
1.
History
..................................................................................................................................
20
2.
Phase 1
.................................................................................................................................
20
Gibbons v. Ogden by Justice Marshall
.....................................................................................
20
Phase 2
......................................................................................................................................
21
Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case)
.......................................................................
21
A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States
......................................................................
23
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
..........................................................................................................
25
3.
Phase 3: New Deal "Realism"
.............................................................................................
26
NLRB V. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
..................................................................................
26
United States v. Darby (1941)
..................................................................................................
27
Wickard v. Filburn (1942)
........................................................................................................
29
Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States
............................................................................
30
4.
Phase 4: 1995-present
..........................................................................................................
32
United States v. Lopez (1995)
..................................................................................................
32
United States v. Morrison (2000)
.............................................................................................
34
Gonzeles v. Rich
p366
............................................................................................................
35
Champion v. AMES (the lottery case) p331
.............................................................................
37
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (
奥巴马医保案
)
...........................
38
II. Taxation power: Article 1 Section 8
............................................................................................
38
Bailey v. Prexel Furniture Co.
..........................................................................................
39
(继续奥巴马医保案)
taxation power valid - start from p460
....................................
40
III. Spending power
..........................................................................................................................
41
South Dakota v. Dole
.........................................................................................................
41
(继续奥巴马医保案)
the Medical expansion provisions
............................................
42
United States v. Butler
.......................................................................................................
43
IV. Federalism-based limits on State power: preemption and the dormant commerce clause
..........................................................................................................................................................
44
1.
Preemption
...........................................................................................................................
45
Arizona v. United States (p442-446)
...............................................................................
45
2.
Dormant Commerce Clause
.................................................................................................
45
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey (p402-404)
..............................................................
46
Class 5: The power of president
.......................................................................................................
47
I. Note: The Theory of Separation and Checks and Balances
.........................................................
47
Roadmap
...........................................................................................................................................
49
Youngstown (The Steel Seizure Case)
(1952)
......................................................................
49
II. Foreign affairs: Execution of Congressionally Delegated Power
...............................................
52
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (functionalism)
............................................
52
Dames & Moore v. Regan (functionalism)
..........................................................................
53
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II) (Recognition power) (functionalism)
53
III. Domestic affairs: Executive privilege and impeachment:
.........................................................
54
United States v. Nixon (p592)
..............................................................................................
55
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
...............................................................................................................
56
Clinton v. Jones [personal issue]
.........................................................................................
57
Cheney v. the US district court
............................................................................................
59
Trump v. Vance
.....................................................................................................................
59
IV. To what extent can Congress delegate their law making authority?
..........................................
61
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983)
................................................
61
Morrison v. Olson (1988)
-
[functionalism]
........................................................................
63
Class 6: Equality and Equal Protection Clause
................................................................................
65
I. 13th and 14th Amendment:
...........................................................................................................
65
II. Before the civil war
......................................................................................................................
66
State v. Post
..........................................................................................................................
66
Dred Scott v. Sandford
.........................................................................................................
66
III. After the civil war
.......................................................................................................................
68
The Civil rights case
............................................................................................................
68
IV. Jim Crow: Separate but equal?
...................................................................................................
70
Plessy v. Ferguson
................................................................................................................
70
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)
..............................................................................
71
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II)
.............................................................................
72
Class 7& 8: Equal protection: economic and race discrimination; discrimination on the basis of
gender, sexual orientation, non-citizenship, disability, and age
.......................................................
72
I. Race issue in 14th amendment
......................................................................................................
72
II. Roadmap
......................................................................................................................................
73
Strauder v. West Virginia
......................................................................................................
74
Railway Express Agency v. New York [Rational Basis Scrutiny] [under inclusive]
...........
74
III. RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY
...............................................................................................
76
New Orleans v. Dukes
..........................................................................................................
76
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer [overinclusive]
.................................................
77
US Depart of Agriculture v. Moreno (
少数适用
Rational Basis
但原告败诉的案子
)
......
77
IV. STRICT SCRUTINY
..................................................................................................................
79
Facially discriminatory Law against racial minority
..................................................................
79
Korematsu v. United States
......................................................................................................
79
Loving v. Virginia
.....................................................................................................................
80
Facially nonracial classification that may disadvantage racial minority
:
...............................
81
Washington v. Davis
.................................................................................................................
81
Palmer v. Thompson
.................................................................................................................
83
Yick Wo v. Hopkins
..................................................................................................................
84
V. Contemporary application of strict scrutiny (start in p769, p779)
..............................................
85
California v. Bakke (quota case)
.........................................................................................
85
Grutter v. Bollinger
..............................................................................................................
86
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VI. Discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation, non-citizenship, disability, and age
........
87
Reed v. Reed
p852
.............................................................................................................
87
Frontiero v. Richardson p853
..............................................................................................
88
Craig v. Boren p860 (Create new standard: intermediate scrutiny)
...................................
90
United States v. Virginia
.......................................................................................................
90
Romer v. Evans
p901, review 911
[Against gay, lesbian, and bisexual] [Rational Basis]
91
Sugarman v. Dougall
[Against Aliens] [Strict Scrutiny]
..................................................
93
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
(p941)
[Against mentally
disabled][rational basis scrutiny]
.................................................................................................
94
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
[Against the age] [rational basis]
..............
94
Class 9 & 10: Substantive Due Process
...........................................................................................
95
No state shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
(14
th
Amendment)
...........................................................................................................................
95
McDonald v. City of Chicago [Second Amendment-fundamental right]
............................
96
Lochner v. New York [
后来被
West coast hotel case overrule]
..........................................
97
Nebbia v. New York
..............................................................................................................
99
West coast hotel co. v. parrish (1937) [overrule decision in Lochner v. New York]
...........
99
Griswold v. Connecticut [right of privacy in marriage]
...................................................
100
Lawrence v. Texas p1148
....................................................................................................
101
Roe v. Wade
........................................................................................................................
103
Webster v. Reproductive Health Service
............................................................................
104
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey [
放弃了
“trimester standard”
代之以“
undue burden test”]
....................................................................................................
104
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
................................................................................
106
Class 11, 12 &13: First Amendment
..............................................................................................
106
Legal analysis framework:
.............................................................................................................
107
1.
“Incitement”-speech that can incite unlawful conduct
................................................
108
Schenck v. United States [“clear and danger standard”] [bad tendency test]
................
109
Abrams v. United States [bad tendency test]
.....................................................................
110
Gitlow v. New York [rational basis scrutiny and apply more like Bad tendency test]
......
111
Whitney v. California [Same rational basis scrutiny in Gitlow]
.......................................
112
Dannis v. United States
......................................................................................................
112
Brandenburg v. Ohio and subsequent cases [Modern standard: express advocacy law
breaking+ immediacy likelihood]
..............................................................................................
113
Hess v. Indiana
...................................................................................................................
113
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
..................................................................................
115
2.
"Fighting Words"
............................................................................................................
116
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
............................................................................................
116
3.
Patriotism and Flags
........................................................................................................
117
Texas v. Johnson [content-neutral regulation] [with content based purpose]
..........
117
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
...................................................
118
4.
Offensive words (profane (
淫秽下流的
)
........................................................................
119
Cohen v. California [no fighting words]
.....................................................................
119
5.
Libel and false speech
......................................................................................................
120
New York v. Sullivan p1422 [actual malice standard]
................................................
120
SHKELZEN BERISHA v. GUY LAWSON, ET AL.
(GORSUCH, J., dissenting)
[majority apply actual malice standard]
...............................................................................
121
Snyder v. Phelps p1383
.................................................................................................
121
6.
Hate speech
.......................................................................................................................
123
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota p1551 [content based regulation]
...................
123
Wisconsin v. Mitchellp1556
..........................................................................................
124
7.
Corporate/commercial speech p1723
.............................................................................
125
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission p1733
.............................................
125
8.
Content-neutral regulation
.............................................................................................
126
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015) [content based]
......................
126
United States v. O'Brien p1665 (symbolic speech) [intermediate scrutiny]
...............
127
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
......................................................................................
128
Schneider v. New Jersey
[content neutral] [no purpose of regulating content]
......
129
9.
Public vs. non-public forums
..........................................................................................
130
Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
...................................
130
10.
Prior Restraints
............................................................................................................
130
generally cannot regulate prior restraints
基本上事先禁止言论都是不行的
(see
Near v. State
of Minnesota ex rel. Olson
, 283 U.S. 697 (1931))
....................................................................
130
Rule
: Courts may not issue injunctions against the publication of newspapers, magazines, or
other periodicals deemed to be “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory” as such a court order
would constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of the press protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
................................................................................................
130
Appendix
........................................................................................................................................
131
Marbury v. Madison
...................................................................................................................
131
Allen v. Wright
...........................................................................................................................
132
McCulloch v. Maryland
..............................................................................................................
132
Baker v. Carr
...............................................................................................................................
133
Nixon v. United States
................................................................................................................
135
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
.........................................................
137
Arizona v. United States
.............................................................................................................
138
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey
............................................................................................
140
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (p543) 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
...................................
141
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
............................................................................
144
Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury
...............................................................
145
ZIVOTOFSKY EX REL. ZIVOTOFSKY v. KERRY
...............................................................
147
United States v. Nixon
................................................................................................................
148
Trump v. Vance
...........................................................................................................................
149
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983)
.......................................................
151
Morrison v. Olson
.......................................................................................................................
153
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)
....................................................................................
155
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II)
...................................................................................
156
Korematsu v. United States
........................................................................................................
157
Loving v. Virginia
.......................................................................................................................
159
Washington v. Davis
...................................................................................................................
160
Grutter v. Bollinger
.....................................................................................................................
161
Craig v. Boren
p860
..................................................................................................................
163
United States v. Virginia
.............................................................................................................
165
Romer v. Evans p901, review 911
..............................................................................................
166
Sugarman v. Dougall
..................................................................................................................
168
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (p941)
...............................................
169
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
..........................................................................
171
McDonald v. City of Chicago
.....................................................................................................
172
Lochner v. New York
..................................................................................................................
174
Nebbia v. New York
....................................................................................................................
176
west coast hotel co. v. parrish (1937)
.........................................................................................
177
Griswold v. Connecticut
.............................................................................................................
178
Roe v. Wade
................................................................................................................................
180
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
.......................................................................................
182
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
................................................................................................
184
Reed v. Town of Gilbert
.............................................................................................................
185
United States v. O'Brien
.............................................................................................................
187
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
....................................................................................................
188
Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
...................................................
190
Class 1: The Constitution’s text, structure, origin, and rationale;
Judicial review; Constitutional interpretation
1.
History led to the establishment of the U.S. Constitution
Slogan: No taxation without representation
Continental Congress
Two crucial ideas of the Declaration of independence:
People have inalienable right. (nature law arguments)
People can throw out the government because they have sovereign to form the
government.
Articles of Confederation
: different from the constitution
Create Equivalent of the U.S nation
Background: States totally independent from each other and go into conflicts
regarding import ect.
Significancy: 13 states agree to Coexist
Problem: weak central government: no power to tax, military, enforce treaties,
mediate conflict between states.
Part of the reason: rich people were afraid that their properties were going to be
deprived.
Result in: Rebellion of farmers, but the federal government has no right to force
an army. The thirteen states decided to gather for a new government.
2.
Constitution
Drafting a constitution with three branches:
Executive branch
President
Congress: regulate tax, enter into treaties, gather the army
Actual awkward circumstances: they were supposed to modify the Articles of
confederation. so they decide to propose the document and the new government
to the people (State ratifying convention).
1787 public of the Constitution
Constitution adopted in two years. But some states want a Bill of Right to protect
the power of people and limit the power of the federal government.
Debate
between
two
groups:
During
the
processing
of
the
Constitution
ratification, there is debate between two groups:
Federalist and Anti-federalist
Structure of the Constitution:
Article I
: § I Congress Power
: “All Legislative powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives”
establishes Congress & limits its powers
by words “herein granted,” but not “expressly” b/c there are also “implied”
powers
o
Art. I §§2-9: separate powers between Congress & the States
o
enumerated powers of Congress (§8) & limits of power (§9)
“a
Congress of the United States” as opposed to the Articles where
Congress
was
the United States
Article II
: Executive power
“shall be vested in a President of the United
States”
o
Art. II §2: non-exhaustive list, no definition of “executive power”
no
limiting language on that power, argument for a strong executive not
limited to the duties listed
Article III
: “The Judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish”
o
one
Supreme Court, all others will be inferior
o
§2: “the judicial power shall extend to…” implying a limit to that
extent
Article IV
governs relationships of the individual States with each other &
their citizens
Article V
: how to amend the constitution
Article VI
: supremacy & significance of the Constitution
3.
Federalist and Anti-federalist
Federalism
: promotes large republic system with
representative democracy
, system
checks & balances on domineering interests of factions
, heterogeneity championed
“Madisonian” view
Federalist No. 10
representative government
o
limits factionalism by increase in sphere of gov’t
o
limits factions through representatives who will refine/clarify citizens’
views & act in favor of common good
Federalist No. 51
separation of powers
among diff. gov’t branches to stave
off concentration of power in 1 particular branch
o
Congress most feared
cured through
bicameralism
(Senate &
House)
o
balance
ensured
vertically
(
federal
v.
state
relationship
)
&
horizontally (
judicial v. legislative v. executive relationship
)
Federalist No. 78
judicial review will not put Supreme Court above
other branches, but will ensure will of ppl will prevail
Antifederalism
:
small
town-hall
style democracy
,
emphasis
on
citizens
with
individualized/decentralized
power,
“civic
Republicanism,”
homogeneity
of
interests & affluence,
promoting virtue will keep factionalist domination at bay
“Jeffersonian” view
against federalist idea of representation
governing ourselves will increase political participation, establish a common
good, & inculcate civic virtue
Constitution is inconsistent with republicanism
strong
Federal
Government
removes
the
People
from
system
of
government
revolution fought against a large remote central government.
rights of the minorities
will be trampled & subjected to will of the majority
Federalists tend to wield
the power of factions (self-interested groups)
but
not to suppose that it can be avoided by small government
need
small, localized government
where people are as similar as possible &
as involved in the political process as possible (keep the democracy small with
the best application of direct democracy)
strong central government creates a threat of
tyranny
4.
Judicial Review
(补充)
Review of other branches of federal government
Federal Review of State Acts
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Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Analysis
debatably most important Constitutional Law case
Judge Marshall’s three-part Analysis:
1)
Did Marbury have right to his commission?
Yes. Marbury
did
have a right to his commission
denied by Secretary
Madison.
Because he was
lawfully appointed
to that position by the president's
act of signing his commission, further enforced by his confirmation in the
Senate. Moreover,
the Law did not require the commission to be
delivered
, only required write and sew.
Justice Marshall says we are “government of laws, not men” (must
uphold legal rights in all situations or else laws mean nothing)
2)
Was Marbury entitled to remedy?
Yes. Marbury
was entitled
to seek remedy of mandamus
enforcing his
right to commission
Madison's refusal to finalize Marbury’s appointment interferes with
Marbury’s legal title, and Marbury is entitled to a remedy under federal
law. Marbury is gov’t official prevented from performing official duty.
3)
Are there ways to remedy Marbury?
No.
Declares Judiciary Act “
repugnant to the Constitution
”.
Even
though a writ of mandamus would have been an appropriate remedy,
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
, which authorized the United
States Supreme Court to give such a remedy,
is unconstitutional
.
Because Three branches (Congress, president and court) are on the
same level.
法院无权干涉或改变其他两个
branch
的做法。
SCt has power to issue mandamus
Marshall reads Judiciary Act
as if SCt has
original jurisdiction
to issue, even though normal
reading would interpret as SCt only having appellate jurisdiction to
issue
o
if 2 possible readings of statute, avoid interpretation that
conflicts w/ Const (later embodied by Justice O’Connor)
Marshall intentionally chooses interpretation that conflicts
w/ Const
Marshall sidesteps political controversy by saying not w/in SCt
power to grant under Judiciary Act
interprets Const as limiting
SCt ability to issue mandamus only to appellate jurisdiction
Marshall’s
structuralist arguments
:
o
1) Congress has duty to check its own Const’l constraints are before it
enacts statutes
o
2)
job
of
Judiciary
to
determine
whether
other
2
branches
conflicting w/ Constitution & check on power of other 2 to
maintain balance of federal system
Marshall’s
textual arguments
:
o
1) “judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law & equity, arising
under this Constitution” [Article III § 2] as meaning
judiciary may
strike down Unconstitutional Congress laws
counterpoint:
does not expressly say SCt may strike down
Congr laws, why does this not just mean SCt evaluate Const’lty
of state actions
o
2)
Congress laws must be subservient to Constitution
[
Supremacy
Clause
/Article VI §1, Clause 2]
宪法是最高法
o
3)
judges have sworn oath to uphold Constitution
counterpoint:
but doesn’t
every
public officer do this too?
Significancy and Argument around Marshall’s Judgement:
Significancy
Establishes
Judicial
Review
(in
dicta,
not
in
main
holding),
where
Supreme Court is
sole interpreter of meaning of Constitution
& is
empowered to strike down laws that conflict with it
o
irony that Marshall
grabs
jud’l review power for Judiciary while at
same time
denying
his power to issue mandamus
o
jud’l review as instrument for legitimizing power of fed gov’t in eyes
of ppl
o
protects minority opinions & rights from domination by majority by
giving power to interpret Const to insulated lifetime justices
o
counterpoint:
Article III itself does not expressly delegate jud’l review
power to SCt (so framers did not envision such great power),
people
themselves upheld Const in Revolutionary days, may prevent Const
from evolving w/ times according to ppl’s will by giving power to
lifetime justices insulated from general populace
Arguments and disputes around Judicial Review:
(tension with democracy-judicial review is anti-democracy)
1.
Counter-majority problems: Non-elected
judges
can undo democratic
action of the representatives of people (the Congress).
for example, the Obama healthcare case. The Congress Acts usually
represents the majority of people, but the Supreme Court’s decisions were
only made by nine judges without election.
2.
Dead-hand problem: “we the people” (dead framers of Con from old time)
triumphs the people at present through the interpretation of constitution by
the judges.
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5.
Interpretation
-Supreme Court approaches to Constitutional interpretation:
textualist
(代表人物
Justice Scalia
)
: ordinary meaning of text of law should
govern its interpretation, can be vague/indeterminate,
structuralist
: look to overall Constitutional arrangement of officers, powers, &
relationships
adhering
to
structural
constraints
of
federal
system
(federalism), separation of powers, democracy
originalist
(
代表人物
Justice Thomas): looking to original framers’ intent &
how original federal system functioned & not imposing new interpretations
foreign to original intention,
vs.
living constitution
formalist
: branches of gov’t must adhere to strict interpretation of roles
enumerated in Constitution
functionalist
: Constitution does not address most separation of powers issues
raised in modern government & innovative power structures should be
allowed as long as they don't allow one branch of gov’t to become too
powerful
- Textualist
(代表人物:
Justice Scalia
):法律文本的普通含义应支配其解
释,可以是模糊的
/
不确定的。
- Structuralist
:关注官员、权力和关系的整体宪法安排,遵守联邦制度(联
邦制)、分权、民主的结构限制。
- Originalist
(代表人物:托马斯大法官):关注原始制定者的意图和原始
联邦制度的运作方式,不强加与原始意图无关的新解释。
- vs. living Constitution
- Formalist
:政府各部门必须遵守对宪法所列举角色的严格解释
- Functionalist
:宪法没有解决现代政府中的大多数权力分立问题,只要不
允许政府的一个部门变得过于强大,就应该允许创新的权力结构。
Class 2: Limits on the judicial power, Federalism and the powers of
Congress
1.
Why do we need interpretation of the Constitution?
the test of the constitution:
which specifies the issue- not specified- So need Interpretation- refer to Case law
2.
stare decisis
(precedent): the legal principle of determining points in litigation
according to precedent
they are very difficult to reverse unless reverse the case by:
good reason from Supreme Court
or add new amendments
3.
Ways to interpret the constitution
(elements the judges may bear in mind when
interpretation):
text, original meaning, structure, natural law, tradition, precedent, policy choice,
morality
Case:
District of Columbia v. Heller
p152
Public’s agreed meaning of “bear arm”
1.
Judicial Restraint (limits on the judicial power)
-
Political Question doctrine
:
political matters are nonjusticiable & cannot be
heard by SCt & best resolved by citizens through the political process
keeps Judiciary out of the territory of the other 2 branches
much gov’t conduct off limits from jud’l review
narrow view of SCt’s role
nonjusticiable issue if expressly given to another
branch
prudential view of SCt’s role
by not ruling on political questions, SCt
preserves its capital for in which SCt has ability to rule (
Baker
dissent)
-other limits on jud’l review
:
case or controversy requirement (also no advisory opinion
-the Supreme Court did
not answer the hypothetical questions)
:
Article III §2 only allows SCt to
invalidate legislative or executive actions only if brought to SCt in context of
Const’l
issue
in
case
(cannot
police
Const’l
issues
outside
cases
or
controversies)
standing [actual harm standard]
:
person bringing suit must have personal stake
in claim made, autonomy & self-determination preserved by allowing those
actually injured to seek remedies
(but sometimes ignorance/poverty/alienation
of those injured may prevent such suits)
ripeness
: cases too premature/speculative to merit jud’l intervention(
案件太早
/
猜
测性太强,不值得司法干预
)
-exemption of ripeness: e.g. surveillance happened before, but the person injured
at that time did not know about it. The person may sue after then surveillance on
the ground that the surveillance may happen again.
mootness
: SCt cannot hear cases too late where issue resolved itself(
在问题自行
解决的情况下,最高法院不能太晚审理案件。
)
Standing Doctrine
General Rule:
person bringing suit must have personal stake in claim made,
autonomy & self-determination preserved by allowing those actually injured to seek
remedies
Case: Allen v. Wright
Background:
Segregation of black and white children in school; IRS is given private school tax
exemption, and this action violated the anti-discrimination law of the constitution.
Three-factor test:
1. Personal injury:
the plaintiff must have a concrete and personalized stigma or
injury.
—First allegation: it is not concrete because it is particularly applied to an individual
but all African-Americans.
whether the personal injury is concrete can be very controversial.
—Second allegation: dose present harm that the respondents’ children are being
denied an integrated educational experience.
2. Causation:
traceable to the defendant’s behavior
Court: the plaintiff failed to show the causation because
3. Redressability
(可补偿性)
2.
Political question doctrine
The reason that the Court did not hear political questions:
The judicial and executive and legislative branches are at the same level, so it is
not within the power of Court to tell how the political issues should be addressed;
If solved, will show disrespect to political branches and even lead to potential
embarrassment
text of constitution (separation of powers)
lack of judicial discovery eligibility: that the Court can’t solve the political issue
(not its expertise)
Note:
无特定标准,
doctrines are case-based and varies in other cases)
Baker v. Carr: p257
Rule: A challenge to malapportionment
立法机构代表分配不均
of state legislatures
brought under the Equal Protection Clause is not a political question and is thus
justiciable.
Impeachment: Nixon v. United States: p262
Rule of Law
The constitutionality of
Senate impeachment proceedings
is a non-justiciable
political question
incapable of judicial adjudication.
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Walter Nixon (plaintiff) was a former federal district court judge who was convicted
of perjury and sentenced to prison. He refused to resign his commission even after
incarceration, and the United States House of Representatives began impeachment
proceedings against him. The matter was referred to the United States Senate to vote
on Nixon’s removal. The Senate appointed a special committee to receive evidence
and hear testimony in the case and then to report their findings to the full Senate.
Nixon instituted this suit arguing that the Senate’s creation of a special committee to
hear the case violated the Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 constitutional requirement that
all impeached persons be “tried by the Senate.” Nixon sought a declaratory judgment
that his impeachment conviction was void and that his judicial salary and privileges
should be reinstated.
沃尔特
-
尼克松(原告)是一名前联邦地区法院法官,他被判定犯有伪证罪并被
判处监禁。他在入狱后仍拒绝辞去职务,美国众议院开始对他进行弹劾程序。此
事被提交给美国参议院,就尼克松的免职进行表决。参议院任命了一个特别委员
会来接受证据和听取证词,然后向参议院全体会议报告他们的调查结果。尼克松
提起此诉讼,认为参议院设立特别委员会审理此案违反了第一条第
3
款第
6
项
宪法规定,即所有被弹劾的人都应
"
由参议院审理
"
。尼克松要求作出宣告性判
决,即对他的弹劾定罪无效,并恢复他的司法工资和特权。
Reasons:
1.
the Senate “sole” power to try impeachments
: the Court concluded that “the
Senate alone shall have authority to determine whether an individual should be
acquitted or convicted.”
2.
the lack of finality
and the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel against
justiciability
.
3.
Concerns for separation of power
: the impeachment is the only way for the
other branches to check the power of the judicial branch.
Supreme Court also bars challenges to Partisan Gerrymandering in recent years (see
the article)
3.
Federalism and boundary between power of State and Federal States: police
power- (10th amendment and section 8 of the constitution)
Federalism:
separation of power
between state and federal (Congress)
o
State
police power – state exercise general sovereign authority
10
th
amendment: Rights Reserved to States or People: The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
o
Federal
limited enumerated power in Article 1 section 8
Article 1 section 8: Powers of Congress
If not congress, then it is people’s /state’s power.
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers (section 8)
Major issue: the boundary between power of state and federal government.
Advantages of Federalism
(1) Effective legislation by the Congress
(2) Individual choice/local legislation more tailor to each State
(3) Helps prevent accumulation of power in federal government
McCulloch v. Maryland
(p159 the case and p171 the note)
The power of tax is the power to destroy.
The
premise
here
is
that
the
constitution
is
not
signed
between
the
federal
governments and states, but the majority of people.
Rule of Law
The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress the power to tax and spend
for the general welfare, and to make such other laws as it deems necessary and
proper to carry out this enumerated power. Additionally, federal laws are supreme
and states may not make laws that interfere with the federal government’s
exercise of its constitutional powers.
Fact
In 1816, Congress passed an act that incorporated the Bank of the United States.
In 1817, the Bank opened up a branch in the state of Maryland (plaintiff). In 1818,
the Maryland state legislature passed an act to impose a tax on all out-of-state
banks operating in the state of Maryland. Although the act was general in nature,
the Bank of the United States was the only such bank in Maryland at that time
and was thus the only establishment affected by the tax. James McCulloch
(defendant), head of the Maryland branch of the Bank of the United States (Bank),
refused to pay the tax. This lawsuit ensued and the case was appealed to the
Maryland Court of Appeals. The court of appeals upheld Maryland’s argument
that because the Constitution was specifically silent on the subject of whether the
United States government could charter a bank, the Bank of the United States was
unconstitutional. The case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
1816
年,国会通过了一项法案,成立了美国银行。
1817
年,该银行在马里
兰州开设了一家分行(原告)。
1818
年,马里兰州立法机构通过一项法案,
对所有在马里兰州经营的州外银行征税。虽然该法案具有普遍性,但美国银
行是当时马里兰州唯一一家这样的银行,因此是唯一一家受该税影响的机构。
美国银行(
Bank
)马里兰州分行的负责人
James McCulloch
(被告)拒绝支
付该税。这场诉讼随之而来,该案被上诉到马里兰州上诉法院。上诉法院支
持马里兰州的论点,即由于宪法对美国政府是否可以特许银行的问题没有明
确规定,美国银行是违宪的。随后,该案被上诉到美国最高法院。
Issue
(1) Does Congress have implied constitutional power to create a bank?
(2) If so, may individual states tax a federally created bank?
Reasoning (By Judge Marshall)
(1)
Yes.
Congress has both enumerated power explicitly stated in the Constitution
and implied power as well.
The power of Congress can be reasonably implied
from the Constitution’s
Necessary and Proper Clause, which states that Congress may
“create laws it
deems necessary and proper to help carry out its enumerated powers.”
(2) No.
Federal Law supreme.
If the Congress has the power to create the bank,
it has the power to preserve it, so Maryland cannot impose tax on the bank.
Maryland’s argument: it is not necessary to create a bank. Even if it is ok to have
a bank, the state has the police power to decide on it.
Marshall redefined “necessary” to mean “appropriate and legitimate,”
--necessary typically means that no less intrusive means could be applied, but
Marshall just redefined it.
covering all methods for furthering objectives covered by the enumerated powers
even those powers are not explicitly outlined in the US constitution (
which
established the implied powers of Congress
)
Class 3 & 4: The powers of Congress: The Commerce Clause,
taxation and spending power, preemption and the dormant
commerce clause
I. Commerce clause
Article 1 section 8 (3)-necessary and proper: “commerce clause”:
“To
regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and
among the several States
,
and with the Indian Tribes.”
Purpose
: to eliminate the trade board (trade protectionism)
贸易保护主义
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Roadmap
Summary
1.
Two approaches:
1)
Formalist approach:
direct or indirect
effect test (
Schechter
)
manufacturing, production and labor are purely local activities-
indirect
effect on the interstate commerce
2)
Realist approach:
substantial
effect test (
NLRB, Wickard
)
4 factor test:
o
Economic:
Congress
may
regulate
non-economic
activity
if
it
substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate.
o
Activity: ongoing economic activity
o
Jurisdiction element: if there is a judicial connection between the issue in
argument with interstate commerce
o
Limiting principle: no limitation for the congress that it can just regulate
virtually any activity
2.
How to apply the rule? (Sample question)
Problem
: Suppose that after the Supreme Court's ruling in
United States v.
Lopez
, Congress amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act in attempt to remedy
its Constitutional deficiencies. The amended law now makes it a federal crime:
o
(A) for any firearm manufacturer to ship a firearm from one State into
another State that has a firearm death rate of more than 11 deaths per
100,000 people; and
use Darby and Champaign case
-directly regulate the interstate commerce
o
(B) for any firearm manufacturer to produce a firearm that does not
include a safety trigger lock; and
not in the scope of interstate commerce
- because the firearm manufacturer did not cross the state boundary
have substantial effect on interstate commerce? Factors taken into account:
1)
ecomoic or non-ecomomic:
regulated the production (economic) but mostly
non-economic
2)
activity or inactivity:
--
ongoing economic activity;
--
inactivity arguments: the manufacturer would not produce the safety trigger
lock if it is not regulated
-
-argue the aggregate rule: it is a part of a bigger market? a single gun may not
affect the IC, but the whole collection of firearm may affect.
3)
jurisdiction connection:
seldom referred to in the precedent
4)
limiting principles:
no limitation for the congress that it can just regulate
virtually any activity
1.
History
1.
Initial Broad Interpretation 1824-1880s
2.
Early Formalism 1880s-1937
3.
New Deal "Realism" 1937-
4.
Lopez: New limits 1995-
2.
Phase 1
Gibbons v. Ogden
by Justice Marshall
Fact
Ogden (plaintiff) received a license under New York state law that purported to give
him the exclusive right to operate steamboats in New York
waters. Gibbons
(defendant) sought and obtained a similar license from the federal government, which
Gibbons used to compete with Ogden in the same water route that Ogden was using.
To protect his monopoly license, Ogden filed suit in the New York Court of Chancery
to enjoin Gibbons from operating his boats in New York waters. Gibbons argued that
he was operating his boats pursuant to an order of Congress, and that Congress has
exclusive power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to regulate interstate
commerce. The New York Court of Chancery found in favor of Ogden and issued an
injunction to restrict Gibbons from operating his boats. Gibbons appealed the case to
the Court of Errors of New York, which affirmed the decision. Gibbons appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
Ogden
(原告)根据纽约州的法律获得了一份许可证,该许可证旨在赋予他在纽
约水域经营汽船的独家权利。吉本斯(被告)向联邦政府寻求并获得了类似的许
可证,吉本斯利用该许可证在奥格登使用的同一水域路线上与奥格登竞争。为了
保护他的垄断许可证,奥格登向纽约大法官法院提起诉讼,禁止吉本斯在纽约水
域经营他的船只。吉本斯辩称,他是根据国会的命令经营他的船只,而根据宪法
第一条第
8
款,国会拥有监管州际商业的专属权力。纽约大法官法院裁定奥格登
胜诉,并发布禁令,限制吉本斯经营他的船只。吉本斯就该案向纽约错误法院提
出上诉,该法院确认了该裁决。吉本斯向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Issue
If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce,
does the state law govern?
Reasoning by Marshall
Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce, the power is “plenary”.
“Commerce”: it includes
all kinds of interstate commercial activities
. The word
“commerce” includes traffic,
intercourse
(
交通往来
), and navigation, as well as
commodities associated with interstate commerce.
“Among several states”:
o
includes interstate commerce “power to regulate doesn’t stop at a state’s
boarder”
o
indicates intrastate commerce that affects
interstate commerce
Regulate:
power to regulate is “plenary”
Significancy of
Phase 2
laissez faire time (
自由放任,政府不作为时期
): tend to have narrow interpretation of
the commerce clause
Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case)
Rule of Law
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Congress may
not
use its Commerce Clause power to
regulate child labor in the
states as this is a purely local matter.
Facts
In 1916, in response to increasing concerns over child labor conditions in mills and
factories, Congress passed the Keating-Owen Act which prohibited goods made by
children under a certain age from being sold in interstate commerce. Dagenhart
(plaintiff) brought suit on behalf of himself and his two sons, who were minor
children employed in a cotton mill in North Carolina, against Hammer (defendant), a
United States attorney, alleging that the Act was an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause Power. The District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina held that Congress acted unconstitutionally in attempting to regulate a
purely local matter. Both Hammer and the United States appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
1916
年,为了回应人们对磨坊和工厂的童工状况越来越多的关注,国会通过了
《基廷
-
欧文法》,禁止由未满一定年龄的儿童制造的商品在州际商业中出售。
达根哈特(原告)代表自己和他的两个儿子(他们是受雇于北卡罗来纳州一家棉
花厂的未成年儿童)对美国律师哈默(被告)提起诉讼,声称该法案是对国会商
业条款权力的违宪行使。北卡罗来纳州西区地区法院认为,国会试图管制一个纯
粹的地方事务,是违宪的行为。哈默和美国都向美国最高法院提出了上诉。
Child Labor Act of 1916 prohibiting
shipment of interstate goods produced
in factories unfairly employing child labor
UnConst’l
Reasoning
Labor issue
只和
production and manufacture of goods
有关,和
stream of
interstate commerce
没 有 关 系 , 因 此
labor issue
和
production and
manufacture of goods
都不是
interstate commerce
.
The
Court
ruled
that
Child
labor
relates
to
the
production
and
manufacture of goods
, and bears no relationship to the entry of those goods
into the streams of interstate commerce
.
是州内商业不是州际商业
Congress may only regulate goods in interstate commerce, not regulate
state
production
narrows
Gibbons
(all stages)
“
commerce” definition
o
regulating hours of labor entrusted to “state authority”
wages &
hours
are
at
production
stage
before
exchange
over
interstate
commerce
o
rejected
argument
that
fed
legislation
needed
to
prevent
unfair
competition
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o
SCt fearful that allowing this legislation would unravel whole federal
system
The Court also ruled that it is
purely local issue that should be regulated by
individual states (state police power)
.
是州权
Federal government argument: it constituted unfair competition among the
states (as child labor is less expensive and some states will benefit from it
while other not)
--The court ruled that the purpose of the Act is to seek to standardize child labor
regulations among the states rather than promote interstate commerce as required
by the Constitution.
目的与商业无关
This is a rather narrow interpretation over the commerce clause.
dissent
(Justice Holmes):
o
Congress has been given power to regulate by Constitution & SCt
should not void it b/c of its indirect effects
o
civilized world recognizes “evil of premature and excessive child
labor”
o
states no longer w/in their separate sovereign sphere when ship
products across state lines (nat’l welfare now at stake)
o
SCt should not be engaging in pretext analysis over motives of
Congress to curb child labor
Historical event: laissez faire time ended and financial crisis began (great
depression)
A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States
Fact
A.L.A.
Schechter
Poultry
Corp.
(defendant)
operated
wholesale
poultry
slaughterhouse markets in Brooklyn, New York. Ordinarily, Schechter bought live
poultry in New York City or occasionally in Philadelphia for slaughter and resale.
When the poultry reached Schechter's Brooklyn markets, it was slaughtered and
locally sold to poultry retailers and butchers who dealt directly with consumers.
Schechter did not sell poultry in interstate commerce. Schechter was convicted of 18
counts of violating the Live Poultry Code (LPC) regulations passed by Congress and
with one count of conspiracy to violate the LPC. Schechter’s violations of the LPC
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included issues relating to its employees’ hours and wages and the quality of its
poultry products sold to local New York retailers. Schechter appealed its convictions
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, alleging that Congress
exceeded its power to regulate interstate commerce by passing regulations over
Schechter’s in-state activities. Additionally, Schechter argued that the president
engaged
in
impermissible lawmaking
by
having
full
discretion
to
approve
or
disapprove the LPC provisions. The appellate court sustained the convictions on 16
counts
but
reversed
the
conspiracy
charge
and
two
convictions
pertaining
to
Schechter’s improper labor standards. The circuit court ruled that the regulations were
beyond Congress’s power to regulate and that the president engaged in impermissible
lawmaking functions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. (
被告)在纽约布鲁克林经营家禽屠宰场批发市场。
通常情况下,
Schechter
公司在纽约市或偶尔在费城购买活的家禽进行屠宰和转
售。当家禽到达
Schechter
的布鲁克林市场时,它们被屠宰并在当地出售给直接
与消费者交易的家禽零售商和屠夫。
Schechter
并没有在州际贸易中销售家禽。
Schechter
被判定犯有
18
项违反国会通过的《活家禽法》(
LPC
)规定的罪行,
以及一项阴谋违反
LPC
的罪行。
LPC
是根据《国家工业复兴法》第
3
条颁布的,
该法授权美国总统批准某一行业或产业的
"
公平竞争守则
"
。
Schechter
违反
LPC
的行为包括有关其雇员的工作时间和工资以及出售给纽约当地零售商的家禽产
品的质量问题。
Schechter
就其定罪向美国第二巡回上诉法院提出上诉,声称国
会通过对
Schechter
的州内活动的监管,超越了其监管州际商业的权力。此外,
Schechter
认为,总统拥有批准或不批准
LPC
条款的充分自由裁量权,从而从事
了不被允许的立法工作。上诉法院维持了对
16
项罪名的定罪,但推翻了共谋指
控和与谢克特的不正当劳动标准有关的两项定罪。巡回法院裁定,这些规定超出
了国会的监管权力,总统从事了不被允许的立法职能。美国最高法院批准了诉讼
请求。
Reasoning
The Poultry business is
not interstate commerce
.
The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry
ended when they are
sent to New York.
The slaughtering and sales were intrastate commerce.
The Poultry business (intrastate commerce
has no direct effect
on interstate
commerce)
The direct vs. indirect effect test (formalist approach)
:
indirect effect, because:
1)
such transactions
remain within the domain of state power
(ended in
the slaughterhouse) ;
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2)
no direct relation to interstate commerce (production of poultry was in the
state).
The concern of the court is that there may be no limits for the congress to
interfere with the intrastate commerce if it allows such kind of indirect
connection
.(
如果让
Congress
管周内商业,会大大扩充政府的权力
)
Roadmap
:
Nat’l Industrial Recovery Act attempted to regulate wages, hours, prices, &
require purchase of whole poultry shipments (incl. sick chickens)
held
UnConst’l
(Justice Hughes)
Congress may not regulate where not within “stream of commerce”
interstate flow had halted w/in state, chickens slaughtered, & then locally
resold as separate products
o
regulating wages, hours, etc therefore interferes with
local business
concurrence
(Justices Cardozo & Stone)
o
subverts distinction b/w local & nat’l commerce
would allow
anything to be deemed interstate & destroy whole federal system
counterarguments:
o
there are multiple segments of interstate commerce
train stationary
in state outside of “interstate commerce”, but before & after pause
qualifies as interstate commerce
o
arbitrary drawing up of “interstate” lines here
these are the same
chickens that were shipped & were transported via interstate methods
o
allows competitive discrimination to go unregulated
Schechter
would undercut farmers beyond state line who raise chickens regulated
by their state’s law (which Schechter would not have to follow)
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
Similar to the Schechter to apply the formalist approach:
indirect affect, the state power
Roadmap
:
Bituminous
Coal
Conservation
Act
created
labor
boards
for
employee
collective bargaining
held UnConst’l
(Justice Southerland)
Congress may not regulate production stage (employment, wages, hours,
working conditions, & bargaining), only trade itself
o
temporal distinction b/w stages of interstate commerce, in terms of
beginning
&
end
of “interstate commerce” (
E.C. Knight
)
o
everything
that moves in interstate commerce has had a local origin
(
Schechter
)
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o
costs obtaining coordinated state action justified to prevent threats to
federalist values
o
distinction b/w “direct” & “indirect” effect
depends on manner in
which effect brought about, not upon magnitude of cause or effect
mining stage is not “interstate commerce”
these evils are
local evils to be resolved using state power, not federal power
Then New Deal became profound popular among people, but still many legislations in
Packing plans were struck down by the conservative court.
The president wanted to have more seats in Supreme Court because they want
the new deal laws passed. (they have the basis of productivity but actually it is
much more political)
Hence the political pressure may be one reason that the court changed its
views.
3.
Phase 3: New Deal "Realism"
NLRB V. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
Rule of Law
Congress may regulate
labor relations
under its Commerce Clause power because
labor relations have a close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce
that their control is essential to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.
Facts
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which created
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (defendant) to enforce federal fair labor
practice standards, including the right of employees to unionize. After Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. (JLSC) (plaintiff) fired ten employees that attempted to unionize
at one of its Pennsylvania plants, the NLRB sanctioned the company for engaging in
discriminatory employment practices in violation of federal standards. JLSC brought
suit alleging that the NLRA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s interstate
commerce power, and the lower courts agreed. The NLRB appealed to the Supreme
Court.
1935
年,国会通过了《国家劳动关系法》(
NLRA
),该法设立了国家劳动关系
委员会(
NLRB
)(被告),以执行联邦公平劳动实践标准,包括雇员组织工会
的权利。在
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (JLSC)
(原告)解雇了试图在其宾夕法
尼亚州一家工厂成立工会的
10
名员工,
NLRB
对该公司违反联邦标准的歧视性
就业行为进行了制裁。
JLSC
提起诉讼,声称
NLRA
是对国会州际商业权力的违
宪行使,下级法院同意。
NLRB
向最高法院提出上诉。
Reasoning
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The power to regulate interstate commerce is
plenary
and is vested solely in
Congress.
Labor relations have a close and substantial relationship to interstate
commerce
substantial effect test (realist approach)
JLSC is a very large company that operated interstate commerce (compared to
Schechter)
Note: realist approach focused more on the facts of the cases
rather than the court's
conception about the federal and state powers.
Roadmap:
Nat’l Labor Relations Act est’d comprehensive system regulating labor-mgmt
relations practices
held Const’l
(Justice Hughes)
Congress has power to protect against burdens from activities having
“close & substantial relations” to interstate commerce
more flexible
direct/indirect test
o
Congress cannot be denied power to control intrastate industrial
strike (effect of unfair labor practices regulated) threatening to
obstruct interstate commerce
o
defers to Congressional findings making strong connection to interstate
commerce
o
ends prior
SCt pattern of striking down New Deal legislation
&
greatly increases Congress Commerce Power
dissent
(Justice McReynolds):
o
Congress interference w/in states should be limited to “direct and
material” violations (like taxation on property that indirectly but
seriously affects cost of transportation,
Shreveport Rate Case
)
Congress has overreached b/c relation is too attenuated
United States v. Darby (1941)
Rule of Law
Congress may regulate the
labor standards
involved in the
manufacture of goods
for interstate commerce
and may exclude from interstate commerce any goods
produced under substandard labor conditions.
Facts
Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to prevent the introduction and
shipment of goods produced under labor conditions that failed to meet federal
standards from entering the stream of interstate commerce. The United States
government (plaintiff) brought suit in the District Court for the Southern District of
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Georgia against Darby Lumber Company (defendant) alleging that the company
engaged in labor practices that fell short of the FLSA’s standards with the intent of
manufacturing goods to be sold in interstate commerce. The district court quashed the
indictment of Darby, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States government
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
国会通过了《公平劳动标准法》(
FLSA
),以防止在不符合联邦标准的劳动条
件下生产的商品进入州际商业流。美国政府(原告)在佐治亚州南区地区法院对
达比木材公司(被告)提起诉讼,指控该公司从事不符合《公平劳动标准法》标
准的劳动行为,目的是为了制造在州际商业中销售的货物。地区法院撤销了对
Darby
的起诉,上诉法院维持原判。美国政府向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Reasoning
While
manufacturing is not itself interstate commerce
,
the shipment of
manufactured
goods
between
states
falls
within
the
definition
of
commerce
and is thus capable of regulation by Congress under its plenary
Commerce Clause powers.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), holding that Congress may
regulate only articles of commerce themselves and not the conditions under
which they are produced, is overruled.
Significancy
It overruled Schechter & Child Labor Case
Schechter & Child Labor Case
里说
Labor and production or manufacturer of
goods, even for cross-border shipment is not interstate commerce and does not
have direct effect on interstate commerce.
本案中明确提到
labor and manufacturer of goods related to interstate
transportation
就是
interstate commerce.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
prohibited shipment of goods made by
workers paid below federal minimum wage/above maximum hours
held
Const’l
(Justice Stone)
Congress power to regulate interstate commerce neither enlarged nor
diminished by non-exercise/exercise of state power &
may act to prevent
states from using sub-standard practices to gain advantage w/in interstate
commerce
(disadv’s states following more costly standards)
o
SCt will no longer allow pretext analysis of Congress to enter ct
rulings
in no position to judge this
o
10
th
Amendment has no independent power to
intrude upon
plenary
power of Congress acting w/in its Const’l constraints
(state
powers irrelevant here)
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10
th
Amdmt just meant to ensure Congress does not act without
its Const’l powers & it has not done so here
o
echoes
McCulloch
’s
rational
basis
review
(means-end
regulation)
Congress may regulate production here b/c it has
prohibited shipment of goods created by this production
o
could also cite
Lottery Case
rejects separate stages of commerce
o
this is a necessary interplay b/w needs of the People & SCt
SCt must
focus on what ppl of U.S. as whole need
no dissent voiced
counterarguments?
o
nearly overrules
Schechter & Child Labor Case
work practices are
at the
production
stage
o
danger of Congressional general police power
counter-counterpoint
: no danger b/c limited to only that which
obstructs interstate commerce
Wickard v. Filburn (1942)
Rule of Law
(开创了一个新原则:
local activity
也可以管)
Congress may regulate
local activity (non-economic activity)
if that activity
exerts a
substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce.
Fact
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt and the
Democratic-controlled Congress passed many “New Deal” programs designed to
improve the poor economic climate in the United States. One such program was the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which limited the area that farmers could
devote to wheat production in an effort to stabilize the national price of wheat. Filburn
(plaintiff), a small farmer, was penalized pursuant to the Act for producing wheat in
excess of the Act's quotas. Filburn filed suit against Secretary of Agriculture Wickard
(defendant), seeking to enjoin enforcement against himself of the penalties. Filburn
argued that because the excess wheat was produced for his own private consumption
and never entered the stream of commerce, his activities could not be regulated by
Congress under the Commerce Clause. The district court agreed with Filburn that
Congress’s regulations were unconstitutional, and the circuit court affirmed. Wickard
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
在
20
世纪
30
年代的大萧条期间,富兰克林
-
罗斯福总统和民主党控制的国会通
过了许多
"
新政
"
计划,旨在改善美国的恶劣经济环境。其中一个计划是
1938
年的《农业调整法》,该法限制了农民用于小麦生产的面积,以稳定全国的小麦
价格。小农
Filburn
(原告)因生产小麦超过法案规定的配额而受到该法案的处
罚。
Filburn
对农业部长
Wickard
(被告)提起诉讼,要求禁止对他自己执行处罚。
Filburn
认为,由于过量的小麦是为他自己的私人消费而生产的,从未进入商业
流通领域,根据商业条款,他的活动不能受到国会的管制。地区法院同意
Filburn
的观点,认为国会的规定是违宪的,巡回法院维持原判。维卡德向美国最高法院
提出上诉。
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Reasoning
The local activity has substantial effect on the interstate commerce:
By growing his own wheat, Filburn decreases the amount of wheat purchased
in the market and negatively impacts the price of wheat grown for interstate
commerce.
Aggregated Method:
Filburn himself has only small effect on the IC, but the
court should take into consideration the aggregate (
When taken together
with all the other farmers similarly situated, Filburn’s activity has a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.
)
Note: The background of this case is that the emergency (great depression) occurred.
—who decided the emergency? maybe the congress
Roadmap
Agricultural Adjustment Act sets quota for wheat production b/c total wheat
supply would exceed normal yr’s domestic consumption & export needs
held Const’l
(Justice Jackson)
if
local
activity
exerts
substantial
aggregate
economic
effect
(not
necessarily
individual
’s effect),
Congress can regulate even though not
facially related to interstate commerce
o
no longer earlier indirect v. direct effects formula of earlier Commerce
cases
o
Congress must be able to restrict both what produced for mkt &
also what withheld from mkt b/c significantly influence prices &
mkt conditions
tend to flow into mkt if prices go up
if not entered into mkt, these products satisfy local needs that
would otherwise be met by mkt purchases
o
no more distinctions b/w stages of commerce
o
in line w/
Gibbons
view of expansive Commerce power
counterarguments
:
o
dangerous to allow federal political officials to use Commerce power
to become sole judges of limits of own power
o
state/local interests not protected by national political process, need
judicial review to step in
Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States
Rule of Law
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Congress may
enact regulations that prevent racially discriminatory policies
in
hotel accommodations because of the
negative effects of those policies on interstate
commerce.
Facts
In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Title II of the CRA forbids
racial
discrimination
by
places
of
public
accommodation
such
as
hotels
and
restaurants. The Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. (plaintiff) in Atlanta, Georgia advertises
to and hosts primarily out-of-state guests. The motel practices a policy of refusing to
rent rooms to African Americans and brought this suit against the United States
government (defendant) in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to
challenge the CRA as an unconstitutional extension of Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce. The district court upheld the CRA as constitutional. The court of
appeals affirmed. Heart of Atlanta appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
1964
年,国会通过了《民权法案》(
CRA
)。
CRA
第二章禁止公共住宿场所(如
酒店和餐馆)的种族歧视。位于乔治亚州亚特兰大的
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
(
原告
)
在佐治亚州亚特兰大市的广告中,主要接待州外的客人。该汽车旅馆实行
拒绝向非裔美国人出租房间的政策,并在佐治亚州北区地区法院对美国政府(被
告)提起诉讼,质疑
CRA
是对国会监管州际商业权力的违宪延伸。地区法院维
持了
CRA
的宪法地位。上诉法院确认了这一点。亚特兰大之心公司向美国最高
法院提出上诉。
Reasoning
Congress may act against discrimination where aggregate qualitative &
quantitative impact on interstate commerce
o
racial discrimination disrupts commerce among states by discouraging
travel of substantial portion of U.S. population (
aggregate effect
)
Congress may remove this obstruction to commerce
o
Congress motives behind this use of Commerce Clause clearly moral
o
rational basis
review
:
means
by
which
Congress
acts
must be
reasonably adapted to end
Note: private entities that discriminate against people are not in violation of 14th
amendment because the state power is not involved.
-So the commerce clause is applied. The Congress acted against the Act to regulate
interstate commerce issues.
注意:歧视人的私人实体并不违反第
14
条修正案,因为不涉及国家权力。
(14
th
amendment
只禁止国家针对个人的歧视,而不禁止私人之间的歧视
)
-
所以适用商业条款。国会对该法采取行动,以规范州际商业问题。
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4.
Phase 4: 1995-present
United States v. Lopez (1995)
Rule of Law
Congress may not, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, pass a law that prohibits
the possession of a gun near a school.
Facts
In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA), making it a
federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm in a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Lopez
(defendant), a student who brought a gun to his high school, was confronted by school
authorities, arrested, and charged with violating the GFSZA. Lopez was tried and
convicted. In his appeal, he brought suit against the United States government
(plaintiff), challenging the constitutionality of the GFSZA as a regulation based on
Congress’s Commerce Clause power. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed with Lopez and reversed his conviction. The United States petitioned for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which granted the petition.
1990
年,国会通过了《无枪学校区法》(
Gun-Free School Zones Act
,
GFSZA
),
规定
"
任何个人在明知或有合理理由相信是学校区域的情况下,故意拥有枪支
"
是一项联邦罪行。洛佩兹(被告)是一名将枪支带入其高中的学生,他被学校
当局当场逮捕,并被指控违反了
GFSZA
。洛佩兹受到审判并被定罪。在他的上
诉中,他对美国政府(原告)提起诉讼,质疑
GFSZA
作为基于国会商业条款权
力的法规是否符合宪法。第五巡回上诉法院同意洛佩兹的意见,推翻了对他的定
罪。美国向美国最高法院提出了诉讼请求,最高法院批准了该请求。
Reasoning
Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activities:
(1) use of
interstate channels, (2) instrumentalities/persons/things in interstate commerce,
or (3) activities substantially affecting interstate commerce or
substantially
relating to interstate commerce
Here, the analysis should focus on the third categories
The court has to focus on
4 factors
to decide whether the activity has
substantial effect on the IC:
1.
is this activity economic?
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Court: The GFSZA is a criminal statute having nothing to do with “commerce”
or any economic enterprise.
2. Is there a jurisdictional element?
Jurisdictional element: ensures that the particular instance of the activity being
regulated has some sort of a connection to interstate commerce.
3. Activity?
The Congress
can only regulate on-going economic activity instead of
create economic activity.
E.g.
奥巴马医保案
4. Is there any limiting principle?
There will be no limitation for the Congress that it can just regulate virtually
any activity.
non-economic activity: only regulates it if it substantially affects IC in the
aggregate-no substantial effect in this case
-
高度可能性
(apply proximate link
here)
Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activities:
(1) use
of
interstate
channels,
(2)
instrumentalities/persons/things
in
interstate
commerce, or (3) activities substantially affecting interstate commerce or
substantially relating to interstate commerce (test in this case)
insufficient
claim
that
guns
near
school
(the
firearm
possession in question was not buying or selling) may result
in violent crime to substantially adverse effect on economy
lacks sufficient proof that gun had been part of interstate
commerce
limiting principles? There will be no limitation for the
Congress that it can just regulate virtually any activity.
concurrence
(Kennedy & O’Connor):
most states already have gun safety laws having same goals as this federal
law & must protect states’ rights to handle matter
wholly unjustified; commerce clause should be limited in a very narrow scope:
buying, selling and possibly the transportation of goods.
dissent
(Breyer)
cumulative
effect
of
similar
instances
when
determine
whether
the
activity affects interstate commerce.
o
local instances as whole
create nat’ly significant problem
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guns
in
schools
do
negative
impact
on
economy
by
threatening ability to teach basic skills
like
Katzenbach
, bizs & families less likely to locate where
violence exists
o
difficult to distinguish “commercial” v. “noncommercial” here
noncomm’l activities of teaching basic skills in school have
serious impact on state commerce
social & commercial
purposes strongly intertwined here
反对意见
(Breyer)
在确定该活动是否影响州际商业时,
类似情况的累积效应。
o
地方性事件作为一个整体造成了全国性的重大问题
学校里的枪支对经济产生负面影响,威胁到教授基本技能的能力
像
Katzenbach
一样,企业和家庭不太可能选择存在暴力的地方
o
在这里很难区分
"
商业
"
和
"
非商业
"
。
在学校教授基本技能的非商业活动对国家商业有严重的影响 社会
和商业目的在此紧密地交织在一起
United States v. Morrison (2000)
Rule of Law
The congress did not have the authority to regulate
violence against women
because
it is
not economic activity
;
14th amendment only dealt with state officials not
private actors.
Facts
In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which
contained a provision for a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence,
even when victims did not file criminal charges. That same year, Christy Brzonkala, a
female student at Virginia Tech University, was allegedly assaulted and raped by
Antonio Morrison (defendant) and
James Crawford. Morrison was temporarily
suspended from school, but a state grand jury did not find enough evidence to indict
him. Brzonkala and the United States government (plaintiffs) brought suit against
Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech under the VAWA in federal district court.
Morrison challenged the VAWA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers. The district court held that Congress lacked authority to
enact the VAWA, but a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. The Fourth Circuit then reheard the case and upheld the district court’s
decision that Congress lacked authority. Brzonkala and the United States appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
1994
年,国会通过了《针对妇女的暴力法案》(
VAWA
),其中有一条规定,
即使受害者没有提出刑事指控,也可以为基于性别的暴力受害者提供联邦民事补
救措施。同年,弗吉尼亚理工大学的女学生克里斯蒂
-
布宗卡拉据称被安东尼奥
-
莫里森(被告)和詹姆斯
-
克劳福德攻击和强奸。莫里森被暂时停学,但一个州
大陪审团没有发现足够的证据来起诉他。
Brzonkala
和美国政府(原告)在联邦
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地区法院根据
VAWA
对莫里森、克劳福德和弗吉尼亚理工大学提起诉讼。莫里
森对
VAWA
提出质疑,认为它是对国会商业条款权力的违宪行使。地区法院认
为,国会无权颁布
VAWA
,但第四巡回上诉法院的一个由三名法官组成的小组
推翻了这一观点。第四巡回法院随后重新审理此案,并维持地区法院关于国会缺
乏权力的裁决。
Brzonkala
和美国向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Reasoning
1. is this activity economic?
Sexual assault is not economic activity.
2. Is there a jurisdictional element?
Jurisdictional element: ensures that the particular instance of the activity being
regulated has some sort of a connection to interstate commerce.
NO.
3. Activity?
The Congress can
only regulate on-going economic activity instead
of create
economic activity. E.g.
奥巴马医保案
No. no ongoing business activity.
4. Is there any limiting principle?
There will be no limitation for the Congress that it can just regulate virtually any
activity.(
如果
Congress
可以管此案,其他
criminal issue
也可以管
)
Congress would have excuse to regulate any crime in any state argued to have
aggregate impact
Moreover, Court goes further than Lopez to
provide bright-line rule
:
Congress
cannot regulate non-economic activity based on aggregate subst’l effect
on
interstate commerce.
dissenting
: the right to determine the substantial effect on interstate commerce
belongs to the congress but not courts.
If congress wants to interfere with the labor law and other discrimination issues, it
must use the commerce clause to regulate them because it is its only choice. The 14th
amendment is used by citizens.
Gonzeles v. Rich
p366
国会可以通过
Commerce Clause
监管
non-business activity
(
private production
)
It is very close to Wickard case rule: The Court upheld the constitutionality of a
comprehensive federal ban on the
private cultivation and use of marijuana
.
Reasons
:
“Congress
can
regulate
purely
intrastate
activity
that
is
not
itsel
‘
commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to
regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in
that commodity.”
Rule of Law
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Congress may regulate the use and production of home-grown marijuana as this
activity, taken in the aggregate, could rationally be seen as having a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce.
国会可以对自产大麻的使用和生产进行监管,因为从总体上看,这种活动可以合
理地被视为对州际商业产生了实质性的经济影响。
Facts
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
to combat illegal drug use in the United States. Shortly after, Congress enacted the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) which categorized illegal drugs into different
“schedules” and prevented their sale, purchase, and possession in the United States. In
1996, California enacted the Compassionate Use Act that allowed the use of medical
marijuana within the state by persons needing it for legitimate medical purposes.
Angel Raich and Diane Monson (plaintiffs) were California residents who both
legally used marijuana to treat legitimate medical issues. Despite receiving approval
from California state officials, federal agents seized and destroyed Raich’s marijuana
plants. Raich brought this suit against Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the
United States (defendant), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the
enforcement of the federal CSA. The court of appeals ruled that the CSA was an
invalid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, and Gonzales appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
1970
年,国会通过了《综合药物滥用预防和控制法》,以打击美国的非法药物
使用。此后不久,国会颁布了《受控物质法》(
CSA
),将非法毒品分为不同的
"
附表
"
,并阻止其在美国的销售、购买和持有。
1996
年,加利福尼亚颁布了《同
情使用法》,允许因合法医疗目的需要使用医用大麻的人在该州内使用。安吉尔
-
赖奇和戴安
-
蒙森(原告)是加州居民,他们都合法使用大麻来治疗合法的医疗
问题。尽管得到了加州官员的批准,联邦特工还是扣押并销毁了拉伊奇的大麻植
物。莱奇对美国司法部长阿尔伯托
-
冈萨雷斯(被告)提起诉讼,寻求禁令和宣
告性救济,禁止执行联邦
CSA
。上诉法院裁定
CSA
是对国会商业条款权力的无
效行使,冈萨雷斯向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Issue
May Congress regulate the use and production of homegrown marijuana?
Holding and Reasoning (Stevens, J.)
Yes. The Court held in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), that Congress has
the power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of
activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In this case, Raich’s
activity of growing marijuana for home use can be seen rationally as having a
substantial effect on interstate commerce because there is an established, albeit illegal,
interstate market for marijuana. The present case is comparable to the homegrown
wheat in Wickard. In Wickard, Congress sought to regulate the national market for
wheat
by
controlling
homegrown
commodities. Likewise,
in
the
present
case,
Congress sought to regulate and eliminate the national market for illegal drugs by
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eliminating home-grown varieties. Just as the addition of homegrown wheat to the
overall market frustrated Congress’s attempts to regulate the entire market in Wickard,
Raich’s addition of homegrown marijuana to the national scheme, when taken in the
aggregate with others similarly situated, has a significant effect on Congress’s ability
to eliminate the national illegal marijuana market. Therefore, the CSA is a valid
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because Congress acted rationally in
determining growing marijuana was an economic activity with a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
法院在
Wickard
诉
Filburn
案(
317 U.S. 111 (1942)
)中认为,国会有权监管属于
对州际商业有实质性影响的经济
"
类活动
"
的纯粹的地方活动。在本案中,
Raich
种植大麻供家庭使用的活动可以被合理地视为对州际商业有实质性影响,因为有
一个既定的、尽管是非法的州际大麻市场。本案与
Wickard
案中的自产小麦有可
比性。在
Wickard
案中,国会试图通过控制自产商品来管理全国的小麦市场。同
样,在本案中,国会试图通过消除自产的品种来规范和消除非法毒品的全国市场。
正如在
Wickard
案中,将自产小麦加入整个市场使国会管制整个市场的尝试受挫
一样,
Raich
将自产大麻加入国家计划,当与其他类似情况的人一起考虑时,对
国会消除全国非法大麻市场的能力有重大影响。因此,
CSA
是对国会商业条款
权力的有效行使,因为国会在确定种植大麻是一种对州际商业有重大影响的经济
活动时是合理的行为。上诉法院的裁决被推翻。
Champion v. AMES (the lottery case) p331
Rule of Law
The trafficking of lottery tickets
across state lines constitutes interstate commerce
that may be prohibited entirely by Congress under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.
Fact
Congress enacted the Federal Lottery Act of 1895 (FLA) which prohibited the buying
and selling of lottery tickets across state lines. Charles Champion (defendant) was
indicted by U.S. Marshall Ames (plaintiff) for bringing Paraguayan lottery tickets into
the United States and shipping them from Texas to California in violation of the FLA.
Champion challenged his indictment by alleging that Congress’s Commerce Clause
power does not include the power to completely prohibit a certain kind of commerce;
only to regulate it. Champion brought this challenge in a writ of habeas corpus in the
Circuit Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, which
dismissed the case.
Champion appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
国会颁布了《
1895
年联邦彩票法》(
FLA
),禁止跨州买卖彩票。查尔斯
-
查普
恩(被告)被美国马歇尔
-
艾姆斯(原告)起诉,罪名是违反《联邦彩票法》,
将巴拉圭彩票带入美国并从德克萨斯州运往加利福尼亚州。
Champion
对他的起
诉提出质疑,声称国会的商业条款权力不包括完全禁止某种商业的权力;只包括
对其进行监管。
Champion
以人身保护令的形式向伊利诺伊州北区巡回法院提出
这一挑战,法院驳回了该案。
Champion
向美国最高法院提出上诉。
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Roadmap:
Federal Lottery Act prohibited interstate transport of foreign lottery tickets
held Const’l
(Justice Harlan)
“commerce among the states” interpreted as carrying of commodities w/
monetary value from 1 state to another
dissent
(Justices Fuller & Brewer)
:
dangerous to give Congress general police
power without more limiting principles in place
o
anything transported from place to place could be considered “article
of commerce” & from state to state “interstate commerce”
o
judicial review should police times when Congress acts w/in power but
unwisely or injuriously, not blindly rely on Congress’s “wisdom &
discretion” (as Marshall did in
Gibbons
)
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (
奥巴马医保案
)
The individual mandate: require the individuals to purchase health insurance or pay a
“penalty”
Commerce clause invalid
–
(1) Individual mandate: the Act requires/compels individuals to become active in
NEW commerce activities, instead of regulating existing on-going activity
; like
“activity” in Wickard: you need to buy certain amount of wheat every day
(2) The Act
did not have substantial effect on interstate commerce
(The
Congress argued that everyone will sooner or later involve in the healthcare insurance
market but the Court ruled against it)
Known as
Dicta
:
附带性意见
- actually did not have to discuss about the commerce
clause
II. Taxation power: Article 1 Section 8
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States;
For what purpose can Congress tax?
o
Opinion 1: taxation is valid only to support other Congress power – Not
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prevail now
o
Opinion 2: to promote general welfare – Prevail
When is the tax not a tax? E.g. a penalty
o
Case: Child labor tax (Bailey v. Prexel Furniture Co.)
Court struck down the child labor tax because the tax is more like a
penalty.
Bailey v. Prexel Furniture Co.
Rule of Law
Congress may not attempt to regulate through a tax a matter that is reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Facts
In 1919, Congress passed the Child Labor Tax Law which constituted a ten
percent tax on the profits of any company using child labor.
The law defined
“child labor” as the use of minors “under the age of sixteen in any mine or quarry, and
under the age of fourteen in any mill, cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing
establishment.” Additionally, the definition applied to the use of children in these age
ranges for more than eight hours a day or six days a week, or during certain evening
hours. Drexel Furniture Co. (plaintiff) brought suit in federal district court against
Bailey
(defendant).
Drexel
challenged
the
law on
the ground
that
it was
an
unconstitutional attempt by the federal government to regulate child labor in the
states–a function exclusively reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution. The district court held the law unconstitutional and the court of appeals
affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1919 年,国会通过了《童工税法》,对任何使用童工的公司的利润征收 10%的税。
该法律将 "童工 "定义为 "在任何矿场或采石场使用 16 岁以下的未成年人,在
任何磨坊、罐头厂、车间、工厂或制造机构使用 14 岁以下的未成年人"。此外,
该定义适用于使用这些年龄段的儿童每天超过 8 小时或每周 6 天,或在某些晚间
时段。Drexel Furniture Co. (原告)在联邦地区法院对贝利(被告)提起诉讼。
德雷克塞尔对该法律提出质疑,理由是该法律是联邦政府试图对各州的童工进行
管理的违宪行为--根据宪法第十修正案,这是专门保留给各州的职能。地区法院
认为该法律违宪,上诉法院维持原判。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Issue
Whether the Child Labor Tax Law is an unconstitutional effort by Congress to
regulate the use of child labor, a power exclusively reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment.
Holding and Reasoning (Taft, C.J.)
Yes. While most laws passed by Congress are entitled to significant deference by the
Court, the current law should not be provided this deference because it clearly
imposes federal restrictions on a power reserved to the states, in this case, the
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regulation of child labor. The Child Labor Tax is not actually a “tax,” as the sole
purpose for taxes is to generate revenue for the government. Congress’ actual motive
behind this tax is to impose monetary penalties upon businesses employing children
for the purpose of regulating child labor use among the states. It is argued, however,
that there is precedence for similar levying of taxes based on regulatory motives. For
example, in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869), the Court upheld a tax on
circulating bank notes that was motivated by the goal of regulating the national
currency. Similarly, in McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904), the Court upheld
a tax on yellow margarine versus white margarine that was motivated by a desire to
promote the sale of white margarine. Finally, in United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S.
86 (1919), the Court upheld a tax on the manufacture, importation, and sale or gift of
opium that was motivated by the goal of discouraging drug use. While each of these
taxes was motivated by a regulatory goal apart from raising revenue, the difference
between them and the Child Labor Tax Law was that each was applied to a subject
area squarely within the ability of Congress to regulate. In contrast, the Child Labor
Tax Law represents an effort by Congress to regulate a subject area clearly reserved to
the states by the Constitution. Thus, Congress overstepped its regulatory bounds and
the Child Labor Tax Law is unconstitutional. The decision of the lower courts is
affirmed.
是的。虽然国会通过的大多数法律都有权得到法院的高度尊重,但目前的法律不
应得到这种尊重,因为它显然对保留给各州的权力施加了联邦限制,在本案中就
是对童工的监管。童工税实际上不是一种 "税",因为税收的唯一目的是为政府
创造收入。国会征收这一税种的实际动机是对雇用儿童的企业进行罚款,以规
范各州之间的童工使用。然而,有人认为,基于监管动机的类似征税有先例可循。
例如,在 Veazie 银行诉 Fenno 案中,75 U.S. 533 (1869),法院支持对流通的
银行票据征税,其动机是为了监管国家货币的发展。同样,在 McCray 诉美国,
195 U.S. 27 (1904)中,法院支持对黄色人造黄油与白色人造黄油征税,其动机
是为了促进白色人造黄油的销售。最后,在美国诉 Doremus 案,
249 U.S. 86 (1919)
中,法院支持对鸦片的制造、进口和销售或赠送征税,其动机是为了阻止毒品的
使用。虽然这些税收的动机除了提高收入外,还有一个监管目标,但它们与《童
工税法》的区别在于,每个税收都适用于国会完全有能力监管的主题领域。相比
之下,《童工税法》代表了国会努力监管宪法明确保留给各州的主题领域。因此,
国会超越了其监管范围,《童工税法》是违宪的。下级法院的裁决得到确认。
(继续奥巴马医保案)
taxation power valid - start from p460
General rule: in the interest of public welfare (promote general welfare)
Three-factor analysis: to determine whether it is a tax
1.
whether it imposes an
exceedingly heavy burden
(10% in Bailey's case as a
heavy burden, but not in this case)
2.
Knowledge
requirement:
whether
it
is
in
punitive
nature
(impose
on
individuals that violated the laws intentionally) (In Bailey case
只有故意违反
法律的人才交税,因此更像罚款而不是税收。本案中所有人都要交税
)
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3.
whether the tax was paid to IRS (in Bailey case the tax is paid to the
department of waiver)
Some other reasoning:
the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation
through
inactivity (the feature of the tax)
Congress' ability to use its taxing power does not give Congress the same
degree of control over the individual behavior, since it is limited to require an
individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury.
Also developed from the case
Bailey v. Prexel Furniture Co.
The court struck down the Child Labor tax in this case because the tax
was more like
a penalty instead of a tax.
In addition,
The Bailey Court
distinguished
Doremus (United States v. Doremus)
this
way:
The court [in Doremus] said that the act could not be declared invalid just because
another motive than taxation, not shown on the face of the act, might have contributed
to its passage. This case does not militate against the conclusion we have reached in
respect of the law now before us. The court, there, made manifest its view that
the
provisions of the so-called taxing act must be naturally and reasonably adapted
to the collection of the tax and not solely to the achievement of some other
purpose plainly within state power.
这也是由
Bailey v. Prexel Furniture Co.
一案发展而来的。
法院在该案中否决了童工税,因为该税更像是一种惩罚,而不是一种税收。
此外,
Bailey
法院这样区分了
Doremus
(美国诉
Doremus
)。
法院
[
在
Doremus
案中
]
说,不能因为该法案表面上没有显示的征税以外的其他动
机,就宣布该法案无效,这可能有助于其通过。这个案例并不妨碍我们对现在的
法律得出的结论。法院在该案中表明了它的观点,即所谓的征税法的规定必须自
然和合理地适应于征税,而不是仅仅为了实现明显属于国家权力的其他目的。
III. Spending power
How far can congress go on things not explicitly expressed in the constitution?
South Dakota v. Dole
o
Fact
A South Dakota law permitted persons age nineteen or older to buy beer
containing up to 3.2% alcohol. In 1984, Congress passed 23 U.S.C. §158, which
directed the Secretary of Transportation,
Dole (defendant), to withhold up to
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five percent of federal highway funds otherwise available to states in which
state laws permitted persons under the age of twenty-one to purchase alcohol.
South Dakota (plaintiff) sued Dole and the United States government in federal
district
court
seeking
a
declaratory
judgment
that
Section
158
violated
constitutional
limits
on
Congress’s
spending
power
and
the
Twenty-First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court ruled that
Congress acted constitutionally, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
南达科他州的一项法律允许
19
岁或以上的人购买酒精含量不超过
3.2%
的啤
酒。
1984
年,国会通过了
23 U.S.C.
§
158
,指示交通部长多尔(被告)扣
留多达
5%
的联邦公路资金,不允许将资金提供给州法律允许
21
岁以下的
人购买酒精的州。南达科他州(原告)在联邦地区法院起诉多尔和美国政府,
要求作出宣告性判决,认为第
158
条违反了宪法对国会支出权的限制和美国
宪法第二十一修正案。地区法院裁定,国会的行为符合宪法,上诉法院维持
原判。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
o
5-factor analysis:
1.
is it for
general welfare
2.
conditions
on the receipt of funds have to be
unambiguous
3.
conditions must
be related to federal interest in a particular project or
program
4.
power must not violate other provisions in the constitution
5.
no coercion(
并非强迫
): not in a compulsive nature that
leave the state no
choice but accept it
Section 158 clearly meets the first four limitations on Congress’s exercise of
spending power as it is designed to promote the general welfare, an unambiguous
condition,
related
to
the
significant
federal
interest
in
promoting
safe
transportation on federal highways, and power did not violate other provisions in
the constitution.
Not in a compulsive nature (compare to
奥巴马医保案
): Noncompliance only
results in a loss of five percent of what states would otherwise receive
.
第
158
条显然符合国会行使支出权的前四项限制,因为它旨在促进普遍福利,
这是一个明确的条件,与促进联邦公路安全运输的重大联邦利益有关,而且
权力没有违反宪法的其他规定。
不具有强制性质(与奥巴马医保案相比)。不遵守规定只导致各州损失本来
可以得到的
5%
的东西。
(继续奥巴马医保案)
the Medical expansion provisions
The medical expansion is
not a valid use of spending power. (The Court
followed the Dole’s rules):
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Does not meet with factor 5: no coercion(
并 非 强 迫
)
: not in a
compulsive nature that leave the state no choice but accept it.
○
The spending powers of the Congress left the state no choice
but to accept the regulation- “compulsory” "coercive"
Funding is not directly related to spending
United States v. Butler
Rule of Law
Congress may not use its taxing and spending powers to obtain an unconstitutional
result, such as invading the reserved rights of the states under the Tenth Amendment.
国会不得利用其征税和支出权力来获得违宪的结果,如侵犯第十修正案规定的各
州的保留权利。
Facts
In 1933, Congress enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) to allow the
Secretary of Agriculture to set limits on the production of certain crops and tax
farmers that produced in excess of those limits. The AAA also provided grants to
farmers to control their production of crops and thus regulate prices. Butler (plaintiff),
a processor of crops, brought suit against the United States government (defendant) in
federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the AAA. The district court
ruled that Butler was required to pay taxes under the AAA, but the court of appeals
reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1933
年,国会颁布了《农业调整法》(
AAA
),允许农业部长对某些农作物的
生产设定限制,并对生产超过这些限制的农民征税。农业调整法》还向农民提供
补助,以控制他们的农作物生产,从而调节价格。巴特勒(原告)是一家农作物
加工商,他在联邦地区法院对美国政府(被告)提起诉讼,质疑
AAA
的宪法性。
地区法院裁定,巴特勒必须根据《农业协定》纳税,但上诉法院推翻了这一裁决。
美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Issue
Is the tax imposed on farmers by the Agricultural Adjustment Act a constitutional
exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power?
Holding and Reasoning (Roberts, J.)
No. Article I, § 8 vests in Congress the power to levy and collect taxes for the general
welfare. The framers held differing views on the scope of this power. Madison
believed the clause merely gives Congress the ability to tax and spend to carry out its
other enumerated powers, whereas Hamilton believed the clause gives Congress a
wholly separate enumerated power to tax and spend as long as it is in furtherance of
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the general welfare. Hamilton’s view is the correct one: Congress’s power to tax and
spend is a separate power not confined by Congress’s other enumerated powers.
However, this power is not without limits. Any congressional power to tax and spend
is limited by Tenth Amendment state sovereignty concerns. The AAA violates state
sovereignty by seeking to
invade states’ rights to regulate and control their own
agricultural production.
Since Congress has no power to regulate and control
agricultural production, it follows that Congress may not indirectly accomplish that
end through its taxing and spending powers. The decision of the court of appeals is
affirmed.
第一条第
8
款赋予国会为公众福利征税和收税的权力。制宪者们对这一权力的范
围持有不同的看法。麦迪逊认为该条款只是赋予国会征税和支出的能力,以执行
其其他列举的权力,而汉密尔顿认为该条款赋予国会完全独立的列举的权力,只
要是为了促进一般福利,就可以征税和支出。汉密尔顿的观点是正确的。国会征
税和支出的权力是一项独立的权力,不受国会其他列举权力的限制。然而,这项
权力并非没有限制。任何国会征税和支出的权力都受到第十修正案中国家主权
问题的限制。美国农业部试图侵犯各州规范和控制其农业生产的权利,从而侵
犯了州的主权。由于国会无权监管和控制农业生产,因此,国会不得通过征税和
支出权间接实现这一目的。上诉法院的判决得到确认。
Dissent (Stone, J.)
The present case should be guided by four principles that, when considered, justify
upholding the AAA as constitutional. Firstly, courts are limited in their inquiry into
the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions and may only determine
whether those branches have the authority to enact statutes or executive orders. It is
not the place of the judiciary to question the wisdom of these statutes if they were
constitutionally enacted. Secondly, Congress unquestionably possesses the power to
levy an excise tax on the production of agricultural materials. Thirdly, because
national agricultural production is in a depressed condition, there is no question that
any tax enacted by Congress to improve production is in furtherance of the general
welfare. Finally, no questions of an unauthorized delegation of legislative power are
raised in this case.
IV. Federalism-based limits on State power: preemption and the dormant
commerce clause
Note: Article 1 section 10 Powers Denied to the States
里有一些对州权利的限制
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1.
Preemption
Preemption: when conflict between federal and state law, federal law will
prevail.
In
a
preemption
challenge,
the
challenger
is
claiming
that
a
state
law
is
unconstitutional because it has been preempted by a valid federal law.
Three types of preemption
: p447
1.
express preemption
(congress expressly stated that the state is preempted in
one issue)
2.
field preemption
(congress rule a field so comprehensively that there is no
space for the state law)
3.
conflict preemption
(impossible to comply with both federal and state law,
then federal law will prevail)
Arizona v. United States (p442-446)
The Court held that the States lacked the authority to complement or to enforce
additional regulations related to alien registration.
Field preemption
reflects a
congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is
parallel to federal standards.
2.
Dormant Commerce Clause
In challenging a law because it violates the dormant Commerce Clause, the challenger
argues that
while the federal government has been silent in the area
(meaning that
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the state law or municipal ordinance is not preempted by federal law),
the state law
(or municipal
ordinance)
places an unreasonable burden on out-of-state or
interstate commerce
and therefore violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
Notice
: it only concerns
commerce power (not spending or taxation).
Problems
: trade protectionism of states vs. exclude state from varieties of power.
Rule
: state con regulate dormant space only if it does not place excessive burden on
other states.
在以违反
Dormant Commerce Clause
为由挑战一项法律时,挑战者认为,虽然联
邦政府在该领域一直保持沉默(意味着该州法律或市政条例没有被联邦法律所
preempt
),但该州法律(或市政条例)对州外或州际商业造成了不合理的负担,
因此违反了
Dormant Commerce Clause
。
注意:它只涉及
Commerce power
(不是支出或税收)。
问题:各州的贸易保护主义与将各州排除在权力品种之外。
规则:只有在不对其他州造成过度负担的情况下,州才能监管休眠空间。
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey (p402-404)
In this case, New Jersey passed its law for legitimate environmental and economic
purposes. However, New Jersey acted improperly when it sought to remedy its
environmental
and
economic
problems
by
targeting
solely
out-of-state
waste
producers with its regulations (facially discrimination between waste from New
Jersey and waste from other states)
.
New Jersey’s refusal to let waste into its
landfills simply because the waste originated from outside New Jersey violates the
Commerce Clause.
在本案中,新泽西州出于合法的环境和经济目的通过了法律。然而,当新泽西州
为了补救其环境和经济问题,只针对州外的废物生产者制定法规(表面上对新泽
西州的废物和其他州的废物进行歧视)时,其行为是不恰当的。新泽西州仅仅因
为废物来自新泽西州以外就拒绝让废物进入其填埋场,这违反了商业条款。
Two conflicting interests in balance:
1)
protectionist
of
states'
commerce
(which
constitute
facial/intentional
discrimination)
2)
legitimate local purpose (the state's police power)
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Class 5: The power of president
I. Note: The Theory of Separation and Checks and Balances
2 levels of separation:
horizontal
Executive v. Judicial v.
Legislative
vertical
state v. federal
framers’ intent behind separating powers
promote efficiency
less confusion on responsibilities & division of labor
b/w branches allows them to develop expertise in their own realms
o
some say we only have gov’t dysfunction today, not efficiency
o
others say adhering to separation keeps gov’t from exerting too much
power
prevent
majoritarian
tyranny
19th
century
assumption
that
gov’t
infringes upon (rather than enhances) individual liberties
o
Executive today goes far beyond framer intent
o
fear of Legislature’s ability to redistribute wealth & democracy thru
representation seems largely unfounded (though wealthy can afford
lobbyists paid to champion their causes)
Note: The purposes of separation and checks.
Throughout American history
the distribution of national powers has been said to serve two distinct purposes.
The first is efficiency. In this view, a division of labor among the various
branches
makes
government
more
efficient,
especially
because
of
the
concentration of executive power in the President, who can act with dispatch.
The second purpose is the prevention of tyranny. The separation of powers
diffuses governmental power, diminishing the likelihood that any one branch
(or any one individual) will be able to use governmental power against the
citizenry. Consider the extent to which these two purposes are in tension with
each other.
分权与制衡的目的
:第一个是效率。在这种观点中,各部门之间的分工使政府更有
效率,特别是因为行政权力集中在总统手中,他可以迅速采取行动;第二个目的是
防止暴政的发生。分权分散了政府权力,减少了任何一个部门(或任何一个人)能
够利用政府权力反对公民的可能性。考虑一下这两个目的在多大程度上是相互矛盾
的。
Problems:
1)
The constitutional distribution of powers:
contemporary criticism.
缺乏效率
Consider, for example, the argument that preoccupation with the balance of power
between institutions of government has distracted us from concern about the balance
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of power between interest groups like the poor and the rich or residents of urban and
rural areas.
See Levinson, Foreword, Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 Harv. L.
Rev. 31 (2016). Other critics have argued that the powerful checks created by
separation of powers have led to inefficiency and stalemate. A related attack is that the
separation of powers scheme, instead of solving the problem of factions, aggravates it
by allowing well-organized private groups to block necessary regulation. In these
circumstances, it is sometimes urged that constitutional doctrine should be altered to
recognize a greater role for the President. See W. Howell & T. Moe, Relic: How Our
Constitution Undermines Effective Government and Why We Need a More Powerful
Presidency (2016). But see Nzelibe and Stephenson, Complementary Constraints:
Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 Harv. L. Rev.
617 (2010) (raising doubts that separation of powers causes “gridlock”).
Conversely, some critics argue that power is now concentrated in the executive branch
and that it is thus necessary to restore Congress to its original status of preeminence. It
is sometimes suggested that the growth of an enormous national bureaucracy,
operating for the most part within the executive branch, has fundamentally altered the
original constitutional framework and requires some sort of response if the original
constitutional concerns are to be satisfied.
1)
权力的宪法分配:当代批评。缺乏效率
例如,有观点认为,对政府机构间权力平衡的关注分散了我们对穷人和富人或城
市和农村居民等利益集团之间权力平衡的关注。见
Levinson, Foreword, Looking
for Power in Public Law, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 31 (2016)
。其他批评者认为,三权分立
产生的强大制衡导致了效率低下和僵局。一个相关的攻击是,分权方案非但没有
解决派别问题,反而让组织良好的私人团体阻挠必要的监管,从而加剧了问题。
在这种情况下,人们有时会敦促改变宪法学说,承认总统的更大作用。见
W.
Howell & T. Moe, Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government
and Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency (2016)
。但见
Nzelibe
和
Stephenson,
Complementary
Constraints:
Separation
of
Powers,
Rational
Voting,
and
Constitutional Design, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (2010)
(对分权导致
"
僵局
"
提出质
疑)。
相反,一些批评者认为,现在权力集中在行政部门,因此有必要恢复国会原有的
优势地位。有时有人认为,一个巨大的国家官僚机构的发展,大部分是在行政部
门内运作,已经从根本上改变了原来的宪法框架,如果要满足原来的宪法关切,
就需要做出某种回应。
2)
The Problem of Enforcement.
司法机关缺乏执行力
Alexander Hamilton argued that an independent judiciary, with “no influence over
either the sword or the purse” possessed of “neither FORCE nor WILL” and the “least
dangerous branch” would enforce the separation. How can an institution with neither
force nor will provide effective enforcement?
2)执行力的问题。司法机关缺乏执行力
亚历山大-汉密尔顿(
Alexander Hamilton
)认为,一个独立的司法机关,"对剑
和钱都没有影响力","既没有力量,也没有意志",是 "最不危险的部门",将
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执行分权。一个既无力量又无意志的机构如何能提供有效的执行?
Roadmap
The president has 2 types of power:
1. Congressionally delegated power
2. Independent Art.2 power/inherent power
(power
clearly enumerated
in Art2 of
the Constitution)
1)
Execution of Congressionally Delegated Power
•
Category 1 – Max
Congress expressly or impliedly grant to president
o
Curtiss-Wright
: Congress expressly authorized President to execute
embargo
o
Dames and Moore:
Congress expressly authorized President to nullify
attachments with the IEEPA
•
Category 2 – Zone of Twilight
Congress is silent
o
Dames and Moore:
The IEEP and Hostage Act did not expressly
authorize Pres to end all court claims pending against Iran but suggest
that Congress would have wanted the President to have that power.
•
Category 3 – Lowest Ebb
Congress expressly or impliedly disapproves
o
Youngstown
:
Congress expressly disapproved of Pres seizing industry to
settle labor disputes in Taft Hartley.
o
Zivotofsky
:
Congress expressly disapproved of Pres not issuing passport
with Israel as country of birth for US citizen born in Jerusalem.
2)
Exercise Independent Art. II Power / Inherent Power
o
Curtiss-Wright
: Court suggests Pres has inherent power over foreign
affairs and so Pres could OK embargo
o
Zivotofsky
:
Pres has exclusive Art II power to recognize a foreign gov and
so could refuse to issue passport
Youngstown (The Steel Seizure Case)
(1952)
Formalism approach
from Black (formalism)
Functionalism approach
from Jackson (functionalism)
Facts
In late 1951, steel mill owners and their employees had disagreements over the terms
of collective bargaining agreements. Unable to reach an agreement, the steel mill
employees’ representative gave notice of intent to strike after the expiration of their
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current agreement. The federal government unsuccessfully entered the negotiations,
and on April 4, 1952, the steel mill employees’ union gave notice of its intent to strike
on April 9, 1952. The importance of steel as a component in weapons and war
materials led President Truman to believe that a reduction in steel production from a
nationwide strike would jeopardize the nation’s security.
The President issued
Executive Order 10340 directing Sawyer (defendant), the Secretary of Commerce, to
take control of and continue operating most of the nation’s steel mills. Sawyer carried
out the order, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (plaintiff), along with other steel
mill operators, brought suit in district court alleging that the President’s order
amounted to an exercise of lawmaking, a legislative function reserved expressly for
Congress. Therefore, the President’s exercise of lawmaking was unconstitutional. The
district court granted an injunction in favor of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., on
the grounds that the President acted unconstitutionally, but the court of appeals stayed
the injunction. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1951
年末,钢厂老板和他们的雇员对集体谈判协议的条款有分歧。由于无法达
成协议,钢厂雇员的代表发出通知,打算在现有协议到期后进行罢工。联邦政府
参与谈判未果,
1952
年
4
月
4
日,钢厂雇员工会发出通知,表示打算在
1952
年
4
月
9
日罢工。钢铁作为武器和战争材料的组成部分的重要性使杜鲁门总统认为,
全国性的罢工造成的钢铁产量减少将危及国家安全。总统发布了第
10340
号行
政命令,指示商务部长索耶(被告)控制并继续经营全国大部分的钢铁厂。
(
原
告)与其他钢厂经营者一起在地区法院提起诉讼,声称总统的命令相当于行使立
法权,这是明确保留给国会的立法职能。因此,总统行使立法权是违宪的。地区
法院以总统的行为违宪为由,发出了有利于扬斯敦薄板与管材公司的禁令,但上
诉法院暂停了该禁令。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
Summary of Jackson’s approach: more practical (functionalism) since it does
not only look into the texts.
Three categories:
1)
Category 1-Max: the power is expressly or impliedly granted by the congress
2)
Category 2-Zone of Twilight: where congress is silent and the zone could be
ambiguous
3)
Category 3-Lowest Ebb: act his power on his own independent powers with strict
limitations
Court’s Rule (Justice Black)
-
[
Formalism
]
President
has
no
inherent
power
to
seize
private
property
b/c
no
enumerated Article II authority or statutory authority conferred by
Congress
o
textualist
not mentioned in Art. II & Congress had
intentionally
withheld
statutory authority to do so by drafting alternative to seizure
in Taft-Hartley Act
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o
formalist
Executive reaching dangerously to “lawmaking” power
reserved only for Congress by not limiting to only “law-executing” of
Congress’s policies
o
formalist
Pres’s enumerated Commander-in-Chief power does not
include seizure of property, much less seizure of American property
Concurrence
(Justice Jackson) (later become binding law)
[Functionalism]
3 categories for determining separation of powers b/w Pres &
Congress:
o
(1) authorized explicitly/implicitly by Congress’ act
President’s actions strongest here
o
(2) when Congress has remained silent on issue
must interpret whether silence means consent or disapproval
o
(3) when Congress has explicitly/implicitly disapproved
difficult to rationalize Pres’l action here
Jackson sees Pres’l seizure as against Congr’s wishes implied
from statutory silence & failure to act twice
Reasoning: Since Congress denied power to the President in the present case under
the Taft-Hartley Act, the third scenario is implicated. The President may be deemed to
have acted constitutionally only if he is acting based on an express grant of power
from the Constitution. The Constitution does not grant the President such powers, and
the President's power to “faithfully execute the laws” does not cross into the function
of lawmaking.
Note: He was very concerned with the power of president because of Nazi-Germany's
example.
推理。由于国会在本案中根据《塔夫特
-
哈特利法》剥夺了总统的权力,因此牵
涉到第三种情况。只有当总统根据宪法明确授予的权力行事时,才能被认为是符
合宪法的行为。宪法并没有赋予总统这样的权力
,总统
"
忠实执行法律
"
的权力
并没有跨越立法的职能。
注:由于纳粹德国的例子,他对总统的权力非常关注。
Concurrence
(Justice
Frankfurter)
[Functionalism-fouced
on
past
experience,
tradition]
o
legislative history (
Fed No. 48
)
President’s emergency powers only
properly exercised when it was acted in times of war or national crisis,
that is in a specific, limited time frame.
counterpoint
: this was actually a pro-labor move that would have allowed
President to appease striking steel workers w/ higher wages
counterpoint
: framers must have envisioned emergencies where Pres must act
immediately & cannot wait for Congress to grant him legislative approval
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II. Foreign affairs: Execution of Congressionally Delegated Power
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (functionalism)
Rule of Law
An otherwise unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the executive
may
nevertheless be
sustained on the ground that its exclusive goal is to provide relief
in a foreign conflict.
Facts
Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to stop the sale of arms to
countries involved in the Chaco border dispute. That same day, President Roosevelt
issued an executive order prohibiting munitions sales to warring countries involved in
the
Chaco
border
dispute.
In
1936,
an
indictment
was
issued
alleging
that
Curtiss-Wright Export Co. (defendant) illegally sold arms to Bolivia, a country
engaged in the Chaco border dispute. The transaction was in violation of the
congressional resolution and the President’s executive order. The district court issuing
the indictment held for Curtiss-Wright, ruling that the indictment was not supported
by sufficient information to charge Curtiss-Wright. The United States government
(plaintiff) appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.
国会通过一项决议,授权总统停止向参与查科边界争端的国家出售武器。同一
天,罗斯福总统发布行政命令,禁止向参与查科边界争端的交战国出售军火。
1936
年,一份起诉书发布,指控柯蒂斯
-
莱特出口公司(
Curtiss-Wright Export Co.
(
被告)非法向参与查科边界争端的国家玻利维亚出售武器。该交易违反了国会
决议和总统的行政命令。签发起诉书的地区法院认定柯蒂斯
-
莱特公司有罪,裁
定起诉书没有足够的信息支持来指控柯蒂斯
-
莱特公司。美国政府(原告)直接
向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Reasoning
When
comes
to
foreign
conflicts,
the president
need
not to
be granted
by
Constitution or Congress
, instead, his power
directly come from British Crown
(not carved from people of US or the state).
1.
The grant of power over foreign affairs vested in the federal government
after it
usurped power from the British Crown (not carved from people of
US or the state).
The President is the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations.
2.
The scope
of the
President’s
powers
in
international
affairs
is
broad
.
Congressional legislation concerning foreign affairs must accord the President
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a degree of discretion and freedom
from statutory restriction that would not
be admissible if domestic affairs alone were involved.
Note:
这个
case
比
Youngstown case
早,所以没有使用
Jackson
的判断方法,但
以后的
case
基本上都用了
Jackson
的判断方法。
This case does not rule in the same way as Jackson in Youngstown case because it is
earlier. However, other cases usually adopted the Jackson analysis
.
Dames & Moore v. Regan (functionalism)
Issue
(1) Whether president has the power to stop prejudgment attachment?
(2) Whether is president entitled to settle pending case by executive order?
Reasoning
Fall into two categories
(见上面总结)
1)
Category 1-Max: the power is expressly or impliedly granted by the congress
Congress
expressly authorized
president to nullify prejudgment attachment
with the IEEPA.
2)
Category 2-Zone of Twilight: where congress is silent and the zone could be
ambiguous
The IEEPA and Hostage Act
did not expressly
authorized president to end
all court claims pending against Iran
but suggest that Congress would have
wanted the President to have that power
.
e.g. past practice:
国会以前有很多机会反对总统这样做,但国会都没有反
对。
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II) (Recognition power)
(functionalism)
Rule of Law
Article II of the Constitution grants the U.S. president the exclusive authority to
formally recognize a foreign sovereign
through executive power that Congress may
not contradict via statute.
Fact
1)
Congress's legislation: Jerusalem is in Israel on citizen's passport
2)
But the State Department refused to do so
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1
)国会的立法。在公民的护照上,耶路撒冷在以色列境内
2
)但国务院拒绝这样做
Reasoning
1.
Fall into Category 3 – Congress has expressly disapproved president to do
so.
Congress has historically deferred to the president in matters such as making
treaties with foreign entities, entering into diplomatic relations with a foreign
sovereign, and sending ambassadors abroad.
2.
Thus turned to Constitution Art. 2.
Art.2 gives president
recognition power (the president's exclusive authority
to recognize the legitimacy of foreign states and governments, including
their territorial boundaries), not expressly stated in Art 2, but implied
(Art 2 sec3)
Note: Trump's case
: building wall on the Mexico boarder as declaring "national
emergency" in the face of congressional prohibition
-It can either fall into the scope of category 1 or 3, if argued in different ways
III. Domestic affairs: Executive privilege and impeachment:
Ground of Executive privilege in Con:
Article 2, section 1 of the Constitution vests “the executive” power in the
president and Article 2, section 3 provides that the president
“shall take care
that the Law be faithfully executed.”
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Two categories of misconduct:
1)
Damages for misconduct while in office: p597
(
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald
)
o
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
: the Court declined to extend presidential immunity
to presidential aides.
Lower-level officials do, however, enjoy
“
qualified
immunity.” These officials can be held liable for damages only if they
violate law that was “clearly established” at the time of the violation.
o Harlow v. Fitzgerald
案:法院拒绝将总统豁免权扩大到总统助理。
然
而,较低级别的官员确实享有
"
限定豁免权
"
。只有当这些官员违反了
在违法行为发生时已经
"
明确确立
"
的法律时,他们才能被追究损害
赔偿责任。
2)
Damages for claims unrelated to service in office: p599
o
Clinton v. Jones
: Compare
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
with
Clinton v. Jones
, 520
U.S. 681 (1997). Jones differed from Fitzgerald in two respects
. First
, it
arose out of alleged misconduct occurring before the President’s term
began and unrelated to his conduct while in office
. Second, the suit was
brought during the President’s term of office.
o
克林顿诉琼斯案。将
Nixon
诉
Fitzgerald
案与
Clinton
诉
Jones
案进
行比较,
520 U.S. 681 (1997)
。琼斯在两个方面与
Fitzgerald
不同。首
先,该案是由总统任期开始前发生的被指控的不当行为引起的,与他
在任期内的行为无关。第二,该诉讼是在总统任期内提出的。
United States v. Nixon (p592)
Facts
: President Nixon (defendant) was named as a co-conspirator in various
charges including conspiracy to defraud the United States. The United States
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District Court for the District of Columbia subpoenaed various tapes and
documents relating to specific meetings in which Nixon was a participant. Nixon
filed a formal claim of privilege and a motion to quash the subpoenas. The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
尼克松总统(被告)被列为各种指控的同谋者,包括阴谋欺诈美国。美国哥
伦比亚特区地区法院传唤了与尼克松参与的特定会议有关的各种录音带和
文件。尼克松提交了一份正式的特权声明,并提出了撤销传票的动议。美国
哥伦比亚特区地区法院拒绝了该动议。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Issue
: May the President of the United States assert an absolute claim of privilege
over all confidential communications?
Holding and Reasoning
: No.
1)
The ground of executive privilege for president is Art 2
(“
总统应有效行
使行政权
”, without executive privilege, president cannot effectively exercise
his executive right)
2)
BUT, There is no absolute, unqualified presidential privilege
: Although
there
is
a
presumptive
presidential
privilege
for
his
confidential
communications,
when the communications do not concern military,
diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, that presumption may
be rebutted due to the constitutional need to produce all relevant
evidence in a criminal case.
3)
BALANCE
:
the need of concrete evidence outweigh the generalized
executive privilege.
A generalized claim of presidential privilege based on a claim of public
interest in confidentiality does not overcome the interest in producing all
relevant evidence consistent with the fair administration of justice.
President
Nixon does not base his claim of privilege on military, diplomatic, or
sensitive national security secrets.
The President’s claim is of a generalized
presidential privilege of confidentiality.
Such a claim cannot be upheld in a
criminal proceeding as the interests of justice outweigh Nixon’s general need
for confidentiality.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
Facts:
Fitzgerald brought an action against President Nixon on the ground that he
had been discharged from a government position because he had exercised his
right to freedom of speech. The Court held, by a five-to-four vote, that the
President was immune from an action for damages.
Rule
: Nixon is immune from the action of damages
regarding his official
conduct
because of the singular importance of the President’s duties, diversion of
his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the
effective functioning of government.”
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事实:菲茨杰拉德对尼克松总统提起诉讼,理由是他因为行使了言论自由的
权利而被解除了政府职务。
法院以五比四的投票结果认为,总统对损害赔偿
的诉讼具有豁免权。
规则:尼克松对有关其官方行为的损害赔偿诉讼享有豁免权,因为总统的职
责非常重要,通过关注私人诉讼转移其精力会对政府的有效运作带来独特的
风险
"
。
Because of the
singular importance of the President’s duties
, lawsuit
against him
when acting in their official capacity will
diverse of his energy
and attention to his performance as a president
and
thus
raise unique risks
to the
effective functioning of government
.
”
The President’s office is more like that of prosecutors or judges, which are
granted absolute immunity from suit when acting in their official capacity
.
Extending
absolute
immunity
to
the
President
is
necessary
because
participating
in
lawsuits
would
severely
detract
time
better
spent
performing presidential duties and serving the American people
.
总统身居要职,
lawsuit
会分散其注意力,使其不能有效管理国家
Allow lawsuit regarding
official conduct
may discourage president from
performing.
因为
lawsuit
是针对
official conduct
的,总统可能因为害怕被起诉而在执
政时畏首畏尾
other ways of check and balance: granting absolute immunity to the President
would not completely remove him from checks and balances on his
behavior.
For example, the President is still highly scrutinized by the press
and subject to the threat of
impeachment
by Congress for misconduct.
除了
lawsuit
之外还有其他制衡总统的方式:
impeachment
The President
has incentives to avoid misconduct
, such as seeking reelection,
maintaining the prestige and influence of his office, and traditional concerns
for his historical stature.
总统本身迫于舆论或想要连任的压力也会避免
misconduct
Clinton v. Jones [personal issue]
Rule of Law
The United States Constitution
does not grant
the President of the United States
immunity
from civil litigation involving actions committed before entering office.
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Facts
William Jefferson Clinton (defendant) was elected President of the United States in
1992 and 1996. In 1991, Clinton served as the Governor of Arkansas. He attended a
conference that year at a hotel staffed by Paula Corbin Jones (plaintiff). Jones alleged
that, while at the conference, Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas police officer,
persuaded her to leave her post and visit Governor Clinton’s hotel room. Once there,
Jones alleged that Clinton made lewd sexual advances towards her which she rejected.
She filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, naming
Clinton
and
Ferguson
as
defendants.
She
also
claimed
that
her
supervisors
subsequently changed her duties and treated her poorly because she rejected Clinton’s
advances. Jones sought actual damages of $75,000 and punitive damages of $100,000.
The district court held that the President was immune from suit and that any litigation
must be stayed until the conclusion of the President’s term. The court of appeals
reversed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
威廉
-
杰斐逊
-
克林顿(被告)于
1992
年和
1996
年当选美国总统。
1991
年,克林
顿担任阿肯色州的州长。那一年,他出席了由保拉
-
科尔宾
-
琼斯(原告)在一家
酒店举办的会议。琼斯声称,在会议期间,前阿肯色州警官丹尼
-
弗格森(
Danny
Ferguson
)劝说她离开岗位,去克林顿州长的酒店房间。在那里,琼斯声称克林
顿对她进行了猥亵性挑逗,被她拒绝。她向阿肯色州东区地方法院提起诉讼,
将克林顿和弗格森列为被告。她还声称,由于她拒绝了克林顿的挑逗,她的主管
后来改变了她的职责,并对她态度恶劣。琼斯要求获得
75,000
美元的实际赔偿
和
100,000
美元的惩罚性赔偿。地区法院认为,总统享有诉讼豁免权,任何诉讼
必须暂停,直到总统任期结束。上诉法院推翻了这一判决,美国最高法院批准了
诉讼请求。
Reasoning
This case involved
personal issue
instead of official issue.
Grant it will
not
distract the president from his work and duties
o
Different from
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
in two aspects
参见上方总结
完整版
The Court rejected Clinton’s claim and held:
1.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald was distinguishable because it had involved official
conduct. But we have never suggested that the President, or any other official, has
an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official
capacity
.
2.
The Court also rejected Clinton
’
s contention that permitting the suit would
risk violation of separation of powers principles.
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3.
President Clinton claimed that defense of civil litigation would impose an
unacceptable burden on his time and energy, thereby impairing his effective
performance in office. In the Court’s view,
however, “if properly managed by
the District Court, [it is highly unlikely that defense of the suit would] occupy
any substantial amount of petitioner’s time.
”
4.
The Court also rejected the argument that permitting such litigation would
generate
a
large
volume
of
“politically
motivated
harassing
and
frivolous
litigation”
1.
尼克松诉菲茨杰拉德案是可以区分的,因为它涉及到官方行为。但我们从
未建议总统或任何其他官员拥有超出以官方身份采取的任何行动范围的豁免
权。
2.
法院还驳回了克林顿的论点,即允许诉讼会有违反分权原则的风险。
3.
克林顿总统声称,为民事诉讼辩护将对他的时间和精力造成不可接受的负
担,从而损害他在办公室的有效表现。然而,法院认为,
"
如果地区法院管理
得当,
[
该诉讼的辩护极不可能
]
占用请愿人的任何大量时间。
"
4.
法院还驳回了允许这种诉讼会产生大量
"
出于政治动机的骚扰性和无意
义的诉讼
"
的说法。
Cheney v. the US district court
Rule
: Friendship with an officer named in a lawsuit in his or her official capacity is
not grounds to recuse a Supreme Court justice.
Trump v. Vance
The Court held:
1.
No precedent
: No U.S. president has successfully
avoided a subpoena
on
executive-immunity grounds.
2.
Trump: all those cases involved federal trials, and that the Supremacy Clause
makes him immune from state prosecutions that
might divert, stigmatize, or
harass him and impair his performance of Article II functions.
Court: But 200 years of precedent establishes that presidents can comply with
a subpoena without this action interfering with their vital functions.
The
Nixon court
rejected the argument that distraction or preoccupation from
official duties warranted quashing a subpoena. A properly tailored subpoena
need not keep a president from performing his office.
3.
Trump:
subpoena
for
a
sitting
president’s
personal
records
must
meet
a
heightened showing of need.
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Court:
1)
with respect to
private papers
, a president
stands in nearly the same
situation as anyone else.
2)
nothing shows heightened protection
is necessary to fulfilling executive
functions.
3)
the public interest
in enforcing the laws favors open access to evidence.
1. No precedent:
没有一位美国总统以行政豁免权为由成功避免了传唤。
2. Trump
:所有这些案件都涉及联邦审判,而且最高条款使他免于受到可能转移、
侮辱或骚扰他并损害他履行第二条职能的国家起诉。
-
法院。但
200
年的先例规定,总统可以遵守传票,而这一行动不会干扰其重要
职能。尼克松法院拒绝了这样的论点,即分散注意力或专注于官方职责的行为可
以证明取消传票。一张合适的传票不需要阻止总统履行其职责。
3.
特朗普:对现任总统个人记录的传唤必须满足更高的需求。
-
法院。
1
)在私人文件方面,总统与其他人的处境几乎相同。
2
)没有任何证据表明加强保护对履行行政职能是必要的。
3
)执行法律的公共利益有利于公开获取证据。
Note
This case is in the state level and someone may point to Trump deliberately in
this way when he is out of office.
In the precedent there is no president immune from the personal issues
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IV.
To
what
extent
can
Congress
delegate
their
law
making
authority?
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983)
Rule of Law
Legislation providing Congress with a one-house veto
over an action of the
executive branch
is unconstitutional because it
does not meet the constitutional
requirements of presentment and bicameralism.
Facts
Through INA (
移民和国籍法
), Congress delegated the power to decide
移民是否可
以留在美国
to INS
(移民局)
,
但同时
INA
也规定
Congress
可以
one-house veto
INS(
移民局
)
的决定。
foreigner Chadha ordered by INS to show cause for why stayed after visa expired
o
immigration judge ruled could stay b/c met req’mts for permanent
residence statute
o
House Resolution (not treated as Art. I legislative act & not submitted
to Senate or Pres) intro’d opposing permanent residency to those like
Chadha
ordered deportation
-
外国人
Chadha
被移民局勒令出示签证过期后的居留理由。
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o
移民法官裁定可以留下,因为他符合永久居留法规的要求。
o
众议院决议(不被视为第一条立法行为,也没有提交给参议院或总
统)提出,反对像
Chadha
这样被命令驱逐出境的人获得永久居留
权。
Reasoning
holding
:
Congress may not use statute to grant itself a legislative veto over
actions
of
Exec
branch
b/c
not
achieved
thru
Bicameralism
&
Presentment
o
Congress must abide by its prior delegation of authority to INS agency
(Exec branch) to allow deportable aliens to remain & to Atty General
to decide decisions on deportation
Congress cannot revoke this delegation w/o use of Bicameralism &
Presentment
o
only 4 narrow Const’l provisions allow House or Senate to act
outside of Bicameral legislative role:
House’s power to initiate impeachments
Senate’s power to conduct trials following impeachment
Senate’s power over Pres’l appt’mts
Senate’s power to ratify treaties
- Holding:
国会不得在未通过
Bicameralism & Presentment
的前提下对行
政部门的行为行使立法否决权。
(因为行使
veto
权实际上是重新立法,
所以必须遵循
Bicameralism & Presentment
的立法原则)
o
国会必须遵守其先前对移民局(行政部门)的授权,允许可被驱逐
的外国人留下,并由总检察长决定驱逐出境的决定。
国会不能撤销这一授权,除非使用两院制和预审权
o
只有四个狭义的宪法条款允许众议院或参议院在
Bicameralism &
Presentment
这两个原则之外采取行动:
众议院有权启动弹劾程序
参议院在弹劾后进行审判的权力
参议院对总统任命的权力
参议院批准条约的权力
Note: Bicameralism
(两院制)
and Presentment (
预审制
)
:
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides that "[e]very
Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United
States"
formalist view
must prevent Madisonian concerns over tyranny & here
Congress invades Exec prerogative, delays are no excuse for Congr’l failure to
comply w/ explicit Const’l stds
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o
counterpoint
: why object to such minor delegation when Exec still
makes the major decisions & actually reduces its burdensome minor
duties?
concurrence
:
offends Separation of Powers b/c House executed a specific
determination affecting 6 individuals not complying w/ statute & this is
not Congress’s role
(especially w/o est’d checks that other branches would be
subject to were they to act similarly)
legislation affects whole classes of
ppl, but here affects individuals
o
Congress not politically accountable to Chadha or the political
process when acting outside of its prescribed role
(no internal
constraints prevent it from arbitrarily depriving of rt to remain, rts
subject to “tyranny of shifting majority”)
o
not bound by est’d substantive rules
(as would Judiciary or admin
agency)
o
no procedural safeguards like those present when ct or agency
adjudicates individual rts
(right to counsel, hearing before impartial
tribunal)
dissent
: functionalist argument
legislative veto mechanism necessary for
allowing Congress to retain role its massive delegation of authority to
agencies
o
if Congress was allowed to delegate Art. I power to admin agencies (&
SCt had not struck that down), then must be some mechanism for
checking that delegated power
o
not a threat of aggrandizement where Congress is simply checking
power that it would have had anyway had it not delegated to agencies
o
nothing in Constitution refutes this method of oversight & changes no
Const’l text to delegate any serious powers to Congress
counterpoint
: there were other Const’ly-sound alternatives that
would not alter Const’l structure
Morrison v. Olson (1988)
-
[functionalism]
Rule of Law
: A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior
executive officer (an independent counsel) and prohibiting the President from
removing
the
officer
without
good
cause
does
not
violate
separation-of-powers principles.
赋予司法机关任命下级行政官员(独立顾问)的权力(行政权力),并禁
止总统在没有充分理由的情况下解除该官员的职务的法律,并不违反分权
原则。
Facts
: Title VI of the Act permitted a court called the Special Division to
appoint
an
independent
counsel
to
investigate
and
prosecute
certain
high-ranking government officials for violations of federal criminal laws upon
request by the Attorney General.
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该法第六章允许一个名为特别法庭的法院任命一名独立顾问,以调查和起
诉某些高级政府官员违反联邦刑事法律的行为,这是应司法部长的要求。
Reasoning (Rehnquist, C.J.)-[functionalism]
1)
First, the independent counsel is subject to removal by a higher executive officer,
the Attorney General.
2)
Second, the independent counsel’s powers are limited to investigation and
prosecution, which do not impact executive policy. In addition, the independent
counsel has limited jurisdiction and tenure.
3)
Next,
the Act is consistent with separation-of-powers principles.
Congress
vested appointment power in the judiciary and removal authority in the Attorney
General; thus, Congress did not usurp executive authority for itself.
4)
Further,
limiting presidential authority to remove officials without cause has
been upheld in the past.
Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S.
, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
The good-cause requirement is not a burden on the president's ability, through the
Attorney General, to execute his constitutional authority. This is because the
president’s need to fully control these types of inferior officers is not central to
the functioning of the executive branch.
The branches of government are separate
but interdependent, and the Act does not violate the separation of powers by
usurping executive authority or upsetting the balance of power between the
branches. Accordingly, the act is constitutional, and the decision of the court of
appeals is reversed.
1
)首先,独立法律顾问可以被更高的行政官员,即司法部长撤职。
2
)其次,独立法律顾问的权力仅限于调查和起诉,这并不影响行政政策。
此外,独立顾问的管辖权和任期有限。
3)
其次,该法符合分权原则。国会将任命权赋予司法机构,将免职权赋予司
法部长;因此,国会没有为自己篡夺行政权力。
4
)此外,限制总统无故罢免官员的权力在过去也得到了支持。
Humphrey's
Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
。良好的理由要求对总统通过司法部长执
行其宪法权力的能力不是一种负担。这是因为总统需要完全控制这些类型的
下级官员,这不是行政部门运作的核心。政府的各个部门是分开的,但又是
相互依存的,该法案并没有因为篡夺行政权力或破坏各部门之间的权力平衡
而违反分权。因此,该法案符合宪法,上诉法院的判决被推翻。
Dissent (Scalia, J.) -[formalism]
1)
Article II of the Constitution specifically states that “
all” (not some) executive
powers of the United States shall be vested in the president
, just as “all”
legislative power is vested in Congress, and “all” judicial power is vested in the
Supreme Court.
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2)
Further, the characterization of the independent counsel as an inferior officer is
wrong; the term “inferior” at the time of the Constitutional Convention meant
subordinate, and the independent counsel is subordinate to no one.
Class 6: Equality and Equal Protection Clause
I. 13th and 14th Amendment:
AMENDMENT XIII [1865]
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV [1868]
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law
; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws
.
Background:
The Constitution was firstly designed to protect slavery. In history, some
provisions implied the Slavery in the Constitution
Article I Section 2, Clause 3 Three-fifths of all other person-slaves
Article I Section 9, Clause 1 important of slave
Article IV Section 2, Clause 3
逃亡奴隶政策
It did not specifically refer to slavery, but those articles implied that the framers
intended to protect the slavery as slave is “other persons” in the constitution.
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II. Before the civil war
State v. Post
Background
1)
US’s land has expanded to the west, and in 1820 the Congress passed a
compromise act (some states are slavery state and some others are non-slavery)
2)
The 1844 New Jersey constitution did not abolish slavery.
Rule
: The court knew that the popular opinion is to abolish slavery.
But we are only
judges to interpret the framers’ idea. The framer’s intent is not to abolish the
slavery.
Dred Scott v. Sandford
Background
(历史背景)
o
Conflicts on Slavery between Northern (most free states) and Southern
States (most slavery states)
o
Expansion of the U.S. territory to the west, question whether the new
territory should allow slavery?
o
Solution: Congress compromised:
新州是自由州,但
Southern State
可
以
remain slavery.
Rule of Law
People of
African descent
brought to the United States and
held as slaves
, as
well as their descendants (either slave or free
), are not considered citizens of the
United States and are not entitled to the protections and rights of the
Constitution
.
Facts
Dred Scott (plaintiff) was an African American man born a slave in Virginia in
the late 1700s. In 1830, he was taken by his owners to Missouri and purchased by
Army Major John Emerson in 1832. Emerson took Scott with him on various
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assignments in Illinois and Wisconsin Territory, areas that outlawed slavery
based on Congress’s enactment of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the
Missouri Compromise of 1820. While in Wisconsin, Emerson allowed Scott to
marry and later left Scott and his wife in Wisconsin when he was reassigned to
Louisiana. While in Louisiana, Emerson married Eliza Irene Sandford. He then
sent for Scott and his wife, who traveled to Louisiana to serve Emerson and his
wife. After Emerson’s death in 1843, his widow inherited his estate, including
Scott. Scott attempted to purchase his freedom from Emerson’s widow, but she
refused. In 1846, Scott sued Emerson’s widow for the freedom of himself and his
family, but the Missouri Supreme Court upheld their slavery. Scott brought suit
again in 1853 in federal district court against John Sandford (defendant), executor
of Emerson’s estate. The federal court relied on Missouri law to find that Scott
was still a slave, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Scott petitioned for
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
德雷德
-
斯科特(原告)是一个非裔美国人,
17
世纪末出生在弗吉尼亚州的
一个奴隶。
1830
年,他被主人带到密苏里,
1832
年被陆军少校约翰
-
爱默生
买下。爱默生带着斯科特在伊利诺伊州和威斯康星州地区执行各种任务,这
些地区根据国会颁布的
1787
年《西北条例》和
1820
年《密苏里妥协》取缔
了奴隶制。在威斯康星州时,艾默生允许斯科特结婚,后来当他被重新分配
到路易斯安那州时,将斯科特和他的妻子留在了威斯康星州。在路易斯安那
州时,爱默生与伊丽莎
-
艾琳
-
桑德福结婚。然后他派人去找斯科特和他的妻
子,后者前往路易斯安那州为爱默生和他的妻子服务。
1843
年爱默生去世后,
他的遗孀继承了他的遗产,包括斯科特。斯科特试图从爱默生的遗孀那里购
买他的自由,但她拒绝了。
1846
年,斯科特为自己和家人的自由起诉爱默生
的遗孀,但密苏里州最高法院维持了他们的奴隶制。
1853
年,斯科特在联邦
地区法院再次对爱默生的遗产执行人约翰
-
桑福德(被告)提起诉讼。联邦法
院依据密苏里州的法律,认定斯科特仍然是奴隶,巡回上诉法院确认了这一
点。斯科特向美国最高法院提出了诉讼请求。
Whether the court has a jurisdiction?-does “diversity jurisdiction” exist?
So the court had to decide Scott is a citizen of the United States.
Reasoning:
Jurisdiction issue:
diversity jurisdiction: plaintiff and defendant come from
different state, so the court has to solve jurisdiction issue first.
Court: African descendant is
not a citizen of the U.S., so court has no
jurisdiction.
o
intent of the framers of constitution
: slaves were an inferior race and
therefore not entitled to basic constitution protections
o
the history and plight of African Americans
o
The congress did have the power to abandoning the slavery
when
regulating the territory because it will be arbitrary for the
奴隶主
to
travel across the states with the risk of losing the slaves as properties.
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密苏里
Compromise itself is not constitutional.
o
Constitution protect property (salve),
并且没有赋予国会废除奴隶制
的权利
Conclusion: not a citizen, no jurisdiction
III. After the civil war
13th amendment after the civil war: represents the formal eradication of slavery
14the amendment is set to further protect the rights of blacks, and “any person”.
But it was a long process that the Court tried to accept the 14th amendment.
So
at
the
beginning,
the
Court
only
adopted
narrow
interpretation
of
the
Reconstruction amendments
United States v. Reese
United States v. Cruikshank
United States v. Harris
内战后的第
13
条修正案:代表着奴隶制的正式根除
第
14
条修正案被设定为进一步保护黑人以及
"
任何人
"
的权利。
但法院试图接受第
14
条修正案是一个漫长的过程。
所以一开始,法院只对重建时期的修正案进行了狭义的解释
美国诉
Reese
案
美国诉
Cruikshank
案
美国诉哈里斯案
The Civil rights case
Congress: The states will be seen as encouraging the private sectors to support
slavery, so the congress can regulate the discrimination against blacks by
private sectors.
o
the court’s argument about state actions
: the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment
[is] prohibitory…upon the States.
[It] is State
action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion
of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment.
The Court acknowledged that laws enacted under the thirteenth amendment
“may be primary and direct in [character]; for the thirteenth amendment is not
a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an
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absolute declaration that
slavery or involuntary servitude
shall not exist in
any part of the United States.”
o
The
Court
also
agreed
that
Congress
was
empowered
under
the
amendment “to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all
badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”
But the crucial
question was whether the discriminatory refusal to serve a black
person
in
a
public
accommodation
was
such
a
badge
or
incident.
The Court thought that accepting this position “would be
running the slavery argument into the ground.” A refusal of service “has
nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude. [If] it is violative of
any right of the party, his redress is to be sought under the laws of the
State; or if those laws are adverse to his rights and do not protect him, his
remedy will be found in the corrective legislation which Congress has
adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting the effect of State laws, or State
action, prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Congress
:各州将被视为鼓励私营部门支持奴隶制,因此国会可以监管私
营部门对黑人的歧视。
o
法院关于州行动的论点:第十四修正案的第一节
[
是
]
禁止性的
......
对州。
[
被禁止的是具有特殊性质的国家行为。个人对个人权利的侵犯不是
该修正案 的主题。
(
十四修正 案只禁止
State action
,而不禁止
individual/private action)
法院承认,根据第十三条修正案颁布的法律
"
在
[
性质
]
上可能是主要的和
直接的;
因为第十三条修正案不仅仅是禁止各州建立或支持奴隶制的法
律,而是一个绝对的宣言,即奴隶制或非自愿的奴役在美国的任何地方
都不存在
"
。
o
法院还同意,
根据该修正案,国会有权
"
通过所有必要和适当的法律,
以废除美国境内的所有奴隶制的标志和事件
"
。
但关键的问题是,在
公共场所歧视性地拒绝为黑人提供服务是否是这样一种徽章或事件。
法院认为,接受这一立场
"
将使奴隶制的论点落空
"
。
拒绝服务
"
与奴
隶制或非自愿劳役没有关系。
[
如果它侵犯了当事人的任何权利,他的
补救措施应根据该州的法律来寻求;或者如果这些法律不利于他的权
利,不能保护他,他的补救措施将在国会已通过或可能通过的纠正性
立法中找到,以抵消第十四修正案所禁止的州法律或州行动的影响。
"
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IV. Jim Crow: Separate but equal?
Plessy v. Ferguson
Rule of Law
Public accommodations that are segregated
according to racial classifications
do
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as long as
such accommodations are
“separate but equal.”
Facts
In 1890, the State of Louisiana passed a law that provided for separate railway cars
for Caucasian and African American persons. Plessy (defendant) was seven-eighths
Caucasian and one-eighth African American, but was considered African American
under Louisiana law. He challenged the law by taking a seat in a Caucasian railway
car and was asked to move to the African American car by the conductor. When he
refused,
he
was
forcibly
ejected
and
imprisoned.
The
Committee
of
Citizens
originally brought suit on behalf of Plessy in Louisiana state court challenging his
arrest and conviction. The presiding judge, Ferguson (plaintiff), held that Louisiana
had a right to enact such legislation to regulate railway companies as long as those
companies operated within the state’s borders. Plessy then sought a writ of prohibition
against Ferguson. The Committee of Citizens appealed on Plessy’s behalf to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which upheld Judge Ferguson’s ruling. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1890
年,路易斯安那州通过了一项法律,规定高加索人和非裔美国人的铁路车
厢要分开。普莱西(被告)是八分之七的高加索人和八分之一的非裔美国人,但
根据路易斯安那州的法律,他被视为非裔美国人。他挑战法律,在一节高加索人
的火车车厢里坐了下来,列车长要求他移到非裔美国人的车厢里。当他拒绝时,
他被强行赶走并被监禁。公民委员会最初代表普莱西在路易斯安那州立法院提起
诉讼,质疑对他的逮捕和定罪。主审法官弗格森(原告)认为,只要铁路公司在
本州范围内运营,路易斯安那州就有权颁布此类立法来监管铁路公司。普莱西随
后寻求对弗格森发出禁止令。公民委员会代表普莱西向路易斯安那州最高法院提
出上诉,该法院维持了弗格森法官的裁决。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Majority opinion
: Distinction between legal equality and social equality
While the object of the Fourteenth Amendment is to promote the equality of
all races before the law,
it cannot have been intended to abolish all
distinctions based on color, or to enforce social (as opposed to political)
equality when African Americans and Caucasians do not actually want to
be commingled.
If
the African
American
race
feels inferior
because
of the laws,
that
inferiority construction is placed upon the race by itself
.
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Dissent (Harlan J.)
The legislation should not consider the race of citizens
The white made the laws to exclude the blacks (consider the purpose of laws)
(law represent a mindset that the black is inferior)
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)
Rule of Law
Separate educational facilities based on
racial classifications
are inherently unequal
and
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
.
Facts
The present case represented a consolidation of cases from Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Delaware. In each state, African American minors sought the aid of
their state courts in gaining admission to public schools on a non-segregated basis. In
all instances, Brown and other minor African American children (plaintiffs) had been
denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or
permitting segregation according to race. They alleged that this segregation deprived
them of Equal Protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1951,
Brown first filed suit against the Board of Education for Topeka, Kansas (defendant)
in federal district court. The district court ruled in favor of the Board of Education,
citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 507 (1896), as guidance. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
本案是堪萨斯州、南卡罗来纳州、弗吉尼亚州和特拉华州的案件的合并。在每个
州,非裔美国人的未成年人都寻求其州法院的帮助,以获得在非隔离的基础上
进入公立学校的机会。在所有情况下,布朗和其他未成年非裔美国人儿童(原
告)都被拒绝进入白人儿童就读的公立学校,因为法律要求或允许按种族进行
隔离。他们声称,这种隔离剥夺了他们根据第十四修正案获得法律的平等保护。
1951
年,布朗首次在联邦地区法院对堪萨斯州托皮卡市教育委员会(被告)提
起诉讼。地区法院援引
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 507 (1896)
案作为指导,裁定
教育委员会胜诉。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
Court
认 为 黑 人 和 白 人 学 校
physically equal
(physical/tangible factors are
equal)
(Majority
opinion)
intangible
factors:
physiological
harm
to
the
African
Americans
or (Thomas’s opinion) superior education resources: not equal
-Qs: If the Constitution is blind to the race and color, is it acceptable to give priorities
to African Americans to compensate for their loss in history?
1.
在决定该问题时,不可能依靠十四修正案颁布时的原始意图
it is not possible
to rely on the original intent surrounding adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(因
为这个问题在之前的各种
case
和
debate
中也一直没有被解决)
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在决定这个问题时,不可能依靠围绕第十四修正案通过的原始意图,因为以前的
案例和颁布时涉及的立法历史对其真正的含义范围没有定论。
2.
也不能依靠十四修正案颁布时的教育情况,因为当时白人上的基本是私立学
校,给黑人上的公立学校数量很少
3.
An examination of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
itself is utilized to
determine the intent behind the Amendment’s application to public education.
To determine whether the segregated schools violate the Fourteenth Amendment as
interpreted, it is necessary to examine the
actual effect of this segregation on the
institution of public education as a whole.
In the present case, the opportunity for education is not equally provided to minority
students, as the existence of segregation has a
profound and detrimental effect on
their hearts and minds.
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II)
de facto discrimination: should the states require the
private schools to do the
same as public schools
?
Individual
school
officials
are
responsible
for
implementing
constitutional
principles in good faith
, but the various district courts that originally heard the
cases against all schools involved in Brown are best equipped to determine
whether a good faith effort is being made.
Class 7& 8: Equal protection: economic and race discrimination;
discrimination on the basis of gender, sexual orientation,
non-citizenship, disability, and age
I. Race issue in 14th amendment
14
th
Amendment: “nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws” (bans every states from denying to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws)
-HOWEVER, nearly
every statute
actually classify and
discriminate
individuals to
some extent.
-So
what kind of discrimination is right?
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II. Roadmap
(1) Discrimination?
Does the law treat similarly situated people differently?
(a) Facial Discrimination
?
No
? Go to 1(b). / Yes
: Go to 2
“Facially
discriminatory
Law”:
Law
itself
draw
a
line
between
different
classification of people.
(b) Facially neutral, but has discriminatory
both
effect
and
discriminatory
purpose
?
No
: No violation. / Yes
: Go to 2.
(2) Against Who?
: How “suspect” is the classification/discrimination?
Apply appropriate level of scrutiny
:
Non-Suspect Class? (e.g., Economic)
[Railway Express Agency v. New York,
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,
US
Depart
of
Agriculture
v.
Moreno]
o
Apply Rational Basis
: If the plaintiff fails to show the law discriminates
against
a suspect
class,
then
courts
apply
“
Rational
Basis
Scrutiny
”
(presumption of constitutionality)
Quasi-Suspect Class? (e.g., Gender)
[Craig v. Boren, United States v. Virginia]
o
Apply Intermediate Scrutiny
- If the plaintiff can
show that
the law
discriminates against a quasi-suspect class, then courts apply “
Intermediate
scrutiny
” (moderate presumption of unconstitutionality)
Suspect Class? (e.g., Race)
[Loving v. Virginia, Yick Wo v. Hopkins]
o
Apply Strict Scrutiny
- If the
plaintiff
can show the law discriminates against
a
suspect class
, then courts apply “
Strict Scrutiny
” (heavy presumption of
un
constitutionality)
(3)
Why?
: Does the government have a good enough reason to be discriminating?
No
? Law is unconstitutional. / Yes
: Go to 4.
[
看答案
]
Rational Basis Part 1: Legitimate Interest?
:
Plaintiff
must show that the
government’s goal or interest is
illegitimate
.
Intermediate Scrutiny Part 1: Important Interest?
:
Government
must show that its
goal or interest is
important
.
Strict Scrutiny Part 1: Compelling Interest?
:
Government
must show that its
goal or interest is
compelling.
(4)
Tailoring
: Is the law sufficiently tailored toward achieving the government’s goal?
No
? Law is unconstitutional. / Yes
: Law is constitutional
Rational
Basis
Part
2:
Rationally
related?
:
Plaintiff
must
show
that
the
classification is an
irrational
way for the government to achieve its legitimate
interest.
An imperfect, yet rational fit is enough.
Intermediate Scrutiny Part 2: Substantially related?
Government must show that
the classification is substantially related to its important interest.
In other words,
a moderately well-tailored fit is required.
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Strict Scrutiny Part 2: Narrow Tailoring
:
Government
must show that the
classification is
narrowly tailored
to its compelling interest.
In other words, a
near perfect fit is required.
Strauder v. West Virginia
Facts
West Virginia (plaintiff) enacted a statute limiting jury service to white males over the
age of 21 who are state citizens. An all-white jury convicted Strauder (defendant), a
black man, of murder. Strauder argues that his conviction by a jury selected under the
West Virginia statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
西弗吉尼亚州(原告)颁布了一项法规,规定只有
21
岁以上属于州公民的白人
男性可以担任陪审员。一个全白的陪审团判定黑人
Strauder
(被告)犯有谋杀罪。
斯特劳德辩称,根据西弗吉尼亚州的法规选择的陪审团对他的定罪违反了第十四
修正案。
Reasoning
14
th
Amendment prohibit State from discriminating someone by
RACE
.
But State
can
discriminate people base on other factors like: Gender, Property,
Age, Citizenship, etc.
The jury selection with discrimination
o
what can be discriminated? Gender, Property, Age, Citizenship
o
what cannot: race
Significancy
The first case to strike down racial discrimination.
此后,在歧视问题上,法院建立了“
strict scrutiny
”
and “rational basis scrutiny”
Strict
Scrutiny
:
race
discrimination
-very
skeptical
about
the
state
law
constitutionality
Rational
basis
scrutiny
:
economics/property
-more
neutral
considering
the
constitutionality
—these classes basically have more resource to protect themselves
Railway
Express
Agency
v.
New
York
[Rational
Basis
Scrutiny]
[under
inclusive]
Rule of Law
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A state law that is substantially underinclusive does not necessarily violate the Equal
Protection Clause because a state may rationally decide to address a public problem in
phases.
Facts
A statute promulgated by the State of New York (plaintiff)
prohibited vehicles
devoted solely to displaying advertisements, but permitted business vehicles to
display signs related to their business as long as the business vehicles were not
solely used for advertising.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. (defendant) was engaged
in a nationwide express business and operated about 1,900 trucks in New York City.
It sold the space on the exterior sides of its trucks for advertising that was primarily
unrelated to its business. Railway was convicted of violating the New York statute in
the magistrate’s court and fined. The conviction was sustained by the Court of Special
Sessions, and the court of appeals affirmed. Railway Express Agency, Inc. appealed
to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that the regulation did not bear a
rational relation to a legitimate state purpose and was thus unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause.
纽约州(原告)颁布的一项法规禁止专门用于展示广告的车辆,但允许商业车
辆展示与其业务有关的标志,只要商业车辆不是专门用于广告。铁路快运公司
(
Railway Express Agency, Inc. (
被告)从事全国性的快递业务,在纽约市经营约
1900
辆卡车。该公司出售其卡车外侧的空间,用于主要与其业务无关的广告。
铁路公司在地方法院被判定违反了纽约法规,并被罚款。特别法庭维持了定罪,
上诉法院确认了这一判决。铁路快运公司向美国最高法院提出上诉,理由是该法
规与合法的国家目的没有合理关系,因此根据平等保护条款是违宪的。
Reasoning
Court created 4-step test:
1.
Is
it
a
discrimination?
(does
the
law
treat
similarly
situated
people
differently?)
2.
Against
who?
how
suspect
the
classification/
discrimination?
apply
appropriate level of scrutiny
3.
Why?
dose
the
government
have
a
good
enough
reason
to
be
discriminating?
No. unconstitutional; Yes, go to 4.
4.
“Tailoring”
Does
the
law
sufficiently
tailored
toward
achieving
the
governmental goal? No (mismatch). unconstitutional; Yes, constitutional
Also, it is important for the court to see whether the purpose is pretextual? sometimes
the purpose in reality is different from what is when created by the framers.
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In this case,
1.
Yes.
2.
Against vehicles devoted solely to displaying advertisements
3.
Legitimate purpose: to regulate the traffic congestion problem
4.
“Tailoring”: Yes, rationally related.
o
Even though the statute is probably
underinclusive (
不能解决所有问题
)
,
但只
要
law
对
government’s purpose
有作用就可以
o
Court will
grant deference to discretion
of New York local authorities that
regulate certain type of advertisement in most pressing need
o
allow the state to solve each problem each time. (
就算有其他问题更急迫,法院
也认为
State
有权自己裁量先解决什么问题
)
III. RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY
Rational Basis Scrutiny:
1. Court will not go deep into the Status
2. proof of burden
在原告:原告必须证明
1) Government’s goal is not legitimate
and, 2) Means are not rationally related to the goal.
New Orleans v. Dukes
Rule of Law
A law that does not affect a fundamental right or discriminate on the basis of race,
religion, or alienage, is constitutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.
Facts
New Orleans (defendant) enacted an ordinance prohibiting all pushcart food vendors
from operating within the French Quarter, but provided an exception for vendors who
had been operating in the French Quarter for at least eight years. Dukes (plaintiff) did
not qualify under the exception, and challenged the ordinance.
新奥尔良(被告)颁布了一项法令,禁止所有推车式食品供应商在法国区经营,
但对在法国区经营了至少
8
年的供应商提供了例外。
Dukes
(原告)不符合该例
外规定,因此对该条例提出质疑。
1)
Apply the same four-tier test above.
2)
The burden is also very high for the plaintiffs and thus failed to prove it.
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New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer [overinclusive]
Rule
: A state regulation that is
over-inclusive
because it regulates a general class
of persons based on the conduct of particular members within that class does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution if it is rationally related to
a legitimate state purpose.
Facts
The New York City Transit Authority (defendant) promulgated a policy that it
would not hire or employ persons currently participating in one of New York
City’s several methadone maintenance programs. About 40,000 persons received
methadone treatments in New York, and treatments were primarily administered
to treat the physical withdrawal symptoms of heroin addicts. Beazer (plaintiff)
and three other persons brought suit in federal district court against the New York
City Transit Authority in a class action on behalf of all persons who had been, or
would in the future be, subject to discharge or rejection as employees of the
Transit Authority because they participated in a methadone maintenance program.
The district court ruled in favor of Beazer and found the employment policy
unconstitutional. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
纽约市交通局(被告)颁布了一项政策,即不雇用或雇佣目前正在参加纽约
市几个美沙酮维持计划之一的人。在纽约约有
40,000
人接受美沙酮治疗,治
疗主要是为了治疗海洛因成瘾者的身体戒断症状。比泽(原告)和其他三人
在联邦地区法院对纽约市交通局提起集体诉讼,代表所有曾经或将来会因为
参加美沙酮维持计划而被交通局解雇或拒绝的人。地区法院作出了有利于
Beazer
的裁决,并认为就业政策是违宪的。该判决得到了第二巡回上诉法院
的确认,美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Beazer’s argument: Transit Authority’s rule was unconstitutional because it was
overbroad and potentially excluded from employment methadone users that
are not recidivists and would successfully complete their programs.
Court:
1.
the general rule employed by the Transit Authority serves general objectives of
safety and efficiency.
2.
The rule does not enact additional discriminatory provisions against a more
defined suspect class of persons, rather, the rule discriminates against a general
class of persons.
US Depart of Agriculture v. Moreno (
少数适用
Rational Basis
但原告败诉的案
子
)
Rule of Law
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A state regulation that arbitrarily creates two classes of persons and deprives one
class of government benefits violates the Equal Protection Clause and Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
because it is based on a mere
legislative preference for one class
that is not rationally related
to a
legitimate state purpose.
一个州的法规任意创造了两类人,并剥夺了一类人的政府福利,这违反了第
五修正案的平等保护条款和正当程序条款,因为它仅仅是基于对一类人的立
法偏好,与合法的州目的没有合理的联系。
Facts
In 1964, Congress passed the Food Stamp Act to govern and reform its food
stamp program. Section 3(e) of the Act excluded from participation in the food
stamp program any household containing an individual who was unrelated to any
other member of the household. Moreno (plaintiff) lived with Sanchez, a person
to whom she was not related, and Sanchez’s three children. Moreno met all
income and other requirements for receiving food stamps, however, her benefits
were denied under § 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act. Sanchez’s benefits were also
denied despite otherwise qualifying. Moreno brought suit against the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (defendant) in federal district court
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the act. The district court held that § 3(e)
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The USDA appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
1964
年,国会通过了《食品券法》以管理和改革其食品券计划。该法第
3(e)
条规定,任何包含与家庭任何其他成员没有关系的个人的家庭不得参与食品
券计划。
莫雷诺(原告)与桑切斯(一个与她没有关系的人)以及桑切斯的
三个孩子住在一起。莫雷诺符合领取食品券的所有收入和其他要求,但是,
根据《食品券法》第
3(e)
节,她的福利被拒绝。桑切斯的福利也被拒绝了,
尽管他符合其他条件。莫雷诺在联邦地区法院对美国农业部(
USDA
)(被
告)提起诉讼,要求禁止执行该法案。地区法院认为,第
3(e)
节违反了第五
修正案的正当程序条款。美国农业部向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Reasoning
It is unconstitutional
because this classification is unrelated to the legitimate
governmental interest
(
apply rational basis review
)
1)
Purpose 1 of the Congress: stimulate the agricultural economy by encouraging
people to purchase farm surpluses.
1)
Court: The governing of relationships within private homes bears no rational
relation to this stated purpose.
1
)国会的目的
1
:通过鼓励人们购买农场剩余物来刺激农业经济。
1
)法院。对私人住宅内关系的管理与这一既定目的没有合理关系。
2)
Purpose 2 of the Congress: Congress primarily sought to exclude “hippies” and
“hippie communes” from participating in the food stamp program.
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2)
However,
this purpose is unconstitutional because the Equal Protection
Clause prevents Congress from passing legislation targeting a particular,
unpopular group.
(非常重要,一定程度上导致
court struck down the statues
)
2
)国会的目的
2
。国会主要是想把
"
嬉皮士
"
和
"
嬉皮士公社
"
排除在食品
券计划之外。
2
)然而,这一目的是违宪的,因为平等保护条款阻止国会通过针对某个不
受欢迎的群体的立法。(非常重要,一定程度上导致法院推翻了这些法规)。
3)
USDA: households composed of unrelated members are more likely to abuse the
program, and thus could have passed legislation that is rationally related to the
legitimate purpose of preventing fraud.
3)
Court: The Act in question is not targeted at people identified as likely to “abuse
the program,” but rather discriminates against an entire class of persons that are
so desperately in need of aid
IV. STRICT SCRUTINY
To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to
further a
"compelling governmental interest,"
and must have
“narrowly tailored”
the
law to achieve that interest.
The strict scrutiny test is generally used when in cases where fundamental rights
or racial classifications
are at issue.
Facially discriminatory Law against racial minority
Korematsu v. United States
Rule of Law
State laws restricting the rights of persons based on race are subject to
strict scrutiny
and will only be upheld if they further a “pressing public necessity.”
基于种族限制人的权利的州法律受到严格审查,只有在促进
"
紧迫的公共需要
"
时才会得到支持。
Facts
On May 9, 1942 under Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, based on Executive Order
9066, Japanese-Americans were ordered to move to relocation camps in light of the
United States’ involvement in World War II. Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34
specifically excluded Japanese Americans from remaining in San Leandro, California,
a region designated as a “Military Area.” Korematsu (defendant) was an American
citizen of Japanese descent who was convicted by the United States Government
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(plaintiff), in federal district court for violating Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34. No
questions were raised as to Korematsu’s loyalty to the United States. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
1942
年
5
月
9
日,根据第
1
号平民限制令,基于第
9066
号行政命令,鉴于美国
参与第二次世界大战,日裔美国人被命令迁往安置营。第
34
号平民驱逐令明确
规定,日裔美国人不得留在加利福尼亚州的圣莱安德罗,该地区被指定为
"
军
事区
"
。
Korematsu
(被告)是一名日裔美国公民,在联邦地区法院被美国政府(原
告)定罪,罪名是违反第
34
号平民排外令。没有人提出
Korematsu
是否忠于美
国的问题。第九巡回上诉法院确认了定罪,而美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
1. Discrimination?
Yes, facially discriminatory Law.
2. Against who?
Related to race-“highly suspect group”-so apply strict
scrutiny”
3. Compelling reason?
The pressing public necessity: the military purpose to
avoid espionage and sabotage
4. Narrowly tailored?
It was such an emergency (war time) so there was no
time to distinguish the loyalty Japanese from disloyalty ones.
Loving v. Virginia
Rule of Law
A state may not restrict marriages between persons solely on the basis of race under
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
根据第十四修正案的平等保护和正当程序条款,一个州不得仅以种族为由限制人
们之间的婚姻。
Facts
In June 1958, Mildred Jeter, an African American woman, and Richard Loving, a
Caucasian man (defendants), were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its
laws. They later moved to Virginia (plaintiff) and resided in Caroline County. The
laws of Virginia, however, banned interracial marriages within the state. In October
1958, the Lovings were indicted for violating the Virginia law. They plead guilty and
were sentenced to one year in jail, but the trial court suspended the sentence for
twenty-five years on the condition that the Lovings would leave Virginia and not
return to the state together for twenty-five years. The Lovings then moved to the
District of Columbia, but filed suit in state trial court to vacate the judgment against
them on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment.
The
Supreme
Court
of
Appeals
affirmed
the
constitutionality of the Virginia statutes and upheld the convictions. The Lovings
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
1958
年
6
月,非裔美国妇女
Mildred Jeter
和白种人男子
Richard Loving
(被告)
在哥伦比亚特区根据其法律结婚。他们后来搬到了弗吉尼亚州(原告),居住
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在卡罗琳县。然而,弗吉尼亚州的法律禁止在该州内进行异族通婚。
1958
年
10
月,洛芬夫妇因违反弗吉尼亚州的法律而被起诉。他们认罪并被判处一年监禁,
但审判法庭将这一判决缓期
25
年执行,条件是
Lovings
夫妇离开弗吉尼亚州并
在
25
年内不返回该州。洛芬夫妇随后搬到了哥伦比亚特区,但在州审判法庭提
起诉讼,要求撤销对他们的判决,理由是判决违反了第十四修正案的平等保护和
正当程序条款。最高上诉法院确认了弗吉尼亚州法规的合宪性,并维持了对他们
的定罪。洛芬夫妇向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Reasoning
Virginia’s argument:
1)
it furthers a legitimate state purpose of preserving racial integrity and preserving
racial pride.
2)
the regulation of marriage has traditionally been left to the states under the Tenth
Amendment.
3)
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause suggested that it is only obligated to
apply its laws equally among different groups of people.
Thus, it argues that it is complying with its obligation by preventing interracial
marriage for all people, not just Caucasians.
Court:
1)
Virginia’s statute
is motivated solely to restrict marriage based on race
, and by
precedent, such laws have been found to be a threat to equality. (
法 院 认 为
Virginia
并没有
Compelling reason
,且
Virginia
说的
interest
并不是他们真实
所想,因为
Virginia
只禁止黑人和白人通婚,并不禁止其他种族之间的通婚
)
2)
At the very least such race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny
and cannot be upheld unless they are shown to accomplish a permissible
state objective independent of the racial discrimination.
Facially nonracial classification that may disadvantage racial minority
:
Washington v. Davis
Rule of Law
A
state-sponsored
racial classification violates the equal protection provisions in
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause only if
1. it is shown to have both a
disproportionate impact on a particular race and 2. is motivated by invidious
racial discrimination.
只有当国家支持的种族分类被证明对某一特定种族有不成比例的影响,并且
是出于令人反感的种族歧视目的时,才违反了第五修正案的正当程序条款中
的平等保护条款。
Facts
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Davis (plaintiff) was an African American man who, along with another African
American man, applied for admission to the Washington, D.C. police department.
Both men were turned down and brought suit in federal district court against
Washington (defendant), the mayor of Washington, D.C., alleging that the police
department used racially discriminatory hiring practices by administering a verbal
skills test (Test 21) disproportionately failed by African Americans. The district
court held for Washington, but the court of appeals reversed on the grounds that
Test 21 was unconstitutional because of its disproportionate impact on African
Americans, regardless of whether the police department’s motive was to use the
test to discriminate against a particular race. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
戴维斯(原告)是一名非裔美国人,他和另一名非裔美国人一起申请加入华
盛顿特区警察部门。两人都被拒之门外,并在联邦地区法院对华盛顿特区市
长华盛顿(被告)提起诉讼,指称警察部门在招聘时采用了种族歧视的做法,
对非裔美国人进行了不成比例的口头技能测试(测试
21
)。地区法院支持华
盛顿,但上诉法院推翻了这一判决,理由是
21
号测试因其对非裔美国人的
影响过大而违宪,而不管警察部门的动机是否是利用该测试来歧视某一特定
种族。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Issue
: Whether the test used by the Washington, D.C. police department to screen
new employees violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Holding and Reasoning (White, J.)
The
disproportionate impact
on a particular racial group
The
purpose is discriminatory
or not
o
How to prove the purpose?-based on all the surrounding factual texts,
including the fact that one
law burdens one race more heavily than
another.
(but not in this case)
o
Note: Compare this case with Yick Wo v. Hopkins (p752): what is the
neutral statutes and what is the statute with discriminatory purpose?
Only if the law has both disproportionate impact and discriminatory
purpose can it apply strict scrutiny.
Note: Q: What is the purpose of Equal protection clause? Equality of opportunity or
result?
•
Equity of opportunity – intentional government discrimination should be
banned
•
Equity of result – should not include intention (discriminatory purpose)
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Palmer v. Thompson
Rule of Law
A state regulation based on racial classifications is unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause if the plaintiff proves both a discriminatory purpose and a
discriminatory impact of the regulation.
根据平等保护条款,如果原告能证明该法规的歧视性目的和歧视性影响,那么基
于种族分类的州级法规是违宪的。
Facts
In 1962, the City of Jackson, Mississippi operated five public parks, swimming pools,
and other public facilities on a racially segregated basis. Four of the swimming pools
were designated for use by Caucasians only. The fifth pool was designated for use by
African
Americans
only.
Several
African
American
plaintiffs
challenged
the
segregation, alleging that it violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. The district court hearing the case held the segregation
unconstitutional, but refused to issue an injunction to stop the practice. The court of
appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. The City
then proceeded to desegregate these public facilities, but declined to operate its
swimming pools on a desegregated basis. The City closed four of its pools. Palmer
(plaintiff), an African American resident of Jackson, and several other African
American residents brought suit against Thompson (defendant), a City of Jackson
official, in federal district court challenging the closing of the pools and seeking to
convince the city to reopen them on a non-segregated basis. The district court denied
this request, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
1962
年,密西西比州杰克逊市在种族隔离的基础上经营五个公共公园、游泳池
和其他公共设施。其中四个游泳池被指定只供白种人使用。第五个游泳池只指定
给非裔美国人使用。几位非裔美国人原告对这种隔离制度提出质疑,声称它违反
了美国宪法第十三和第十四修正案。审理此案的地区法院认为这种隔离是违宪的,
但拒绝发布禁止令来停止这种做法。上诉法院维持原判,而美国最高法院拒绝了
诉讼请求。该市随后着手消除这些公共设施的种族隔离,但拒绝在消除种族隔
离的基础上经营其游泳池。该市关闭了其中的四个游泳池。杰克逊市的非裔居民
帕尔默(原告)和其他几位非裔居民在联邦地区法院对杰克逊市的一位官员汤普
森(被告)提起诉讼,对关闭游泳池提出质疑,并试图说服该市在非隔离的基础
上重新开放。地区法院拒绝了这一请求,上诉法院维持原判。美国最高法院批准
了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
May be have discriminatory purpose.
But purpose is hard to prove and
purpose only is not enough.
Plaintiff
failed to show that the pool closing has a discriminatory impact
on African American residents as a group.
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Yick Wo v. Hopkins
Rule of Law
A facially neutral law that is applied in a discriminatory manner on the basis of
race or nationality violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Facts
The petitioner was convicted of violating a local ordinance prohibiting operation
of a laundry not located in a brick or stone building without the consent of the
board of supervisors. He alleged that he and more than two hundred other
Chinese nationals had petitioned the board of supervisors for consent, but that all
of their petitions were denied, whereas all but one of the petitions filed by
non-Chinese were granted.
请愿人被判定违反了当地的一项条例,该条例禁止未经监事会同意在砖或石
建筑内经营洗衣店。他声称,他和其他两百多名中国公民曾向监理会申请同
意,但他们的申请都被拒绝了,而除了一个非中国人提出的申请外,其他申
请都被批准了。
Reasoning
: The Court unanimously reversed Yick Wo’s conviction. It held that
the facts shown establish an administration
directed so exclusively against a
particular class of persons
as to warrant and require the conclusion, that,
whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied
by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing
the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical
denial by the State of [equal] protection of the laws.
法院一致推翻了对
Yick Wo
的定罪。法院认为,所显示的事实证明,政府的
管理是专门针对某一类人的,从而证明并要求得出这样的结论:无论所通过
的条例的意图是什么,负责管理这些条例的公共当局,从而代表国家本身,
是以一种不平等和压迫的心态来实施的,相当于国家实际拒绝了法律的
[
平等
]
保护。
Qs: Suppose the statute banned all people from running such business?
Palmer v. Thompson p755-756
purpose alone may not be enough to justify the discrimination claim; both the
purpose and adverse effect matter.
—connection with the Brown case: is it necessary to prove that the discrimination has
harmed the children psychologically (the impact factor)?
Conclusion
: facially neutral statute is subject to enhanced review only when it has
both a discriminatory purpose and a disproportionate impact.
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V. Contemporary application of strict scrutiny
(start in p769, p779)
Background: Affirmative Action
California v. Bakke (quota case)
Rule of Law
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a public
university may not discriminate on the basis of race in its admissions policies,
even if doing so benefits members of minority races.
根据第十四修正案的平等保护条款,公立大学不得在其招生政策中进行基于
种族的歧视,即使这样做有利于少数种族成员。
Facts
The University of California, Davis Medical School practiced a policy whereby it
reserved 16 out of 100 places in its entering class for members of racial minority
groups. A special committee was appointed to administer this admissions policy.
Allan Bakke (plaintiff) brought suit against the Regents of the University of
California (defendant) on the ground that this policy was unconstitutional. Bakke
challenged the policy in California state court after his application for admission
was rejected even though applicants were admitted under this special policy with
grade
point
averages,
MCAT
scores,
and
benchmark
scores
that
were
significantly lower than Bakke’s averages and scores. The Supreme Court of
California held the admissions policy was unconstitutional and directed Bakke to
be admitted to the medical school. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
加州大学戴维斯分校医学院实行了一项政策,即在
100
个入学班中为少数民
族成员保留
16
个名额。一个特别委员会被任命来管理这项招生政策。
Allan
Bakke
(原告)对加州大学执委会(被告)提起诉讼,理由是这项政策违反
宪法。在他的入学申请被拒绝后,
Bakke
在加州州法院对该政策提出了质疑,
尽管在该特别政策下被录取的申请人的平均成绩、
MCAT
分数和基准分数都
明显低于
Bakke
的平均成绩和分数。加州最高法院认为该招生政策是违宪的,
并指示
Bakke
被医学院录取。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
All racial and ethnic classification
s are inherently suspect and
must be
viewed with strict scrutiny.
Goal (increasing diversity) is compelling.
The fourth goal of increasing diversity is a permissible purpose.
Tailoring? – Not narrowly tailored.
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but the particular medical school problem falls short because it
fails to
consider any aspect of “diversity” other than race in its admissions
policies.
Concurrence:
Some justices applied
“intermediate”
level of scrutiny:
to justify such a classification an important and articulated purpose for its use
must be shown.
o
To pass intermediate scrutiny, the challenged law must:
1) further an
important
government interest (diversity in student body)
2) and must do so by means that are
substantially related to that interest.
Significancy
First discussed the constitutionality of a
program designed to increase minority
enrollment
Grutter v. Bollinger
Rule of Law
Consideration of race as a factor in admissions by a state law school does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment because supporting student body diversity is a compelling
state interest;
however, the school must demonstrate it previously made a serious,
good faith consideration of workable, race-neutral alternatives to achieve the
sought-after racial diversity.
一所州立法学院在招生中考虑种族因素并不违反第十四修正案,因为支持学生群
体的多样性是一项引人注目的国家利益;但是,该校必须证明它之前认真、真诚
地考虑过可行的、种族中立的替代方案以实现所寻求的种族多样性。
Facts
The University of Michigan Law School followed an unofficial policy that sought to
achieve student body diversity by giving substantial weight to the race of each
applicant in making admissions decisions, in addition to its consideration of other
academic and non-academic variables. Barbara Grutter (plaintiff) was a Caucasian
Michigan resident who applied to the Law School with a 3.8 grade point average and
161 LSAT score. The Law School rejected her application, and she filed suit in federal
district court against Bollinger, the university president, and other university officials
(defendants) alleging her denial of admission was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the Law School’s
use of race in its admissions policy was unlawful, but the court of appeals reversed.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
密歇根大学法学院遵循一项非官方政策,除了考虑其他学术和非学术变量外,
还在做出录取决定时对每个申请人的种族给予很大的重视,以实现学生群体的
多样性。芭芭拉
-
格拉特(原告)是一名密歇根州的高加索居民,她以
3.8
的平均
成绩和
161
的
LSAT
成绩申请法学院。法学院拒绝了她的申请,她在联邦地区法
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院对博林格、大学校长和其他大学官员(被告)提起诉讼,声称拒绝录取她违反
了第十四修正案的平等保护条款。地区法院认为,法学院在其招生政策中使用种
族是非法的,但上诉法院推翻了这一观点。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
1)
discrimination
o
facial discrimination
2)
Who is the law against?
o
White student-
是否适用
strict scrutiny,
法院法官有不同意见 (
Majority
opinion strict scrutiny
)
3)
Why? can the school show compelling purpose?
o
student body diversity-compelling accepted by the Court
4)
Tailored? Court: narrowly tailored
o
not a quota system as in
Bakke
o
more specific ways to evaluate every single person
o
学校已经穷尽了其他方法来达到“
diversity
”的目标
. School states it has
exhausted other alternatives to achieve diversity.
School provided reasons that alternative methods of achieving the Law
School’s purpose risk sacrificing both academic excellence and other types of
diversity in the school.
Moreover: court says they will cease the racial consideration after a period of time
(when the discrimination in history is remedied)
VI.
Discrimination
based
on
gender,
sexual
orientation,
non-citizenship, disability, and age
Early stages
Bradwell v. Illinois, etc.
At first, the Court refused to apply the 14th Amendment to female for
section 2of
14th explicitly protect vote right of male.
The road to intermediate scrutiny
Reed v. Reed
p852
Fact
: A law of the state of Idaho imposed a mandatory preference for the
selection of males over females in the appointment of an administrator of an
intestate estate.
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爱达荷州的一项法律规定,在任命无遗嘱遗产的管理人时,必须优先选择男
性而不是女性。里德(原告)因其性别而未被选中担任遗产管理人。里德对
法院任命男性管理人的做法提出上诉。州最高法院维持了基于性别的任命。
里德向美国最高法院提出复审请求。
Rule:
When state law imposes differential treatment among different classes of
individuals, the classification must bear a
substantial relation
to the purpose of
the legislation.
Reasoning
1. Goal? – Legitimate goal
2. Tailored? – Not substantially related to the goal
State government
: The state Supreme Court concluded that the law at issue
promoted the
efficient administration of intestate estates
by eliminating one
point of potential controversy.
Court:
While the goal of promoting efficient probate administration may be
legitimate, eliminating a class of participants exclusively on the basis of
gender is inconsistent with the mandates of the Equal Protection Clause.
Frontiero v. Richardson p853
Rule of Law
Under the Due Process Clause, governmental classifications based on sex are
inherently suspect and must be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny
.
根据《正当程序条款》,政府基于性别的分类本身就是可疑的,必须接受严
格的司法审查。
Facts
Congress passed a law granting members of the armed services with dependents
an increased housing allowance, as well as medical and dental benefits for their
dependents. Under the law, a serviceman was permitted to claim his wife as a
dependent, regardless of whether the wife was actually dependent. In contrast, a
servicewoman was only permitted to claim her husband as a dependent upon a
showing that her husband was actually dependent on the servicewoman for more
than half of his support. Sharron Frontiero (plaintiff), a member of the United
States Air Force, tried to claim her husband (plaintiff) as a dependent. Frontiero’s
application was denied, because she did not make the required showing of
dependence.
Frontiero
alleged
that
the
law
violated
the
procedural
and
substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by
imposing
additional
procedural
burdens
on
female
service
members
and
extending
dependency
benefits
to
non-dependent
spouses
of
male
service
members. Frontiero brought suit in federal district court against the Secretary of
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Defense, Richardson, and others (defendants). A majority of the three-judge
district court upheld the law, concluding that Congress might have believed the
policy was economical and efficient because husbands are typically breadwinners,
and wives are typically dependent. The Frontieros appealed directly to the United
States Supreme Court.
国会通过了一项法律,给予有家属的武装部队成员更多的住房补贴,以及对
其家属的医疗和牙科福利。根据该法律,允许军人将其妻子作为受扶养人,
无论该妻子是否真的受扶养。相反,女军人只有在证明其丈夫实际依赖女军
人的一半以上的生活费时,才允许将其丈夫作为受抚养人。美国空军成员
Sharron Frontiero
(原告)试图将其丈夫(原告)作为受抚养人。
Frontiero
的
申请被拒绝了,因为她没有提出所需的依赖性证明。
Frontiero
声称,该法违
反了第五修正案的正当程序条款的程序性和实质性要求,对女军人施加了额
外的程序性负担,并将受抚养人福利扩大到男军人的非受抚养配偶。
Frontiero
在联邦地区法院对国防部长
Richardson
和其他人(被告)提起诉讼。由三名
法官组成的地区法院的大多数法官支持该法律,认为国会可能认为该政策是
经济和有效的,因为丈夫通常是养家糊口的人,而妻子通常是依赖他人。
Frontieros
公司直接向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Court: Suspect Class test: (determine whether a class should be suspect
class)
o
Immutable characteristic? (
是否为不可改变的特征?
)
Sex is “an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth,”
and
discrimination
on
this
basis
has
no
relationship
to
an
individual’s capabilities.
o
History of discrimination?
Women, like racial minorities, have faced a long history of discrimination.
o
No political power?
As a result of this discrimination, historically, women could not vote,
serve on juries, bring suit in their own names, own property, or sometimes
serve as legal guardians of their own children.
o
Victims of hate/animus?
Test
:
Strict scrutiny
should be applied.
Government
: In this case, the government’s asserted legitimate purpose for the
statutory scheme is administrative convenience.
Court
:
1)
However, the government fails to offer any concrete evidence that the law
actually saves money.
2)
Moreover, there are more important values than administrative efficiency.
3)
Frontiero was denied her constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
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Craig v. Boren p860
(Create new standard: intermediate scrutiny)
Rule of Law
: Women is treated as
a suspect class
and the Court created a new
standard:
the intermediate scrutiny
Fact
: An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of “non-intoxicating” 3.2 percent
alcoholic beer to males under the age of twenty-one,
but permitted the sale of
such beer to females over the age of eighteen
.
俄克拉荷马州的一项法规禁止向
21
岁以下的男性出售
3.2%
酒精含量的啤酒,
但允许向
18
岁以上的女性出售这种啤酒。
•
Reasoning
o
Discrimination?
facial discrimination
o
Against who?
against women
o
Goal?
goal: highway safety
o
Tailored: The statute failed on poor tailoring-no substantial relation of goal
and method to achieve the goal
-- While the difference is statistically significant, it is not enough to justify a
broad categorical rule prohibiting the sale of alcohol to males, and not
females, in this age group.
United States v. Virginia
Facts
: The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was the onl
y single-sex public
higher education institution
in the State of Virginia. It functioned to train men
for leadership in civilian life and military service using an “adversative” method.
VMI refused to admit women. After an adverse court ruling that this policy of
excluding women
violated
the Equal
Protection
Clause,
VMI
created
an
alternative program for women known as the
Virginia Women’s Institute for
Leadership
(VWIL).
VWIL
differed
from
VMI in
its
academic
offerings,
methods of education, and financial resources.
弗吉尼亚军事学院(
VMI
)是弗吉尼亚州唯一一所单一性别的公立高等教育
机构。它采用
"
对抗性
"
方法培养男子在平民生活和军事服务方面的领导能
力。
VMI
拒绝招收女性。在法院作出不利裁决,认为这种排斥妇女的政策
违反了平等保护条款之后,
VMI
为妇女创建了一个替代方案,称为弗吉尼
亚妇女领导力学院(
VWIL
)。
VWIL
在其学术课程、教育方法和财政资源
方面与
VMI
不同。
Holding and Reasoning (Ginsburg, J.)
o
facial discrimination
o
against women – Apply intermediate scrutiny
o
goal ?
(both goals provided by Virginia struck down by the court)
1)
Virginia: women cannot handle the standard of the school,
学校也不能降低
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标 准 来 适 应 女 性 (
its adversative method of training students provides
educational benefits that cannot be made available, unmodified, to women.
)
1)
Court:
存在可以适应标准的女性
2)
Virginia: the existence of a single-sex school furthers the important state
purpose of
maintaining a diversity of public education institutions
.
2)
Court: don not believe in Virginia. VMI has never existed for the purpose of
promoting diversity, evidenced by its policy of excluding women.
Dissent (Scalia, J.)
o
The constitution should be silent on this issue. We are on the court to tell the
society which side of value should win, but not based on the majority of public
opinion. [originalism]
o
Also, the majority is more likely to be a policy argument.
o
The majority ignores
precedent, history, and tradition
in holding that VMI
must admit women.
o
The majority completely ignores evidentiary findings that inherent
physical
differences
exist in men and women that justify requiring them to attend separate
schools.
o
宪法应该对这个问题保持沉默。我们在法庭上要告诉社会哪一方的价值应该获
胜,但不是基于大多数公众意见。
[
原创主义
]
o
另外,多数派更有可能是政策性的争论。
o
多数人无视先例、历史和传统,认为
VMI
必须接纳女性。
o
多数人完全无视证据的发现,即男女存在固有的身体差异,证明要求他们在不
同的学校上学是合理的。
Romer v. Evans
p901, review 911
[Against gay, lesbian, and bisexual]
[Rational Basis]
Facts
Several Colorado municipalities passed ordinances banning discrimination
based
on
sexual
orientation
in
housing,
employment,
education,
public
accommodations,
health
and
welfare
services,
and
other
transactions
and
activities. In response to these ordinances, Colorado voters passed Amendment 2,
which
prohibited all governmental intervention
designed to protect the status
of persons based on their sexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships
.
Evans (plaintiff) represented a class of aggrieved homosexual persons and
municipalities in Colorado and brought suit in Colorado state court against Roy
Romer (defendant), the Governor of Colorado, on the grounds that
Amendment
2
was unconstitutional. The trial court enjoined enforcement of Amendment 2.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
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科罗拉多州的几个城市通过了禁止在住房、就业、教育、公共住宿、健康和
福利服务以及其他交易和活动中基于性取向的歧视的法令。作为对这些条例
的回应,科罗拉多州选民通过了第
2
号修正案,禁止所有旨在保护基于性取
向、行为、做法或关系的人的地位的政府干预。埃文斯(原告)代表科罗拉
多州一群受害的同性恋者和市政当局,在科罗拉多州法院对科罗拉多州州长
罗伊
-
罗默(被告)提起诉讼,理由是第二修正案是违宪的。初审法院禁止执
行第
2
号修正案。科罗拉多州最高法院维持原判,而美国最高法院批准了诉
讼请求。
Holding and Reasoning (Kennedy, J.)
o
Discriminatory Law? - Facial discrimination
State: no discrimination.
只是不允许
gay/lesbian
获得
special protection.
Court:
有歧视,因为
law actually banned LGBT Group from extra help that
other group enjoy.
o
Rational Basis scrutiny
The court did not say why apply rational basis scrutiny.
The court did not say
whether LGBT Group is suspect class. Instead, the Act did not even pass
the rational basis review
o
Goal?
The goal claimed by Colorado: morals (LGBT Group has been viewed
immoral), individual’s freedom not to provide service to LGBT Group, equal
protection to homosexual individuals, conserving resources to fight other
discrimination.
--The court struck down all the goals based on that all of them are not
legitimate purposes but sexual orientation discrimination.
Court
认为
state’s
goal is designed merely to discriminate politically unpopular group.
o
Tailoring?
Court: poorly tailoring. Law just LGBT Group from seeking help.
Dissent (Scalia, J.)
o
What is behind the issue is the democratic value.
o
The Colorado citizens voted for the Amendment 2 and it represented their
freedom of objection to the homo-sexual orientation individuals.
o
The respect for the morality
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QS: Is Scalia consistent in previous cases? Constitution should not interfere with the
democratic process. consider the race-blind case.
Sugarman v. Dougall
[Against Aliens] [Strict Scrutiny]
Rule of Law
Laws affecting a suspect classification must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest.
Facts
A New York state statute prohibited aliens from being employed as civil servants in
the competitive class. This prohibition applied to a wide range of positions, though
not to elected offices or higher offices in state agencies. Several New York resident
aliens who were discharged from civil-service positions on the basis of their alienage
(plaintiffs) brought an action against the administrator of the New York City Human
Resources Administration (defendant), challenging the constitutionality of the statute.
A three-judge panel of the district court held that the statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Supremacy Clause. The United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction to review the case.
纽约州的一项法规禁止外国人被聘为竞争性级别的公务员。这项禁令适用于各种
职位,但不适用于国家机构中的民选职位或高级职位。几位因外籍身份而被解除
公务员职务的纽约居民外国人(原告)对纽约市人力资源管理局的行政人员(被
告)提起诉讼,质疑该法规的合宪性。地区法院的一个三法官小组认为,该法规
违反了第十四修正案和最高条款。美国最高法院指出可能有管辖权来审查该案。
Reasoning (strict scrutiny & suspect class):
facial discrimination
against aliens – Aliens are suspect class – apply strict scrutiny
4-part test:
Immutable characteristic?
History of discrimination?
Left out of political rights?
Victims of animus/bias?
Compelling purpose:
undivided loyalty
of certain jobs
公务员需要极度忠诚
Narrowly tailoring: does the law well further the purpose? (a very close match
between the goal and government means to achieve the goal?)
—NO. Plenty of government jobs do not require such loyalty. (
法院认为有一些岗位
(环卫工人等)不需要极度忠诚
)
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City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
(p941)
[Against
mentally disabled][rational basis scrutiny]
Rules
(rational basis review)
The mentally disabled are not a quasi-suspect class
and thus any legislative
regulations affecting their rights are subject
to rational basis review and not
intermediate scrutiny.
Facts
In 1980, the Cleburne Living Center (Center) (plaintiff) filed an application for a
special use permit with the City of Cleburne, Texas (City) (defendant). The
Center sought a permit to build a residential facility for mentally disabled men
and women. The facility would house up to thirteen persons, who would be
supervised at all times. The City denied the permit application, and the Center
brought suit in federal district court challenging the denial. The district court
upheld the denial. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the mentally
disabled were a quasi-suspect class of persons and thus intermediate scrutiny
should be applied to the City’s denial of the permit application. It invalidated the
denial as not furthering an important government purpose. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1980
年,克莱本生活中心(
Center
)(原告)向德克萨斯州克莱本市(
City
)
(被告)提交了一份特殊使用许可申请。该中心寻求获得许可,为智障男女
建造一个住宅设施。该设施将容纳多达
13
人,这些人将一直受到监督。市
政府拒绝了该许可申请,该中心向联邦地区法院提起诉讼,质疑这一拒绝。
地区法院维持了拒绝的决定。上诉法院推翻了这一判决,认为智障人士是一
个准嫌疑人群体,因此对市政府拒绝许可申请的行为应进行中间审查。上诉
法院认为,拒绝许可的行为没有促进重要的政府目的,因此无效。美国最高
法院批准了诉讼请求。
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
[Against the age] [rational
basis]
Rule of Law
: A state statute instituting mandatory retirement for police officers
at age fifty is subject to
rational basis review
and does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
o
facial discrimination
o
Against
older
police
officers:
not
a
suspect
class
(factors:
immutable
characteristics; history of discrimination; left out of political process; victims
of animus/bias-did not fall into any of the scope)
o
purpose: ensuring the physical health and vitality of uniformed police officers
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o
tailoring: the statutes only should be rationally related to the legitimate
purpose, but not have to be the best way to achieve its goal-applying here.
Thus the age requirement is reasonable (the best means is required by the strict
scrutiny test).
Class 9 & 10: Substantive Due Process
No state shall…deprive any person of life,
liberty
, or property without due
process of law. (14
th
Amendment)
At the very beginning, the 14
th
Amendment did not incorporate other rights to apply
to the state level. Bill of Right
只适用于
federal
层面而不适用于
State
层面
The Slaughter-House Cases (1873) held
not
to incorporate the Bill of Rights against
the states.
Two categories:
1)
“
procedural” due process
: a state may generally deprive…if certain procedures
is established.
2)
substantive due process
: some
liberty interests
are so
fundamental
that no
amount of process can justify a state in taking that way that liberty without a good
reason.
Two Approaches:
1)
total incorporation: all Bill of Rights qualify as the fundamental rights.
2)
selective incorporation:
made separate determinations about whether individual
provisions in Bill of Rights were incorporated.
(prevail)
What “liberty” interests are fundamental?
-The text does not say, so the
method of interpretation
is extremely important.
The Bill of Rights?
Court has
refused to totally “incorporate”
the Bill of Rights.
Twinning v. NJ (1908).
Instead, the Court
has selectively incorporated only the rights in the
Bill of Rights that are “fundamental.”
Federalist paper: Hamilton is strong supporter of judicial review.
-“living constitution” and “nature law” argument
Note: Court apply
strict scrutiny to fundamental right
and
rational basis scrutiny
to non-fundamental right
.
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McDonald v. City of Chicago [Second Amendment-fundamental right]
Facts
: Petitioners challenged a law enacted by the City of Chicago (respondent) that
prohibited Chicago residents from possessing handguns, claiming that the law
violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
第二修正案持枪权
请愿人对芝加哥市(被告)颁布的禁止芝加哥居民拥有手枪的法律提出质疑,声
称该法律违反了第二和第十四修正案。第二修正案持枪权
Issue
: Does the Second Amendment apply to the states, thereby invalidating a local
law prohibiting residents from possessing handguns?
Reasoning (
第二修正案的持枪权有很深的历史渊源并且根植于国民心中
)
Under the process of
selective incorporation
, a particular Bill of Rights guarantee
will apply to the states
if it is fundamental to the nation’s scheme of ordered
liberty or deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570 (2008), this Court found that
individual self defense is a basic right, which forms the central component of the
Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms, and which is deeply rooted in the
nation’s history and tradition. Following the Civil War, in response to the efforts of
some states to disarm returning black soldiers and other black people, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which protected the right of all citizens to keep
and bear arms. When this was met with southern resistance and presidential vetoes,
Congress responded by adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby providing a
constitutional basis for the rights included in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
是的,
第二修正案适用于各州,因此芝加哥禁止居民拥有手枪的法律是无效的。
根据选择性纳入的过程,如果某项权利法案的保障是国家有序自由计划的基础,
或深深扎根于国家的历史和传统,那么它将适用于各州。
在哥伦比亚特区诉海勒
案(
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570 (2008)
)中,本法院认为,个人自
卫是一项基本权利,它构成了第二修正案中持有和携带武器的权利的核心部分,
并且深深扎根于国家的历史和传统之中。内战结束后,针对一些州试图解除返乡
黑人士兵和其他黑人的武装,国会颁布了
1866
年《民权法案》,保护所有公民
持有和携带武器的权利。当此举遭到南方的抵制和总统的否决时,国会的回应是
通过了第十四修正案,从而为
1866
年《民权法案》中包含的权利提供了宪法基
础。根据第十四修正案,第二修正案中的持有和携带武器的权利适用于各州。
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Concurrence (Alito, J.)
-
mostly based on the United State’s historical record and its tradition
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the states under
Concurrence (Scalia, J.)
historical approach: the best way in Scalia’s eyes.
Qs: Is this approach also subjective and biased despite Scalia’s objection to Steve’s
opinions based on his own value judgments? (though he argued that historical
approach is objective)
•
Scalia’s counter-argument about Steve’s approach:
1)
a right that has traditionally been recognized and regulated by the states
would deserve less protection than a right that the political branches have
traditionally withheld.
2)
Further, Justice Stevens’ assertion that the right to bear arms is different from
other fundamental rights because it is not critical to leading a life of
autonomy, dignity, or political equality is an
inappropriate political and
moral judgment
.
3)
Finally, Justice Stevens argues that even if there is a constitutional basis for
incorporating the right to bear arms, the Court should not do so for
prudential reasons.
The Court does not have the authority to withhold rights
protected under the Constitution, and Justice Stevens’ argument that states
have a right to experiment with solutions to gun violence
because the
solution to the problem is unclear
is equally applicable to any serious
social problem
.
Dissent (Stevens, J.)
1)
the Court must be sensitive to both intrinsic ideas of liberty and to the practical
realities of contemporary society.
2)
discretion should be given to states: allow state and local governments the right to
experiment in finding solutions to gun problems.
3)
Historical views can be unclear and uninformative, and are sometimes wrong;
judges were not expert in the area to decide on it.
1
)法院必须对自由的内在理念和当代社会的实际现实保持敏感。
2
)应给予各州自由裁量权:允许州和地方政府有权在寻找枪支问题的解决方案
方面进行试验。
3
)历史观点可能是不明确的,没有参考价值的,有时也是错误的;法官不是该
领域的专家,无法对其进行裁决。
Lochner v. New York [
后来被
West coast hotel case overrule]
•
Rule of Law
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A state may not regulate
the working hours mutually agreed upon by
employers and employees
(bakers) as this violates their Fourteenth Amendment
right to contract freely under the Due Process Clause.
国家不得对雇主和雇员(面包师)共同商定的工作时间进行管理,因为这违
反了第十四修正案中的正当程序条款下的自由签约权。
•
Fact
In 1896, the New York legislature enacted the Baker shop Act which limited the
hours bakers were permitted to work to no more than ten per day. Joseph Lochner
(defendant) owned a bakery in New York (plaintiff) and was fined twice under
the law for overworking an employee. His conviction was upheld in the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court, and was affirmed in the New York
Court of Appeals. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1896
年,纽约立法机构颁布了《面包店法》,限制了面包师的工作时间,每
天不得超过
10
小时。
约瑟夫
-
洛克纳(被告)在纽约拥有一家面包店(原告),
并根据该法因雇员过度工作而被罚款两次。纽约最高法院上诉庭维持了对他
的定罪,并在纽约上诉法院得到确认。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
•
Holding and Reasoning (Peckham, J.)
1)
States may impose
reasonable conditions
on the right to contract that
further
the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.
Pursuant to their
constitutional police powers, states may
prohibit contracts
which violate either a
federal or state statute, or contracts to use one’s personal property for immoral or
illegal purposes.
2)
However, the baking profession does not present any of the concerns justifying
the states’ regulation of hours in some other professions. The regulation in
question was not a health law, but was an arbitrary interference into the
individual right of employers and employees to contract.
•
Dissent (Holmes, J.)
The majority decided this case based on an economic theory that is largely
unsupported by the popular will of the United States.
It is settled by various
precedent decisions and state constitutions
that state laws can regulate the lives
of individuals in many ways that are not supported by the national
legislature.
However, the purpose of the United States Constitution is not to
require states to exercise their police powers uniformly, but to instead give them
the power to make their own judgments about what laws are best for their
individual citizens.
The “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
should not function to prevent the exercise of a dominant opinion among
states
, that opinion being, in this case, that states can constitutionally regulate the
work hours of employees within their borders. The majority ignores the reality of
state regulations across the country.
大多数人对本案的裁决是基于一种经济理论,而这种理论基本上没有得到美
国民众意愿的支持。各种先例判决和各州宪法都规定,各州法律可以在许多
方面规范个人的生活,而这些都是国家立法机构所不支持的。然而,美国宪
法的目的并不是要求各州统一行使其警察权力,而是赋予他们权力,让他们
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自己判断什么法律对其公民个人最有利。第十四修正案所保护的
"
自由
"
不
应该用来阻止各州行使主导意见,在本案中,这种意见就是各州可以根据宪
法规定对其境内雇员的工作时间进行管理。大多数人忽视了全国各州法规的
现实。
•
Dissent (Harlan, J.)
1)
states
have police powers
under the Constitution to regulate activities for the
promotion of the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.
2)
limiting employees’ work hours bears
a direct relationship
to promoting their
health, safety, and general welfare. Specifically, the air breathed by workers in
bakeries is not as clean or healthful as that breathed by workers in other
professions
, and this condition justifies the New York legislature’s regulation.
3)
bakers as a class are more frail and die earlier than other workers
, a fact largely
attributed to their hard work and long hours.
Nebbia v. New York
•
Fact:
In 1933 (During the Great Depression), the State of New York (plaintiff)
established a Milk Control Board which had the power to fix the prices of milk
sold by New York stores.
•
Rule
: Without the presence of other constitutional prohibitions, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent states from enacting
economic policies such as price regulations to further the public good as long as
those policies are not unreasonable or arbitrary.
-
事实:
1933
年(大萧条时期),纽约州(原告)成立了牛奶管制委员会,
该委员会有权确定纽约商店出售的牛奶的价格。
-
规则。在没有其他宪法禁令的情况下,第十四修正案的正当程序条款并不
妨碍各州颁布经济政策,如价格管制,以促进公共利益,只要这些政策不是
不合理的或任意的。
West coast hotel co. v. parrish (1937) [overrule decision in Lochner v. New
York]
Rule:
A state may regulate the minimum wage paid to female employees when that
regulation is for the purpose of promoting employees’ health, safety and general
welfare.
当一个州为了促进雇员的健康、安全和一般福利,可以对支付给女性雇员的最
低工资进行监管。
Facts
The State of Washington passed a law which regulated the minimum wages paid to
female and minor employees. Elsie Parrish (plaintiff) was employed as a maid at a
hotel owned by the West Coast Hotel Co. (defendant). Together with her husband,
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Parrish brought suit in Washington state court to recover the difference between the
wages she was paid by West Coast Hotel Co. and the minimum wage fixed under
Washington state law. West Coast defended the suit on the grounds that the state law
violated
its
Due
Process
right
to
freely
contract
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Washington trial court held for the hotel, but the Washington
Supreme Court reversed. West Coast Hotel Co. appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
华盛顿州通过了一项法律,规定了支付给女性和未成年雇员的最低工资。
Elsie
Parrish
(原告)受雇于
West Coast Hotel Co.
拥有的一家酒店,担任女仆。
(
被告)
所拥有的酒店担任女佣。
Parrish
和她的丈夫一起在华盛顿州法院提起诉讼,要求
追回
West Coast
酒店公司支付给她的工资与华盛顿州法律规定的最低工资之间
的差额。西海岸公司为该诉讼辩护,理由是该州法律违反了第十四修正案规定的
自由签约的正当程序权利。华盛顿州初审法院判决酒店胜诉,但华盛顿州最高法
院推翻了判决。西海岸酒店公司向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Reasoning
1)
Overruled the previous decision in
Lochner v. New York
: “there is no
freedom of contract”
2)
States police power: due process constraints on a state’s freedom to contract, and
to deny protections for the health and safety of women.
3)
Additionally, changing economic times mean that workers who are not paid a
living wage would have to rely on taxpayers for the care of their various needs
during Great Depression.
Griswold v. Connecticut [right of privacy in marriage]
•
Facts
: Griswold and Buxton of the medical center, were arrested for giving
information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons for preventing
conception. Griswold and Buxton challenged the convictions and brought suit
against Connecticut, (plaintiff), alleging that the statutes violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
医疗中心的
Griswold
和
Buxton
因向已婚人士提供预防受孕的信息、指导和
医疗建议而被捕。格里斯沃尔德和巴克斯顿对定罪提出质疑,并对康涅狄格
州(原告)提起诉讼,声称该法规违反了第十四修正案。
•
Rule:
An implied “right of privacy” exists within the Bill of Rights that
prohibits a state from preventing married couples from using contraception.
权利法案中存在一种隐含的
"
隐私权
"
,禁止一个州阻止已婚夫妇使用避孕药
具。
o
Concurrence (Goldberg, J.):
intrusion to
the right to marital privacy
.
1)
It is supported by numerous decisions of the Court, as well as specifically by
the language and history of the
Ninth Amendment
. The Ninth Amendment
provides that “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
“
宪法对某
些权利的列举,不应被解释为否认或贬低人民保留的其他权利。
” Relying
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on Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137 (1803) every clause in the
Constitution is meant to be given effect.
2)
The
right of privacy
in marriage is rooted in the “traditions and
collective
conscience” of people
and is therefore a fundamental right.
o
赞成意见(
Goldberg
,
J.
):对婚姻隐私权的侵犯。
1
)它得到了法院众多裁决的支持,以及第九修正案的语言和历史的具体支
持。第九修正案规定
, “
宪法对某些权利的列举,不应解释为否认或贬低人民
保留的其他权利。
”
根据
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137 (1803)
,
宪法中的每一个条款都要被赋予效力。
2
)婚姻中的隐私权植根于人们的
"
传统和集体良知
"
,因此是一项基本权利。
Lawrence v. Texas p1148
o
It is a liberty (due process clause) case;
o
also equality (equal protection clause) case.
A liberty argument-and the Supreme Court made it a liberty case:
Rule
:
(apply the rational basis scrutiny and did not pass)
Individuals have liberty to family choice. The sex relationship is seen as a
foundation of family.
Government cannot punish the gays based on the moral judgment.
The same sex relationship has existed for a long time and very important in
people's lives. Public opinion has changed in 21st century because they have
set up families and raised children.
Justice Kennedy
is in favor of the liberty and his choice matters to 5-4 in
Supreme Court.
规则。
(
应用合理基础审查,没有通过
)
-
个人有选择家庭的自由。性关系被看作是家庭的基础。
-
政府不能根据道德判断来惩罚同性恋者。
-
同性关系已经存在了很长时间,在人们的生活中非常重要。
21
世纪的公众
舆论已经发生了变化,因为他们已经建立了家庭,养育了孩子。
-
肯尼迪法官赞成自由,他的选择对最高法院来说是
5
比
4
。
Note: Many same sex intimacy cases, including Lawrence v. Taxes,
法院并没
有决定是否适用
strict scrutiny
(
whether LGBT Group is suspect class
)
,
而
是说
Law do not even pass rational basis scrutiny.
Facts
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Police officers were dispatched to the home of John Lawrence (defendant) in
response to a report of a weapons disturbance. When the police went into the
home, the police observed Lawrence and Tyron Garner (defendant) engaged in a
sexual act. The State of Texas (plaintiff) charged Lawrence and Garner with
engaging in deviate sexual intercourse with a person of the same sex. Lawrence
and Garner were convicted by a Justice of the Peace and exercised their right to a
new trial in criminal court. Lawrence and Garner argued that the statute was a
violation
of
the
Equal
Protection
Clause.
The
criminal
court
rejected
the
arguments, and Lawrence and Garner entered a plea of nolo contendere. The court
of appeals confirmed the convictions, and Lawrence and Garner petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for review.
警察被派往约翰
-
劳伦斯(
John Lawrence
)(被告)的家中,以回应关于武器
骚乱的报告。当警察进入该住宅时,警察看到劳伦斯和泰伦
-
加纳(被告)正
在进行性行为。德克萨斯州(原告)指控劳伦斯和加纳从事与同性的偏离性
行为。劳伦斯和加纳被一名治安法官定罪,并在刑事法庭上行使了重新审判
的权利。劳伦斯和加纳辩称,该法规违反了《平等保护条款》。刑事法庭驳
回了这些论点,劳伦斯和加纳作出了无罪辩护。上诉法院确认了定罪,劳伦
斯和加纳向美国最高法院提出复审请求。
Another case afterwards: A Florida law prohibits gay couple to adopt
children.
•
It should be built as the equality case. The liberty argument here is a bit weird
because the adoption is not actually a right, and it should be guided and regulated
by the government.
•
The scrutiny (rational/high/intermediate) is very apparent in equal protection
clauses, but unfortunately it is not applied in this case. It is still within the scope
of liberty.
之后的另一个案例。佛罗里达州的一项法律禁止同性恋夫妇收养儿童。
- prof
认为该案应该作为
equality case
。这里的自由论点有点奇怪,因为领养
实际上不是一种权利,它应该由政府来指导和管理。
-
在平等保护条款中,审查(理性
/
高度
/
中级)是非常明显的,但不幸的是,
它并没有在本案中应用。它仍然属于自由的范围。
Procedural or substantive of due process clause
o
At least 5 judges in Supreme Court don't think the substantive aspect should be
taken much consideration as new ideas and values are evolved.
o
Lawrence v. Texas
is consistent with American social values: e.g. they wait until
2015 to set the same sex marriage case, partly based on the poll (more than 60
percent agree) that indicated that the society is ready
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Roe v. Wade
Note: why Supreme Court decides?
1)
maybe other branches are reluctant to decide on it;
2)
the Court is widely respected and have much discretion
Rule of Law
The constitutional right to privacy protects a woman’s right to choose to have an
abortion.
Facts
Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code restricts legal abortions to those “procured or
attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.” Roe
(plaintiff), a pregnant single woman, brought suit against Wade (defendant), a Texas
state official, on the grounds that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on her
right to obtain an abortion. The federal district court considering the case issued
declaratory, though not injunctive, relief stating that the Texas statute was void for its
overbreadth, vagueness, and infringement on Roe’s Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Roe appealed the denial of injunctive relief to the United States Supreme
Court.
德克萨斯州刑法典》第
1196
条将合法堕胎限制在
"
为挽救母亲的生命而通过医
学建议获得或尝试
"
的情况。
罗(原告)是一名单身孕妇,她对德克萨斯州的一
名官员韦德(被告)提起诉讼,理由是该法规对她获得堕胎的权利是一种违宪限
制。审理此案的联邦地区法院发布了声明性救济,但没有发布禁令,称德克萨斯
州的法规因其过于宽泛、模糊和侵犯罗的第九和第十四修正案权利而无效。罗对
禁止性救济的拒绝向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Reasoning
•
Right of privacy set up in
Griswold v. Connecticut Case
is a
fundamental
right and should apply strict scrutiny.
•
Strict scrutiny
使
State must have compelling reason and must narrowly
tailored.
State: Compelling reason: 1) Protect fetus 2) Protect the mother
•
Court apply
“trimester standard”
to determine whether narrowly tailored.
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•
Three phases:
1)
first trimester (within 1 month) -free of interference –
此时
right of privacy
outweigh)
2)
second trimester (the next month) -state can regulate the abortion for
compelling reason to
protect the maternal health
3)
third trimester (viabilities of the fetus) -state can ban the abortion (
compelling
reason to protect the fetus) unless necessary to preserve the health of
mother.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Service
The controversy of Supreme Court and the case of Webster (
Webster v. Reproductive
Health Service
) came.
--The hospital can check about the viability of fetus after 20 weeks of pregnancy. (
医
院可以在怀孕
20
周以上检查胚胎是否
viable)
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey [
放弃了
“trimester
standard”
代之以“
undue burden test
”
]
Then it is the
Casey
case (
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey
).
stare desis
先例原则
so the Court of Casey respected Roe's rulings
but the Court did not believe that there existed “free of interference” period
and changed part of Roe’s ruling:
o
give up the three trimester test and apply
“undue burden” test
Rule of Law
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A state abortion regulation places an
undue burden
on a woman’s right to an
abortion and is invalid if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
一个州的堕胎条例对妇女的堕胎权造成了不适当的负担,如果其目的或效果是对
寻求在胎儿成活前进行堕胎的妇女设置了实质性障碍,则该条例无效。
Facts
Planned Parenthood (plaintiff) brought suit against Casey (defendant), the Governor
of Pennsylvania, in federal district court for the purpose of challenging five
restrictions on abortion under Pennsylvania law. Most significantly, the Pennsylvania
statute required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period for all women prior to
undergoing the procedure. All minors seeking an abortion were required to obtain the
informed consent of at least one parent, while a married woman had to show that she
notified her husband of her intent to abort the fetus. The district court issued judgment
for Planned Parenthood, but the court of appeals upheld all Pennsylvania provisions
except the requirement of spousal notification. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
计划生育协会(原告)在联邦地区法院对宾夕法尼亚州州长凯西(被告)提起诉
讼,目的是质疑宾夕法尼亚州法律对堕胎的五个限制。
最重要的是,宾夕法尼亚
州的法规要求所有妇女在接受堕胎手术前要有知情同意和
24
小时的等待期。所
有寻求堕胎的未成年人都必须获得父母中至少一人的知情同意,而已婚妇女必
须证明她已将堕胎的意图通知她的丈夫。
地区法院作出了对计划生育的判决,但
上诉法院维持了宾夕法尼亚州的所有规定,除了通知配偶的要求。美国最高法院
批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
•
Roe v. Wade cannot be overturned, but need to be changed
(Court did not
believe that there existed “free of interference” period)
o
Standard to determine whether a stare decisis should be overturned
1)
workable: the previous case like Roe still stands
2)
consistent and people can rely on the Roe case rulings
3)
has the previous case became principle
4)
has the previous law became principle
However, the
factual circumstances could be different
, and thus the
rulings may change based on different facts: 1) The abortion is safer
now in the second and third trimester; 2) the viability notion.
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•
Court replace “trimester standard” in Roe v. Wade with “undue burden”
test
○
Waiting period and knowledge for 24h is not undue burden
○
Consent from husband is undue burden
Justice Scalia (dissenting opinion): it is in history that the abortion is allowed.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
•
Rule: A law with the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to
have an abortion and is thus unconstitutional.
o
In determining the burden, not just consider the burden itself but also
whether the standard benefited the patients or not.
Class 11, 12 &13: First Amendment
First amendment:
Congress shall make no law respecting…
1)
Apply to federal government: not only apply to Congress,
其他
executive
branch
和
president
也适用
2)
Apply to state government
:(通过
14th amendment
(substantive due process
clause)
来适用) ,
so the states cannot make such laws as well
General Principle
: The laws can't ban the speech based on its content-“content
discrimination”
The values of the speech
1)
truth-seeking: a free marketplace to have all opinions to debate
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o
free marketplace will regulate the bad speeches itself and the correct
information will finally prevail in the debate
2) Self-improvement: necessary to the democratic society
3) Self-government: to allow citizens to involve in public affairs
4) Safety value: release the pressure and even anger of the public or they may use
violence instead
On the other hand, the government can forbid some categories of speech when they
do not further those abovementioned goals.
Exception of First Amendment: Unprotected Speech
1) Incitement
Advocacy law breaking, political speech
是受法律保护的
2) Fighting words
3) Obscene (
淫秽下流的
)
4) Profane (
语言污秽的
)
5) libel
Note: political speech in category of incitement is high-value speech, 2)-5)
都属于
low-value speech
Legal analysis framework:
(1) Is "speech" being regulated or just pure conduct?
(a) Pure Conduct: Apply rational basis.
(b) Speech: Go to (2) (e.g.,
O’Brien
;
Texas v. Johnson
)
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(2) What is the
method
of regulating the speech?
(a) Prior Restraint: Almost per se unconstitutional. -you cannot regulate the
speeches before they occurred. (e.g.,
Near
;
Pentagon
)
(b) Punishment after the speech: Go to (3)
(3) What is the
forum
where the speech is taking place?
(a) Non-public forum: Apply rational basis.
(e.g.,
Lee
)
(b) Public forum: Go to (4)
(4) Does the law regulate a category of
unprotected
speech?
(a) Yes: For unprotected speech, apply rational basis (e.g.,
Chaplinsky
)
(b) No: For protected speech, go to (5)
(5) Does the law regulate protected speech on the basis of its
content
?
(a) Does the law regulate content on its face?
1.
Yes: Apply strict scrutiny.
(e.g.,
Reed; TX v. Johnson; Cohen; RAV
)
2.
No: go to (5)(b)
(b) Even if the law is facially neutral, is its purpose to regulate content?
1.
Yes: Apply strict scrutiny.
(e.g.,
Texas v. Johnson
)
2.
No: Law is content-neutral; apply intermediate scrutiny.
(
O'Brien
;
Ward
)
Exception of content discrimination
1.
“Incitement”-speech that can incite unlawful conduct
Summary:
数字越大越不受第一修正案保护
1)
Protected:
political speech
-what framers will think most proper to protect
2)
“Bad tendency” (
Schenck
)
3)
Express Advocacy Lawbreaking
4)
Express Advocacy + Immediacy+ likehood
5)
Unprotected:
actual law-breaking
(e.g. murder, coupett?)
Standard from Judge Homes:
“clear and present danger”
of evil that the
government should prevent
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Schenck v. United States [“clear and danger standard”] [bad tendency test]
-The first case that the Court truly considered the 1st amendment
Rule of Law
Speech that would ordinarily be protected by the First Amendment may nevertheless
be prohibited when it is used in such circumstances and is of such a nature as to create
a
clear and present danger
of substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
通常受第一修正案保护的言论,如果在这种情况下使用,并且其性质会造成国会
有权防止的明显和现实的实质性危险,则仍可被禁止。
Facts
Two months after the United States’ entry into World War I, Congress enacted the
Espionage Act of 1917 (EA). The law made it a crime for any person, during time of
war, to willfully “make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to
interfere” with the military success or “to promote the success of its enemies.”
The
law also made it a crime to willfully “obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service
of the United States.”
Convictions could be punished by sentences of up to twenty
years’ imprisonment and fines of up to $10,000. Schenck (defendant) was indicted by
the United States Government (plaintiff) for the charge of “conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act” after he mailed literature to draftees during World War I that criticized
the draft. The government alleged that Schenck conspired to violate the EA by
attempting
to
cause
insubordination
in
the
military
and
to
obstruct
military
recruitment. Schenck was convicted in federal district court, but appealed his
conviction on the grounds that the Espionage Act violated his First Amendment right
to freedom of speech. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
美国加入第一次世界大战两个月后,国会颁布了《
1917
年间谍法》(
EA
)。该法
规定,任何人在战争期间故意
"
制作或传递虚假报告或虚假陈述,意图干扰
"
军事成功或
"
促进其敌人的成功
"
,即为犯罪。该法还规定,故意
"
阻碍美国的
征兵或招募服务
"
是一种犯罪。被定罪者可被判处高达
20
年的监禁和高达
10,000
美元的罚金。申克(被告)在第一次世界大战期间向应征入伍者邮寄批评
征兵的资料后,被美国政府(原告)以
"
共谋违反间谍法
"
的罪名起诉。政府指
称,申克试图在军队中引起不服从,并阻挠征兵,从而密谋违反《间谍法》。申
克在联邦地区法院被定罪,但他对定罪提出上诉,理由是《间谍法》侵犯了他的
第一修正案的言论自由权。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
•
Created “clear and present danger” standard
“The required question in every case dealing with this issue is whether the
words used are expressed in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger.”
•
Emphasis on the situation faced by the U.S. (war time v. peace time)
如果原告的行为放在
peace time
结果就会不一样,但目前是在战争期间,
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存在
clear and present danger
•
Created Standard of “clear and present danger” – “Bad tendency test”
Q: Schenck
并没有
explicitly advocate people breaching the law
,法院为什
么认为
Schenck
的行为还是有“
clear and present danger
”?
Judge Homes
:
Schenck’s behavior has “bad tendency” to cause people drop
the draft.
所以可以认为
Schenck intend to cause the foreseeable result.
Note: “Bad tendency” test
:
Speech could constitutionally be punished as an
attempt to cause some forbidden or otherwise undesirable conduct if the natural
and reasonable tendency of the expression might be to bring about the conduct,
and if the speaker intended such a result.
Judge Hand’s analysis of
express incitement
is under protective of free speech
Abrams v. United States [bad tendency test]
Facts
Abrams and four others (plaintiffs) were convicted of conspiring to violate the
Espionage Act of 1917 (EA), as amended in 1918. Abrams printed many copies
of leaflets, written both in English and Yiddish, denouncing the United States’
decision to send troops to Russia as part of World War I. Other leaflets
denounced the United States’ general involvement in World War I and United
States’ efforts to curtail the Russian Revolution. The distribution of these leaflets
was found unlawful by the federal district court because it involved the spreading
of language meant to incite resistance to the war effort and to urge the curtailment
of production of essential war materials. Abrams challenged his convictions on
the grounds that the EA was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment,
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
艾布拉姆斯和其他四人(原告)因密谋违反
1917
年的《间谍法》(
EA
)而
被定罪,该法于
1918
年修订。艾布拉姆斯印制了许多用英语和意第绪语写
成的传单,谴责美国决定在第一次世界大战中向俄罗斯派兵,其他传单则谴
责美国对第一次世界大战的普遍参与以及美国为遏制俄罗斯革命所作的努
力。
联邦地区法院认为散发这些传单是非法的,因为它涉及传播旨在煽动抵
制战争和敦促削减基本战争物资生产的语言。艾布拉姆斯对他的定罪提出质
疑,理由是《宪法》违反了第一修正案的规定,美国最高法院批准了诉讼程
序。
What is the difference between
Schenck
and
Abrams
?
Dissenting opinion
(
Holmes
在
Schenck
主笔了
majority opinion
,但在这个
案子
dissent
,所以重点还是关注他的观点)
:
The same test applied here claimed by the Holmes, but he think
the danger here is
not that clear and present of immediate evil
,
based on:
Flyer
涉及的是美国对俄国的行动,不减损美国目前针对德国的战争
just a political speech, does not advocate actual law breaking
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the leaflet content is really silly that no one would actually believe it
Abrams is an unknown man unlike a celebrity in
Schenck
So he enjoyed the discretion of confronting the government.
Gitlow v. New York [rational basis scrutiny and apply more like Bad tendency
test]
Facts
The State of New York passed a statute that prohibited the written or verbal advocacy
of criminal anarchy, which is a doctrine advocating overthrowing the government
through force or violence. Gitlow (defendant), a socialist, was arrested for distributing
copies of a left-wing manifesto that called for the establishment of Socialism in
America through mass political strikes and revolutionary mass action of any kind. At
trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no conduct incited by the publication and
distribution of the manifesto, his speech constituted mere utterances that did not
present a clear and present danger to the United States government. Gitlow was
nevertheless convicted. He then challenged his conviction against the State of New
York (plaintiff) on the grounds that the state’s criminal anarchy statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
纽约州通过了一项法规,禁止书面或口头宣传无政府主义犯罪,这是一种主张通
过武力或暴力推翻政府的学说。吉特洛(被告)是一名社会主义者,因散发一份
左翼宣言的副本而被捕,该宣言呼吁通过大规模政治罢工和任何形式的革命群
众行动在美国建立社会主义。在审判中,吉特洛辩称,由于没有出版和分发宣言
的行为被煽动,他的言论构成了单纯的言论,并没有对美国政府构成明显的危险。
尽管如此,吉特洛还是被定罪了。然后,他对纽约州(原告)的定罪提出质疑,
理由是该州的无政府主义刑事法规违反了第十四修正案的正当程序条款。美国最
高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Majority opinion
(bad tendency test):
o
Court
使用了
more like “bad tendency test”: the risk of overthrowing the
US government: the State cannot reasonably be required to measure the
danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler’s scale.
They are not required to wait until the breaches of the peace are
actually foreseeable.
o
immediacy should not be applied
in this case because the consequence
here could be so severe.
o
The court decided to apply
rational basis level of scrutiny rather than
“clear and present danger”
Dissenting opinion (Homes, J)
:
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o
Gitlow should have chance to express his view in the free market of idea.
[free market of ideas, let the market decide on which view will
prevail]
What about the risk? It is just the nature of freedom of speech. (If, in the
long run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to
be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning
of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their
way
)
o
Gitlow
did not advocate law breaking
, he just advocate the communist
society. (advocate the communist society is not equal to incitement to law
breaking. )
o
Every idea is incitement,
如 果 适 用
incitement
规 则 , 会 使
first
amendment
落空
Whitney v. California [Same rational basis scrutiny in Gitlow]
Majority: Rule is simiar to Gitlow: apply the same rational basis level of scrutiny.
Dissent: no more rational basis level of scrutiny, but should apply “clear and present
test”
Dissent: Home, J
本案不应该适用
rational basis scrutiny,
而应适用“
clear and present danger
”
Reason to protect free speech - Arguments about Values (by Judge
Homes):
1)
Truth: a free marketplace to have all opinions to debate
o
free marketplace will regulate the bad speeches itself and the correct
information will finally prevail in the debate
2)
Self-improvement: necessary to the democratic society
3)
Self-government: to allow citizens to involve in public affairs
4)
Safety value: release the pressure and even anger of the public or they may use
violence instead
Note: Holmes is known as a judicial constraint. (vs. activist) about 14th amendment
cases, but not about 1st amendment.
Dannis v. United States
The rule is similar to Gitlow
the risk argument again
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Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place
where they belong in a free society
Brandenburg
v.
Ohio
and
subsequent
cases
[Modern
standard:
express
advocacy law breaking+ immediacy likelihood]
Facts
Brandenburg (defendant) was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan in the State of Ohio
(plaintiff). Brandenburg was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act
(OCSA) for “advocating the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence,
or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform,” and for “voluntarily assembling with any society, group, or assemblage of
persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” He was
arrested after inviting a news reporter to attend a Ku Klux Klan rally. The reporter
filmed Brandenburg in Klan regalia, burning a cross and uttering speech that was
derogatory to African Americans and Jews. Brandenburg was convicted in Ohio state
court, and was fined and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He challenged his
conviction on the grounds that the OCSA violated his First Amendment right to free
speech.
布兰登伯格(被告)是俄亥俄州三
K
党的领导人(原告)。根据《俄亥俄州犯罪
集团主义法》(
OCSA
),布兰登伯格因
"
鼓吹犯罪、破坏、暴力或非法的恐怖主
义方法作为完成工业或政治改革的手段的责任、必要性或适当性
"
以及
"
自愿与
任何为教授或鼓吹犯罪集团主义学说而成立的社会、团体或人员集会聚集
"
而被
定罪。他是在邀请一名新闻记者参加三
K
党集会后被捕的。该记者拍摄了身穿
三
K
党服装的勃兰登堡,焚烧十字架并发表贬低非裔美国人和犹太人的言论。
布兰登伯格在俄亥俄州法院被定罪,并被罚款和判处
10
年监禁。他对自己的定
罪提出质疑,理由是《俄亥俄州宪法》侵犯了他的第一修正案的言论自由权。
Note
:法院认为
pure advocacy of law breaking
是合法的,除非也满足以下两个
标准
Modern standard three part test: The test that most in favor of protection of
freedom of speech:
1)
express advocacy of law breaking
2)
immediacy
3)
likelihood
Hess v. Indiana
Rule of Law
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Speech that advocates illegal activity or the use of force is protected under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution unless it is both intended and
likely to
provoke imminent illegal activity.
鼓吹非法活动或使用武力的言论受到美国宪法第一修正案的保护,除非它既打算
又可能挑起即将发生的非法活动。
Facts
Gregory Hess (defendant) was arrested for
disorderly conduct
during an antiwar
demonstration on a university campus. During the demonstration, a group of
protesters gathered in the street to block passage of a police car transporting arrested
protesters. A group of officers proceeded down the street and the protestors moved to
the sidewalks. Hess was arrested after one of the officers allegedly heard him shout an
obscenity.
Witnesses testified that Hess had shouted “We’ll take the fucking
street later,” or “We’ll take the fucking street again.”
The witnesses testified that
Hess appeared to be making a general exclamation to nobody in particular, even
though he was facing the crowd of protestors at the time. The witnesses also testified
that Hess’ exclamation was no louder than the shouts of others in the crowd at the
time. Hess was convicted of disorderly conduct and appealed his conviction up to the
state supreme court. The state supreme court upheld Hess’ conviction on a finding
that his exclamation was intended to encourage the crowd to engage in illegal activity
and was likely to have that effect. Hess’ appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States.
格雷戈里
-
赫斯(被告)在大学校园的一次反战示威中因扰乱秩序而被捕。在示
威期间,一群抗议者聚集在街上,阻挡运送被捕抗议者的警车通行。一群警察沿
着街道前进,抗议者则转移到人行道上。据称,其中一名警官听到赫斯喊脏话后
将其逮捕。证人作证说,赫斯曾喊道:
"
我们稍后会占领他妈的街道,
"
或
"
我
们会再次占领他妈的街道
"
。证人作证说,赫斯似乎是在对任何一个人发出一般
性的感叹,尽管他当时面对的是抗议者的人群。证人还证实,赫斯的感叹声并
不比当时人群中其他人的喊声大。赫斯被判定犯有扰乱秩序罪,并就其定罪向州
最高法院提出上诉。州最高法院维持了对赫斯的定罪,认为他的呼喊是为了鼓励
人群从事非法活动,并可能产生这种效果。赫斯向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Issue
Is speech that advocates illegal activity or the use of force protected under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution when it is not both intended and likely
to provoke imminent illegal activity?
Holding and Reasoning (Per Curiam)
Yes. Speech that advocates illegal activity or the use of force protected under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution when it is not both intended and likely
to provoke imminent illegal activity. Our decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) clearly establishes that the constitution forbids state punishment of speech
that advocates unlawful activity unless, under the circumstances, the speech at issue
will have the probable effect of provoking others into immediately or inevitably
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embarking on a course of illegal conduct. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that
Hess’ exclamation was not intended as an exhortation to any particular group of
people. There is no evidence that Hess contemplated or desired to provoke any
immediate action as a result of his exclamation. As such, the statement is
constitutionally protected speech and cannot be penalized by the state. The state court
judgment is reversed.
问题
鼓吹非法活动或使用武力的言论,如果不打算也不可能激起即将发生的非法活动,
是否受到美国宪法第一修正案的保护?
裁定和推理
(Per Curiam)
是的,主张非法活动或使用武力的言论,如果不是有意和可能激起紧迫的非法活
动,则受美国宪法第一修正案的保护。我们在
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969)
一案中的决定明确规定,宪法禁止国家对主张非法活动的言论进行惩罚,
除非在这种情况下,有争议的言论很可能会激起他人立即或不可避免地走上非法
行为的道路。无可争议的证据表明,赫斯的感叹并不是为了劝告任何特定的人
群。没有证据表明赫斯打算或希望通过他的感叹来激起任何立即行动。因此,
该声明是受宪法保护的言论,不能受到国家的惩罚。州法院的判决被推翻。
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
Rule of Law
The government does not have a right to prohibit peaceful political activity designed
to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
政府无权禁止旨在实现宪法保障的权利的和平政治活动。
Facts
The
NAACP
organized
a
boycott
of
white
businesses
in
Claiborne
County,
Mississippi. The purpose of the boycott was to influence government policies to bring
about social change. The NAACP sought to persuade people to join the boycott
through social pressures, including publishing the names of those people who shopped
at the white businesses. The businesses (plaintiffs) brought suit against the NAACP
and those individuals that participated in the boycott (defendants). The trial court
found the defendants liable for damages. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
有色人种协进会在密西西比州克莱伯恩县组织了一次抵制白人企业的活动。抵制
的目的是为了影响政府政策,以实现社会变革。有色人种协进会试图通过社会压
力说服人们加入抵制行动,包括公布那些在白人企业购物的人的名字。这些企业
(原告)对有色人种协进会和那些参与抵制活动的个人(被告)提起诉讼。初审
法院认定被告有责任赔偿损失。密西西比州最高法院维持原判。美国最高法院批
准了诉讼请求。
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Issue
Does the government have a right to prohibit peaceful political activity designed to
effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution?
Holding and Reasoning (Stevens, J.)
No. Although the government has broad authority to regulate economic activity, that
authority does not extend to economic regulations that prohibit peaceful political
activity designed to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself. The
boycott in this case is a form of non-violent speech that is entitled to First
Amendment protection.
For the NAACP or any of its members to be liable on
account of association, it must be proven that the group’s goals were unlawful
and that its members intended to further those goals.
The goals of the boycott
were to effectuate social equality already guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even though the defendants used social ostracism to coerce individuals to join the
boycott, the threat is not sufficient to overcome the First Amendment protections.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi is reversed and the case is remanded.
观点和推理(史蒂文斯,法官)
虽然政府有监管经济活动的广泛权力,但这种权力并没有延伸到禁止旨在实现宪
法本身所保障权利的和平政治活动的经济法规。本案中的抵制活动是一种非暴力
的言论形式,有权得到第一修正案的保护。有色人种协进会或其任何成员要因结
社而承担责任,就必须证明该团体的目标是非法的,而且其成员打算推进这些
目标。抵制活动的目标是为了实现第十四修正案中已经保障的社会平等。即使被
告利用社会排斥来胁迫个人加入抵制活动,这种威胁也不足以克服第一修正案的
保护。因此,密西西比州最高法院被推翻,该案被发回重审。
2.
"Fighting Words"
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
Rule of Law
“Fighting words” that incite others to violence are not protected by the First
Amendment
from governmental regulation.
Facts
Chaplinsky (defendant) was a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Chaplinsky was
distributing religious literature on a street corner. Several citizens complained to the
City Marshal, Bowering, that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religions. Bowering
responded that Chaplinsky was lawfully permitted to voice his opinion, but
nevertheless warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless. After a
disturbance occurred later, Chaplinsky was escorted by a police officer to the police
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station. On the way, Chaplinsky passed Bowering and called him a “racketeer” and a
“fascist.” Chaplinsky admitted to uttering the offensive language in question.
Chaplinsky was convicted by the State of New Hampshire (plaintiff) for violating a
New Hampshire law prohibiting speech directed at a person on public streets that
derides, offends or annoys others. Chaplinsky’s conviction was affirmed by the state
supreme court, and he appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds
that the New Hampshire law violated the First Amendment.
Chaplinsky
(被告)是耶和华见证会的成员。卓别林斯基在一个街角散发宗教资
料。几位市民向市警察局长鲍尔林抱怨说,卓别林斯基在谴责所有的宗教。鲍尔
林回答说,卓别林斯基被合法地允许表达自己的观点,但他还是警告卓别林斯基,
人群正在变得躁动。后来发生骚乱后,卓别林斯基被一名警察护送到警察局。在
路上,卓别林斯基经过鲍尔林,称他为
"
敲诈者
"
和
"
法西斯
"
。查普林斯基承
认说出了有关的攻击性语言。查普林斯基被新罕布什尔州(原告)定罪,因为他
违反了新罕布什尔州禁止在公共街道上针对某人发表嘲笑、冒犯或惹恼他人的言
论的法律。
Chaplinsky
的定罪得到了州最高法院的确认,他向美国最高法院提出
上诉,理由是新罕布什尔州的法律违反了第一修正案。
Why are the fighting words “low value speech”?
intended to inflict harm rather than to communicate ideas, and thus are not
really “speech” at all.
likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach
of the peace.
“no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”
为什么打架的话是
"
低价值的言论
"
?
-
旨在造成伤害而不是传达思想,因此根本不是真正的
"
言论
"
。
-
有可能激起普通人的报复行为,从而导致和平的破坏。
- "
不是任何思想论述的基本部分
"
。
3.
Patriotism and Flags
Texas v. Johnson [content-neutral regulation] [with content based purpose]
Rule of Law
A state statute that criminalizes the burning of an American flag as a means of
political protest violates the First Amendment.
Facts
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Gregory Lee Johnson (defendant) burned an American flag during a political
demonstration at the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas. The State of
Texas (plaintiff) charged Johnson with desecration of a venerated object in violation
of a state statute. Johnson was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined
$2,000. Johnson appealed his conviction. The appellate court upheld Johnson's
conviction, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Court of Criminal
Appeals treated Johnson's conduct as protected symbolic speech and ultimately held
that punishing Johnson for burning the flag during a political protest was not
consistent with the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
格雷戈里
-
李
-
约翰逊(被告)在
1984
年达拉斯共和党全国大会的一次政治示威
中焚烧了一面美国国旗。德克萨斯州(原告)指控约翰逊违反州法规,亵渎了受
人尊敬的物品。约翰逊被定罪,被判处一年监禁,并被罚款
2,000
美元。约翰逊
对他的定罪提出上诉。上诉法院维持了对约翰逊的定罪,但德克萨斯州刑事上诉
法院推翻了这一判决。刑事上诉法院将约翰逊的行为视为受保护的象征性言论,
并最终认为,对约翰逊在政治抗议中焚烧国旗的行为进行惩罚不符合第一修正案
的规定。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
•
Burning flag is an expressive conduct, and is a form of speech.
•
if the regulation is related to expression, then the court must utilize a
strict
scrutiny standard
to determine if the state's interests justify the conviction.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
Rule of Law
A state may not compel individuals to engage in involuntary expression.
The
present regulation, however, is offered without any allegation that remaining passive
during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify an
effort to limit that expression.
Facts
In 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education (WVSBE) (defendant) adopted a
resolution that ordered the salute to the American flag during activity programs in all
public schools. All public school teachers and students were thus required to extend
their right arms, palms upward, and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag and the
United States of America. The refusal to salute the flag was regarded an act of
insubordination, and offending students were expelled and denied readmission until
they complied with the statute. Meanwhile, expelled children were considered
unlawfully absent and their parents or guardians could be prosecuted, fined, and
imprisoned. Barnette and others (plaintiffs) filed suit on behalf of public school
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children and teachers in federal district court alleging that the compulsory salutation
of the flag under the West Virginia statute violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Barnette specifically asked for an injunction to restrain enforcement of
the law against Jehovah’s Witnesses, as their religion prohibited them from swearing
allegiance to the flag. The district court agreed and enjoined enforcement of the
statute. The West Virginia State Board of Education appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
1942
年,西弗吉尼亚州教育委员会(
WVSBE
)(被告)通过一项决议,命令在
所有公立学校的活动项目中向美国国旗敬礼。因此,所有公立学校的教师和学
生都被要求伸出右臂,手掌向上,并背诵效忠国旗和美利坚合众国的誓言。拒
绝向国旗敬礼被认为是不服从命令的行为,违规的学生被开除并被拒绝重新入
学,直到他们遵守法规为止。同时,被开除的儿童被视为非法缺席,他们的父母
或监护人可能被起诉、罚款和监禁。巴尼特和其他人(原告)代表公立学校的儿
童和教师向联邦地区法院提起诉讼,声称西弗吉尼亚州法规规定的强制敬礼国旗
的做法违反了第一和第十四修正案。巴尼特特别要求禁止对耶和华见证人执行该
法律,因为他们的宗教禁止他们向国旗宣誓效忠。地区法院同意并禁止执行该法
规。西弗吉尼亚州教育委员会向美国最高法院提出了上诉。
4.
Offensive words (profane (
淫秽下流的
)
Cohen v. California [no fighting words]
Facts: The Los Angeles Municipal Court convicted Robert Cohen (defendant) for
violating the state penal code prohibiting “maliciously and willfully disturbing the
peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive conduct.” He was
convicted after wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft.”
Women and
children were present. Cohen argued that he wore the jacket as a means of expressing
the depth of his feelings toward the Vietnam War and the draft.
洛杉矶市法院判定罗伯特
-
科恩(被告)违反了州刑法典,禁止
"
恶意和故意以
攻击性行为扰乱任何社区或个人的和平或安静
"
的规定。他是在穿了一件印有
"
去他妈的征兵
"
字样的夹克后被定罪的。当时有妇女和儿童在场。科恩辩称,他
穿上这件夹克是为了表达他对越南战争和征兵的深刻感受。
Majority’s opinion:
not incitement
not fighting words:
did not target at anyone (Cohen did not yell the word to a
certain person)
the speech was not offensive, based on:
1)
whether the speech is offensive is very hard to determine;
2)
the offensive speech should be tolerated in public place;
3)
the word “Fuck the draft” actually convey idea and thoughts, so its not
with no social value. if certain words are banned, then it is hard for
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people to express and convey their ideas.
(Any governmental regulation that
prohibits this word risks suppressing a substantial number of ideas in the
process.)
5.
Libel and false speech
New York v. Sullivan p1422 [actual malice standard]
Rule of Law
If a plaintiff is a public official or is running for public office, he or she can recover
damages for defamation only by proving with clear and convincing evidence the
falsity of the defamatory statements and the presence of actual malice in the speaker.
Facts
Sullivan (plaintiff) was Commissioner of the Police Department, Fire Department,
Department of the Cemetery, and Department of Scales for Montgomery, Alabama.
He brought a civil libel action against New York Times Co. (defendant) after it printed
allegedly false and defamatory statements about Sullivan’s actions to control African
American protesters and his treatment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The newspaper
article in question accused Sullivan’s police force of conducting a wave of terror
against African American students and brutally harassing Dr. King.
It is undisputed
that several of the allegations were either false or exaggerated.
At trial, the trial
judge charged the jury that the statements in the article were “libelous per se” and that
damages were appropriate if the statements were merely “of and concerning” Sullivan.
The jury returned a verdict for Sullivan and awarded him $500,000 in damages. The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
沙利文(原告)是阿拉巴马州蒙哥马利市警察局、消防局、公墓局和天平局的
局长。他对纽约时报公司(被告)提起了民事诽谤诉讼。
(
被告
)
提起民事诽谤诉
讼,因为该公司刊登了关于沙利文控制非裔美国人抗议者的行动和他对待小马
丁
-
路德
-
金博士的所谓虚假和诽谤性言论。该报纸的文章指责沙利文的警察部队
对非裔美国学生进行恐怖袭击,并残酷地骚扰金博士。无可争议的是,其中有
几项指控是虚假的或夸大的。
在审判中,主审法官指控陪审团,文章中的陈述
"
本身就是诽谤
"
,如果这些陈述只是
"
关于
"
沙利文的,那么损害赔偿是适当的。
陪审团作出了对沙利文有利的裁决,并判给他
500,000
美元的赔偿。阿拉巴马州
最高法院维持原判,而美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
1.
Nature of the speech in this case:
speech about public issues and officials
2.
The minor effect of the speech compared to heavy punishment.
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•
The false info in the news are really tiny facts and wouldn’t affect
Sullivan’s reputation
•
But the amount of compensation made up to 500k dollars.
3.
Criticism of government action
did not target on the individual
(the news
did not even mention Sullivan’s name, so there could be no infringement
towards plaintiff, in person)
4.
The Court is really concerned when it comes to
restrictive liabilities in
speech about public issues and officials.
•
Critics of official conduct
may be deterred from voicing their
criticism
, even though it is believed to be true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do
so. (chilling effect?)
•
less basis of objection to criticism because the government officials
serve the public affairs
5.
“Breathing room for false speech” and “prevent chilling effect
6.
actual malice standard
:
publish the speech, 1)
even though know that it
was false
or 2)
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not
.-in
this case found no actual malice. (
当对公共事项发表观点时,只有满足
actual malice standard
才能脱离
first amendment
的保护
)
Subsequent development: Public official to public figure--the scope of the actual
malice test is broader and broader
o
consider the case between voting machine companies and fox news. Now
even the companies can fall into the scope of public figure.
SHKELZEN BERISHA v. GUY LAWSON, ET AL.
(GORSUCH, J., dissenting)
[majority apply actual malice standard]
Dissenting opinion
: It seems that publishing without investigation, fact-checking, or
editing has become the optimal legal strategy.
o
It pointed out the influence of new social media and facilitates the spread of
disinformation.
不同意的意见。似乎不经调查、不经事实核查、不经编辑就发布已经成为最佳的
法律策略。
o
它指出了新的社会媒体的影响,并促进了虚假信息的传播。
Snyder v. Phelps p1383
Rule
: A church protesting a military funeral (after 911) on public land in a peaceful
manner is considered public speech protected by the First Amendment.
Majority
:
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a public or a private concern: the Court ruled that the issues they raise related to
matters of public interest and concern, not to harm the feeling of Snyder
reasonable place, time and peaceful manner
Rule of Law
A church protesting a military funeral on public land in a peaceful manner is
considered public speech protected by the First Amendment.
Facts
Fred Phelps (defendant), founder of the Westboro Baptist Church (defendant),
organized a picket and protest of a military funeral held in Maryland. Phelps and
several members of his congregation stood holding signs outside the Maryland State
House, U.S. Naval Academy, and the church where the funeral took place. The signs
stated phrases such as “Thank God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Thank God for
IEDs,” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.” Albert Snyder (plaintiff), the father of the
fallen soldier, noticed the Westboro picketers but could not read the content on the
signs.
Snyder
filed
suit
against
Phelps,
the
church,
and
the
other
protestors
(collectively Defendants) in federal district court alleging five state tort law claims
including intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). At trial, it was shown that
Phelps had notified local authorities in advance of the protest and had complied with
police instructions in staging the demonstration. The protestors occupied a 10- by
25-foot plot of public land approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the
funeral was held. There was no evidence of violence, yelling, or other disruptive
behavior during the 30 minute protest period before the funeral. Snyder testified that
although he did not see what was written on the picketers’ signs, he had suffered
severe depression and emotional anguish. A jury found for Snyder on the IIED claim
an awarded him $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive
damages. The district court lowered the punitive damages amount to $2.1 million but
affirmed the jury’s verdict in all other respects. The Defendants appealed. The court of
appeals reversed and held that the protest was protected by the First Amendment. The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.
Issue
Is a church protesting a military funeral on public land in a peaceful manner
considered public speech protected by the First Amendment?
Holding and Reasoning (Roberts, C.J.)
Yes. In Maryland, a plaintiff alleging a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED) must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or recklessly
engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe
emotional distress. Here, Defendants claim that their right to freedom of speech under
the First Amendment shields them from liability for IIED. Whether Defendants are
liable turns on whether the claimed speech is private or public in nature. If the speech
is public, the First Amendment provides greater protection than if the speech is private.
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Private speech typically does not implicate issues of public importance that often
warrant heightened protection. The Court has held that speech is of public concern
when it relates to any matter of political, social, or other community concern or when
it is the subject of legitimate news interest and value to the public. See Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004).
Despite the arguable inappropriate or controversial nature of the content on the picket
signs, the issues they raise relate to matters of public interest and concern. They
highlight political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens. Synder
argues that because the protest took place in connection with his son’s private funeral
the speech is a matter of private concern. However, merely because the Defendants
protested a private funeral does not by itself transform the nature of the speech to a
matter of private concern. Although the speech hurt Snyder during a time of personal
loss, the church’s members picketed peacefully 1,000 feet from the church on public
land. Moreover, church members picketed public sites like the Maryland State House
and the U.S. Naval Academy. Even though public speech is protected by the First
Amendment, it is not limitless. Public speech is still subject to reasonable time, place,
or manner restrictions and is not protected when it occurs outside a personal residence
or an abortion clinic entrance. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
6.
Hate speech
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota p1551 [content based regulation]
Facts
R.A.V. (defendant), a juvenile, and several other teenagers burned a wooden cross on
the lawn of a home owned by a black family. R.A.V. was arrested for violating the St.
Paul Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance (the Ordinance), enacted by the City of St. Paul,
Minnesota (plaintiff) to promote human rights for groups that have historically been
subject to discrimination. The Ordinance prohibited the placement of hateful symbols,
including burning crosses, “which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouse . . . anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.” R.A.V. moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the
Ordinance was facially invalid under the First Amendment. Specifically, R.A.V.
argued the Ordinance was an unconstitutionally overbroad content-based regulation of
speech. The trial court granted the motion. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the language of the statute, “arouses anger, alarm or resentment,” limited
the regulation to “fighting words,” which are not protected speech. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
R.A.V.
(被告)是一名青少年,他和其他几名青少年在一户黑人家庭的草坪上焚
烧了一个木制十字架。
R.A.V.
因违反明尼苏达州圣保罗市(原告)制定的《圣保
罗偏见犯罪条例》(该条例)而被捕,该条例旨在促进历史上受到歧视的群体的
人权。该条例禁止放置仇恨标志,包括燃烧的十字架,
"
明知或有合理理由知道
会引起
......
他人基于种族、肤色、信仰、宗教或性别的愤怒、震惊或怨恨
"
。
R.A.V.
请求驳回指控,理由是根据第一修正案,该条例表面上是无效的。具体而言,
R.A.V.
认为该条例是一种基于内容的言论管制,不符合宪法规定。初审法院批准
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了这项动议。明尼苏达州最高法院推翻了这一裁决,认为法令中
"
引起愤怒、惊
恐或怨恨
"
的语言将该条例限制在
"
战斗性语言
"
上,而这是不受保护的言论。
美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
The State
banned certain type of fighting words
(subtype of the fighting words –
hate speech)
•
The court ruled that the state
cannot ban certain fighting words (cannot ban
fighting words on the basis of its content), but should ban the fighting
words as a whole
(
在我看来很奇怪的逻辑哈哈
)
-can't discriminate the speech
based on the actual viewpoint
.
○
Scalia, J: “you are not using fighting words as a vehicle to include hate
speech into the ban. It’s improper.”
○
Prof: “Calling hate speech a kind of / subtitle of fighting words and
ban them.” (
将
fighting words
作为
ban hate speech
的一个借口
)
•
Two types of content discrimination:
1.
subject matter (e.g. abortion
这个
issue
本身
)
2.
viewpoint (discrimination)
(
e.g.
支持
/
反对某一方的观点)
•
Scalia, J: “
this case is viewpoint discrimination
, because it banned the
speech of the one side of racism.”
•
The supreme court
cannot interfere with the political issues or public issues
.
If so, it is actual viewpoint discrimination.
•
“Burning the cross in one’s yard” is a extreme racial action,
but there could
be some racial speech that are not so extreme to make people “want to
punch him in his face”
and they could be under first amendment protection.
•
Scalia also criticized European's approach based on its protection of public
order,
which
is
regarded
as
the
individual's
freedom
to
express
their
preferences, but not to respect public order.
Wisconsin v. Mitchellp1556
Rule of Law
The First Amendment permits states to enact statutes imposing stricter penalties on
defendants who choose victims based on their membership in a protected class, such
as race.
Facts
Mitchell (defendant) was a young black man who, along with a group of friends, beat
up a white boy in Wisconsin (plaintiff). Mitchell instigated the attack after viewing a
movie in which a white man beat up a black boy, asking his friends, “Do you all feel
hyped up to move on some white people?” Mitchell was convicted of aggravated
battery. The trial court increased his sentence under a Wisconsin “hate crimes” statute,
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which permitted penalty enhancements for defendants who selected victims based on
their race. Mitchell argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, because it punished the motives behind the attack. The United States
Supreme Court considered the statute’s constitutionality.
米切尔(被告)是一名年轻的黑人男子,他与一群朋友一起殴打了威斯康星州的
一名白人男孩(原告)。米切尔在观看了一部白人殴打黑人男孩的电影后煽动了
这次攻击,他问他的朋友们:
"
你们都觉得很兴奋,想对一些白人动手吗?
"
米
切尔被判定犯有严重的殴打罪。初审法院根据威斯康星州的
"
仇恨犯罪
"
法规增
加了他的刑期,该法规允许对基于种族选择受害者的被告加重处罚。米切尔辩称,
根据第一修正案,该法规是违宪的,因为它惩罚了攻击背后的动机。美国最高法
院审议了该法规的合宪性。
Note: What is the exact difference between fighting words and hate speech?
Not all hate speech are fighting words.
(在美国只有很严重冒犯的仇恨言论才能算
fighting words
,特别言论自由),
and the state constitution can allow certain fighting
words itself.
e.g. you can express hatred to gays (hate speech), but cannot express in a way
that someone wants to punch you (fighting words),
且
fighting words
大多时候是
针对特定人的
.
7.
Corporate/commercial speech p1723
was largely criticized because it is too much in favor of "free market"
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission p1733
One of the most controversial case in constitution history
Rule of Law:
Under the First Amendment, the government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity.
Majority: Corporation has the First Amendment rights the same as individuals.
Facts
Citizens United (plaintiff) is a nonprofit corporation that primarily accepts funds
from private donations, with a small portion of its funds coming from for-profit
corporations. In January 2008, Citizens United produced a documentary film that
was
essentially
a
negative
advertisement
urging
viewers
to
vote
against
then-Senator Hillary Clinton in the 2008 Democratic primary election. Citizens
United
released
the
film
in
theaters
and
on
DVD,
and
began
running
advertisements about the film’s future release on video-on-demand. The film and
advertisements amounted to “express advocacy” by Citizens United, and thus
raised concerns under § 441(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA).
Section
441(b)
makes
it
a
felony
for
all
corporations–including
nonprofit advocacy corporations–either to expressly advocate the election or
defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within thirty
days of a primary election or sixty days of a general election. Section 441(b)
carves out an exception for Political Action Committees (PACs) in that it permits
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the political speech of these groups, even when the PACs are formed by
corporations. Citizens United challenged the constitutionality of § 441(b) in
federal district court against the Federal Election Commission (FEC) (defendant)
on the ground that § 441(b) was an unconstitutional restriction of freedom of
speech for corporations. The district court ruled for the FEC, and Citizens United
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Qs:Is corporation different from individuals here?
The majority think that they are
the same because the corporation is just a
composition of individuals, but those individuals themselves may have different
political opinions, so how can the corporation represent them?
8.
Content-neutral regulation
举 例 :
Difference
between
content
based
regulation
and content
neutral
regulation
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015) [content based]
Rule
: A restriction on speech that is
content-based
on its face is subject to
strict
scrutiny
regardless of the government’s benign motive or justification.
Facts
The Town of Gilbert (defendant) passed an ordinance regulating the posting of signs
in
the
town.
The
ordinance
created
different
categories
of
signs,
including
“Ideological Sign[s],” “Political Sign[s],” and “Temporary Directional Signs Relating
to a Qualifying Event.” The ordinance applied different restrictions to each category.
The ordinance was more restrictive with its regulation of temporary directional signs.
Good News Community Church and its pastor, Clyde Reed (plaintiffs), held church
services at various buildings in the town. Reed posted temporary signs around the
town to direct parishioners to the services. The town cited Reed because the signs
violated the sign ordinance. Reed brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona, claiming that the ordinance violated his freedom of speech.
The town cited aesthetic appeal and traffic management as the interests served by
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implementing the different restrictions based on sign type. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
吉尔伯特镇(被告)通过了一项条例,对在该镇张贴标志进行管理。该条例规定
了不同类别的标志,包括
"
意识形态标志
"
、
"
政治标志
"
和
"
与合格活动相关
的临时指示标志
"
。该条例对每一类都有不同的限制。该条例对临时指示牌的限
制更为严格。好消息社区教会及其牧师克莱德
-
里德(原告)在该镇的不同建筑
中举行教会仪式。里德在镇上张贴了临时标志,以引导教友们去参加礼拜。该镇
对里德进行了处罚,因为这些标志违反了标志条例。里德向美国亚利桑那州地区
法院提起诉讼,声称该条例侵犯了他的言论自由。该镇将审美和交通管理作为根
据标志类型实施不同限制的利益所在。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
The ordinance is
content-based on its face
because the level of the regulation a
sign receives is entirely dependent on the message the sign contains.
Under strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that a law is
narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
o
did not pass the test: The town does not provide any evidence that temporary
directional signs are less aesthetically appealing or more dangerous for traffic
than political or ideological signs.
该镇没有提供任何证据表明临时指示牌
比政治或意识形态标志更不美观或对交通更危险。
United States v. O'Brien p1665 (symbolic speech) [intermediate scrutiny]
Rule
: If conduct contains both speech and nonspeech elements, an important or
substantial governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element may justify
some limitations on constitutionally protected speech elements.
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if
(1) it is within the constitutional power of the government,
(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest,
(3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and
(4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
(1)
它属于政府的宪法权力范围。
(2)
它促进了重要或实质性的政府利益。
(3)
政府利益与压制自由表达无关,并且
(4)
对所谓的第一修正案自由的附带限制不超过促进该利益所必需的程度。
Facts
Every male in the United States over the age of 18 was required by the Universal Military
Training and Service Act (UMTSA) to register with a local draft board. Each registrant
was assigned a number and given a registration certificate (also called a draft card). In
1966, David Paul O’Brien and three others (defendants) burned their draft cards on the
steps of the South Boston Courthouse. O’Brien was indicted by the United States
Government (plaintiff) and convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts. The indictment charged that O'Brien “willfully and
knowingly did mutilate, destroy, and change by burning his Registration Certificate” in
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violation of the UMTSA, as amended in 1965. That act made it a crime for a person to
forge, alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate, or in any manner change a
registration certificate. O’Brien appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals reversed
on the grounds that the UMTSA violated the First Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
根据《普遍军事训练和服务法》(
UMTSA
),美国每个
18
岁以上的男性都必须在
当地征兵委员会登记。每个登记者都被分配一个号码,并得到一份登记证书(也称
为征兵卡)。
1966
年,大卫
-
保罗
-
奥布莱恩和其他三人(被告)在南波士顿法院的
台阶上烧毁了他们的征兵卡。奥布莱恩被美国政府(原告)起诉,在美国马萨诸塞
州地区法院的陪审团审判后被定罪。起诉书指控
O'Brien "
故意和明知故犯地毁坏、
销毁和烧毁他的注册证书
"
,违反了
1965
年修订的《联邦运输法》。该法案规定,
任何人伪造、变造、故意毁坏、故意破坏或以任何方式改变注册证书,都是犯罪行
为。奥布莱恩对他的定罪提出上诉,上诉法院推翻了他的判决,理由是
UMTSA
违
反了第一修正案的规定。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Reasoning
(1) Is “speech” being regulated or just pure conduct? – Speech
(2) What is the method of regulating the speech? – punishment after speech
(3) What is the forum where the speech is taking place? – public forum
(4) Does the law regulate a category of unprotected speech? – protected speech
(5) Does the law regulate protected speech on the basis of its content?
(a) Does the law regulate content on its face? – No. (
本案中只禁止烧卡,没有提到
具体内容
)
(b) Even if the law is facially neutral, is its purpose to regulate content? – No. –
content-neutral regulation
-
apply intermediate scrutiny
Standard of intermediate scrutiny:
(1) it is within the constitutional power of the government,
(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest,
(3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and
(4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
not every way to communicate the speech is speech: did not agree with O’Brien’s
argument that the speech is symbolic speech;
even it is symbolic speech, he government's interest and the law implicate only
the
noncommunicative
aspect
of
O'Brien's
conduct,
and
it
was
for
the
noncommunicative impact of his conduct that O'Brien was convicted.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
Fact
: As part of its attempt to regulate the volume of amplified music at the bandshell,
New
York
City
required
bandshell
performers
to
use
sound-amplification
equipment and a sound technician provided by the city.
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Rule
: Under the First Amendment, a regulation of the time, place, or manner of
protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate,
content-neutral interests,
but does not need to be the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of doing so.
规则。根据第一修正案,对受保护言论的时间、地点或方式的规定必须是狭义的,
以满足政府合法的、内容中立的利益,但不需要是限制性最小或侵扰性最小的手
段。
Content neutral
: the purpose of the guideline is to control noise levels at
bandshell events. This justification for the guidelines has nothing to do with
content.
the regulation promotes a substantial government interest (noise control) and that
interest would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation (the noise could
not be controlled without the regulation)
the city’s guidelines leave open ample alternative channels of communication: the
guidelines continue to permit expressive activity in the bandshell.
内容中立:该准则的目的是控制乐队活动的噪音水平。准则的这一理由与内容毫
无关系。
该法规促进了政府的实质性利益(噪音控制),如果没有该法规,该利益的实现
将不那么有效(没有该法规就无法控制噪音)。
市政府的指导方针留下了充足的替代沟通渠道:指导方针继续允许在乐队大厅进
行表达性活动。
Comparison: Content-based and content-neutral
Schneider v. New Jersey
[content neutral] [no purpose of regulating content]
Rule of Law
While municipalities may impose reasonable restrictions and time requirements for
soliciting and canvassing on public property, the First Amendment does not permit
them to restrict these activities entirely in public places.
Facts
Municipal
codes
in
four
separate
cities—Los Angeles,
California;
Milwaukee,
Wisconsin; Worchester, Massachusetts; and Irvington, New Jersey—prohibited the
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distribution of handbills and pamphlets in public places such as streets, parks, and
sidewalks. They also prohibited the hand-to-hand distribution of these materials to
private residences. Clara Schneider (defendant) was a Jehovah’s Witness and was
convicted with other Jehovah’s Witnesses for violating these ordinances in various
cities. They challenged their convictions in various state courts on the grounds that the
codes were unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
consolidated all cases.
加利福尼亚州洛杉矶市、威斯康星州密尔沃基市、马萨诸塞州沃切斯特市和新泽
西州欧文顿市这四个城市的市政法规禁止在街道、公园和人行道等公共场所散发
传单和小册子。它们还禁止在私人住宅中手把手地分发这些材料。克拉拉
-
施耐
德(被告)是耶和华见证会的成员,与其他耶和华见证会成员一起因在不同城市
违反这些条例而被定罪。他们在各州法院对其定罪提出质疑,理由是这些法规是
违宪的。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求并合并了所有案件。
Reasoning
Content-neutral, no purpose of regulating speech – apply intermediate scrutiny
But LA law failed.
因为管的范围
so board
,禁止了所有
speech
,且政府本来有更
好的
alternative
9.
Public vs. non-public forums
Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
Fact
: restriction of speech in airport-terminal buildings: The Port Authority
adopted a regulation forbidding the repetitive solicitation of money and the
distribution of literature within the terminals.
Rule
: In a nonpublic forum like an airport terminal, a challenged governmental
restriction on speech will be upheld if the restriction is reasonable.
o
Unconstitutional because it is an unreasonable restriction of speech in
non-public forum.
10. Prior Restraints
generally cannot regulate prior restraints
基本上事先禁止言论都是不行的
(see
Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson
, 283 U.S. 697 (1931))
Rule
: Courts may not issue injunctions against the publication of newspapers,
magazines, or other periodicals deemed to be “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory”
as such a court order would constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of the press
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
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Appendix
Marbury v. Madison
United States Supreme Court 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
Rule of Law
The Supreme Court of the United States has the authority to review laws and
legislative acts
to
determine
whether they
comply
with
the United States
Constitution.
Facts
U.S. President John Adams appointed several individuals to the judiciary in the final
days of his presidency. The group of appointees was duly approved by Congress, and
Adams had signed their commissions. However, finalizing the appointments required
delivering the commissions to the appointees, and that step had not been completed by
the time Adams's term expired. The next president, Thomas Jefferson, refused to fully
finalize Adams's judicial appointments and directed his Secretary of State, James
Madison (defendant) not to deliver the commissions. William Marbury (plaintiff),
who had been appointed a Justice of the Peace of the District of Columbia by Adams,
brought an action against Madison in the United States Supreme Court. Marbury
sought a writ of mandamus to compel Madison to deliver the commission and finalize
Marbury’s appointment. Congress had authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of
mandamus as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, so Marbury brought his action under
the Court's original jurisdiction.
Issue
Does the Supreme Court of the United States have the authority to review laws and
legislative
acts
to
determine
whether
they
comply
with
the
United
States
Constitution?
Holding and Reasoning (Marshall, C.J.)
Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States has the authority to review laws and
legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the United States Constitution.
The Constitution clearly limits the powers that may be exercised by each branch of
government. The legislative branch must operate within these Constitutionally defined
limits in passing laws. The role of the judicial branch is to identify, interpret, and
apply the law to decide cases. If there is a conflict between a law passed by Congress
and the Constitution, then the Constitution must control, and the offending law will be
void. Here, Marbury has a right to his commission as Justice of the Peace because he
was
lawfully appointed to that
position by the president's
act of signing
his
commission, further enforced by his confirmation in the Senate. Madison's refusal to
finalize Marbury’s appointment interferes with Marbury’s legal title, and Marbury is
entitled to a remedy under federal law. However, even though a writ of mandamus
would have been an appropriate remedy, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which authorized the United States Supreme Court to give such a remedy, is
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unconstitutional. The Act allows the Supreme Court to have original jurisdiction over
actions for writs of mandamus. However, this provision directly conflicts with Article
III of the Constitution, which greatly limits the cases in which the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction and provides it with appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The
Act is unconstitutional because it seeks to expand the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction, and therefore, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Marbury’s
claim.
Allen v. Wright
Facts
. Parents of black public school children sued the IRS, alleging that by not
denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools, the IRS was
harming their children in two ways. First, the IRS conduct was in fact giving federal
financial aid to racially segregated institutions. Second, the conduct encourages the
operation and expansion of such schools and this interferes with desegregation of the
public
schools.Issue.
Does
the
harm
alleged
by
the
respondents
fulfill
the
constitutional requirement of standing?
Held
. No. Reversed and remanded. Addressing the first allegation, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor (J. O’Connor) notes “an asserted right to have the government act in
accordance with the law” is insufficient to grant jurisdiction. Extending this line of
argument, she says “[a] black person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of a tax
exemption to a racially discriminatory school in Maine.” Furthermore, the issue of
funding the schools does not harm the respondents directly. The second allegation
does present harm, that the respondents’ children are being denied an integrated
educational experience. However, the IRS’s actions are too far attenuated from this
harm. There is no evidence that denying tax-exempt status to the private schools in
question would result in a more integrated public education system.
Dissent
. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens), dissenting, postulates that removing
tax-exempt status from the private schools, will make the schools more expensive to
operate, causing them to be less cost competitive or requiring them to change their
admissions policies to remain open.
Discussion
. While the dissent’s argument has theoretical soundness – removing
tax-exempt status will cause an immediate increase in cost – the majority points out
that this does not guarantee integration. For example, Private donors could still make
up the difference in lost funding.
McCulloch v. Maryland
United States Supreme Court 4 L. Ed. 579, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
Rule of Law
The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress the power to tax and spend for the
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general welfare, and to make such other laws as it deems necessary and proper to
carry out this enumerated power. Additionally, federal laws are supreme and states
may not make laws that interfere with the federal government’s exercise of its
constitutional powers.
Facts
In 1816, Congress passed an act that incorporated the Bank of the United States. In
1817, the Bank opened up a branch in the state of Maryland (plaintiff). In 1818, the
Maryland state legislature passed an act to impose a tax on all out-of-state banks
operating in the state of Maryland. Although the act was general in nature, the Bank
of the United States was the only such bank in Maryland at that time and was thus the
only establishment affected by the tax. James McCulloch (defendant), head of the
Maryland branch of the Bank of the United States (Bank), refused to pay the tax. This
lawsuit ensued and the case was appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The
court of appeals upheld Maryland’s argument that because the Constitution was
specifically silent on the subject of whether the United States government could
charter a bank, the Bank of the United States was unconstitutional. The case was then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue
(1) Does Congress have implied constitutional power to create a bank? (2) If so, may
individual states tax a federally created bank?
Holding and Reasoning (Marshall, C.J.)
(1) Yes. Congress has the constitutional power to charter the Bank of the United States.
This power is ultimately derived from the Constitution’s grant to Congress of the
general power to “tax and spend” for the general welfare. However, in addition to its
enumerated powers, Congress is also given general powers under the Constitution’s
Necessary and Proper Clause, which states that Congress may create laws it deems
necessary and proper to help carry out its enumerated powers. The Necessary and
Proper
Clause
functions
to
expand,
not
limit,
Congress’s
enumerated
powers.
Congress decided that chartering the Bank of the United States was a necessary and
proper method of raising revenue to carry out its overall taxing and spending powers.
(2) No. The Bank was created by federal statute. Maryland may not tax the Bank as a
federal institution because federal laws are supreme to state laws. A federally created
institution may not be inhibited by a state law. The Bank of the United States
functions to serve the entire nation. It is thus inappropriate for it to be controlled by
one part of the nation (i.e. Maryland) through a tax. The judgment of the court of
appeals is reversed.
Baker v. Carr
369 U.S. 186 (1962)
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Rule of Law
A challenge to malapportionment of state legislatures brought under the Equal
Protection Clause is not a political question and is thus justiciable.
Facts
Baker (plaintiff) was a Republican living in Shelby County, Tennessee. The Tennessee
Constitution required that legislative districts be redrawn every ten years to adjust for
changes in population. Baker brought suit against Carr (defendant), Secretary of State
in Tennessee, in his official capacity alleging that because Tennessee had not actually
redistricted since 1901, the urban Shelby County district had ten times as many
residents as did the more rural districts. As a result, Baker argued that rural votes
counted more than urban votes, and that he was thus denied equal protection of the
laws. The State of Tennessee argued that legislative districting issues were not judicial
questions but political questions, and were thus not capable of being decided by the
courts based on the Constitution’s prohibition on the Court’s deciding political
questions.
Issue
Does an equal protection challenge to malapportionment of state legislatures qualify
as a non-justiciable political question?
Holding and Reasoning (Brennan, J.)
No. Under Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), challenges to the malapportionment of
state
legislatures
brought
under
the
Guaranty
Clause
of
the
Constitution
are
inappropriate political questions. Unlike Luther, the case at bar is brought under the
Equal Protection Clause There is no question the Court is meant to adjudicate
plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection under the laws due to its precedent. For an issue
to be a non-justiciable political question, one of six tests (listed in descending order of
importance
and
certainty)
must
be
satisfied:
(1)
a
textually
demonstrable
constitutional commitment of that issue to another political branch; (2) a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue; (3) an
impossibility of deciding the issue without making an initial policy determination of a
kind not suitable for judicial discretion; (4) a lack of respect for the other branches of
government in undertaking independent resolution of the case; (5) an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potential for
embarrassment for differing pronouncements of the issue by different branches of
government. In the present case, there is no textually-demonstrable commitment of
Equal Protection issues to other branches of government. There are certain judicial
standards already in place for adjudicating such claims, and because Baker is an
individual person suing a state government, there is no separation of powers concerns
implicated. This claim does not fall under one of the six tests of a political question
and therefore the claim is justiciable. The case is remanded to the district court for
consideration of the merits.
Concurrence (Douglas, J.)
The issue presented in this case deals more with the extent to which a state is allowed
to weigh one citizen’s vote more heavily than another’s. The right to vote is inherent
in the Constitution. Each vote should count equally. Designing legislative districts
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such that one vote counts more in one district than in another represents the exact kind
of invidious discrimination by states that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to
prohibit. Baker should be given a chance to prove his claim in court.
Concurrence (Clark, J.)
The disparate weight given to votes from different districts constitutes an actionable
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. It is wrong to remand the matter to the
Tennessee courts with no clear guidance as to how to proceed in granting relief, and
thus the majority’s holding, while appropriate, should have gone farther.
Concurrence (Stewart, J.)
The concurring and dissenting opinions confuse the issue presented in this case as
well as the holding. The majority makes three rulings: that the jurisdiction is proper
over the subject matter; that Baker states a justiciable cause of action under which he
should be entitled to relief; and that Baker has standing to challenge Tennessee’s
apportionment statutes. The holding must be narrowly and clearly defined for future
jurisprudence.
Dissent (Frankfurter, J.)
The majority’s decision is not based on history or precedent, and it seriously violates
judicial restraint and separation of powers concerns under the Constitution. Prior
cases dealing with the relationship of population to legislative representation have
been uniformly decided to the contrary as being nonjusticiable political questions. No
meaningful difference exists between a challenge brought under the Equal Protection
Clause and the Guaranty Clause.
Dissent (Harlan, J.)
The majority’s analysis is clouded by too many tangential issues to focus on the real
issue at hand. The only real issue in the case is whether the complaint sufficiently
alleged a violation of a federal right such that a district court would have jurisdiction
over the case. The complaint, taken as a whole to be true, does not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Nothing
in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that state
legislatures must deliberately structure their districts so as to reflect absolute equality
of votes. Additionally, the complaint does not adequately show that Tennessee’s
existing system of apportionment is so arbitrary and capricious as to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Without more facts alleging a violation, Baker does not state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Nixon v. United States
506 U.S. 224 (1993)
Rule of Law
The constitutionality of Senate impeachment proceedings is a non-justiciable political
question incapable of judicial adjudication.
Facts
Walter Nixon (plaintiff) was a former federal district court judge who was convicted
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of perjury and sentenced to prison. He refused to resign his commission even after
incarceration, and the United States House of Representatives began impeachment
proceedings against him. The matter was referred to the United States Senate to vote
on Nixon’s removal. The Senate appointed a special committee to receive evidence
and hear testimony in the case and then to report their findings to the full Senate.
Nixon instituted this suit arguing that the Senate’s creation of a special committee to
hear the case violated the Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 constitutional requirement that
all impeached persons be “tried by the Senate.” Nixon sought a declaratory judgment
that his impeachment conviction was void and that his judicial salary and privileges
should be reinstated.
Issue
Whether the scope of the Senate’s constitutional authority to conduct impeachment
proceedings is a non-justiciable political question incapable of resolution by the
courts.
Holding and Reasoning (Rehnquist, C.J.)
Yes. Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the Constitution gives sole power to the Senate
to try all impeachments. The framers’ use of the word “sole” is significant in that it is
a textually-demonstrable commitment of complete discretion to the Senate to conduct
impeachment proceedings and to determine the rules by which those proceedings are
conducted. Under this premise, the Senate has authority to create a special committee
as
part
of
its
overall
impeachment
trial
proceedings. Additionally,
in
reality,
impeachments involve two separate trials: an impeachment trial by the Legislature
and a criminal trial by the Supreme Court. It is important that there be no judiciary
role in deciding impeachment proceedings issues to ensure the judiciary remains
unbiased in future criminal proceedings. Finally the framers intended impeachment
proceedings to be the only check on the judicial branch by the legislature. Allowing
participation of the judicial branch in legislative proceedings would upset the
necessary
system
of
checks
and
balances.
The
constitutionality
of
Senate
impeachment proceedings is a non-justiciable political question incapable of judicial
adjudication. The case is dismissed.
Concurrence (Stevens, J.)
Regardless of the relative weights assigned to the words “sole” and “try” in the
Constitution, the framers’ decision to give complete impeachment power to the
legislative branch justifies prohibiting judicial interference into that function.
Concurrence (White, J.)
The Constitution does not prohibit judicial review of the constitutionality of Senate
impeachment proceedings. On the merits, the Senate’s committee structure had
fulfilled its constitutional obligation to “try” Nixon.
Concurrence (Souter, J.)
The majority is wrong to rule that questions of Senate impeachment proceedings are
never justiciable. The Senate might act in the future so far beyond its scope of
appropriate constitutional powers that judicial intervention would be necessary to
ensure a just result.
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National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
132 S.Ct. 2566, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
Rule of Law
(1) The individual mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 is a valid use of Congress’s power to tax.
(2) The Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 is an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spending powers.
Facts
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Shortly
afterward, multiple parties, including business organizations, individuals, and 26
states,
filed
suit
in
district
courts
across
the
country
to
challenge
the Act’s
constitutionality. The results were fractured: some courts upheld some or all of the
ACA,
others
declared
part
or
all
unconstitutional,
some
concluded
offending
provisions could be severed, and others argued that the Act couldn’t be challenged
until someone was forced to pay the penalty. The National Federation of Independent
Business, the State of Florida, and others (plaintiffs) sued in Florida federal court
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(defendant). The litigation challenged two key provisions of the legislation: (1) the
individual mandate, which requires individuals to purchase health insurance or pay a
“penalty” and (2) the Medicaid expansion provision, which conditioned continued
receipt of federal Medicaid funds on states expanding their eligibility requirements for
the program. The district court held that Congress had exceeded its authority in
passing the individual mandate. The court concluded that the individual mandate was
not severable and struck down the Act as a whole. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed that the individual mandate was unconstitutional. However,
the court of appeals determined that the individual mandate was severable; so, the rest
of the Act remained intact. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split
between the circuits.
Issue
(1) Is the individual mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 a valid use of Congress’s power to tax?
(2) Is the Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 a constitutional use of Congress’s spending powers?
Holding and Reasoning (Roberts, C.J.)
(1) Yes. The individual mandate contained in the Act is a valid use of Congress’s
power to tax. The individual mandate cannot be justified as a valid exercise of
commerce power, because the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to
compel individuals to engage in commercial activity. Further, the possibility that
people could participate in the healthcare market at some point in the future is not
enough. This is a slippery slope that could open the door to congressional regulation
of all sorts of activity or inactivity not contemplated by the Framers. For example,
obesity is more responsible for increased healthcare costs than uninsured people, but
under the government’s theory, the federal government could mandate that people buy
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vegetables. Next, the Necessary and Proper Clause only gives Congress the power to
do things that are incidental to the valid exercise of some enumerated power, and
therefore the individual mandate cannot be justified on this ground either. However,
the individual mandate’s penalty provision operates more like a tax imposed on those
opting against purchasing coverage. Because the tax is assessed just like other taxes,
based on income, and collected by the IRS, the fact that Congress calls it a penalty is
irrelevant. The Court interprets legislation as constitutional if possible, and the
individual mandate can be saved by interpreting the penalty provision as a valid
exercise of Congress's power to tax.
(2) No. The Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 is an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spending powers. With
respect to the Medicaid extension, the federal government cannot withhold existing
Medicaid funding from states that choose not to participate. Congress can offer grants
to states and condition the funds on compliance with certain requirements, as happens
frequently with highway and infrastructure funding. However, the Act does not offer
the states a genuine choice, because they need to accept a basic change in the nature
of Medicaid or risk losing all Medicaid funding. Accordingly, the Medicaid provision
is unconstitutional. This provision is severable from the remainder of the Act, which
is left intact.
Concurrence/Dissent (Ginsburg, J.)
The individual mandate should be upheld under the Commerce Clause because there
was
a
rational
basis
for
Congress
to
believe
the
large
uninsured
population
substantially
affected
interstate
commerce
and
the
mandate
bore
a
reasonable
connection to addressing the problem. The majority is incorrect in holding that the
Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional. States have no “existing” rights to federal
funds, and Congress may decide whether federal funds should be given to the states,
and under what conditions.
Dissent (Scalia, J.)
The entire Act should be struck down as unconstitutional. Neither the Commerce
Clause nor the power to tax and spend grants Congress the authority to require the
individual mandate. The Act’s “threats” to terminate states’ Medicaid funding absent
compliance with the Medicaid expansion are impermissibly coercive.
Arizona v. United States
567 U.S. 387 (2012)
Rule of Law
A state law that addresses immigration and alien registration is preempted where
Congress has completely occupied the entire field.
Facts
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The Arizona Legislature passed S.B. 1070, a law designed to deter the unlawful entry
and presence of illegal aliens in the state. The federal government (plaintiff) filed suit
against the State of Arizona (defendant) in district court and sought a preliminary
injunction to prohibit the implementation of four specific provisions of the statute.
The district court granted the injunction which prohibited the state law from taking
effect. Arizona appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review.
Issue
Is a state law that addresses immigration and alien registration preempted where
Congress has completely occupied the entire field?
Holding and Reasoning (Kennedy, J.)
Yes. Congress possesses vast authority to enact laws and govern over immigration
issues and the regulation of aliens. Immigration policy can affect federal and
international trade, tourism, diplomatic relations, and other vital interests of the
United States. The federal government argues that four provisions of Arizona’s law
are preempted by federal law covering the field of immigration. Section 3 of the
statute penalizes an individual for failing to carry an alien registration document on
his person. In
Hines v. Davidowitz
, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), the Court found that Congress
intended to completely occupy the immigration field with one all-embracing system.
There, the Court held that the States lacked the authority to complement or to enforce
additional
regulations
related
to
alien
registration.
Field
preemption
reflects
a
congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is
parallel to federal standards. Thus, Section 3’s requirement that an individual possess
an alien registration document is preempted by federal law. Section 5(C) of the statute
makes it a state misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for or
solicit work in a public place. The federal government argues that § 5 upsets the
balance struck by Congress’ passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA) and therefore must also be preempted. Congress enacted the IRCA as a
measure to combat the employment of illegal aliens. Although the federal law does
not impose criminal penalties, some civil fines may be assessed. It is well settled that
state law will be preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress.
Here, § 5 clearly conflicts with the objectives of the IRCA and is therefore preempted.
Section 6 provides that a state police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if
he has probable cause to believe that the person may have committed any offense that
makes him removable from the United States. The federal government argues that § 6
creates an obstruction to the alien removal process created by Congress. Under
Arizona’s law, a police officer may arrest someone if he has probable cause to believe
the person has committed any public offense that makes him removable from the
United States. However, under the federal immigration system, the illegal status of an
alien alone is no basis for an arrest. Instead, an administrative process kicks in with
the filing of specific documentation to conduct a hearing. If it is determined after such
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a hearing that the alien is removable, the Attorney General issues a warrant to arrest
the alien which is executed by trained immigration officers. Section 6 attempts to
circumvent the federal process by allowing Arizona police officers to arrest suspected
illegal aliens. This would allow the state to have its own immigration policy in place
of the federal immigration system and is thus preempted by federal law. Finally,
Section 2(B) requires Arizona police officers to make a reasonable attempt to discern
the immigration status of any person they stop, detain, or arrest if there is a suspicion
that the person is an illegal alien. The section further provides that any person who is
arrested will have his or her immigration status determined prior to being released.
Through its comprehensive immigration regulatory scheme, Congress has obligated
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to respond to any request made by state
officials for verification of a person’s immigration status. The federal scheme leaves
some room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.
However, there is no definitive interpretation from the lower courts of Section 2(B) to
determine whether it can be construed in a manner that conflicts with federal law.
Therefore, §§ 3, 5(C), and 6 of S.B. 1070 are preempted by federal law. It was
improper, however, to enjoin § 2(B) until such time as it may be shown that the
provision in fact conflicts with federal law. The judgment of the court of appeals is
affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with the opinion.
Concurrence/Dissent (Scalia, J.)
The majority’s decision deprives Arizona, and any other State, from furthering its
sovereign right and power to exclude people who have no right to be in the state.
Moreover, the mere existence of federal action in the immigration field does not mean
that a State is powerless to also act in that field. The Arizona laws being challenged
do not extend, alter, or revise federal immigration restrictions, but merely enforce
current federal restrictions more effectively.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey
437 U.S. 617 (1978)
Rule of Law
A state may not discriminate against other states’ articles of commerce on the basis of
origin.
Facts
In 1974, New Jersey passed a law that prohibited other states from shipping their
waste across its borders and depositing the waste in New Jersey landfills. New Jersey
stated that the purpose for the regulation was to preserve its environment, as well as
not overburden its landfills and thus increase the costs of waste disposal for New
Jersey residents. The City of Philadelphia, other cities, and owners of private landfills
in New Jersey (plaintiffs) brought suit in state court against New Jersey (defendant)
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on the grounds that the New Jersey law was an unconstitutional restriction on
interstate commerce. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute, and the City
of Philadelphia appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue
May a state control its waste by prohibiting out-of-state waste from crossing its
borders?
Holding and Reasoning (Stewart, J.)
No. Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, if Congress has not acted to
regulate an area of interstate commerce, states are presumably free to regulate that
area. Any state regulation is subject only to Commerce Clause restrictions and may
not burden interstate commerce. In this case, New Jersey passed its law for legitimate
environmental and economic purposes. However, New Jersey acted improperly when
it sought to remedy its environmental and economic problems by targeting solely
out-of-state waste producers with its regulations. New Jersey’s refusal to let waste
into its landfills simply because the waste originated from outside New Jersey violates
the Commerce Clause. The decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court is reversed.
Dissent (Rehnquist, J.)
The realities of the health and environmental hazards presented by landfills to New
Jersey leaves New Jersey with little choice in choosing how to regulate its landfills.
Landfills
cause
significant
health
and
safety
problems.
Presently,
there
is
no
alternative waste-disposal solution available. Thus, New Jersey cannot completely
shut down its landfills to avoid these problems. However, the majority’s opinion
requires New Jersey either not to use the landfills at all for its own waste disposal
needs, or to accept waste from every single state in the union so as not to discriminate
based on the Commerce Clause.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (p543) 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
Rule of Law
The President of the United States may not engage in lawmaking activity absent
an
express authorization from Congress or the text of the Constitution.
Facts
In late 1951, steel mill owners and their employees had disagreements over the terms
of collective bargaining agreements. Unable to reach an agreement, the steel mill
employees’ representative gave notice of intent to strike after the expiration of their
current agreement. The federal government unsuccessfully entered the negotiations,
and on April 4, 1952, the steel mill employees’ union gave notice of its intent to strike
on April 9, 1952. The importance of steel as a component in weapons and war
materials led President Truman to believe that a reduction in steel production from a
nationwide strike would jeopardize the nation’s security.
The President issued
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Executive Order 10340 directing Sawyer (defendant), the Secretary of Commerce, to
take control of and continue operating most of the nation’s steel mills. Sawyer carried
out the order, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (plaintiff), along with other steel
mill operators, brought suit in district court alleging that the President’s order
amounted to an exercise of lawmaking, a legislative function reserved expressly for
Congress. Therefore, the President’s exercise of lawmaking was unconstitutional. The
district court granted an injunction in favor of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., on
the grounds that the President acted unconstitutionally, but the court of appeals stayed
the injunction. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
May the President of the United States, under his constitutional executive powers,
issue a lawmaking order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of
and operate most of the nation’s steel mills?
Holding and Reasoning (Black, J.) -formalism
No. The President’s power to issue executive orders must come from either an act of
Congress or the Constitution. Congress expressly rejected the use of seizure to solve
labor disputes as unconstitutional when it considered the drafting of the Taft-Hartley
Act in 1947.
Here, the President does not rely on any statutory authority to seize real
property. Since Congress has not acted to grant seizure powers to the President in
labor disputes, the President’s authority must come from the Constitution. Sawyer
admitted that there is no express authority in the Constitution that justifies the
President’s actions, but argues that the President’s power to do so should still be
implied from powers granted to the President in Article II of the Constitution. This
argument is not constitutionally supported since the link between the power to make
war decisions and the power to seize private property for the resolution of labor
disputes is attenuated. Additionally, the President’s actions cannot be supported by his
general executive powers, as the Constitution charges the Executive with “faithfully
executing the laws,” not making the laws themselves. The decision of the district
court is affirmed.
Concurrence (Burton, J.)
The Constitution vests authority to deal with this type of national emergency in
Congress. Congress therefore properly outlined the procedures available to the
President
to
prevent
a
large-scale
strike
that
could
harm
the
country
in
the
Taft-Hartley Act. Congress chose not to authorize the President to seize an industry,
retaining that power for itself. The President decided to use an unauthorized method
to deal with the steel mill labor crisis, but he lacked the inherent power to make the
seizure on his own accord. There was no “imminent invasion or threatened attack”
here, and thus, there is no need to determine what the President’s constitutional
authority would be in that case. The order cannot be justified as a military command
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either. Ultimately, the President usurped Congress’s authority and violated the
separation of powers when he issued the order, and the order is unconstitutional.
Concurrence (Jackson, J.) -Functionalism
The President and Congress have distinct powers, but the Constitution allows for
some overlap of authority in different scenarios. The President may act pursuant to
executive powers, congressionally-granted powers, or a combination of both
. When
the President acts under an express or implied grant of power, he can rely on both his
own powers and Congress’s. When the President acts without an express grant or
denial of Congress’s powers, he acts under the aggregate of his own independent
powers. When the President acts in a way that is incompatible with the express or
implied will of Congress, he may rely only on the powers expressly granted to him by
the Constitution. Since Congress denied power to the President in the present case
under the Taft-Hartley Act, the third scenario is implicated. The President may be
deemed to have acted constitutionally only if he is acting based on an express grant of
power from the Constitution. The Constitution does not grant the President such
powers, and the President's power to “faithfully execute the laws” does not cross into
the function of lawmaking. The President is checked by the Fifth Amendment’s
prohibition on depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. The President has clearly deprived steel mill owners of their property without
due process.
Concurrence (Douglas, J.)
Congress is the only branch of government that can appropriate money to pay for a
program involving a nationwide seizure of property. Hence, Congress is the only
branch that may authorize such actions. It is important to keep this power within
Congress to avoid the possibility of a future President abusing the power.
Concurrence (Frankfurter, J.)- the past experience (tradition)
The
President
has
been
given
powers
to
seize
production,
transportation,
communication, or storage facilities on sixteen separate occasions since 1916.
However, the difference between these occurrences and the present case was that, in
all prior instances, Congress granted temporary powers to the President to act in times
of war or national crisis. Additionally, the powers were only granted for a specific,
limited time frame. In the present case, the President was acting to remedy only an
industrial problem that was not connected with wartime or a national emergency.
Additionally, Congress specifically withheld this type of power from the President, in
labor relations settings, when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. The President
acted unconstitutionally because the facts surrounding the present case are different
than prior instances of presidential grants of power and because Congress could have
given the President power but chose instead to withhold it.
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Concurrence (Clark, J.)
This case is controlled by the holding in
Little v. Barreme
(1804), which held that
when Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis
confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in responding to that crisis.
However,
in
the
absence
of
such
procedures
from
Congress,
the
President’s
independent power to act depends on the gravity of the situation confronting the
nation.
The
President’s
actions
are
unconstitutional
because
Congress
already
prescribed procedures for use in this particular situation, and the situation is not so
grave as to warrant his acting without a grant of power from Congress.
Dissent (Vinson, C.J.)—the executive power could be very broad.
The President acted in a necessary way to prevent a crisis of national defense that
could result from a lack of steel production. The Constitution delegates to the
President the duty to execute legislative programs. The implementation of a steel
seizure program designed to preserve production and promote the national defense
qualifies as a legislative program. The President is uniquely qualified to step in and
implement this program, as no other branch of government has the ability to act so
quickly by releasing an Executive Order. The President’s actions are fully within the
actions given to the executive branch by the Constitution, as the Framers necessarily
made the executive branch a robust one so it could serve as an actual check and
balance to the other branches of government. The majority’s decision is improperly
aimed at “straw men” as it seeks to prevent the evils of potential future presidents.
This scenario is not at issue. The President is both authorized and uniquely qualified
to perform this function.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
Rule of Law
An otherwise unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive may
nevertheless be sustained on the ground that
its exclusive goal is to provide relief in
a foreign conflict.
Facts
Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to stop the sale of arms to
countries
involved
in
the
Chaco
border dispute.
That
same
day,
President
Roosevelt issued an executive order prohibiting munitions sales to warring countries
involved in the Chaco border dispute.
In 1936, an indictment was issued alleging
that Curtiss-Wright Export Co. (defendant) illegally sold arms to Bolivia, a
country engaged in the Chaco border dispute.
The transaction was in violation of
the congressional resolution and the President’s executive order. The district court
issuing the indictment held for Curtiss-Wright, ruling that the indictment was not
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supported by sufficient information to charge Curtiss-Wright. The United States
government (plaintiff) appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether
an
otherwise
unconstitutional
delegation
of
legislative
power
to
the
executive may nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive goal is to
provide relief in a foreign conflict.
Holding and Reasoning (Sutherland, J.)
Yes.
There are significant differences in the federal government’s power to
regulate
internal
versus
foreign
affairs.
All
powers
given
to
the
federal
government over internal affairs are carved out by enumerated provisions in the
Constitution from the powers generally reserved to the states. In contrast, any
powers given to the federal government over foreign affairs are not carved out
from state power because the states never possessed powers over foreign affairs.
The grant of power over foreign affairs vested in the federal government after it
usurped power from the British Crown. The President is the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations. Any exercise of power by the
President must be exercised within the constitutional parameters granted to him, but
the scope of the President’s powers in international affairs is broad.
In order to
effectively maintain international relations, congressional legislation concerning
foreign affairs must accord the President a degree of discretion and freedom
from statutory restriction that would not be admissible if domestic affairs alone
were involved.
The President’s executive order is constitutional and the decision of
the district court is reversed.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury
Rule of Law
The President of the United States has authority to settle judicial claims through an
executive order if the settlement of claims is necessary for the resolution of a major
foreign-policy dispute with another country and if Congress acquiesces in the
president’s action.
Facts
On November 4, 1979, the Iranian hostage crisis began when the American Embassy
in Tehran, Iran was seized. In response, President Carter, acting pursuant to the
International
Emergency
Economic
Powers
Act
(IEEPA),
declared
a
national
emergency and issued an executive order that froze all Iranian assets in the United
States. Carter's administration also ordered that lawsuits against Iranian interests in
U.S.
courts
could
not
proceed
without
the
administration's
approval.
The
administration granted a license for lawsuits against Iranian interests, which allowed
prejudgment attachment of property but not final judgments. Pursuant to that license,
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Dames & Moore (plaintiff) sued Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) for failing
to pay Dames & Moore for work it had done on an Iranian nuclear-power plant.
On
January 20, 1981, the American hostages in Iran were released pursuant to an
agreement reached between the United States and Iran. The agreement stated that the
U.S. government would seek to end all pending litigation against Iran by referring
cases to an Iran-United States claims tribunal that was established to facilitate
settlements.
President Reagan subsequently issued an executive order requiring the
transfer of all pending cases to the tribunal and ordering the transfer of Iranian assets
to the Federal Reserve Bank to be controlled by the U.S. Treasury for settlement
purposes. After the issuance of the executive order
, the district court stayed a final
judgment in Dames & Moore's favor in its action against the AEO. On April 28, 1981,
Dames & Moore sued U.S. Government officials including the Secretary of the
Treasury (defendant), seeking to prevent enforcement of the president's executive
order and Treasury Department regulations implementing the new agreement with
Iran.
The district court dismissed the action, and the United States Supreme Court
granted Dames & Moore's petition to review the case.
Issue
Does the President of the United States have the authority to settle judicial claims
through an executive order as part of a resolution of a major foreign-policy dispute
with another country?
Holding and Reasoning (Rehnquist, J.)
Yes. The United States, along with other countries, has historically exercised its right
to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign governments for the purpose of
keeping
peace
with
those
governments.
Although
international
treaties
often
accomplish these actions, the president historically used executive orders, without the
consent of the Senate, to settle claims. For example, since 1952, the president has
entered into at least 10 binding settlement agreements with foreign nations. Congress
has implicitly approved this practice through its history of acquiescence and its
enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (ICSA). The ICSA
provides for a tribunal to handle settlements between United States citizens and the
government of Yugoslavia. Congress has frequently amended the ICSA to address
particular
problems
stemming
from
settlement
agreements
with
other
nations,
evidencing
Congress’s
continued
approval
of
the
president’s
claim-settlement
authority. This holding is narrow and does not mean that the president has plenary
power to settle all claims. The president has authority to settle such claims if, as here,
settlement is necessary to resolve a major foreign-policy dispute and Congress
acquiesces in the president’s action. The district court's judgment is affirmed.
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ZIVOTOFSKY EX REL. ZIVOTOFSKY v. KERRY
Rule of Law
Article II of the Constitution grants the U.S. president the exclusive authority to
formally recognize a foreign sovereign through executive power that Congress may
not contradict via statute.
Facts
Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky (plaintiff) was born to United States citizens living
in Jerusalem. Zivotofsky’s mother requested a passport and report of birth abroad for
her son, listing his place of birth as Jerusalem, Israel.
The request was denied pursuant
to a State Department policy put forth by the U.S. president, which provided that a
passport could only list Jerusalem as the place of birth. Zivotofsky filed suit in federal
district court against Secretary of State John Kerry (defendant), claiming that § 214(d)
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Act), 116 Stat. 1350,
permitted citizens born in Jerusalem to list their place of birth as Israel.
The district
court dismissed the action, reasoning that the action presented a nonjusticiable
political question and that Zivotofsky lacked standing. Zivotofsky appealed. The court
of appeals affirmed the political-question determination, but reversed on the standing
issue. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the matter to the court of appeals to determine whether
Zivotofsky’s interpretation of § 214(d) was correct and whether the statute was
constitutional, rather than whether Jerusalem was in fact part of Israel. On remand, the
court of appeals held that the statute was unconstitutional, concluding that the
president exclusively held the power to recognize a foreign sovereign and that § 214(d)
directly contradicted this constitutional authority.
The Court again granted certiorari.
Issue
Does Article II of the Constitution grant the U.S. president the exclusive authority to
formally recognize a foreign sovereign through executive power that Congress may
not contradict via statute?
Holding and Reasoning (Kennedy, J.)
Yes. Article II of the Constitution grants the U.S. president the exclusive authority to
formally recognize a foreign sovereign, which is an executive power that Congress
may not contradict via statute.
A recognition is a formal acknowledgment that a
particular entity possesses the qualifications for statehood or that a particular foreign
regime is the government of a state. Status as a recognized sovereign confers many
benefits. Recognized sovereigns may sue in federal court and benefit from sovereign
immunity when they are sued. However, the term “recognition” appears nowhere in
the Constitution. In this case, Secretary Kerry argues that the president may exercise
this recognition power based on the Reception Clause, Art. II, § 3, which directs that
the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.” Pursuant to this
authority, Congress has historically deferred to the president in matters such as
making treaties with foreign entities, entering into diplomatic relations with a foreign
sovereign, and sending ambassadors abroad. The Constitution thus assigns the
president the authority to effect recognition on his own initiative. Congress, by
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contrast, has no similar constitutional power that would enable it to initiate diplomatic
relations with a foreign nation. Congress is not without constitutional authority with
respect to foreign nations, as Congress may regulate commerce, establish a uniform
Rule of Naturalization, and declare war. However, Congress may not contradict the
president’s exclusive authority to recognize the legitimacy of foreign states and
governments, including their territorial boundaries. Thus, Congress cannot require the
president, via § 214(d), to contradict his own statement regarding a determination in
an official document issued by the secretary of state. Therefore, Zivotofsky may only
list Jerusalem as his place of birth. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Dissent (Scalia, J.)
Section 214(d) does not require the secretary of state to make a formal declaration
about Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem. Making a notation with respect to a
citizen’s place of birth in a passport does not encumber the United States with any
international obligations. Instead, the statute merely requires passports to list Israel as
the place of birth when requested by an individual.
Dissent (Roberts, C.J.)
Section 214(d) does not contradict the president’s recognition authority. Rather, the
statute simply gives an American citizen born in Jerusalem the option to designate his
or her place of birth as Israel for purposes of a passport.
United States v. Nixon
Facts
: President Nixon (defendant) was named as a co-conspirator in various charges
including conspiracy to defraud the United States. The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia subpoenaed various tapes and documents relating to
specific meetings in which Nixon was a participant. Nixon filed a formal claim of
privilege and a motion to quash the subpoenas. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia denied the motion. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
Issue
May the President of the United States assert an absolute claim of privilege over all
confidential communications?
Holding and Reasoning (Burger, C.J.)
No. Although there is a presumptive presidential privilege for his confidential
communications, when the communications do not concern military, diplomatic, or
sensitive national security secrets, that presumption may be rebutted due to the
constitutional need to produce all relevant evidence in a criminal case. Thus there is
no absolute, unqualified presidential privilege. Separate powers were not meant to
operate with absolute independence. (BALANCE)A generalized claim of presidential
privilege based on a claim of public interest in
confidentiality
does not overcome the
interest in producing all relevant evidence consistent with the fair administration of
justice. President Nixon does not base his claim of privilege on military, diplomatic,
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or sensitive national security secrets. The President’s claim is of a generalized
presidential privilege of confidentiality. Such a claim cannot be upheld in a criminal
proceeding
as
the
interests
of
justice
outweigh
Nixon’s
general
need
for
confidentiality. As a result, the order of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia denying Nixon’s motion to quash the subpoena is affirmed.
Trump v. Vance
Rule of Law
Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not categorically prevent subpoenaing a
sitting president’s records or require a heightened showing of need.
Facts
During an ongoing grand-jury investigation, the New York County District Attorney’s
Office (defendant) issued a subpoena duces tecum directing the personal accounting
firm (defendant) of President Trump (plaintiff) to produce Trump’s tax returns and
related records. Trump sued his accounting firm and the prosecutor in federal court to
block the subpoena, arguing that a sitting president is absolutely immune from
criminal prosecution under Article II and the Supremacy Clause.
The federal court
held that Trump was not entitled to injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed that
presidential immunity did not bar the subpoena and that no heightened standard of
need applied. Trump appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue
Do Article II and the Supremacy Clause categorically prevent subpoenaing a sitting
president’s records or require a heightened showing of need?
Holding and Reasoning (Roberts, C.J.)
No. Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not categorically prevent subpoenaing a
sitting president’s records or require a heightened showing of need. In accordance
with the ancient maxim “the public has a right to every man’s evidence,” the Sixth
Amendment guarantees an accused compulsory process to obtain witnesses to prepare
a defense.
1.
No U.S. president has successfully avoided a subpoena on executive-immunity
grounds. In 1807 Chief Justice Marshall ruled that President Jefferson was not
immune from subpoena in Aaron Burr’s treason trial. Marshall also ruled that the
subpoena power reached papers in the president’s possession unless particular
executive
communications
should
be
withheld.
Over
the
next
200
years,
presidents from Monroe to Clinton accepted that ruling and uniformly testified
when called in criminal proceedings. In 1974 President Nixon tried to suppress
Oval
Office
recordings,
claiming
absolute
immunity
for
presidential
communications. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, reasoning that both
sides in the case needed compulsory process and that a general assertion of
executive privilege must yield to a demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
criminal trial.
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2.
Here, Trump counters that all those cases involved federal trials, and that the
Supremacy Clause makes him immune from state prosecutions that might divert,
stigmatize, or harass him and impair his performance of Article II functions. The
solicitor general argues that a subpoena for a sitting president’s personal records
must at least meet a heightened showing of need. But 200 years of precedent
establishes that presidents can comply with a subpoena without this action
interfering with their vital functions. The Nixon court rejected the argument that
distraction or preoccupation from official duties warranted quashing a subpoena.
A properly tailored subpoena need not keep a president from performing his office.
Fulfilling a citizen’s duty to provide relevant information in a criminal trial is not
necessarily stigmatizing, and the grand jury is sworn to secrecy. An investigation
of the president himself might be more stigmatizing, but the Constitution permits
such investigations. The rules also already prevent using subpoenas to harass,
manipulate, interfere with, or retaliate against someone in the performance of
official duties.
3.
Finally, no heightened need is required for three reasons. First, with respect to
private papers, a president stands in nearly the same situation as anyone else.
Second, nothing shows heightened protection is necessary to fulfilling executive
functions. Third, the public interest in enforcing the laws favors open access to
evidence. The president may still challenge a particular subpoena based on its
breadth, improper motive, or interference with his duties, but Article II and the
Supremacy
Clause
do
not
afford
the
president
categorical
immunity
from
subpoena or require heightened need. Affirmed and remanded.
Dissent (Alito, J.)
The court correctly concludes that a president has no absolute immunity from a
subpoena in a state criminal prosecution and remands to the trial court, where Trump
may raise any appropriate constitutional or legal concerns with the subpoena itself.
However, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), set a longstanding precedent
that requires a prosecutor to establish a “demonstrated, specific need” for information
from the president. That standard ensures a need that justifies interfering with a
president in the performance of Article II functions. The court should not treat this
subpoena like any ordinary subpoena and relegate the president to ordinary defenses.
The presidency warrants greater protection. The prosecutor should at least be required
to generally describe the offenses under investigation, how the records subpoenaed
relate to those offenses, and why producing the records is important generally and
specifically while the president remains in office. No state prosecutor has ever
subpoenaed a sitting president’s records. If the presidency is not protected, the
country’s 2,300-plus local prosecutors could seriously impede the functioning of the
executive, which is vital to the nation’s safety and well-being. [Ed.’s note: The
casebook excerpt omits a concurrence by Justice Kavanaugh and a dissent by Justice
Thomas.]
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Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983)
Rule
: Legislation providing Congress with a one-house veto over an action of the
executive branch is unconstitutional because it does not meet the constitutional
requirements of presentment and bicameralism.
规定国会对行政部门的行动拥有一
院否决权的立法是违宪的,因为它不符合宪法规定的预审和两院制要求。
Facts
: Congress passed § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
authorizing
one
house
of
Congress,
by
resolution,
to
invalidate
an
executive
determination that allowed a deportable person to remain in the United States. Jagdish
Rai Chadha (plaintiff), a Kenyan citizen, lawfully came to the United States on a
student
visa,
but
he
remained
after
the
visa
expired.
The
Immigration
and
Naturalization Service (INS) (defendant) ordered Chadha to show cause why he
should not be deported. Chadha applied for a suspension of deportation. After a
deportation hearing, an immigration judge suspended Chadha's deportation under §
244(a)(1) of the INA, which allows the Attorney General to exercise his discretion to
suspend a deportation. The suspension was reported to Congress pursuant to §
244(a)(1). However, after considering 340 cases, the House of Representatives passed
a resolution vetoing Chadha's suspension and the suspension of five other individuals
pursuant to § 244(c)(2). The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceeding
and eventually ordered that Chadha be deported. Although Chadha argued that §
244(c)(2) was unconstitutional, the immigration judge concluded that he did not have
the power to rule on the statute's constitutionality. Chadha appealed the decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his action and also held that it
had no power to rule that the statute was unconstitutional. Chadha then petitioned the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the deportation
order. In the Ninth Circuit, the INS agreed with Chadha that § 244(c)(2) was
unconstitutional.
The
Ninth
Circuit
directed
both
the
United
States
House
of
Representatives and Senate to submit
amicus curiae
briefs on the issue. The Ninth
Circuit ultimately ruled in Chadha's favor and held that Congress could not overturn
the decision of the Attorney General, and the court ordered the Attorney General to
stop the deportation process. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
: Is legislation providing Congress with a one-house veto over an action of the
executive branch unconstitutional?
Holding and Reasoning (Burger, C.J.) (formalism)
Yes. Legislation providing Congress with a one-house veto over an action of the
executive branch is unconstitutional because it does not meet the constitutional
requirements of presentment and bicameralism. Article I of the Constitution requires
that all legislation be presented to the president before becoming law. The Framers
carefully crafted this requirement into the Constitution. Additionally, the Framers
required bicameralism in the enactment of any law,
i.e.
, a law could not be passed
without gaining support from a majority of both houses. The Great Compromise
established this provision, requiring the approval of both houses to accommodate
representation concerns by smaller states. The requirements of presentment and
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bicameralism under Article I do not apply to every action taken by either house of
Congress; rather, they apply only to an exercise of legislative power. To be an
exercise of legislative power, an action must be legislative in its purpose and effect. In
this case, § 244(c)(2) is legislative in purpose and effect because it altered the legal
rights, duties and relations of people, including the Attorney General, executive
branch officials, and Chadha. This extensive type of action is historically only
permitted by a legislative act of Congress. Moreover, the Constitution includes
specific enumerated instances granting one house of Congress the unilateral power to
act, such as the power of the House of Representatives to initiate impeachment
proceedings and the power of the Senate to ratify treaties and approve or disapprove
of presidential appointments. Section 244(c)(2) is not included in one of these express
authorizations of unilateral power, and Congressional power in this area cannot be
implied. Accordingly, § 244(c)(2) of the INA is unconstitutional and is severable from
the remainder of the statute. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Concurrence (Powell, J.)
The House of Representatives acted inappropriately in determining that Chadha and
the other five individuals do not meet the statutory criteria for continued residence in
the United States. These types of determinations are typically left to other branches of
government. Allowing the House to assume this role would create a state of
unchecked power for Congress—a system of governmental tyranny the Framers
sought to avoid. Congress exceeded its prescribed authority under the Constitution.
Dissent (Rehnquist, J.)
Section 244(c)(2) of the INA is not severable. Severing the provision would allow for
the Attorney General to suspend deportations in cases in which Congress never stated
that suspension is appropriate. The INA should not be expanded without a clear
indication that Congress intended for its expansion. The legislative history of the INA
demonstrates that Congress has consistently rejected the executive branch's requests
for complete discretion to suspend deportation and that Congress has repeatedly
insisted on retaining control over the suspension process either through concurrent
resolutions or the one-house veto.
Dissent (White, J.)
(functionalism
)
The majority’s decision has far-reaching implications for over 200 other statutory
provisions in which
Congress reserves the power of a “legislative veto.”
The
judiciary cannot prohibit legislative vetoes, because they are necessary tools in the
passage of legislation in a modern government. Additionally, the absence of a
constitutional provision providing for a legislative veto should not be dispositive, as
precedent decisions have frequently interpreted the Constitution as being flexible in
addressing modern circumstances. Congress already has legislative veto power over
presidential actions; allowing them to exercise it in this way is not unconstitutional.
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The Constitution does permit Congress to delegate legislative power to the executive
without fulfilling presentment and bicameralism concerns. These elements of the
Constitution need not always be met in all legislative actions. A legislative veto is a
constitutionally acceptable manner for Congress to override a decision made by the
executive branch.
Morrison v. Olson
487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988)
Rule of Law
A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer (an
independent counsel) and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing the officer
without good cause does not violate separation-of-powers principles.
Facts
Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (the Act). Title VI of the Act
permitted a court called the Special Division to appoint an independent counsel to
investigate and prosecute certain high-ranking government officials for violations of
federal criminal laws upon request by the Attorney General. The independent counsel
could terminate the position when the investigation and/or prosecution was complete.
Additionally,
the
Act
gave
the
Attorney
General
sole
removal
power
of
an
independent
counsel
“for
good
cause.”
Independent
Counsel
Alexia
Morrison
(plaintiff)
was
appointed
to
investigate
possible
obstruction
of
congressional
investigations by Department of Justice officials (defendants), including allegations of
misconduct
and
providing
false
or
misleading
testimony
to
a
congressional
subcommittee by Solicitor General Ted Olson (defendant). When Morrison requested
that the federal court issue subpoenas requiring production of withheld Environmental
Protection
Agency
documents,
Olson
moved
to
quash,
claiming
the
Act’s
independent-counsel provision was unconstitutional. Olson argued that the Act
violated separation-of-powers principles. The district court denied the motion to
quash, declared the Act constitutional, and held Olson in contempt for not complying
with the subpoenas. A divided court of appeals reversed, holding that an independent
counsel is a principal officer, rather than inferior officer, and thus the Act violated the
Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution. Morrison appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
Issue
Does a law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive
officer (an independent counsel) and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing
the officer without good cause violate separation-of-powers principles?
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Holding and Reasoning (Rehnquist, C.J.)-functionalism
No. A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer
(an independent counsel) and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing the
officer without good cause does not violate separation-of-powers principles. The
Constitution divides federal officers into “principal” and “inferior” officers. The
Appointments Clause requires principal officers to be appointed by the President and
approved by the Senate, but allows inferior officers to be appointed by the President,
department heads, or the judiciary. There is not a precise line separating principal and
inferior officers, but some factors
affecting an officer's characterization include
whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher department official and whether
the scope of the officer's duties and jurisdiction is limited. In this case, the
independent counsel is an inferior officer. First, the independent counsel is subject to
removal by a higher executive officer, the Attorney General. Second, the independent
counsel’s powers are limited to investigation and prosecution, which do not impact
executive policy. In addition, the independent counsel has limited jurisdiction and
tenure. Thus, Congress may authorize the interbranch appointment of independent
counsels by the judiciary, as permitted by the Excepting Clause of the Constitution.
The functions of the Special Division authorized by the Act are permissible under
Article III, though the Division has exceeded these functions in the past. Next, the Act
is consistent with separation-of-powers principles. Congress vested appointment
power in the judiciary and removal authority in the Attorney General; thus, Congress
did not usurp executive authority for itself. Further, limiting presidential authority to
remove officials without cause has been upheld in the past.
Humphrey’s Executor v.
U.S.
, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The good-cause requirement is not a burden on the
president's
ability,
through
the Attorney
General,
to
execute his constitutional
authority. This is because the president’s need to fully control these types of inferior
officers is not central to the functioning of the executive branch. The branches of
government are separate but interdependent, and the Act does not violate the
separation of powers by usurping executive authority or upsetting the balance of
power between the branches. Accordingly, the act is constitutional, and the decision
of the court of appeals is reversed.
Dissent (Scalia, J.)
Article II of the Constitution specifically states that “
all” (not some) executive
powers of the United States shall be vested in the president
, just as “all” legislative
power is vested in Congress, and “all” judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court.
The Court impermissibly replaces this bright line rule with an imprecise balancing test
for determining the appropriate distribution of power within the executive. The
principle of a unified executive is essential in preserving the concept of separation of
powers. The Act divests the president of substantial control over the prosecutorial
functions of the independent counsel and upsets the balance of power among the
branches of government. Further, the characterization of the independent counsel as
an inferior officer is wrong; the term “inferior” at the time of the Constitutional
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Convention meant subordinate, and the independent counsel is subordinate to no one.
Accordingly, the Act’s delegation of appointment power to the judiciary violates the
Appointments Clause.
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)
347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Rule of Law
Separate educational facilities based on racial classifications are inherently unequal and
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts
The present case represented a consolidation of cases from Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Delaware. In each state, African American minors sought the aid of their
state courts in gaining admission to public schools on a non-segregated basis. In all
instances, Brown and other minor African American children (plaintiffs) had been denied
admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting
segregation according to race. They alleged that this segregation deprived them of Equal
Protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1951, Brown first filed suit
against the Board of Education for Topeka, Kansas (defendant) in federal district court.
The district court ruled in favor of the Board of Education, citing
Plessy v. Ferguson
, 163
U.S. 507 (1896), as guidance. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
Whether the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other tangible factors are equal, deprives the children of
the minority group of educational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Holding and Reasoning (Warren, C.J.)
Yes. In deciding the issue it is not possible to rely on the original intent surrounding
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment because prior cases and the legislative history
involved in its enactment are inconclusive as to the true extent of its meaning. Additionally,
it is not helpful to look at the status of public education at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, as most Caucasian children were then educated by private
schools, and most African American children were not educated at all. Very few public
schools existed at the time, which adds to the difficulty in determining the historical
intentions surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s effect on public education. An
examination of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself is utilized to determine the
intent behind the Amendment’s application to public education. The basic language of the
Amendment suggests that it was passed to prohibit all forms of discriminatory legislation
against African Americans. In the present case, all basic attributes of the Caucasian and
African American schools are essentially the same. To determine whether the segregated
schools violate the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted,
it is necessary to examine the
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actual effect of this segregation on the institution of public education as a whole.
Public education has, over the years, become one of the most valued and important public
services performed by state and local governments. Children can hardly be expected to
succeed in life if they are not educated. Thus, when an opportunity for education exists and
the state has undertaken to provide it, that opportunity must then be made available to all
students on equal terms. In the present case, the opportunity for education is not equally
provided to minority students, as the existence of segregation has a profound and
detrimental effect on their hearts and minds. Modern studies confirm that the children
experiencing segregation feel inferior, become less motivated, and perform at a lower
standard
than
children
that
do
not
experience
segregation.
To
the
extent
to
which
Plessy
held to the contrary regarding the psychological effects of segregation, it is
hereby overturned. The African American students are deprived of equal protection of the
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment because of the segregation in their public education.
The decision of the district court is reversed.
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II)
349 U.S. 249, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083 (1955)
Rule of Law
Adequate compliance with the Court’s previous holding that racial discrimination in public
education is unconstitutional requires public schools to desegregate “with all deliberate
speed.”
Facts
In its original decision in Brown v. Board of Education (I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the
United States Supreme Court held that racial discrimination in public education was
unconstitutional. The Court upheld a challenge by Brown (plaintiff) to discriminatory
racial policies in public schools operated by various boards of education (defendant) in
several different states. However, in deciding the original case, the Court left open the
question of the appropriate remedy for plaintiffs based on its holding. In the present case,
the Court heard arguments from public schools requesting relief concerning the task of
desegregation. The Court sought to further explain the specific requirements imposed on
public schools in its previous holding that all schools must desegregate.
Issue
Must public schools desegregate “with all deliberate speed” in order to comply with the
Court’s previous holding that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional?
Holding and Reasoning (Warren, C.J.)
Yes. Since the original decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) one
year ago, public schools have taken substantial steps towards fully desegregating.
Individual school officials are responsible for implementing constitutional principles
in good faith, but the various district courts that originally heard the cases against all
schools involved in Brown are best equipped to determine whether a good faith effort
is being made.
The case is remanded to those courts. In rendering decisions on the cases,
each respective district court is guided by principles of equity. The courts are responsible
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for furthering the interest of plaintiffs in gaining admission to public schools as soon as
possible on a nondiscriminatory basis. The ultimate date of compliance by schools with
this interest is up to the discretion of individual courts, which should require schools to
desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” Ultimately, the continuing responsibility of
monitoring compliance with the Court’s 1954 ruling is left to the district courts.
Korematsu v. United States
Rule of Law
State laws restricting the rights of persons based on race are subject to strict scrutiny
and will only be upheld if they further a “pressing public necessity.”
Facts
On May 9, 1942 under Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, based on Executive Order
9066, Japanese-Americans were ordered to move to relocation camps in light of the
United States’ involvement in World War II. Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34
specifically excluded Japanese Americans from remaining in San Leandro, California,
a region designated as a “Military Area.” Korematsu (defendant) was an American
citizen of Japanese descent who was convicted by the United States Government
(plaintiff), in federal district court for violating Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34. No
questions were raised as to Korematsu’s loyalty to the United States. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
Issue
Whether Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, an Executive Order requiring Japanese
Americans to relocate to internment camps during World War II, was constitutional.
Holding and Reasoning (Black, J.)
Yes. Although all legal restrictions which restrict the civil rights of a single racial
group are automatically suspect, it does not follow that all such restrictions are
automatically unconstitutional.
Such restrictions are subject to rigid scrutiny by
the courts, and will only be upheld in instances of a “pressing public necessity.
”
A comparison is made of the present case to a prior decision in
Hirabayashi v.
United States
, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), that upheld a conviction for the violation of a
curfew order by a Japanese American during World War II. It was determined
in Hirabayashi that the order was designed as a “protection against espionage and
against sabotage.” Applying Hirabayashi to the present case, it is within the power of
Congress and the executive branch to exclude Japanese Americans from the West
Coast war area during World War II when the United States is in conflict with Japan.
Like the curfew order, the same concerns over preventing espionage and sabotage
constitute a sufficient “pressing public necessity” to justify excluding Japanese
Americans from their homes in particular areas during the war effort. It does not
matter that many Japanese Americans remain loyal to the United States because the
military has determined that many others retain loyalties to the Japanese government.
The United States Government
does not have the resources to make individualized
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determinations of loyalty during the war effort
, therefore exclusion of Korematsu
from the West Coast, regardless of his personal loyalties, is justified because of the
existence of a “pressing public necessity.” The decision of the court of appeals is
affirmed.
Concurrence (Frankfurter, J.)
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 clearly makes it a crime for Korematsu to remain in
the Military Area during World War II. Both Congress and the executive act
constitutionally in passing the Order based on the powers given to the government
under the Constitution to “wage war successfully.” The constitutionality of the
particular Civilian Exclusion Order should be judged within the context of the war in
which it is enacted. The power to enact exclusionary measures such are justified if the
circumstances of war necessitate it, as they are in this case.
Dissent (Roberts, J.)
The undisputed facts exhibit a clear violation of Korematsu’s constitutional rights.
The total exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast for the duration of
the war is a far more significant violation of their rights than the curfew provision at
issue in Hirabayashi. In the present case, Korematsu was convicted because he
refused to submit to imprisonment in an internment camp by the government despite a
lack of inquiry into his loyalty to the United States. Additional Executive Orders were
issued that severely restricted the travel of Japanese Americans, and thus Korematsu
found himself in a predicament where he was faced with violating the travel
restrictions or being imprisoned because he unlawfully remained in his home in
violation of the Civilian Exclusion Order. The existence of two laws with which equal
compliance is impossible effectively deprives Korematsu of his due process rights
under the Constitution because it makes him a criminal regardless of what action he
chooses. The Civilian Exclusion Order should have been found unconstitutional.
Dissent (Murphy, J.)
Congress and the executive exercised unconstitutional authority, and the Civilian
Exclusion Order itself is motivated by racism.
The military is justified in making
these types of decisions, but power to do so is limited by the judicial process
which determines the reasonableness of its actions when they conflict with other
important liberty interests.
The majority should have only looked to whether the
exclusion of Japanese Americans from their homes
“reasonably related”
to the
United States’ interest in preventing espionage and sabotage. Applying this standard,
the exclusion of all Japanese people as a whole from their homes on the West Coast is
not reasonably related to preventing these dangers. To conclude that the exclusionary
provision is related to espionage and sabotage is to justify the Civilian Exclusion
Order on racist grounds and assert that Japanese Americans as a class are more likely
to commit these crimes than other racial groups. Even if some Japanese Americans
are more likely to commit such acts, this is not a sufficient reason to adopt a racist
exclusionary measure which affects all Japanese Americans as a group.
Dissent (Jackson, J.)
The authority of the military to enact provisions like the Civilian Exclusion Order is
not unlimited. Whenever the military decides to act in this way to protect its security
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interests in a war area, the need for protection based on the situation on the ground is
likely very
grave
. However, even in light of these pressing circumstances, the
military’s actions are constrained by the Constitution. The judiciary is ill-equipped to
evaluate the reasonableness of military decisions, however, it should not acquiesce
默
许
to
the
decisions
of
military
superiors
when
these
decisions
are
clearly
unconstitutional.
The
Civilian
Exclusion
Order
in
the
present
case
is
clearly
unconstitutional.
Loving v. Virginia
Rule of Law
A state may not restrict marriages between persons solely on the basis of race under
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts
In June 1958, Mildred Jeter, an African American woman, and Richard Loving, a
Caucasian man (defendants), were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its
laws. They later moved to Virginia (plaintiff) and resided in Caroline County. The
laws of Virginia, however, banned interracial marriages within the state. In October
1958, the Lovings were indicted for violating the Virginia law. They plead guilty and
were sentenced to one year in jail, but the trial court suspended the sentence for
twenty-five years on the condition that the Lovings would leave Virginia and not
return to the state together for twenty-five years. The Lovings then moved to the
District of Columbia, but filed suit in state trial court to vacate the judgment against
them on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment.
The
Supreme
Court
of
Appeals
affirmed
the
constitutionality of the Virginia statutes and upheld the convictions. The Lovings
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue
May a state enact a statute that prevents marriages between persons solely on the basis
of racial classification without violating the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding and Reasoning (Warren, C.J.)
No. State bans on interracial marriages were passed as a reaction to slavery and have
been present since the colonial period. Such bans were affirmed by the Racial
Integrity Act of 1924, passed during a period of extreme nativism following World
War I. However, in the fifteen years preceding the Lovings' case, fourteen states had
repealed their own similar bans on interracial marriage. In the present case, the
Commonwealth of Virginia seeks to uphold its interracial marriage ban on the
grounds that
it furthers a legitimate state purpose of preserving racial integrity
and preserving racial pride.
Virginia also argues that
the regulation of marriage
has traditionally been left to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
Finally,
Virginia argues that
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause suggested that it
is only obligated to apply its laws equally among different groups of people.
Thus,
it argues that it is complying with its obligation by preventing interracial marriage for
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all people, not just Caucasians. The argument that the mere equal application of a law
is enough to overcome the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on invidious racial
discrimination is rejected. Virginia’s statute is motivated solely to restrict marriage
based on race, and by precedent, such laws have been found to be a threat to equality.
At the very least such race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and
cannot be upheld unless they are shown to accomplish a permissible state objective
independent of the racial discrimination. In the present case, there is no legitimate
overriding
purpose independent
of invidious racial
discrimination
that justifies
Virginia’s classification. The Virginia statutes violate the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judgment of the court of
appeals is reversed.
Concurrence (Stewart, J.)
As expressed in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), and restated here, “it is
simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the
criminality of an act depend on the race of the actor.”
Washington v. Davis
Rule of Law
A state-sponsored racial classification violates the equal protection provisions in the
Fifth
Amendment’s
Due Process
Clause only if
it is
shown
to
have
both a
disproportionate impact on a particular race and is motivated by invidious racial
discrimination.
Facts
Davis (plaintiff) was an African American man who, along with another African
American man, applied for admission to the Washington, D.C. police department.
Both men were turned down and brought suit in federal district court against
Washington (defendant), the mayor of Washington, D.C., alleging that the police
department used racially discriminatory hiring practices by administering
a verbal
skills test
(Test 21) disproportionately failed by African Americans. The district court
held for Washington, but the court of appeals reversed on the grounds that Test 21
was unconstitutional because of its disproportionate impact on African Americans,
regardless
of whether
the police department’s motive was
to
use the test
to
discriminate against a particular race. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
Issue
Whether the test used by the Washington, D.C. police department to screen new
employees violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Holding and Reasoning (White, J.)
No. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to prevent official conduct that
discriminates on the basis of race. However, the Court has never adopted a rule which
invalidates official conduct that merely has a disproportionate impact on a particular
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racial group
without evidence of a discriminatory purpose
. A discriminatory
purpose can be inferred from the totality of the facts, including the fact that
a law
burdens one race more heavily than another.
However, the mere instance of a
disproportionate impact does not, without more, trigger strict scrutiny by the courts.
Applying these principles to the present case, the administration of Test 21 by the
Washington, D.C. police department does not, by itself, indicate a discriminatory
purpose. The test itself is neutral on its face and was administered to all applicants to
ascertain whether they had reached a particular level of verbal skill necessary
for becoming a successful police officer
. African Americans that failed the test
cannot assert a violation of their right to equal protection of the laws any more than
Caucasian applicants that also failed the test. Under Title VII, when challenging
hiring and promotion practices that disqualify substantially disproportionate numbers
of blacks, a discriminatory purpose need not be proved. Under Title VII, government
actors are required to demonstrate that their hiring practices are not discriminatory
based on
a strict scrutiny standard of review
. However, this heightened standard of
review is
not necessary in applying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
present case
as there is no indication that the Washington, D.C. police department
acted with a discriminatory purpose in administering Test 21. Thus Washington, D.C.
did not act unconstitutionally in its hiring practices. The judgment of the court of
appeals is reversed.
Concurrence (Stevens, J.)
The line between a disproportionate impact and discriminatory purpose is not always
as bright as the majority suggests. In some cases, for example, the disproportionate
impact on a racial group can be so severe as to constitute a prima facie case of a
discriminatory purpose.
Dissent (Brennan, J.)
At a minimum, Washington should be required to prove that Test 21 bears a direct
relationship to measuring job-related skills or predicting job performance. Not
requiring this proof risks the possibility that applicants with generally good verbal
skills will pass the test more often than others, regardless of whether they actually
possess sufficient job-related skills. A higher level of scrutiny should have been
applied to Washington’s hiring practices in this case.
Grutter v. Bollinger
Rule of Law
Consideration of race as a factor in admissions by a state law school does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment because supporting student body diversity is a compelling
state interest; however, the school must demonstrate it previously made a serious,
good
faith
consideration
of
workable,
race-neutral
alternatives
to
achieve
the
sought-after racial diversity.
Facts
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The University of Michigan Law School followed an unofficial policy that sought to
achieve student body diversity by giving substantial weight to the race of each
applicant in making admissions decisions, in addition to its consideration of other
academic and non-academic variables. Barbara Grutter (plaintiff) was a Caucasian
Michigan resident who applied to the Law School with a 3.8 grade point average and
161 LSAT score. The Law School rejected her application, and she filed suit in
federal district court against Bollinger, the university president, and other university
officials (defendants) alleging her denial of admission was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the Law
School’s use of race in its admissions policy was unlawful, but the court of appeals
reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
May a school use race as a factor in student admissions without violating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding and Reasoning (O’Connor, J.)
Yes. The Court previously addressed the use of race as a consideration in higher
education admissions in its decision in
University Regents v. Bakke
, 438 U.S. 235
(1978). In Bakke, the Court was unable to reach a majority on the question of whether
it was unconstitutional to consider race as an important factor in admissions for the
purpose of remedying past discrimination against minorities.
Student body diversity
is a compelling state interest that justifies the use of race in university admissions.
The proper standard for reviewing this issue is strict scrutiny. In determining that the
Law School’s policy passed strict scrutiny, a certain amount of deference is given to
the Law School’s admissions department in their determination that diversity is
essential to its educational mission. The Law School cites significant benefits as
reasons for its policy, including the promotion of cross-racial understanding, the
breaking down of racial stereotypes, and the enabling of students to better understand
persons of different races. Any one of these benefits constitutes a compelling state
interest for strict scrutiny. Additionally, the Law School uses narrowly-tailored means
to accomplish its purpose because it does not employ a quota system as outlawed
in Bakke to achieve diversity. The Law School provides an individual, holistic review
of each of its applicants and reasons that alternative methods of achieving the Law
School’s purpose risk sacrificing both academic excellence and other types of
diversity in the school. However,
the Law School should cease racial consideration
in its admissions policies after instances of past discrimination have been
sufficiently remedied.
The admissions policy does
not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Concurrence (Ginsburg, J.)
The majority’s conclusion is correct, but the majority should have required the Law
School to adopt sunset provisions, which would require the race considerations in the
Law School’s admissions policy to be phased out as racial discrimination ceases to be
a problem in the admission of minorities to higher education institutions.
Concurrence/Dissent (Scalia, J.)
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The educational benefits touted by the Law School’s admissions department provide
insufficient constitutional justification for their actions. The promotion of these
benefits merely constitutes a life lesson for students in good citizenship. The effect of
the majority’s holding would be to uphold any type of program that purports to teach
such values, even if it is discriminatory in some way and does not further a
compelling state interest. It is the correct result given the specific facts at issue. The
holding might be overly fact-specific and difficult to apply to future cases.
Concurrence/Dissent (Thomas, J.)
Frederick Douglass said that the government should leave African Americans alone
and that African Americans should be provided only with justice and the opportunity
to succeed, and they would do so. The Law School’s admissions policy is
inherently
elitist
and
not effective in remedying the past effects of discrimination of
minorities.
Additionally, the majority
determines incorrectly that the admissions
policy is necessary for furthering a compelling state interest.
There is no pressing
public necessity to maintain a public law school. Michigan is already served by
several private law schools, and some states operate without even one public law
school within their borders. The Law School enacted the policy to serve its own elitist
goals. The Law School’s policy should be invalidated, and the judgment of the court
of appeals affirmed.
Dissent (Rehnquist, C.J.)
The admissions policy is a glorified system of employing racial balancing or racial
quotas in higher education. Minorities are admitted in relatively precise ratios,
suggesting that the Law School’s admissions department makes deliberate balancing
efforts to create a certain racial composition within the student body. This constitutes
the exact type of behavior outlawed by the Court in Bakke.
Dissent (Kennedy, J.)
The majority did not properly apply strict scrutiny. The majority should not have been
so quick to accept the Law School’s statement that its policy furthers important
educational benefits, but should have instead conducted a more sweeping inquiry into
the constitutionality of the policy’s
actual effects.
The majority did not sufficiently
inquire into whether the Law School actually conducted an individual, holistic review
of each applicant for admission.
Craig v. Boren
p860
Rule of Law
A governmental regulation involving gender discrimination is constitutional if it is
substantially related to the achievement of an important government purpose.
Facts
An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of “non-intoxicating” 3.2 percent alcoholic
beer to males under the age of twenty-one,
but permitted the sale of such beer to
females over the age of eighteen
. Craig (plaintiff), a liquor vendor in Oklahoma,
brought suit against Boren (defendant), an Oklahoma state official, in federal district
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court on the grounds that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court upheld the statute, holding that statistical
evidence
regarding
young
men’s
drunk-driving
arrests
and
traffic
injuries
demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was substantially related to the
achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads. Craig appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether a statute that denies the sale of alcohol to individuals of the same age based
solely on gender violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Holding and Reasoning (Brennan, J.)
Yes.
The
appropriate
standard
of
review
for
governmental
gender-based
classifications is
intermediate scrutiny.
The classification must be
substantially
related to the achievement of an important government purpose.
Applying this
standard, Boren offers statistical evidence to show that the state regulations were
related to
traffic safety.
Even if the statistics are taken as accurate in showing the
propensity of both sexes to drive under the influence of alcohol, the statistics show
that 0.18 percent of females between ages eighteen and twenty were arrested for that
offense, while 2 percent of males in that age group were arrested for the same offense.
While the difference is statistically significant, it is not enough to justify a broad
categorical rule prohibiting the sale of alcohol to males, and not females, in this
age group.
Additionally, no statistics are offered regarding the use and relative
dangerousness of 3.2 percent alcoholic beer as compared to alcohol in general.
No
justification exists for enacting a gender-based law governing the sale of this
particular beer and not alcohol in general to males and females between ages
eighteen and twenty.
The gender-based discrimination contained in Oklahoma’s law
constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws to males between eighteen and
twenty. The judgment of the district court is reversed.
Concurrence (Powell, J.)
Gender-based classifications are subject to
strict,
not intermediate
scrutiny
, as
outlined in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Oklahoma did not meet its burden of
proof to withstand strict scrutiny.
Concurrence (Stevens, J.)
There is a need for
a third standard of review beyond strict scrutiny and rational
basis review.
On the merits, the statistics presented do not automatically point to the
conclusion that males are more likely to drive under the influence of alcohol than
females.
Dissent (Burger, C.J.)
Gender classifications should be analyzed under
rational basis review.
Even though
the majority does not agree with the means used by the Oklahoma legislature in
passing its statute (i.e. relying on statistical evidence), the majority cannot say that the
legislature acted irrationally in reaching its conclusion.
Dissent (Rehnquist, J.)
The majority is wrong to apply any more stringent scrutiny than
rational basis
for
gender classifications. The language of requiring sex-discriminating regulations to be
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“substantially related to an important government purpose” is not supported by the
Equal Protection Clause, case precedent, or any other constitutional provision. Any
form of strict scrutiny itself is not appropriate as state legislatures are entitled to great
deference in their judgments. The statute should be upheld and the judgment of the
district court affirmed.
United States v. Virginia
Rule of Law
All governmental gender classifications must be substantially related to an important
government purpose that can be demonstrated by the government if it offers an
exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification.
Facts
The Virginia Military
Institute (VMI)
was
the onl
y single-sex
public higher
education institution
in the State of Virginia. It functioned to train men for
leadership in civilian life and military service using an “adversative” method. VMI
refused to admit women. After an adverse court ruling that this policy of excluding
women violated the Equal Protection Clause,
VMI created an alternative program
for women known as the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL)
.
VWIL differed from VMI in its academic offerings, methods of education, and
financial resources.
Issue
Whether VMI’s policy of excluding women from admission denies women equal
protection of the laws, and, if so, whether the creation of an alternative school for
women is the proper remedy for this denial.
Holding and Reasoning (Ginsburg, J.)
Yes and no. The standard of review for any governmental gender classification is
intermediate
scrutiny.
This
standard
requires
the
government
to
provide
an
exceedingly persuasive justification
for policies that discriminate against women.
Inherent differences exist between men and women, but these differences can be used
only for purposes such as remedying the history of sex discrimination against women,
or promoting equal employment opportunities, not for denigration of the members of
either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity. Virginia has not
shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding all women from VMI’s
leadership training. Virginia argues that the existence of a single-sex school furthers
the important state purpose of maintaining a diversity of public education institutions.
This argument is rejected. VMI has never existed for the purpose of promoting
diversity, evidenced by its policy of excluding women. Virginia also argues that its
adversative method of training students provides educational benefits that cannot be
made available, unmodified, to women. There is no reason that Virginia’s stated goal
of training competent future leaders cannot be extended to include women. Without
further
proof,
Virginia
falls
short
of
establishing
the
“exceedingly
persuasive
justification” required for a sustainable gender-based classification. In addition, the
VWIL is different and substandard when compared to VMI on many levels. The
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creation of this school does not provide a meaningful educational alternative for
women seeking to attend VMI. Thus Virginia’s policy of excluding women from VMI
is unconstitutional.
Concurrence (Rehnquist, C.J.)
The majority’s addition of the requirement that the government offer an “exceedingly
persuasive
justification”
for
gender-based
classifications
injects
an
element
of
uncertainty
into
the
Court’s
long-standing
intermediate
scrutiny
test
requiring
governmental gender classifications to be substantially related to an important
government purpose. As new educational opportunities opened up for women,
Virginia had notice that the constitutionality of VMI’s exclusion policy would one
day be challenged. However, VMI responded appropriately by commissioning an
independent study that ultimately concluded VMI should not admit women, as this
would threaten the school’s integrity and processes. However, VWIL is not an
appropriate remedy because of its lack of equal opportunities for women.
Dissent (Scalia, J.)
The majority’s opinion effectively shuts down a long-standing and valuable public
education institution. The majority ignores
precedent, history, and tradition
in
holding that VMI must admit women. The majority completely ignores evidentiary
findings that inherent
physical differences
exist in men and women that justify
requiring them to attend separate schools.
Romer v. Evans p901, review 911
Rule of Law
A law prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for the gay, lesbian, and bisexual
community violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts
Several Colorado municipalities passed ordinances banning discrimination based on
sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health
and welfare services, and other transactions and activities. In response to these
ordinances,
Colorado
voters
passed
Amendment
2,
which
prohibited
all
governmental intervention
designed to protect the status of persons based on their
sexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships
. Evans (plaintiff) represented a
class of aggrieved homosexual persons and municipalities in Colorado and brought
suit in Colorado state court against Roy Romer (defendant), the Governor of Colorado,
on the grounds that
Amendment 2
was unconstitutional. The trial court enjoined
enforcement of Amendment 2. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
Does a law prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for the gay, lesbian, and
bisexual
community
violate
the
Equal
Protection
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment?
Holding and Reasoning (Kennedy, J.)
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Yes. A law prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for the gay, lesbian, and
bisexual
community
violates
the
Equal
Protection
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause provides that
no person may be denied
the equal protection of the laws
. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, the law will pass constitutional muster under the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. In this case,
the State of Colorado argues that Amendment 2 is not unconstitutional because it put
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in the same position as all other persons. However, the
Colorado Supreme Court found that the effect of Amendment 2 repeals existing
statutes, regulations, and policies that bar discrimination based on
sexual orientation
.
Additionally, Amendment 2 functions to ensure that no similar laws protecting gay,
lesbian, and bisexual people are ever enacted. Thus, the Amendment does
treat
homosexual persons
differently
from the population as a whole because it withdraws
from them, but no other persons, specific legal protection from discrimination, and it
forbids the reinstatement of laws and policies that would protect their interests. The
effects of the Amendment are far-reaching and prevent the enactment of policies in
both the public and private sectors that would protect gay, lesbian, and bisexual
people from discriminatory treatment in accessing basic services, which is a basic
freedom taken for granted by most other people. Given the understanding of the true
effect of Amendment 2, the law fails constitutional scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Amendment 2
selects an entire group of people based on a single
trait
(i.e., sexual orientation) and discriminates against them across the board. As a
result, a whole class of people is unable to seek the protection of the laws. Such a
targeted and injurious denial of basic rights can bear no rational relation to a
legitimate
state
interest
even
under
this
lenient
standard
of
judicial
review.
Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court's decision is affirmed.
QS: Is Scalia consistent in previous cases? Constitution should not interfere with
the democratic process. consider the race-blind case.
The majority mischaracterizes Amendment 2 as showing much more animosity
toward gays and lesbians than it actually does. Amendment 2 is not a targeted attack
on the rights of homosexuals, but rathe
r an attempt by voters to preserve
traditional and long-held sexual mores.
The majority attempts to overturn its prior
decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick
, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and puts the Court's weight
behind the idea that opposing homosexuality is as offensive as exhibiting racial or
religious bias. The Equal Protection Clause, which has previously been used to uphold
the civil rights of racial and religious groups, should not be used in the present case to
uphold the rights of homosexuals as a class. The majority actually declines to consider
the issue of whether Amendment 2 bears a rational relation to a legitimate state
purpose, because the majority is focused on asserting its view that discrimination
against homosexuals
is evil
. This holding is unsupported by precedent and misguided
in its conclusions.
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Sugarman v. Dougall
Rule of Law
Laws affecting a suspect classification must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest.
Facts
A New York state statute prohibited aliens from being employed as civil servants in
the competitive class. This prohibition applied to a wide range of positions, though
not to elected offices or higher offices in state agencies. Several New York resident
aliens who were discharged from civil-service positions on the basis of their alienage
(plaintiffs) brought an action against the administrator of the New York City Human
Resources Administration (defendant), challenging the constitutionality of the statute.
A three-judge panel of the district court held that the statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Supremacy Clause. The United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction to review the case.
Issue
Is a state law prohibiting aliens from serving in all competitive civil service positions
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding and Reasoning (Blackmun, J.)
No. A state law prohibiting aliens from serving in all competitive class civil service
positions is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Aliens are in general entitled to the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), this Court
found that aliens are a discrete and insular
minority
, and that classifications based on
alienage are therefore subject to
strict scrutiny
. In that case the Court applied strict
scrutiny to a state law barring aliens from receiving welfare assistance, and found that
the state’s interest in preserving the limited amount of available benefits for its
citizens was not sufficient justification for prohibiting assistance to non-citizens. Here,
the appellants argue that the distinction between citizens and aliens is justified
because civil servants participate directly in government policy and must be free from
competing obligations to another government. However, this justification does not
apply to many of the workers affected by the statute’s broad application, such as
typists and sanitation workers. At the same time, many other positions to which this
justification would naturally apply, such as
elected officials and higher officials in
state agencies, are not included under the statute
. Although a state has broad
power to define its political community and an interest in limiting participation in
government to people within that political community, a statute that seeks to achieve
this purpose through discrimination against aliens must be both narrowly confined
and precisely applied. The statute at issue here is neither, and it is therefore
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is not to say, however, that
states may not place restrictions on the employment of aliens if those restrictions are
narrowly confined, since the states are empowered under the Tenth Amendment to
define their political communities and to establish the qualifications of their officials.
The district court's judgment is affirmed.
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Dissent (Rehnquist, J.)
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment does not contain the term “suspect
classification.” Although the Court has previously, and correctly, found classifications
based on race to be suspect, nothing in the history of the amendment suggests that
alienage is similarly suspect, or that it was intended to apply to any discrete and
insular minorities other than racial minorities. The majority, and the Court in Graham,
errs in holding citizenship status to be a suspect classification
, and fails to define a
precise method for determining which classifications should be considered suspect.
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (p941)
Rule of Law
The
mentally
disabled
are
not
a
quasi-suspect
class
and
thus
any
legislative
regulations
affecting
their rights
are
subject
to
rational
basis
review
and
not
intermediate scrutiny.
Facts
In 1980, the Cleburne Living Center (Center) (plaintiff) filed an application for a
special use permit with the City of Cleburne, Texas (City) (defendant). The Center
sought a permit to build a residential facility for mentally disabled men and women.
The facility would house up to thirteen persons, who would be supervised at all times.
The City denied the permit application, and the Center brought suit in federal district
court challenging the denial. The district court upheld the denial. The court of appeals
reversed, finding that the mentally disabled were a quasi-suspect class of persons and
thus intermediate scrutiny should be applied to the City’s denial of the permit
application. It invalidated the denial as not furthering an important government
purpose. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
Whether a city’s denial of a permit for a group home for mentally disabled persons
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether the
review of such a denial required intermediate scrutiny.
Holding and Reasoning (White, J.)
Yes and no. The court of appeals erred in applying heightened scrutiny to the denial
of the permit application. The mentally disabled are
not a quasi-suspect class,
and
thus
rational basis review of the City’s decision is appropriate.
Firstly, it is
undeniable that mentally disabled persons require special care for functioning in the
everyday world, so legislative judgments are likely to be rational and should not be
scrutinized more closely. Secondly, on a national scale, federal lawmakers have
shown great appreciation for the plight of the mentally disabled and enacted
significant legislation prohibiting discrimination against them. Applying heightened
scrutiny and requiring the legislature to show that these efforts are substantially
related
to
an
important
governmental
purpose
might
actually
discourage
the
legislature from continuing to act to protect the mentally disabled. Thirdly, the
existence of so many regulations make it clear that the mentally disabled are not
politically powerless, but have already been able to attract the attention of lawmakers
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to provide for their rights.
Fourthly, finding the mentally disabled a quasi-suspect
class would pose problems in the future for classifying other groups as such that
possibly share some but not all characteristics with mentally disabled persons as a
group
. For these reasons, rational basis review is appropriate for any legislative
determinations affecting mentally disabled persons. The City does not require a
special use permit for apartment buildings, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging
houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, hotels, hospitals, sanitariums,
nursing homes for convalescents or the elderly, private clubs, and fraternal orders. In
contrast, the City requires a special use permit for a group home for mentally disabled
persons. This difference in treatment is irrelevant because the Center’s proposed home
would not threaten legitimate interests of the City in a way that other permitted uses
would not. The City’s arguments that the home would create negative attitudes about
the mentally disabled in the community, or that it would elicit harassment of residents
from children in a nearby school, are rejected as this concern is speculative and thus
irrelevant. The City’s concern that the home is located on a floodplain is not sufficient
for denying the permit for the home because other similar buildings are located there.
Finally, the City’s concerns about the size of the home and the amount of residents are
also rejected because if the residents were not mentally disabled, the city would have
no objections. Thus, there is no rational basis for the City to conclude the group home
would impact its legitimate interests, and therefore the denial of the special use permit
violates the Equal Protection Clause. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
Concurrence (Stevens, J.)
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence more accurately reflects a continuum of
judicial responses ranging from strict scrutiny to rational basis review, rather than a
system of three clearly-defined standards. The complicated facts of individual cases
do not fit neatly into the existing standards, and a “rational basis” for review is
preferential. The rational basis test, when properly and thoughtfully applied, is
adequate for deciding all cases implicating the rights of various classes of persons.
Heightened scrutiny is unnecessary.
Concurrence/Dissent (Marshall, J.)
Mental retardation should not be used as a proxy for invalidating the rights of an
entire group of persons. Mental disabilities affect different people in different ways,
and it is unfair for governments to make regulations which discriminate against all
mentally disabled individuals. The majority is correct in saying that the Equal
Protection Clause requires attention to the capacities and needs of mentally disabled
persons as individuals. However, the majority’s determination that the case can be
sufficiently decided with rational basis review, and denying that any action by the city
requires heightened scrutiny, is incorrect. Heightened scrutiny should have been
applied to the case, and there should have been a better job in investigating and
articulating the facts of the city’s actions to justify this result. The majority erred in
applying rational basis review in light of the present facts which suggest the need for
heightened scrutiny.
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Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
Rule of Law
A state statute instituting mandatory retirement for police officers at age fifty is
subject to rational basis review and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
face discrimination
against
older
police
officers:
not
a
suspect
class
(factors:
immutable
characteristics; history of discrimination; left out of political process; victims
of animus/bias)
purpose: ensuring the physical health and vitality of uniformed police officers
tailoring: the statutes only should be rationally related to the legitimate
purpose, but not have to be the best way to achieve its goal-applying here, the
age requirement is reasonable.
(the best means is required by the strict scrutiny test)
Facts
Robert Murgia (plaintiff) was a uniformed police officer with the Massachusetts state
police. The Massachusetts Board of Retirement (defendant) retired him at age fifty.
Murgia brought a civil suit against the Board in federal district court on the grounds
that his forced retirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The district court dismissed the suit, but the court of appeals reversed.
The Massachusetts Board of Retirement appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue
May a state enact a law that requires a uniformed state police officer to retire at age
fifty without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding and Reasoning (Per Curiam)
Yes. The task of working as a uniformed police officer in Massachusetts is
both
physically and mentally challenging
. Officers are required to undergo rigorous
physical testing to ensure they possess the requisite stamina to perform the job.
Murgia passed a physical exam four months before his retirement. No dispute exists
as to whether he had the physical capacity to continue performing the job.
Strict
scrutiny is not appropriate
for evaluating whether the Massachusetts Board’s
decision to retire Murgia on account of his age violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Strict scrutiny is required only when
a legislative classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class. A state policy of instituting mandatory retirement of
police officers at age fifty implicates neither of these situations, and strict scrutiny is
not appropriate. In the United States, the elderly have not experienced a history of
invidious discrimination making them a “discrete and insular minority.”
Rational
basis review is appropriate
for examining the constitutionality of the Massachusetts
retirement statute. The statute passes rational basis review because the means
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employed (mandatory retirement at age fifty) rationally furthers
a legitimate state
goal of ensuring the physical health and vitality of uniformed police officers
. The
Court is not tasked with determining the wisdom of the Massachusetts statute, but
rather whether the statute itself is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The
statute is upheld as constitutional and the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
Dissent (Marshall, J.)
The right to work is a fundamental right, so the actions by Massachusetts require strict
scrutiny review. The elderly have suffered a history of discrimination so as to make
them a suspect class. Clinical studies and individual cases demonstrate that imposing
mandatory retirement on elderly persons is particularly damaging to them on an
economic, social, and physical level. Many studies confirm that the loss of a job for
an elderly person directly contributes to lowering his or her life expectancy. Although
Massachusetts offers a legitimate purpose for its statute in ensuring the health and
vitality of its police officers, a mandatory retirement age of fifty is so over-inclusive
as to make the statute unconstitutional. The same objective can be achieved by
individually testing police officers. The Massachusetts statute is not narrowly tailored
to the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose. Other valid, less-discriminatory means
exist to accomplish the same purpose.
McDonald v. City of Chicago
Rule of Law
A Bill of Rights guarantee applies to the states if it is fundamental to the nation’s
scheme of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition.
Facts
Petitioners challenged a law enacted by the City of Chicago (respondent) that
prohibited Chicago residents from possessing handguns, claiming that the law
violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue
Does the Second Amendment apply to the states, thereby invalidating a local law
prohibiting residents from possessing handguns?
Holding and Reasoning (Alito, J.)
Yes. The Second Amendment applies to the states, thereby invalidating Chicago’s law
prohibiting residents from possessing handguns. Under the process of selective
incorporation, a particular Bill of Rights guarantee will apply to the states if it is
fundamental to the nation’s scheme of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the nation’s
history and tradition. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570 (2008), this
Court found that individual self defense is a basic right, which forms the central
component of the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms, and which is
deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition. Following the Civil War, in
response to the efforts of some states to disarm returning black soldiers and other
black people, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which protected the
right of all citizens to keep and bear arms. When this was met with southern resistance
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and presidential vetoes, Congress responded by adopting the Fourteenth Amendment,
thereby providing a constitutional basis for the rights included in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Concurrence (Alito, J.)
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the states under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The City argues that gun
ownership is not a fundamental right because other countries have limited gun
ownership. However, the standard to be applied in incorporation cases is not whether
there is any civilized legal system that does not recognize a particular right, but
whether a particular right is fundamental to this nation’s justice system.
In
addition, the Second Amendment
does not differ from other rights simply because
a right to a deadly instrument raises issues of public safety
, as rights that restrict
law enforcement activities and criminal prosecutions also implicate public safety.
Finally, it is important to note that Heller does not invalidate laws that prohibit the
possession of firearms by felons or the mentally ill or within government buildings
and schools, or which place conditions on the sale of firearms.
Concurrence (Thomas, J.)
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the states, and is
both fundamental to the nation’s scheme of ordered liberty and deeply rooted in the
nation’s history and tradition. However, the Second Amendment is enforceable
against the states, not through the Due Process Clause, but rather through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, because the right to keep
and bear arms is guaranteed as a privilege of being an American citizen. The Due
Process Clause only guarantees process before a deprivation of a right, and cannot
define the substance of rights not expressly included in the Constitution. The doctrine
of substantive due process is inconsistent with the understanding of the Due Process
Clause at the time it was ratified.
Concurrence (Scalia, J.)
Justice Stevens argues that the right to keep and bear arms is not incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment despite being deeply rooted in the nation’s history and
tradition. In addition, Justice Stevens would have the Court defer to the democratic
process when states are already giving close consideration to a right. However, under
this approach,
a right that has traditionally been recognized and regulated by the
states would deserve less protection than a right that the political branches have
traditionally withheld.
Further, Justice Stevens’ assertion that
firearms have an
ambivalent
矛盾的
relationship to liberty
because they can injure others seems to
require that to be incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment a right must have no
harmful effect on anyone, a requirement that no right can meet. Justice Stevens’
assertion that the right to bear arms is different from other fundamental rights because
it is not critical to leading a life of autonomy, dignity, or political equality is an
inappropriate political and moral judgment
. Finally, Justice Stevens argues that
even if there is a constitutional basis for incorporating the right to bear arms, the
Court should not do so for
prudential reasons.
The Court does not have the authority
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to withhold rights protected under the Constitution, and Justice Stevens’ argument
that states have a right to experiment with solutions to gun violence
because the
solution to the problem is unclear
is equally applicable to any serious social
problem
. While the
historical approach
may not be the perfect means for limiting
judicial lawmaking, it is the best and most objective means available.
Dissent (Breyer, J.)
Nothing in this country’s history supports Heller’s finding that a private right of self
defense is incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment against the states.
Incorporating a private right of self defense against the states will not protect discrete
and insular minorities from state regulation, help ensure equal respect for individuals,
promote a necessary part of the democratic process, or protect individuals at risk of
unfair treatment by a majority. In addition, the fact-intensive questions raised in
analyzing state gun laws are better left to legislatures, not the courts.
Dissent (Stevens, J.)
In undertaking a substantive due process analysis, the Court must show respect for the
democratic process. Judicial intervention may be improper where a liberty interest is
already the subject of close consideration by the states. In addition, while some
fundamental aspects of personhood and dignity require protection, in deciding to
recognize a new liberty
the Court must be sensitive to both intrinsic ideas of
liberty and to the practical realities of contemporary society.
Firearms can both
assist in self defense and contribute to the murder of innocent people. The right to
possess a particular type of firearm is also different from liberty interests previously
identified under the Due Process Clause, because it is not necessary in order to live a
life of autonomy, dignity, and political equality, and because of its risk to other
people’s security
. Moreover, state regulation on gun possession is just as deeply
rooted in the nation’s history and tradition as the individual interest in possessing a
firearm. Because conditions vary greatly from one locality to another,
courts should
allow state and local governments the right to experiment in finding solutions to
gun problems.
In addition, opponents of gun control are a powerful group not at risk
of unfair treatment by the majority. Finally, when determining whether a right is
fundamental, it makes little sense to treat history as dispositive, as Justice Scalia does.
Historical views can be unclear and uninformative
, and are sometimes wrong, and
the historical approach gives judges unprecedented powers in an area in which they
have no special qualifications.
Lochner v. New York
Rule of Law
A state may not regulate
the working hours mutually agreed upon by employers
and employees
as this violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to contract freely
under the Due Process Clause.
Facts
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In 1896, the New York legislature enacted the Bakershop Act which limited the hours
bakers were permitted to work to no more than ten per day. Joseph Lochner
(defendant) owned a bakery in New York (plaintiff) and was fined twice under the
law for overworking an employee. His conviction was upheld in the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court, and was affirmed in the New York Court
of Appeals. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
May a state regulate the working hours of certain classes of workers without violating
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding and Reasoning (Peckham, J.)
No. The general right of an employer to make a contract in relation to his business is
part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty
protected by this Amendment, unless there are circumstances that exclude the right.
States may impose
reasonable conditions
on the right to contract that
further the
health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.
Pursuant to their constitutional
police powers, states may
prohibit contracts
which violate either a federal or state
statute, or contracts to use one’s personal property for immoral or illegal purposes.
Additionally, precedent decisions permit states to regulate certain types of
employment when the nature of the work or the character of the employees warrants it.
Specifically, states have previously been permitted to regulate the hours of employees
in the smelting and mining fields. However, state police power is not absolute and
must be balanced against individual liberty concerns protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the present case, the baking profession does not present any of the
concerns justifying the states’ regulation of hours in some other professions. The
regulation in question was not a health law, but was an arbitrary interference into the
individual right of employers and employees to contract. The law is thus invalid and
the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
Dissent (Holmes, J.)
The majority decided this case based on an economic theory that is largely
unsupported by the popular will of the United States. It is settled by various precedent
decisions and state constitutions that
state laws can regulate the lives of individuals
in many ways that are not supported by the national legislature. However, the purpose
of the United States Constitution is not to require states to exercise their police powers
uniformly, but to instead
give them the power to make their own judgments about
what laws are best for their individual citizens
. The “liberty” protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment should not function to prevent the exercise of a dominant
opinion among states, that opinion being, in this case, that states can constitutionally
regulate the work hours of employees within their borders. The majority ignores the
reality of state regulations across the country.
Dissent (Harlan, J.)
It is well settled that states
have police powers
under the Constitution to regulate
activities for the promotion of the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.
The right to contract is necessarily limited by this police power, and limiting
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employees’ work hours bears
a direct relationship
to promoting their health, safety,
and general welfare. Specifically, the air breathed by workers in bakeries is not as
clean or healthful as that breathed by workers in other professions
, and this condition
justifies the New York legislature’s regulation. Additionally, it is well documented by
other commentators that bakers as a class are more frail and die earlier than other
workers
, a fact largely attributed to their hard work and long hours. In light of these
facts, it is wrong for the majority to assume that the New York legislature acted in bad
faith or without deliberation. The majority should have deferred to the legislature’s
judgment, and this would have upheld the New York law.
Nebbia v. New York
Without the presence of other constitutional prohibitions, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent states from enacting economic policies
such as price regulations to further the public good as long as those policies are not
unreasonable or arbitrary.
Fact:
In 1933, the State of New York (plaintiff) established a Milk Control Board which
had the power to fix the prices of milk sold by New York stores. Nebbia (defendant)
owned a grocery store in Rochester, New York and was convicted of selling milk at a
price below the fixed price. The County Court of Appeals for Monroe County
affirmed the conviction, and Nebbia appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Holding and Reasoning (Roberts, J.)
Yes. During the Great Depression, the price farmers received for milk was far below
the cost of milk production. This discouraged farmers from producing milk, an
essential item of a healthful diet. The legislature thus determined, for the public good,
it must set the price of milk to ensure farmers received a fair price for their product
and continued to promote healthy diets by producing milk. This interest in
encouraging milk production was balanced against the individual interest in freedom
from governmental interference in the making of contracts. However, the freedom to
contract is not absolute. States inherently possess the power to pass regulations that
promote the public good. In the present case, the milk industry in New York was
severely impacted by price-cutting by retailers. To combat this problem, the New
York legislature established the Milk Control Board to fix prices. This decision was
not arbitrary, but instead promoted the public good by protecting the milk industry.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent states from
enacting economic policies to promote the public good, as long as those policies are
not unreasonable or arbitrary. The policies in the present case were not unreasonable
or arbitrary, so Nebbia’s conviction in the court of appeals is affirmed.
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west coast hotel co. v. parrish (1937)
Rule:
A state may regulate the minimum wage paid to female employees when that
regulation is for the purpose of promoting employees’ health, safety and general
welfare.
Facts
The State of Washington passed a law which regulated the minimum wages paid to
female and minor employees. Elsie Parrish (plaintiff) was employed as a maid at a
hotel owned by the West Coast Hotel Co. (defendant). Together with her husband,
Parrish brought suit in Washington state court to recover the difference between the
wages she was paid by West Coast Hotel Co. and the minimum wage fixed under
Washington state law. West Coast defended the suit on the grounds that the state law
violated its Due Process right to freely contract under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Washington trial court held for the hotel, but the Washington Supreme Court
reversed. West Coast Hotel Co. appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue
May a state regulate the minimum wage paid to female employees?
Holding and Reasoning (Hughes, C.J.)
Yes. The previous decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923),
makes it unconstitutional for states to set minimum wage laws. However, changing
social and economic circumstances since that decision warrant a fresh consideration
of the issue. The liberty interest asserted by West Coast is that of freedom to contract,
but this freedom is not expressly found in the Constitution. Rather, the Constitution,
through its Fourteenth Amendment, clearly outlines the liberty interest of freedom
from actions which attack an individual’s health, safety, or general welfare. Thus, all
asserted liberty interests are ultimately restrained by the health, safety, and general
welfare interests that comprise due process. Applying this principle, the prior decision
in Adkins is an improper application of the constitutional due process provisions that
govern states’ regulation of the relationship between employers and employees. States
pass minimum wage laws designed to promote the health and safety of female
employees, and this regulation thus embodies principles of due process. To hold that
states cannot regulate in this way would be to deny due process constraints on a
state’s freedom to contract, and to deny protections for the health and safety of
women. Additionally, changing economic times mean that workers who are not paid a
living wage would have to rely on taxpayers for the care of their various needs. This
is an unprecedented problem because the United States is currently in the middle of
the “Great Depression.” Thus, more workers than ever are seeking community
assistance, which leads to an impermissible burden on taxpayers. Washington’s
minimum wage law is upheld because it promotes the health and safety of women,
and because requiring employers to pay a living wage alleviates the burden on
taxpayers of having to care for underpaid employees. The decision of the Washington
Supreme Court is affirmed.
Dissent (Sutherland, J.)
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The majority allows itself to be too swayed by changing current events. The United
States Constitution is not designed to be changed according to shifting trends in the
country’s economic climate. The majority is rash in overruling its long-established
jurisprudence in response to the economic climate because the “Great Depression” in
the United States is a temporary change in economic conditions. The majority
improperly rejects the precedent that freedom to contract is a firm rule under the Due
Process Clause with few exceptions. Additionally, the majority’s social welfare
justification for its holding is rejected because it is unfair to shift the entire burden of
providing for the poor onto employers. The minimum wage legislation should be
invalidated on this basis.
Griswold v. Connecticut
Rule of Law
An implied “right of privacy” exists within the Bill of Rights that
prohibits a state
from preventing married couples from using contraception.
Facts
Griswold (defendant) was Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut. Buxton was a licensed physician and professor at Yale Medical School
who served as Director for the League at its Center in New Haven. The Center was
open and operated from November 1 to November 10, 1961, when Griswold and
Buxton were arrested for giving information, instruction, and medical advice to
married persons for preventing conception. Buxton and Griswold were arrested and
convicted as “accessories” pursuant to Connecticut statutes that prevented using
contraception or assisting someone else in using contraception. Griswold and Buxton
challenged the convictions and brought suit against Connecticut, (plaintiff), alleging
that the statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division of the
Circuit Court affirmed their convictions, and the Supreme Court of Errors affirmed.
Griswold and Buxton appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue
Does the Bill of Rights contain an implied right of privacy that permits the use of
contraceptives by married persons?
Holding and Reasoning (Douglas, J.)
Yes. A “right of privacy” protecting the intimate relations of married couples is
implied in
the Bill of Rights. For example, the First Amendment protects the right to
association. The Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers in a person’s
house without their consent. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination. The
Ninth Amendment provides that “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” The
protected activities in each of these Amendments are “penumbras” that are not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, but instead represent various “zones of
privacy” into which the government cannot intrude. The marital relationship is located
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within a
“zone of privacy
” impliedly created by these various fundamental
constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights. The Connecticut law seeks to prohibit
the use of contraceptives in the marital relationship and in doing so violates this area
of protected freedoms. The right of privacy in marriage is a concept older than the Bill
of Rights that should necessarily be kept sacred and free from intrusion by the state.
The Connecticut law is unconstitutional and Griswold’s conviction is reversed.
Concurrence (Harlan, J.)
Rather than relying on an implied right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, the right to use
contraception in marriage is supported by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment
. In looking beyond established law such as the Due Process Clause and
inferring a new right of privacy from the Constitution, the majority is engaging in
inappropriate judicial activism.
Concurrence (White, J.)
The Connecticut law as applied to married couples deprives them of liberty without
due process of law, as used
in the Fourteenth Amendment
. Additionally, the ban on
the use of contraceptives by married couples does not in any way reinforce the state’s
ban on illicit sexual relationships. Connecticut does not disagree with the use of
contraceptives as a whole, but rather with their use in adultery and fornication.
However, the prevention of these relationships is the stated purpose of the
Connecticut statute, making the statute sweepingly broad and over-inclusive as to be
rendered unconstitutional.
Concurrence (Goldberg, J.)
Connecticut’s birth control law unconstitutionally intrudes upon
the right to marital
privacy
. Even though the right of marital privacy is not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, it is supported by numerous decisions of the Court, as well as
specifically by the language and history of the
Ninth Amendment
. The Ninth
Amendment provides that “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
“
宪法对某些权
利的列举,不应被解释为否认或贬低人民保留的其他权利。
”
Relying on Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137 (1803) every clause in the Constitution is meant to
be given effect. If the Court denies the existence of a marital right of privacy simply
because it is not enumerated in the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights, it is
essentially denying all meaning in the Ninth Amendment. Additionally, the right of
privacy in marriage is rooted in the “traditions and collective conscience” of people
and is therefore a fundamental right. Connecticut offers a legitimate purpose as
justification for its statute (i.e. preventing adulterous relationships), but fails to
consider less-intrusive means for accomplishing this purpose.
Dissent (Black, J.)
The Connecticut law is unwise and based on unsound policy. There is no basis in the
Constitution for the “right of privacy” concept as defined by the majority. The closest
provision to a right of privacy is the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizure in the Fourth Amendment. However, the Fourth Amendment does not
establish a general right of privacy. Additionally, the Ninth Amendment and Due
Process Clause should not be used by the Court as authority to strike down all state
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legislation that the Court believes violates “fundamental principles of liberty and
justice,” or is contrary to the “traditions and collective conscience” of the American
people.
Dissent (Stewart, J.)
The Connecticut law is silly, unenforceable, and unwise. However, it is not
unconstitutional. It is not the duty of the Court to strike down legislation with which it
simply disagrees. If the people of Connecticut disagree with a state law, their best
recourse is to
use their actual Ninth and Tenth Amendment rights and convince
their elected officials to change the law.
Roe v. Wade
Rule of Law
The constitutional right to privacy protects a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion.
宪法规定的隐私权保护妇女选择堕胎的权利。
Facts
Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code restricts legal abortions to those “procured or attempted by
medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.” Roe (plaintiff), a pregnant single
woman, brought suit against Wade (defendant), a Texas state official, on the grounds that the
statute was an unconstitutional restriction on her right to obtain an abortion. The federal district
court considering the case issued declaratory, though not injunctive, relief stating that the Texas
statute was void for its overbreadth, vagueness, and infringement on Roe’s Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Roe appealed the denial of injunctive relief to the United States Supreme
Court.
德克萨斯州刑法典》第
1196
条将合法堕胎限制在
"
为挽救母亲的生命而通过医学建议获得
或尝试
"
的情况。罗(原告)是一名单身孕妇,她对德克萨斯州的一名官员韦德(被告)提
起诉讼,理由是该法规对她获得堕胎的权利是一种违宪限制。审理此案的联邦地区法院发布
了声明性救济,但没有发布禁令,称德克萨斯州的法规因其过于宽泛、模糊和侵犯罗的第九
和第十四修正案权利而无效。罗对禁止性救济的拒绝向美国最高法院提出上诉。
Issue
Does the constitutional right to privacy protect a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion?
Holding and Reasoning (Blackmun, J.)
Yes. The constitutional right to privacy protects a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion.
However, abortions may be regulated by a state after the first trimester of pregnancy and may be
completely prohibited after the point of “viability” of a fetus unless necessary to preserve the
health of the mother. Historically, women have had a greater right to terminate their pregnancies
than they currently enjoy. There are three reasons for the gradual increase in strictness in
anti-abortion laws. Firstly, decreasing the availability of abortion is seen as a way to decrease
illicit sexual activity. Secondly, concerns over the safety of abortion procedures prompted a
decrease in its prevalence to protect the health of women. Finally, states increasingly note their
own interest or duty in protecting prenatal life. The Court must analyze the right of women to
obtain abortions against the backdrop of these countervailing state interests. The Constitution does
not explicitly mention a right to personal privacy, but such a right is implied from various aspects
of the Bill of Rights. The “zone of privacy” implied in the Constitution is broad enough to
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encompass a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. However, this holding is
qualified by noting that the right is not unlimited and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation. Regulation limiting a “fundamental right” of privacy must be justified by a
compelling state interest, and legislative enactments must be narrowly tailored to further that
interest.
Applying this test to the abortion issue, a woman’s privacy interest outweighs any countervailing
state interests during the first part of her pregnancy when abortion is deemed relatively safe and
when the fetus is very early in its development. However, at some point in the pregnancy, the
potential dangers to the mother of a later abortion and the increased development of the fetus as a
potential person outweigh the right of the mother to privacy. Thus, state interests grow in
substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a certain point during pregnancy, became
compelling enough to override her general right to privacy. With respect to the state’s interest in
protecting the health of the mother, the interest becomes compelling at approximately the end of
the first trimester (first three months of pregnancy), when performance of an abortion becomes
increasingly risky. A state’s interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling at viability, or
whenever the fetus is capable of a meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. A state can prohibit
abortion after viability, except when it is necessary to protect the life of the mother. Measured
against these standards, Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code overly restricts abortions in allowing
them only when necessary to save the life of the mother. The statute is unconstitutional, and the
district court’s decision is reversed.
是的,宪法规定的隐私权保护了妇女选择堕胎的权利。然而,在怀孕的前三个月之后,堕胎
可能会受到州政府的管制,在胎儿
"
可存活
"
之后,可能会被完全禁止,除非是为了保护母
亲的健康所必需。从历史上看,妇女终止妊娠的权利比她们目前享有的要大。反堕胎法的严
格程度逐渐提高有三个原因。首先,减少堕胎机会被认为是减少非法性活动的一种方式。其
次,对堕胎程序安全性的担忧促使堕胎的流行率下降,以保护妇女的健康。最后,各国越来
越注意到自己在保护产前生命方面的利益或义务。法院必须在这些对抗性国家利益的背景下,
分析妇女获得堕胎的权利。宪法》没有明确提到个人隐私权,但《权利法案》的各个方面都
隐含了这种权利。宪法中隐含的
"
隐私区
"
非常广泛,足以包括妇女选择终止妊娠的权利。
然而,这一认定是有条件的,因为它指出该权利不是无限的,必须在监管中对照重要的国家
利益加以考虑。限制隐私权的
"
基本权利
"
的法规必须由令人信服的国家利益来证明,而且
立法颁布必须是狭义的,以促进该利益。
对堕胎问题适用这一测试,在妇女怀孕的第一阶段,当堕胎被认为是相对安全的,并且胎儿
处于非常早期的发育阶段时,妇女的隐私利益超过了任何对抗性的国家利益。然而,在怀孕
的某个阶段,后期堕胎对母亲的潜在危险以及胎儿作为一个潜在的人的发育程度的增加,都
超过了母亲的隐私权。因此,随着妇女接近孕期,国家的利益越来越大,在怀孕期间的某一
时刻,国家的利益足以压倒她的一般隐私权。关于国家在保护母亲健康方面的利益,这种利
益在大约前三个月(怀孕的前三个月)结束时变得引人注目,此时进行堕胎的风险越来越大。
国家在保护潜在生命方面的利益在生存能力上变得引人注目,或者说,只要胎儿能够在母亲
的子宫外过上有意义的生活。国家可以禁止在生存能力之后进行堕胎,除非是为了保护母亲
的生命而有必要。根据这些标准来衡量,《德克萨斯州刑法典》第
1196
条过度限制了堕胎,
只允许在拯救母亲生命的必要情况下进行堕胎。该法规是违宪的,地区法院的判决被推翻。
Concurrence (Burger, C.J.)
The Texas abortion statute impermissibly restricts abortions for the purpose of preserving the
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health of pregnant women.
Concurrence (Stewart, J.)
The Griswold majority attempted to rely on other bases for its judgment than the “liberty”
interests protected by substantive due process. In the same way, the liberty interest at stake in the
present case—the right of a woman to choose an abortion—is best supported by substantive due
process provisions, rather than a vague right to privacy such as that outlined in Griswold.
Concurrence (Douglas, J.)
The case is governed by the holding in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), recognizing
a constitutional right to privacy. The right to an abortion is included in the basic rights governing
marriage and family decisions protected by Griswold and is derived from various amendments in
the Bill of Rights. The right of privacy is ultimately subject to a balancing test including
compelling state interests. The majority is correct that the right exists for women and is not
outweighed by such interests in the present case.
Dissent (White, J.)
Nothing in the language or history of the Constitution supports the majority’s judgment. The
majority simply creates a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers, investing it with sufficient
constitutional authority to override many existing state anti-abortion statutes. The majority
completely overrides the political process and denies voters across the nation the ability to weigh
in with their beliefs on this important issue.
Dissent (Rehnquist, J.)
The constitutional right of privacy is not implicated in the present case. The Texas statute bars a
licensed physician from performing a medical procedure on a woman. Such a transaction is not
“private” in the traditional sense of the word. As such, the Texas regulation of abortion should be
treated similar to other economic and social regulations and upheld if it has a rational relation to a
valid state objective. Even under this test, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would limit any state statute that seeks to prohibit all abortions, even when the life of the mother is
in jeopardy. Such an absolute statute likely would not be found rationally related to a legitimate
state objective, as states have a strong interest in preserving the health of women. In the same vein,
however, the majority’s sweeping invalidation of any restrictions on abortion during the first
trimester of pregnancy ignores any state interest in the potential life of the fetus and is impossible
to justify under a rational basis standard. In addition, the entire trimester system itself, as defined
by the majority, is reflective more of a legislative than a judicial judgment. The majority creates a
right that does not exist in the Fourteenth Amendment. All regulation powers over abortion should
be left entirely to state legislatures.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
Rule of Law
A law with the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion and is thus
unconstitutional.
一项法律的目的或效果是在寻求堕胎的妇女的道路上设置一个实质性的障碍,对妇女的堕胎
权造成了不适当的负担,因此是违宪的。
Facts
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The State of Texas passed two laws governing abortions. The first required that a doctor
performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital no more than 30 miles from where
the abortion was being performed (the admitting-privileges requirement). This provision was
adopted to ensure that women had easy access to a hospital in the event that complications from
the abortion arose. The second provision required that the standards for each abortion facility meet
the minimum standards for ambulatory surgical centers (the surgical-center requirement). Whole
Woman’s Health (plaintiff) sued John Hellerstedt
(defendant), commissioner of the Texas
Department of State Health Services, claiming that the laws were unconstitutional. The district
court determined that the laws would reduce the number of abortion facilities in Texas from 40 to
seven or eight. The district court found that this reduction in facilities would make it difficult to
serve all the women who wanted abortions in Texas, particularly in rural areas. In addition, the
district court found that abortion was an adequately safe practice in Texas prior to the adoption of
the laws. Finally, the district court found that abortions performed at ambulatory surgical centers
were not appreciably safer than abortions performed at other types of abortion facilities. For these
and other reasons, the district court found the laws to be unconstitutional. The court of appeals
reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
德克萨斯州通过了两项有关堕胎的法律。第一部法律规定,进行堕胎的医生必须在距离堕胎
地点不超过
30
英里的医院有住院权限(住院权限要求)。通过这项规定是为了确保妇女在堕
胎出现并发症时能够方便地去医院。第二条规定要求每个堕胎设施的标准必须符合非住院手
术中心的最低标准(手术中心要求)。整个妇女健康组织(原告)起诉德克萨斯州卫生服务
部专员
John Hellerstedt
(被告),声称这些法律是违宪的。地区法院认定,这些法律将使德
克萨斯州的堕胎设施从
40
个减少到
7
或
8
个。地区法院认为,设施的减少将使得克萨斯州
难以为所有想要堕胎的妇女提供服务,特别是在农村地区。此外,地区法院认为,在通过这
些法律之前,堕胎在德克萨斯州是一种充分安全的做法。最后,地区法院认为,在非住院手
术中心进行的堕胎并不比在其他类型的堕胎设施进行的堕胎明显安全。由于这些和其他原因,
地区法院认为这些法律是违宪的。上诉法院推翻了这一判决。美国最高法院批准了诉讼请求。
Issue
Is a law with the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion unconstitutional because it imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an
abortion?
Holding and Reasoning (Breyer, J.)
Yes. A law with the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion and is
unconstitutional. Under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), states can impose
limited restrictions on abortions that ensure the safety of the patient, but these restrictions cannot
unduly burden the patient’s right to have an abortion. In this case, the district court did not err by
finding that the two Texas abortion laws are unconstitutional. Each law is an unnecessary safety
regulation with the purpose of creating a substantial obstacle to seeking an abortion. The
admitting-privileges requirement does not provide any real health benefit to women. Even without
the requirement, abortion is already a safe procedure in Texas. The law does, however, place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, because the law will result in the
closure of the majority of abortion facilities in Texas. The surgical-center requirement similarly
makes it more difficult to obtain an abortion without any evidence that the law is necessary to the
health of women. In sum, the laws impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an
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abortion. Both requirements are thus unconstitutional. The judgment of the court of appeals is
reversed.
是的。一项法律的目的或效果是在寻求堕胎的妇女的道路上设置一个实质性的障碍,这对妇
女的堕胎权造成了不适当的负担,是违宪的。根据
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)
,各州可以对堕胎施加有限的限制,以确保病人的安全,但这些限制不能对病人的堕
胎权造成不适当的负担。在本案中,地区法院认定德克萨斯州的两项堕胎法是违宪的,并没
有错。每条法律都是不必要的安全规定,目的是为寻求堕胎制造实质性障碍。接纳特权要求
并没有为妇女提供任何真正的健康利益。即使没有这项要求,堕胎在德克萨斯州已经是一个
安全的程序。然而,该法律确实给寻求堕胎的妇女带来了实质性的障碍,因为该法律将导致
德克萨斯州的大多数堕胎设施关闭。手术中心的要求同样使堕胎更加困难,没有任何证据表
明该法律对妇女的健康是必要的。总而言之,这些法律对妇女的堕胎权造成了不适当的负担。
因此,这两项要求都是违宪的。上诉法院的判决被推翻。
Concurrence (Ginsburg, J.)
Complications from abortions are rare and even when they do occur, they often are not dangerous.
In fact, abortions are safer than childbirth, and yet there are no admitting-privileges requirements
or surgical-center requirements for childbirth in Texas. The challenged laws will not actually
protect the health of women. Instead, the law will simply decrease access to abortion services.
Dissent (Alito, J.)
The Court should not have heard this case, according to the doctrine of res judicata.
Dissent (Thomas, J.)
While the entirety of this Court’s abortion jurisprudence is troubling, the Court’s opinion today
rewrites the undue-burden test in Casey. The Court’s adoption of exceptions and balancing tests is
“a regrettable concession of defeat—an acknowledgement that we have passed the point where
‘law,’ properly speaking, has any further application.”
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
376 U.S. 254 (1964)
Rule of Law
If a plaintiff is a public official or is running for public office, he or she can recover
damages for defamation only by proving with clear and convincing evidence the falsity of
the defamatory statements and the presence of actual malice in the speaker.
Facts
Sullivan (plaintiff) was Commissioner of the Police Department, Fire Department,
Department of the Cemetery, and Department of Scales for Montgomery, Alabama. He
brought a civil libel action against New York Times Co. (defendant) after it printed
allegedly false and defamatory statements about Sullivan’s actions to control African
American protesters and his treatment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The newspaper
article in question accused Sullivan’s police force of conducting a wave of terror against
African American students and brutally harassing Dr. King. It is undisputed that several of
the allegations were either false or exaggerated. At trial, the trial judge charged the jury
that the statements in the article were “libelous per se” and that damages were appropriate
if the statements were merely “of and concerning” Sullivan. The jury returned a verdict for
Sullivan and awarded him $500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed,
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and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
Whether a state law for civil liability that disregards intention abridges the freedom of
speech and press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments when applied to an
action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.
Holding and Reasoning (Brennan, J.)
Yes. The rule of law announced by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient
because it fails to provide safeguards for the freedom of speech and freedom of press
required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It is well established that there is a
profound national commitment in America to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the government and public officials.
The treatment of African Americans in the Civil Rights movement qualified as one such
issue worthy of open public debate. However, the question remains whether the otherwise
constitutionally-protected article forfeited its protections because it contained false and
allegedly defamatory statements. Historically, First Amendment protections do not turn on
whether the speech sought to be protected is true, popular, or socially useful. Additionally,
criticism of official conduct—an important aspect of open public debate—does not lose its
constitutional protection just because it is defamatory. Since both false and defamatory
speech relating to public officials is individually protected, the First Amendment also
protects the combination of the two. This is historically demonstrated by Congress’s
conclusion that the Sedition Act of 1798 was unconstitutional because it prohibited the
ability of individuals to speak out against the government. Congress found that it was
inadequate even to permit defendants accused of violating the Sedition Act to offer a
defense of truth, as this required an impermissible level of self-censorship in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, it would be inadequate to permit New York
Times Co. to offer a defense of truth. The only proper way to guarantee that the
protections of freedom of speech and of the press are not ignored in civil libel actions is to
adopt a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with actual malice. Actual malice occurs when the defendant knew that the
statement was false or acted with reckless disregard of the truth. The evidence presented is
constitutionally insufficient to support a judgment for Sullivan as there was no indication
that actual malice existed. The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert
135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015)
Rule of Law
A restriction on speech that is content-based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of the government’s benign motive or justification.
Facts
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The Town of Gilbert (defendant) passed an ordinance regulating the posting of signs in the
town.
The ordinance created different categories of signs, including “Ideological Sign[s],”
“Political Sign[s],” and “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event.”
The ordinance applied different restrictions to each category. The ordinance was more
restrictive with its regulation of temporary directional signs. Good News Community
Church and its pastor, Clyde Reed (plaintiffs), held church services at various buildings in
the town. Reed posted temporary signs around the town to direct parishioners to the
services. The town cited Reed because the signs violated the sign ordinance. Reed brought
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, claiming that the
ordinance violated his freedom of speech. The town cited aesthetic appeal and traffic
management as the interests served by implementing the different restrictions based on
sign type. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
Is a restriction on speech that is content-based on its face subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of the government’s benign motive or justification?
Holding and Reasoning (Thomas, J.)
Yes. A restriction on speech that is content-based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of the government’s benign motive or justification. Content-based restrictions
on speech are presumptively unconstitutional. “The vice of content-based legislation . . . is
not that it is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to
use for those purposes.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Under
strict scrutiny
, the government must demonstrate that a law is narrowly tailored to
serve a
compelling
governmental interest.
In
this case,
the town’s
ordinance is
content-based on its face and does not pass strict scrutiny. The ordinance is
content-based
on its face
because the level of the regulation a sign receives is entirely dependent on the
message the sign contains.
The ordinance is thus subject to strict scrutiny regardless of any
benign motive or justification on the part of the town. The ordinance does not pass
strict-scrutiny review. The town stated that the interests furthered by the ordinance were
aesthetic
appeal
and
traffic
management.
Assuming
that
these
are
compelling
governmental interests, the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to serving those interests.
The town does not provide any evidence that temporary directional signs are less
aesthetically appealing or more dangerous for traffic than political or ideological signs.
And yet, the ordinance imposes more-restrictive regulations on temporary directional signs.
The ordinance is not narrowly tailored to serve the town’s interests in aesthetic appeal and
traffic safety. Accordingly, the ordinance is unconstitutional.
Concurrence (Kagan, J.)
While the judgment in this case is correct, the majority’s analysis opens the door to myriad
municipal sign ordinances being struck down under strict-scrutiny review. Applying strict
scrutiny to all content-based sign regulations will not further the First Amendment’s goals
of preserving a marketplace of ideas and prohibiting governmental bias for or against a
particular message. The town’s ordinance in this case does not pass any sort of
constitutional scrutiny, let alone strict scrutiny. As a result, there is no need for the Court to
make sweeping pronouncements on the application of strict scrutiny to sign ordinances
moving forward.
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Concurrence (Alito, J.)
The Court’s holding will not prevent the town from enacting all sign ordinances. Only
content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. Content-neutral sign restrictions
applicable to all signs, including size, location, number of signs per mile, and lighting
requirements would not be subject to strict scrutiny.
United States v. O'Brien
391 U.S. 367 (1968)
Rule of Law
If conduct contains both speech and nonspeech elements, an important or substantial
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element may justify incidental
limitations on the protected speech if (1) the regulation is within the constitutional power
of the government, (2) the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression,
and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Facts
Every male in the United States over the age of 18 was required by the Universal Military
Training and Service Act (UMTSA) to register with a local draft board. Each registrant
was assigned a number and given a registration certificate (also called a draft card). In
1966, David Paul O’Brien and three others (defendants) burned their draft cards on the
steps of the South Boston Courthouse. O’Brien was indicted by the United States
Government (plaintiff) and convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts. The indictment charged that O'Brien “willfully and
knowingly did mutilate, destroy, and change by burning his Registration Certificate” in
violation of the UMTSA, as amended in 1965. That act made it a crime for a person to
forge, alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate, or in any manner change a
registration certificate. O’Brien appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals reversed
on the grounds that the UMTSA violated the First Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
If conduct contains both speech and nonspeech elements, may an important or substantial
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element justify incidental limitations on
protected speech?
Holding and Reasoning (Warren, C.J.)
Yes. If conduct contains both speech and nonspeech elements, an important or substantial
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element may justify some limitations on
constitutionally protected speech elements. A government regulation is sufficiently
justified if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government, (2) it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Here,
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the 1965 amendment to the UMTSA does not on its face restrict free speech. However,
O’Brien argues that the 1965 amendment is unconstitutional as applied to him because his
act of burning his draft card is protected as symbolic speech under the First Amendment
.
This argument is based on the idea that the First Amendment protects every method of
communicating an idea through conduct.
However, the label of "speech" cannot be applied
to an unlimited variety of conduct whenever the person engaging in the conduct is doing
so to express an idea. Furthermore, even assuming that O’Brien’s conduct does contain a
communicative
element
and
thus
implicates
the
First
Amendment,
it
does
not
automatically follow that burning a draft card is constitutionally protected. The UMTSA
meets the four requirements for a valid government regulation. Congress has the
constitutional ability to classify individuals for military service and establish a registration
system. Legislation designed to ensure the availability of registration certificates issued in
aid of the system (e.g., the UMTSA) serves a legitimate and substantial purpose in the
system’s administration. Destroying or mutilating the registration certificates would defeat
the certificates' purpose by (1) making it difficult to verify registration; (2) complicating
communication between registrants and their local boards; (3) eliminating reminders that
registrants must update their local boards with address or status changes; and (4)
increasing the difficulty of detecting abuses in the use of certificates, such as fraud,
alteration, or forgery. The government's interest is limited to preserving the functionality of
the draft system, by preventing the willful destruction or mutilation of registration
certificates to ensure that the certificates remain available. The government's interest and
the law therefore implicate only the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct, and it
was for the noncommunicative impact of his conduct that O'Brien was convicted
.
Accordingly, because the UMTSA as amended in 1965 is constitutional, the decision of
the court of appeals is vacated.
Concurrence (Harlan, J.)
The Court's holding does not prohibit First Amendment challenges to laws if the speaker
has no other lawful way to express his or her view. In this matter, O'Brien could have
expressed his views in many other ways besides burning his draft card.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
491 U.S. 781 (1989)
Rule of Law
Under the First Amendment, a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech
must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests,
but does not need to be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.
Facts
An amphitheater and stage structure existed in Central Park known as the Naumberg
Acoustic Bandshell. In close proximity to the bandshell was Sheep Meadow, a grassy open
area. New York City designated Sheep Meadow as a quiet area for private recreation,
including walking and reading. The bandshell was also close to the apartments and
residences of Central Park West. Sheep Meadow users issued complaints to the city about
excessive noise from the bandshell during concerts. As part of its attempt to regulate the
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volume of amplified music at the bandshell, New York City required bandshell performers
to use sound-amplification equipment and a sound technician provided by the city. Rock
Against Racism (RAR) (plaintiff) was a sponsor of rock concerts at the bandshell. RAR
challenged the guidelines against Ward (defendant), a New York City official, in federal
district court on the grounds that the sound equipment and technician requirements
violated the First Amendment. The district court upheld the guidelines as reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations. The court of appeals reversed, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
Under the First Amendment, must a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected
speech be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests,
and be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so?
Holding and Reasoning
(Kennedy, J.)
No. Under the First Amendment,
a regulation of the time, place, or manner of
protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate,
content-neutral interests, but does not need to be the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of doing so
. The principal justification for the sound-amplification
guidelines is the city’s desire to control noise levels at bandshell events
. The city wishes to
retain the character of Sheep Meadow and its quiet activities, and to avoid undue intrusion
into residential areas. This justification for the guidelines has nothing to do with content,
and thus satisfies the requirement that time, place, and manner restrictions on speech be
content-neutral.
The city’s regulation is also narrowly tailored to serve the significant
government interest in protecting citizens from unwanted noise. The requirement of
narrow tailoring is satisfied if the regulation promotes a substantial government interest
and that interest would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation
. New York City’s
substantial interest in limiting sound volume is served in a direct and effective way by the
requirement of using the city’s sound technician during performances. The city’s interest
would have been less served without this requirement, as is evidenced by the complaints
about excessive noise generated by past concerts. Finally, the city’s guidelines leave open
ample alternative channels of communication.
The requirements do not attempt to ban any
particular manner or type of expression at a given place or time. Rather the guidelines
continue to permit expressive activity in the bandshell and have no effect on the quantity
or content of that expression beyond regulating the extent of amplification.
The city’s
guidelines are constitutional, and the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
Dissent (Marshall, J.)
The majority’s opinion is influenced by its own distaste for excessive noise, and does not
properly consider how its holding damages First Amendment rights. A key safeguard of
free speech has been the government’s obligation to adopt the least intrusive restriction
necessary to achieve its goals until today’s decision. By abandoning this requirement of
narrow tailoring, the majority replaces constitutional scrutiny with mandatory deference to
decisions made by government officials. The guidelines should have been invalidated
because the guidelines were not narrowly tailored to serve the city’s interest in regulating
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loud noise, and because the guidelines constituted an impermissible prior restraint on
speech.
Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
505 U.S. 830 (1992)
Rule of Law
A ban on the distribution of literature in airport-terminal buildings is an unconstitutional
restriction of speech.
Facts
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey owns and operates three major airports
in the New York City area and controls terminals at the airports. The airports were funded
by user fees and were operated to make a profit. The terminals were generally accessible to
the public and contained restaurants and snack stands, bars, newsstands, and stores. Most
people who came to the terminals were airline or terminal employees, or they were at the
terminals for air-travel-related purposes, such as taking a flight or accompanying
passengers. The Port Authority adopted a regulation forbidding the repetitive solicitation
of money and the distribution of literature within the terminals. However, the Port
Authority permitted solicitation and distribution on the sidewalks outside the terminal
buildings. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) (plaintiff) is a
religious group whose members solicit funds and distribute literature in public places to
support its movement. ISKCON brought an action against Walter Lee (defendant), a Port
Authority official, in federal district court on the grounds that the regulation abridged the
group’s First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to
ISKCON. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding the
solicitation ban and striking down the distribution ban. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. In a separate opinion, International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s
judgment upholding the solicitation ban.
Issue
Is a ban on the distribution of literature in airport-terminal buildings an unconstitutional
restriction of speech?
Holding and Reasoning (Per curiam)
Yes.
A
ban
on
the
distribution
of
literature
in
airport-terminal
buildings
is
an
unconstitutional restriction of speech. The right to distribute literature is one of the liberties
protected by the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and a free press. In a
nonpublic forum
like an airport terminal, a challenged governmental restriction on speech
will be upheld if the restriction is reasonable.
In analyzing reasonableness, the court
considers
the
forum’s
characteristics
and
purpose,
as
well
as
the
surrounding
circumstances. A restriction on speech will be found reasonable if the restriction is
consistent with the government’s legitimate interest in preserving the forum for its
dedicated use.
Here, considering the terminals’ purpose and the surrounding circumstances,
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the distribution ban is an unreasonable restriction on speech. The airport terminals are
large, multipurpose environments that enable air travel while providing the stores and
amenities of a commercial shopping mall. Nothing about the distribution of literature is
inconsistent
with
the
terminals’
multifunctional
nature.
Unlike
with
face-to-face
solicitations—which
this
Court
has
now
held
may
be
prohibited
inside
airport
terminals—terminal visitors are not required to read, think about, or discuss the literature
being distributed in order to receive the speaker’s message. Rather, visitors can simply
take the literature from the distributor and read it later. The Port Authority may be able to
set appropriate restrictions on the time, place, and manner in which literature may be
distributed. However, the Port Authority’s complete ban on distribution in the terminals is
unconstitutional. The ban would also be unconstitutional if the public areas of the airport
terminals were considered public forums. The appellate court’s judgment striking down
the distribution ban is affirmed.
Dissent (Rehnquist, C.J.)
The ban on the distribution of literature in the airport terminals is reasonable and should be
upheld. Distributing literature increases the risk of congestion in the terminals, and it could
cause delays and inconvenience for passengers and others in the airport. Moreover, if
terminal visitors take the literature and then drop it shortly afterward, this could lead to
dirty and potentially unsafe litter buildup in the terminal, which would create additional
maintenance work for terminal employees. It may also prove difficult for the Port
Authority to monitor groups in the airport to ensure that the groups are engaging only in
permitted distribution of literature and not in prohibited solicitation.
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