IAC STUDY GUIDE - Final

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IAC STUDY GUIDE 902 SFS Installation Access Controller (IAC) 797 Duty Task List (DTL) 1. 902 SFS IAC 1: Know an Apply Wear of Body Armor and Duty Gear -- TR: 902 SFS OI 31-001 Chapter 1 para 1.4 - 1.4.1.4 1.4. Wear of Body Armor and Duty Gear . Defenders will maintain a professional military image at all times. The wear of the Operational Camouflage Pattern (OCP) combat shirt is authorized while armed, in the process of arming/de-arming and wearing the Modular Service Vest (MSV). At no time will the combat shirt be worn as the primary outer garment. 1.4.1 Defenders will have all required duty equipment on their person or in a duty bag immediately available, including those listed in SFGI 31-001, to include the following: 1.4.1.1. Nitrile, latex, non-latex or similar “rubber” style gloves. 1.4.1.2. While performing Installation Patrol duties, Defenders will carry the required basic forms; including but not limited to: AF Form 1168, Statement of Suspect/Witness/Complaint , AF IMT 1176, Authority to Search and Seize , AF IMT 1364, Consent For Search and Seizure , AF IMT 3907, Security Forces Field Interview Card , DD Form 2701, Initial Information for Victims and Witnesses of Crime , DD FORM 1408, Armed Forces Traffic Citation , etc. 1.4.1.3. Duty holster for assigned weapons systems. 1.4.1.4 DAF GS 0083s are authorized to wear their issued concealable body armor while armed during FPCON Normal to Bravo. During FPCON Charlie and Delta, the issued plate carrier body armor and Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (ESAPI) will be worn. 2. 902 SFS IAC 2: Know and Perform SF Communication Systems -- TR: 902 SFS OI 31-001 Chapter 1 para 1.5 - 1.5.2 1.5 . Communications. The 902 SFS operate on Channel 1, Zone C, radio communications net for normal day to day operations, and Channel 2 or 3, Zone C during contingencies and duress situations. The Randolph communications net is considered a “closed net,” meaning all radio transmissions must go through the ECC and SF Members must request permission to go direct with other posts and patrols. 1.5.1 Radio Call signs are managed by the Personal Wireless Communications Systems (PWCS) monitor/502 SFG. Personnel will not use call signs not assigned and validated. 1.5.2. Personal cellular telephones are authorized for emergency usage during communication outages, while on patrol and while on rest after being properly relieved of a posted Defender’s duties. (Example: a patrol relieves a member of the gate so they can eat food while the patrol maintains vigilant over watch.) 3. 902 SFS IAC 3: Know and Perform Commercial Vehicle Inspection Procedures -- TR: BDP V1, Appendix 1 to Annex G; GTM (SFG FY23-007) APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G TO JBSA BASE DEFENSE PLAN: (CUI) COMMERCIAL VEHICLE INSPECTIONS REFERENCES: DTM-09-012, Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-012, “Interim Policy Guidance for DoD Physical Access Control ,” DAFI 31-101, Integrated Defense , DoDM 5200.08v3_AFMAN31- 101v3_AFGM2020-01, Installation Perimeter Access Control , and AF Handbook 10-2401, Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide . 1. (CUI) SITUATION: The immense volume of commercial vehicles entering JBSA presents a potential hazard should an adversary choose to carry out an attack against the installation.

2. (CUI) MISSION: Installation access and circulation control are crucial to BD operations. SF operate a formal commercial vehicle inspection station to preclude probabilities of an adversary introducing unauthorized weapons/explosives/hazardous materials or entry by person(s) intending to commit crimes and/or plan hostile acts against DoD resources or personnel. SF will inspect all commercial vehicles in accordance with higher headquarters directives and instructions prior to allowing entry. 3. (CUI) EXECUTION: 3.1. (CUI) Concept of Operations: Commercial vehicle inspection (CVI) requirements contained in this plan, when executed as stipulated, form the basis for JBSA’s risk related to certain specified adversary tactics. Failure to meet these minimum inspection requirements could have a negative impact on the IDRMP, risk rating, and increase the potential of putting lives and property in jeopardy. 3.1.1. (CUI) A large commercial vehicle is defined as non-government or non-privately owned vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or more. All large commercial vehicles will be inspected at established commercial vehicle inspection areas utilizing at minimum, processes described within this Appendix. Detailed inspection procedures are maintained with each SFS. 3.1.2. (CUI) A standard commercial vehicle is a non-government or non-privately owned vehicle weighing less than 10,000 pounds and is designed for commercial purposes. Examples include floral delivery vehicles, bread vans, plumber/electrician trucks/vans, snack delivery vans, etc. (i.e. any vehicle used for any purpose other than for personal conveyance). Based on the current IDRMP, standard commercial vehicles will not undergo inspections before access to JBSA is granted as a matter of routine, but will be accomplished through the aggressive utilization of designated Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs). Additional inspection parameters may be implemented based upon threat(s), FPCONs or commander directives. (CUI) 3.1.2.1. (CUI) The DFCs, through coordination with the 502 SFG/CC and based on current threat and/or IDRMP results, determine where standard commercial vehicles undergo inspection. 3.1.2.2. (CUI) The DFCs, through coordination with the 502 SFG/CC, determine the level of detail for standard commercial vehicle inspections (e.g. visual inspections of common areas of concealment, detailed inspections of all compartments, use of MWD or use of explosive detection equipment, etc.). 3.1.3. (CUI) The exception to paragraphs 3.1.2. – 3.1.2.2. above is during FPCON Charlie or higher. Under these conditions, all inspections, regardless of commercial vehicle size, will occur at the commercial vehicle inspection area and will be a detailed inspection of the vehicle(s). 3.1.4. (CUI) Inspection processes at commercial vehicle inspection areas: 3.1.4.1. (CUI) Inspection personnel will conduct 100% search/sweep for explosives, contraband, unauthorized persons and other threats on all large commercial vehicles, and standard commercial vehicles when conditions/directives warrant. 3.1.4.2. (CUI) As a minimum, an inspection of the vehicle interior/exterior, trunk/cargo areas, wheel wells, spare tire compartment, under the hood, and the glove box. Detailed inspection procedures will be documented and maintained at each SFS. 3.1.4.3. (CUI) Inspection staffs will verify delivery/pick-up orders for all commercial vehicle/drivers requesting installation entry during FPCON Bravo operations or as directed. Verification will be accomplished by contacting the on-installation destination to verify the need for entry or through properly submitted visit requests from an authorized sponsor. If verification cannot be made, entry is denied. 3.1.4.4. (CUI) Utilize MWD teams and/or explosive detection equipment, if available to support and/or enhance procedures developed from AF Handbook 10-2401, AF Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide. Vehicle operators will open all compartments as directed by the inspector. 3.1.4.5. (CUI) The inspection station staff records information regarding commercial vehicle operators and commercial vehicles entering the installation. The SF operations staff will store information via hard copy and/or electronic means for a period of one year. The following information will be recorded at minimum: 3.1.4.5.1. (CUI) Driver’s name. 3.1.4.5.2. (CUI) Driver’s license number and state of issue. 3.1.4.5.3. (CUI) Installation affiliation.

3.1.4.5.4. (CUI) Destination. 3.1.4.5.5. (CUI) Date/time entered the installation. 3.1.4.5.6. (CUI) Vehicle make, model, year. 3.1.4.5.7. (CUI) License plate of Cab (and trailer if applicable). 3.1.4.5.8. (CUI) Type of trailer (e.g. flatbed, box, type, refrigeration, etc.) 3.1.4.6. (CUI) Ensure all vehicle operators stopped for inspections are checked against installation debarment/suspension rosters and NCIC/TSLs. 3.1.4.7. (CUI) SF members conducting inspections will take the following actions in the event contraband is discovered during the inspection: 3.1.4.7.1. (CUI) Immediately terminate the inspection. 3.1.4.7.2. (CUI) Advise the operator/passenger of their rights according to the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 3.1.4.7.3. (CUI) Attempt to obtain permission to search utilizing an AF Form 1364, Consent for Search. If consent is denied, then pursue Authorization for Search and Seizure through established procedures. Accomplish an Incident Report. 3.2. (CUI) Tasks: 3.2.1. (CUI) 502 SFG/CC: 3.2.1.1. (CUI) Establishes a commercial vehicle inspection station that facilitates thorough inspections of large commercial vehicles away from critical resources and/or mass gathering areas. 3.2.1.2. (CUI) Mandates all large commercial vehicles falling into the definition above are inspected for unauthorized explosives, firearms, or other hazardous materials before permitting access to the installation. 3.2.2. (CUI) DFCs: 3.2.2.1. (CUI) Maintain command and control over all installation access control operations and maintain tactical control (TACON) over all assigned security and Base Defense forces performing vehicle inspection operations. 3.2.2.2. (CUI) Assess and plan commercial vehicle inspection operations. 3.2.2.3. (CUI) Ensure contracting organizations include commercial vehicle inspection requirements into applicable Statements of Work (SOW). 3.2.2.4. (CUI) Develop detailed procedures pursuant to the appendix to ensure thorough inspection of all commercial vehicles at designated commercial vehicle inspection areas. 3.2.2.5. (CUI) Ensure available resources are available to the greatest extent possible for the commercial vehicle inspection process. Where and when available, employ MWD support, explosive detection equipment, in concert with the adherence to developed and systematic detailed inspection processes capable of unpredictable patterns of inspections throughout all FPCONs. 3.2.2.6. (CUI) If deliveries are permitted during FPCON Charlie, require all cleared large commercial vehicles be physically escorted by an authorized escort to intended destinations. Authorized escorts will be performed by the individual/agency expecting the commercial shipment. NOTE: SF will not provide escorts. 3.2.2.7. (CUI) Prohibit commercial vehicle deliveries in FPCON Delta, or as determined by the 502 ABW/CC based on threat(s) or risks involved. 4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT: See Annex D, Appendix 2, Service Support . 5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL: 5.1. (U) Command. See Annex J, Command Relationships . 5.2. (U) Signal. See Annex K, Communications and Information.

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SUBJECT: Guidance-Type Memorandum (SFG FY23-007), “FPCON Commercial Vehicle Inspection Change to Base Defense Plan Vol 1, Appendix 1 to Annex G.” 1.Currently the JBSA Base Defense Plan 31-101, outlines standard Commercial Vehicle Inspection processes utilized up to and including FPCON Alpha, with more stringent and detailed inspection criteria being initiated in FPCON Bravo. Due to FPCON Bravo becoming the baseline force protection condition throughout CONUS, the more detailed inspection procedures will be implemented in FPCON Charlie or higher. The changed paragraph will be as follows: A. Current paragraph to Appendix 1 to Annex G, para 3.1.3.: (CUI) The exception to paragraphs3.1.2. – 3.1.2.2. above is during FPCON Bravo or higher. Under these conditions, all inspections, regardless of commercial vehicle size will occur at the commercial vehicle inspection area and will be a detailed inspection of the vehicle(s). B .Changed paragraph to Appendix 1 to Annex G, para 3.1.3. will read: (CUI) The exception to paragraphs 3.1.2. – 3.1.2.2. above is during FPCON Charlie or higher. Under these conditions, all inspections, regardless of commercial vehicle size will occur at the commercial vehicle inspection area and will be a detailed inspection of the vehicle(s). 2. This change will take effect upon receipt of this GTM and will remain in effect until the 2023 BDPVolume 1 is published later in the year. 4. 902 SFS IAC 4: Know and Perform Apprehension and Detention Procedures -- TR 902 SFS OI 31-001 Chapter 2 para 2.1 - 2.3.7.3 2.1 Apprehension and Detention of Suspects on Randolph. Apprehension is defined as the taking of a person into custody (restraint of free movement) by military members or by SF. The authority to apprehend military members is identified in the Manual for Courts-Martial, Rule 302(b)(1), and Article 7b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). No specific “words or any words” at all need be used “U.S. v. Repp, 23 MJ 589 (AFCMR, 1986).” Telling a suspect to “freeze and get up against a wall” is sufficient, “U.S. v. Walker, 13 MJ 982 (ACMR, 1982).” Apprehending a suspect normally done “by clearly notifying the person to be apprehended that the person is in custody. This notice should be given orally or in writing, but it may be implied by the circumstances” (MRE 302(d) 1.). 2.2. Custody. Custody is the restraint of free movement. An apprehension occurs when a SF member tells a suspect they are under apprehension. Once apprehended and in the custody of the person who affected the apprehension, SF control the movements of an offender. SF are responsible for protecting the health and welfare of all apprehended suspects. 2.3. Holding Cell Procedures. The holding cells are is located in the back room of the Flight Chief office in bldg. 235, and may be used to temporarily house personnel who are under the custody of SF. The on- duty Flight Chief will make the determination if the holding cell should be used in coordination with the Operations Officer. Once the decision to place an individual in the holding cell has been made, the following MUST be accomplished. 2.3.1. A thorough search of the subject and holding cell must be accomplished for any items which may be used to inflict injury to the individual or other personnel. 2.3.2. All personal property will be removed from the subject (i.e., belt, shoes, cell phone, wallet, loose change, lighters, dog tags/necklaces, jewelry, etc.). All items must be inventoried and accounted for via AF Form 52, Evidence Tag . 2.3.3. Once the search is complete and if the individual is cooperative, remove handcuffs. NEVER attach the handcuffs to the holding cell bars or bench. Notify the ECC and Operations Officer when a subject is placed in the holding cell. 2.3.4. Designate an Over-watch for the subject in the holding cell. 15 minute physical checks will be conducted by the Over-watch while there is someone in the holding cell. 2.3.5. Once the subject in custody is released to civil authorities, transfer custody of the subjects using DD Form 2708, Receipt for Inmate or Detained Personnel , and subjects property using AF Form 52.

Lastly, an inspection will be conducted of the holding cell ensuring no contraband, property or evidence was left behind intentionally by the subject. 2.3.6. Restrictions. The holding cells can hold only one (1) subject for no more than 8 hours. If a subject will be in the cell longer than 8 hours due to a delay in processing, final disposition or transportation; notify, 902 Security Forces Operations Officer immediately. If multiple subjects meet the criteria for using the holding cell, contact 902 Security Forces Squadron Operations Superintendent, for guidance. 2.3.7. Emergency Situations . In the event bldg. 235 must be evacuated, the on-duty Flight Chief will: 2.3.7.1. Designate a patrol to remove the subject from the holding cell, handcuff and provide an escort to the designated evacuation area. Ensure the subject is secured in a vehicle and the escort maintains surveillance. 2.3.7.2. Following evacuation, and after the building is deemed safe; ensure the subject is placed back into the holding cell once the building is deemed safe and can be inhabited. Make notifications to 902 Security Forces Squadron Operations Superintendent if the evacuation will be long term. 2.3.7.3. If the subject needs medical attention while in the holding cell, notify the Fire Department for emergency medical response. Escort medical personnel into the holding cell. Notify 902 Security Forces Squadron Operations Superintendent of the medical response. Ensure the proper entry is made in the SF blotter annotating the medical response and final disposition of the response (i.e. treated on scene or transported to medical facility). Notify 902 Security Forces Squadron Operations Superintendent and civilian agency if EMS transport is needed. 5. 902 SFS IAC 5: Know and Perform Assigned Installation Entry Controller Duties -- TR 902 SFS OI 31-001 para Chapter 3 para 3.1 - 3.1.4 3.1. Installation Access Control Duties. JBSA-Randolph has four (4) installation gates: Lindsey Gate/Gate-1 open 24 hours, West Gate/Gate-2 Monday-Friday 0600-1400 inbound traffic/1400-1800 outbound traffic only excluding holidays and AETC Family Days, South Gate/Gate-4, Monday-Friday 0600-1800 excluding holidays and AETC Family Days and East Gate/Gate-3, closed currently. East Gate will be utilized in coordination with the Defense Force Commander or the Operations Support Staff for emergency purposes or when the other three gates are being repaired. Note : The Lindsey Gate is the only authorized location to issue visitor passes after VCC duty hours unless otherwise directed by 902 Security Forces Squadron Operations Superintendent or higher authority. All personnel requesting visitor passes will park their vehicles at the VCC and walk to the Lindsey Gate with all required documents. 3.1.1. Installation Access Controllers will: 3.1.1.1. Ensure status of DBIDS is operational. 3.1.1.2. Remain outside the gate shack to effectively control traffic. 3.1.1.3. Not engage in horseplay, swearing, foul language or any other actions that degrade your professionalism or military bearing. 3.1.1.4. Maintain their radio on their person. Use the gate telephone for official business only (the primary communication is the hand held radio). 3.1.1.5. All personnel requesting visitor passes after the visitor control center (VCC) duty hours will be checked against the JBSA debarment roster and through TLETS. 3.1.1.6. Over-watch duties are mandatory at all times. These duties do not include sitting inside a facility distracted from and unable to provide effective cover your fellow Airmen. There must always be an Over- watch to ensure the safety and security of the IAC. Duties such as cleaning can be completed by a third person or once oncoming forces arrive. Over-watch personnel are there to protect their fellow Airmen and enforce security. 3.1.2. Traffic Calming Devices. Traffic calming devices will be deployed at Lindsey Gate access control point in-bound lanes from 2100 to 0430 daily, to slow approaching vehicle speed. Temporary traffic barriers will be placed in the approved pattern, prescribed in Figure 1.1. Traffic Calming Pattern. This pattern is designed to limit the flow of incoming traffic.

Figure 3.1. Traffic Calming Pattern. 3.1.3. Lane Opening/Closing & Bollard Utilization. Two lanes will always be open 0500-1800 at the Lindsey Gate. During peak traffic hours, the third lane of traffic will be opened 0600-0830 and 1130- 1330 . IAC can use judgement to open a third lane when traffic backs up causing delays. To avoid traffic pattern predictability, ensure Defenders alternate bollard placement. 3.1.3.1 Lindsey Gate (M-F) Bollards will be removed from the outbound lanes due to increased traffic volume and vehicles act as a natural barrier from 0700-1800. Tiger teeth also combat vehicles driving the wrong direction in the outbound lane. 3.1.3.2 West Gate (M-F) Bollards will be removed from the outbound lanes due to increased traffic volume and vehicles act as a natural barrier from 1530-1800. 3.1.3.3 Flight Chiefs may authorize the removal of bollards during increased traffic volume on Saturday, Sundays, special events, down days and holidays. 3.1.4. Vehicle Holding Procedures. In the event the IAC determines a vehicle or vehicle occupants are in need of assistance, has active wants/warrants, or further installation access vetting is needed, the IAC will hold that vehicle in the lane of traffic where initial contact was made until another IAC member not conducting duties or an Installation Patrol arrives on scene to assume control over the persons/vehicle. This will help alleviate the potential for the person driving onto the installation or turning around and departing the installation. 6. 902 SFS IAC 6: Know and Perform Bloodborne Pathogen Exposure Control -- TR: DAFI 31-118, Para 4.40.8. 4.40.8. Bloodborne Pathogen Protective Kit (required in all SF vehicles. Contents of kits and Bloodborne Pathogen Exposure Control Plan are located in SF Training Reference guide, 2 Volume 4 First Responder. Train those personnel determined to have occupational exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens about how to use kit contents. The DFC and installation medical officer will determine other contents of the kit. Remove unit level equipment before turning in vehicle for maintenance. NOTE: Exceptions may include posting/investigation vehicles.

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7. 902 SFS IAC 7: Know Types of Jurisdiction and Examples -- TR: BDP V1, TAB B TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C, para 3.1.5.4.10 - 3.1.5.4.10.2.; Annex E, para 3.2.3., 3.2.4., 3.2.6. 3.1.5.4.10. (CUI) Operationally responsible for Seguin Auxiliary Airfield. The 502 SFG exercises proprietary jurisdiction at the airfield. 3.1.5.4.10.1. (CUI) Share force protection/antiterrorism responsibility for Seguin AUX with the 902 CES/CEF. While on the airfield OSS and CEF personnel will work in concert to perform assigned Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs) as stipulated in the RAM program. 3.1.5.4.10.2. (CUI) In the event an aircraft not designated as PL 1-3 must remain overnight after airfield closure, the BDOC will notify Seguin Police Department and Guadalupe County Sheriff’s Office to request periodic checks. The 12 OSS or MXG will ensure an authorized person remains with the PL-4 aircraft to ensure security requirements are met until coordinating efforts with Seguin PD and Guadalupe County Sheriff’s office are solidified. NOTE: Security forces will not provide static security of PL 4 aircraft remaining overnight at Seguin AUX Airfield. Annex E. 3.2.3. (CUI) Areas near the ends of runway, both on and off JBSA-Randolph, are concurrent jurisdiction. These areas must be marked on BDOC maps used to plot incidents or for SF or BD force dispatch/deployment. 3.2.4. (CUI) The USAF exercises proprietary jurisdiction in Eberle Park on JBSA-Randolph. 3.2.6. (CUI) JBSA Canyon Lake Recreational areas are USAF proprietary jurisdiction. 8. 902 SFS IAC 8: Know and Perform Completion of Forms -- TR: DAFI 31-118, para 5.12. - 5.12.14. 5.12. SF Forms 5.12.1. AF Form 52, Evidence Tag. Use this two-part form to record evidence and maintain a chain of custody, as prescribed in AFI 31-115. 5.12.2. AF Form 53, SF Desk Blotter. Use this form only when the SF Case Management System is unavailable to record a chronology of SF activities during a shift. This documents often contains sensitive investigative or Privacy Act information and must be controlled, as prescribed in AFI 31-115. NOTE: Use of the SF Case Management System is mandatory. 5.12.3. AF Form 75, Visitor/Vehicle Pass. A pass issued to visitors of installations. The AF Form 75 is generally computer generated. 5.12.4. AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log. Provides a log of visitors/and or personnel entering areas which the entry and/or exit is controlled. 5.12.5. AF Form 1168, Statement of Suspect/Witness/Complainant. Use this form to take a written statement from a suspect or accused person, witness or complainant, as prescribed in AFI 31-115. Also, the AF Form 1168 is used to advise an individual of their Article 31/Fifth Amendment privileges. 5.12.6. AF Form 1176, Authority to Search and Seize. Use this form to obtain authorization to search and seize, as prescribed in AFI 31-115. 5.12.7. AF Form 1315, Accident Report. Use this form to record investigations of major traffic accidents, as prescribed in AFMAN 31-116. 5.12.8. AF Form 1361, Pick Up/Restriction Order. Use this form to record facts and provide SF with information about pick-up orders or to place a restriction order on military personnel. 5.12.9. AF Form 1364, Consent for Search and Seizure. Use this form to document when an individual consents freely and voluntarily to a search of his/her person or property, as prescribed in AFI 31-115. 5.12.10. AF Form 3226, Authority to Apprehend in Private Dwelling. Use this form when acquiring authority to make an apprehension in a private on-base dwelling.

5.12.11. AF Form 3907, Security Forces Field Interview Data. Use this form only when the SF Case Management System is unavailable to collect information on suspicious people or individuals contacted during routine operations who do not require any other administrative action, as prescribed in AFI 31-115. 5.12.12. DD Form 460, Provisional Pass. Use this form to assist military personnel in returning to their unit, as prescribed in AFMAN 31-115 VI. 5.12.13. DD Forms 2708, Receipt for Pre-Trial/Post Trial Prisoner or Detained Person. Use this form to transfer prisoners between confinement facilities or to release a detained person to his or her unit commander or representative, as prescribed in AFI 31-115. 5.12.14. AF Form 3545 and 3545/A, Incident Report. The use of the SF Case Management System AF Form 3545A complies with 34 USC § 41303, Uniform Federal Crime Reporting Act of 1988 and is mandatory for all incidents that are NIBRS/DIBRS reportable (T-1). Use this form to record facts about an incident or complaint for the proper military authority, as prescribed in AFI 31-115. Include in the report all available facts, names of personnel involved and a summary of the initial on-scene investigation. 9. 902 SFS IAC 9: Know and Perform Detention and disposition of Civilian Procedures -- TR DAFI 31- 115, para 4.3.2.1 - 4.3.2.1.3., 4.8. - 4.8.1.5. 4.3.2. Detention. See Paragraph 3.5.1 and the definition in the terms section of Attachment 1 . 4.3.2.1. Civilians. The DFC, with the advice of the SJA, will establish local procedures for detaining civilian offenders (who are generally never arrested unless by authorized civilian OSI special agents) and turning them over to other federal or state LE officials for arrest, issuing them a federal citation, a barment, or other legitimate military purpose. (T-1) . Detention time must be limited to a reasonable time necessary to engage with civilian authorities. (T-1) . Detained individuals may be transported to the BDOC or similar location, but may not be transported off of the installation for delivery to a state or local police department or jail. (T-1) . They may, however, be transported to the gate for delivery to a state or local police department or jail. 4.3.2.1.1. Civilians may be detained for offenses committed on a military installation. Civilians may be detained to document information required for National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) entry when a Title 18 U.S.C. Section 922, Unlawful Acts (also cited as the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, or Brady Act ) prohibition has been triggered. Since civilians are not normally subject to the UCMJ, refer civilian violators to a United States Magistrate for judicial disposition, or to the local civil authorities having jurisdiction. For National Guard and Air National Guard members, determine if the member is in federal, state, or civilian status. If the member is in state status, treat as a civilian but detain as necessary until the member can be turned over to their state CoC for disposition. Refer to AFMAN 71-102 for additional guidance. 4.3.2.1.2. For minor offenses, release civilian offenders to their military sponsor. (T-1) . If they do not have a military sponsor, release them to a relative, friend or on their own recognizance. (T-1) . 4.3.2.1.3. Only in coordination with servicing SJA office, and by exception, it is conceivable SF might detain someone in a holding/detention cell pursuant to the installation commander’s inherent authority to protect AF personnel and property. (T-1) . Some rare examples: SF assesses a civilian is under the influence or is mentally unstable, and that the offender poses a physical threat to self or others. In such cases, SF must make reasonable attempts to refer the civilian offender matter to another agency. (T-1) . In addition to local LE, SF and installation authorities should identify and contact other off-base agencies who may be able to assist. Another rare example: SF makes reasonable attempts to have a next of kin or associate recommended by the offender to escort the civilian offender off the installation. For instance, perhaps the civilian offender cannot or will not provide a safe/feasible address where SF can deliver the offender. In such cases, SF might detain the civilian offender (possibly in a holding cell) in the interest of

safety. This is not to be construed as punishment. See Paragraph 4.11 of this AFI for further guidance concerning holding/detention cells. 4.8. Disposition of Civilian Offenders and the United States Magistrate Court . 4.8.1. Permitted SF Law Enforcement Activities for Civilian Offenders. The installation commander’s inherent authority to protect the installation permits SF, as agents of the installation commander, the authority to detain civilians for offenses occurring on the installation. SF may NOT apprehend/arrest civilians. (T-0) . However, SF may detain civilians for a reasonable period of time based on probable cause for the purpose of taking administrative action, such as: 4.8.1.1. Issuing a barment letter, and/or escorting the civilian suspect off of the installation. 4.8.1.2. Documenting information required for NICS entry. SF will document information required for NICS entry whenever a Brady Act prohibition has been triggered. (T-0) . Refer to Paragraph 8.2.8 of this AFI and AFMAN 71-102 for guidance on collecting information to conduct a NICS entry when a Brady Act prohibition has been triggered on civilians. 4.8.1.3. Obtaining positive identification. SF may collect fingerprints from detained civilians for positive identification using the criminal inquiry, see Paragraph 8.2.5.1 SF will not submit a civilian’s fingerprints or DNA for criminal indexing. (T-0) . 4.8.1.4. CONUS installations with exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction may also issue a Central Violations Bureau (CVB) Form 1805, United States District Court Violation Notice , citation for the violation of a misdemeanor offense, in accordance with DoDI 5200.08; AFI 51-206, Use of Magistrate Judges for Trial of Misdemeanors Committed by Civilians ; 18 U.S.C. § 1382; and 50 U.S.C. § 797. 4.8.1.5. SF may also detain civilians for a reasonable period of time, if another LE agency agrees to accept responsibility, and while SF is awaiting said LE agency or civilian authorities to arrive. DFC will pursue an MOU with local LE agencies in advance and will work with the installation commander and the servicing SJA office to establish MOU. (T-1) . See the MOU template at Attachment 2 . 10. 902 SFS IAC 10: Know and Perform Installation Entry and Exit Vehicle Checks -- TR DAFI 31-115, Para 5.8.; BDP V1 para 3.1.17 5.8. Random Installation Entry/Exit Vehicle Checks . Installation commanders may order SF to inspect all or a percentage of motor vehicles/property entering or leaving the installation per AFMAN 31-101 Volume 3, Installation Perimeter Access Control ; AFI 31-101; 18 U.S.C. § 1382; and MRE 313(b) and 314 (c). Random installation entry/exit vehicle checks are ordered at a specific ratio (e.g., every fifth vehicle entering or outgoing) by the installation commander. The purpose of an entry/exit check is to prevent introduction of weapons and other contraband, as well as to prevent the loss of classified information or government property. If a vehicle operator refuses to comply with a random entry/exit vehicle check, SF will conduct a walk-around inspection of the vehicle to look for any probable cause in plain view (e.g., classified cover sheet, drug paraphernalia, weapon, etc.). (T-1) . If evidence is discovered to use as a foundation for a search request, SF must obtain authorization to search from the proper authorities (normally the installation commander). (T-0) . If there is no probable cause for a search, SF will hold the individual and contact the SJA for further advice. (T-0) . BDP V1 3.1.17. (CUI) Delegates to the 502 SFG/CC the authority to establish and implement the Random Installation Entry/Exit Vehicle Checks (RIEVC) for JBSA. 11. 902 SFS IAC 11: Know and Understand Searches and Seizures -- TR DAFI 31-115, Para 5.1. - 5.6.3.2.

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5.1. Jurisdictional Authority to Search . SF may conduct searches on-base or off-base whether CONUS or OCONUS in accordance with federal law, federal regulations, DoD policy (and applicable international agreements when OCONUS). Whether on or off the installation, SF must conduct all searches under the appropriate search authorization authority. (T-0) . Procedures for searches conducted in privatized housing will be established at the local level in accordance with local and state laws. 5.1.1. Search Authorization. A search authorization is an express permission, written or oral, issued by competent military authority to search a person or an area for specific property, evidence or for a specific person; and to seize such property, evidence or person. Search authorizations are based upon probable cause and describe the person, place or thing to be searched and specific objects being sought. When practical, a search authorization (without the affidavit) should be shown to the concerned parties at the scene. SF should always attempt to obtain a search authorization. SF will complete a search authorization via AF Form 1176, Authority to Search and Seize, accompanied by an affidavit of probable cause. (T-1) . An AF Form 1176 should be completed before the search. (T-1) . A verbal authorization may be sought in exceptional cases in which preparing the AF Form 1176 with affidavit is impractical, or during exigent circumstances where the delay could result in the loss or destruction of evidence. In these cases, the AF Form 1176 with affidavit must be completed as soon as possible following the execution of the search and maintained in the investigative case file. (T-1) . 5.1.1.1. Search Affidavit. A search affidavit is a statement of “probable cause,” sworn under oath, supporting the request for authorization to search and seize. This affidavit must be completed by the person requesting search authority and, if presented telephonically, and after being sworn by oath administered by the attorney assigned to the servicing SJA office, must be read word-for-word to an attorney assigned to the servicing SJA office. (T-1) . After coordinating with the SJA, SF will read the affidavit (if presented telephonically) word-for-word to the military search authority authorized to order the search. (T-1) . This will ensure each party was given identical information. The best practice is for the request to be completed face-to-face (both for SJA coordination and search granting authority request), in which case the SJA representative and search granting authority can read the AF Form 1176 and affidavit. In cases where requests are presented over the telephone, it should be done through a conference call. (T- 1) . In cases where time is critical (e.g., to prevent loss of evidence), the person requesting the search authority may orally relay the probable cause information and complete the AF Form 1176 and affidavit as soon as possible, but no later than one duty day. (T-1) . The affidavit must still contain the same information which was relayed to the SJA and the search granting authority. (T-1) . 5.1.1.2. On-Base Search Authority. In accordance with AFI 51-201, para 5.1, only military judges and qualified commanders have authority to grant search authorizations. SF will coordinate with the servicing SJA for all probable cause searches. (T-1) . 5.1.2. Search Warrant. A search warrant is an express written permission, issued by a competent civilian authority, to search and seize personnel or property. Because search authorizations and search warrants refer to different concepts and are subject to different rules, personnel must maintain the distinction between them. (T-1) . The terms are not interchangeable. 5.1.2.1. Off-Base Search Authority (United States, possessions and territories). SF members cannot personally obtain search authority/warrants to search off-base quarters of military personnel. The installation commander’s authority to search does not apply off-base. Search warrants for off-base searches may be obtained and executed by civil authorities (federal or state) and, in some circumstances, civilian OSI special agents. SF members may participate in an off-base search, if requested to assist by the civil authorities, and where there is a federal interest (i.e., subject to the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act). SF members must be aware of the scope of the search by civil authorities. (T-0) . If a member subject to the UCMJ gives written consent for a SF member to search their quarters, a search may be conducted without a search warrant. SF will use AF Form 1364, Consent for Search and Seizure , to document this permission, and maintain in the investigative case file. (T-1) . 5.1.2.2. Off-Base Search Authority OCONUS. Searches of off-base homes and property depend upon local agreements between the United States and the HN where American personnel are stationed. The commander of an AF installation issues procedures for off-base searches in a foreign country, with the

advice of the local servicing SJA. Off-base searches of persons not subject to the UCMJ are the concerns of local authorities, unless otherwise stated in local directives or agreements. 5.1.3. Search and Seizure in Postal Channels. Searches in postal channels require very specific handling. After letters and parcels have gone through the postal service and have been delivered, they become the personal property of the person receiving them. As personal property, mail is subject to search and seizure in any legal manner. While in postal channels, mail may be searched and seized following authorization from the Postal District Magistrate. In all cases contact the servicing SJA for further guidance. 5.2. Search . A search is an examination of a person, place or thing with a view toward discovery of evidence of a crime (e.g., stolen goods, burglary tools, weapons) or criminal intent. SF personnel conduct searches of persons, places or things within legal limitations. A NCIC and III check will be conducted prior to all planned investigative activities involving search of subjects/sources or their property, including a subject interview, to confirm any NICS prohibitions or protective orders. (T-1) . Searches will be conducted in accordance with this instruction. SF personnel will comply with the SFTRGs (on SMARTNet) and AFI 31-117, in preparing for searches and ensuring officer safety. (T-1) . 5.2.1. Illegal Searches. Evidence obtained in an illegal search may be inadmissible at a court-martial or other legal proceedings. SF who conduct unreasonable or illegal searches may be subject to discipline, criminal prosecution, judicial proceedings, and civil action for damages. 5.2.2. Personnel Searches. 5.2.2.1. SF will conduct searches in accordance with AFMAN 31-115 Volume 1. (T-1) . 5.2.2.2. Stop and Frisk. SF may stop another person temporarily when the SF member has information or observes unusual conduct that leads them reasonably to conclude, in light of their experience, that that criminal activity has been, is being, or may be committed by a suspect. The purpose of the stop must be investigatory in nature. (T-0) . When a lawful stop is performed, the person stopped may be frisked for weapons. Contraband or evidence located in the process of a lawful frisk may be seized. Note: The SF member stopping a person must be able to point to specific facts or circumstances even though the level of suspicion need not rise to that of the belief that is supported by probable cause. (T-0) . A reasonable suspicion is more than a hunch. 5.2.3. Property or Premise Searches. SF must conduct property or premises searches where objects sought could reasonably be found (e.g., if searching a room for a Big Screen TV, looking inside a small drawer would be unreasonable; confine the search to those areas where the TV could be located). (T-0) . The search ends when the object being sought is located or cannot be located in the place designated for search. 5.2.4. Common Area Search. A common area search is an examination of a common area such as a dayroom in a dormitory. A common area is an area which is available for use by more than one person. Any questions concerning what is considered common area should be directed to the SJA prior to conducting the search. 5.2.5. Confinement Search. A confinement search is an examination of the location where prisoners or detained personnel are held. Conduct confinement searches in accordance with AFMAN 31-115 Volume 1, Air Force Corrections System . 5.3. Probable Cause Search . Probable cause to search exists when there is a reasonable belief that the person, property or evidence sought is located in the place or on the person to be searched. 5.3.1. Probable cause searches may be granted by the proper search granting authority as defined in AFI 51-201. SF must coordinate with the servicing SJA office to request authority for probable cause searches, to ensure legal compliance. (T-1) . To document a probable cause statement for purposes of search and seizure, SF will either capture the probable cause statement in an affidavit of probable cause, attached to an AF Form 1176; or on bond paper and attached to a report. (T-1) . 5.3.2. Most searches require probable cause (reasonable belief) or consent to be valid. There are unique situations where SF do not need probable cause such as when entering certain controlled or restricted areas.

5.3.3. When justified, the manner and extent of the search are commensurate with the reason for the search. 5.3.4. Normally, SF do not conduct a probable cause search based solely upon the statement of one individual. The search authority may grant a search authorization if the reporting individual is considered to be particularly trustworthy or reliable. The credibility and trustworthiness of a witness is one important factor when requesting a probable cause search, especially if the information forming the basis of the search comes from one witness. SF should take care to document in a search authorization request why the witness is considered credible. (T-0) . 5.4. Search Incident to Apprehension (On or Off the Installation) . Under the Fourth Amendment, LE may search, incident to the arrest, the area within an arrestee’s immediate control for weapons or destructible evidence. The area within the person’s “immediate control” is the area which the individual searching could reasonably believe that the person apprehended could reach with a sudden movement to obtain such property. Any questions concerning what is considered immediate area over which the apprehended/detained person exercises control should be directed to SJA office prior to conducting the search. (T-1) . 5.5. Motor Vehicle Searches Incident to a Lawful Stop . When a person lawfully stopped is the driver or a passenger in a motor vehicle, the passenger compartment of the vehicle may be searched for weapons if the SF member who made the stop has a reasonable belief that the person stopped is dangerous and that the person stopped may gain immediate control of a weapon. Furthermore, SF members may search an entire operable vehicle, including the trunk, without the need to obtain a search authorization/warrant, if they have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. 5.6. Search with Consent . Consent to search should be in writing, but may also be verbal. Verbal consent should be witnessed by a reliable second party, preferably another SF member. (T-1) . SF will ensure notes detailing the time, date, circumstances of consent, and what is being searched for (e.g. contraband, photographs, or weapons) are documented and included with the report. (T-1) . If possible, obtain the written documentation as soon as possible after the verbal consent; use AF Form 1364 if available. When the AF Form 1364 is not available, written consent may be given in any format or on any available material. Such written consent may be valid provided it indicates it was freely and voluntarily given and indicates the time, date, individual(s), and place(s) to be searched. Ensure the individual reads their absolute right to give consent to a search. (T-1) . SF must inform them that they can withdraw their consent to search at any time. (T-1) . SF will ensure the individual understands that if they consent to a search, anything found in the search can be used against them in a criminal trial or in any other disciplinary or administrative proceeding. (T-1) . SF will ensure the individual understands that, if they do not consent, a search cannot be made without a search authorization, search warrant, or other authorization recognized by law. (T-1) . However, regardless of consent from one individual with standing at a residence, if a second individual with standing refuses to consent to the search, the residence cannot be searched (e.g., wife consents and husband refuses consent). 5.6.1. SF must positively identify the non-consenting party. (T-0) . This can be done by their presence at the residence, the party reporting to the BDOC/ECC or through contact with an SF patrol. SF do not have to contact both parties to obtain a consent. 5.6.2. Before asking incriminating questions, the law may require rights advisement before, during or after requesting or receiving consent to a search, depending upon if and when the individual becomes a "suspect" and the particular investigative circumstances. Note: See Chapter 6 for more information on rights advisement. 5.6.3. In cases where consent might be revoked before seized evidence can be properly processed/searched for example, urine or blood samples for blood alcohol content testing, computers, cellular phones or other electronic equipment needing special processing, SF will not inform the consenting person of the existence of the search authorization, if a search authorization has been secured. (T-1) . If consent is refused or is withdrawn, SF will notify the individual of the existence of the search authorization and continue with the search. (T-1) .

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5.6.3.1. SF may request consent to search even after a suspect requests a lawyer or decides to remain silent. (United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467 [1977]). 5.6.3.2. Unless otherwise required, SF are not required to advise a suspect of his or her right to counsel prior to seeking consent to search. Refusal to provide an answer will be considered a declination of consent. 12. 902 SFS IAC 12: Know and Understand SF Surveillance Detection Program -- TR JBSA BDP V1, Annex N para 3.1 - 3.4 ANNEX N TO JBSA BASE DEFENSE PLAN: (CUI) RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE 3.1. (CUI) Concept of Operations: The primary points of concern regarding pre-operational threat activities are JBSA ECPs and certain points along each location Base Boundary (BB) that afford the advantage of cover or concealment to adversaries conducting pre-operational surveillance activities. While SF have an active role in detecting reconnaissance or surveillance activity, all JBSA members, to include civilian employees and family members, are vital to successful detection. Executing an effective reconnaissance and surveillance detection program has a direct bearing on an adversary's ability to effectively plan attacks against JBSA and can be a primary contributor to the operating environment. 3.2. (CUI) SF and BD forces will execute this annex as determined by the DFCs. Operations may also be included into the JBSA location Random Antiterrorism Measure (RAM) program administration. 3.3. (CUI) The objectives of the surveillance detection program is to record the activities of persons behaving in a suspicious manner and to provide this information in a format useable by the appropriate law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 3.4. (CUI) Depending upon the circumstances or trends, the Threat Working Group (TWG) may determine the need for more specialized counter surveillance measures to assure installation protection. 13. 902 SFS IAC 13: Know and Understand JBSA Vehicle Policies and Emergency Driving Operations -- TR JBSAI 31-001, Para 10.5 and 10.8 14. 902 SFS IAC 14: Know and conduct Identity Proofing Authorized Credentials TR: JBSAI 31-1131, para 2.9 - 2.9.1.3 & 2.10.1.11. 2.9. Identity Proofing Authorized Credentials. As a closed installation, issuance of access credentials is limited to; proper identity proofing, successful fitness determination and a valid need to access the installation. Access is granted to personnel who successfully meet the above requirements. Access credentials may be revoked at any time at the direction of the Installation Commander. During increases in FPCONs, supplemental identification may be required or general access significantly restricted. Personnel are always required to carry authorized credentials while on the installation. Possession of authorized credentials does not provide inherent escort or sponsor authority. Personnel are subject to intermittent identification and credential checks as directed by the Installation Commander. Personnel must immediately report a lost or stolen access credential to the Security Forces Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) located at either Lackland, Fort Sam Houston, or Randolph. BDOCs will input lost/stolen credentials into DBIDS systems upon obtaining notice. 2.9.1. Pre-approved identity Credentials must comply with the standards for installation access as directed by DoDM-5200.08_Volume 3_AFMAN 31-101_Volume 3, Installation Perimeter Access Control [Enclosure 1 – Establishing Identity] to be considered an authorized pre-approved identity credential.

2.9.1.1. While in the performance of official duties, Federal, Tribal, State, and local law enforcement officials with current police credentials (badge and department photo identification) may use those credentials for access. Emergency services personnel (police, fire, and emergency medical services) responding to an emergency may be allowed onto JBSA locations without proofing and vetting. 2.9.1.2. Individuals under 18 years of age, without a state-issued driver’s license, state identification card or authorized credentials per DoDM-5200.08_Volume 3_AFMAN 31-101_Volume 3, may use a school record or report card, daycare or nursery school record or original/certified copy of a birth certificate issued by an authorized government agency bearing an official seal. 2.9.1.3. Prohibited Use of Pre-approved Identity Credentials: Pre-approved identity credentials that are not issued for the specific purpose of engaging in commercial enterprise, are prohibited for use in furtherance of commercial gain or to facilitate installation access for the purpose of enabling a commercial enterprise. Authorized credential holders are considered contractors or vendors for the purpose of entering for a commercial/financial enterprise and must obtain an approved contractor or vendor access credential. ( Example: A retiree with an approved retired credential may not use that credential to access the installation while performing duties as a pizza delivery driver.) 2.10.1.11. TWIC can be used as a source identity document when combined with a driver’s license that is not Real ID compliant. Both documents must bear the same name and photograph. 15. 902 SFS IAC 15: Know and understand Types of Access on JBSA TR: JBSAI 31-1131, para 2.14. - 2.14.4.6. 2.14. Types of Access onto Joint Base San Antonio. 2.14.1. Types of access onto JBSA. Access to JBSA may occur under one of three processes or types: Unescorted, Trusted Traveler, and escorted. Each process requires a specific set of requirements to be implemented across the JBSA enterprise in a consistent, uniform and predictable manner to facilitate authorized access. 2.14.2. Unescorted Access . Unescorted access requires personnel to establish their identity, obtain a favorable fitness determination, and have an acceptable purpose for their presence on JBSA. 2.14.2.1. To be granted unescorted access to JBSA, an individual must establish their identity by presenting an “acceptable credential” identified within paragraph 3.9.1 or paragraph 3.10 of this instruction. Unescorted access to JBSA is the most common form of visitor access permissions granted. 2.14.2.2. For an acceptable credential to meet required unescorted access standards, the credential(s) must: 2.14.2.2.1. Be original and current. 2.14.2.2.2. Not contain markings indicating the credential is “Not Valid for Federal Purposes” or similar verbiage indicating the credential cannot be used as federal identification. 2.14.2.2.3. In instances where a driver’s license issued by proper authority is used as identity proofing documentation, the driver’s license must abide by the provisions outlined in paragraph 2.10.1.7 above and as stipulated in DoDM-5200.08_Volume 3_AFMAN 31-101_Volume 3, Installation Perimeter Access Control [Enclosure 1]. 2.14.2.2.4. Access to JBSA with an approved credential that does not accurately depict the intended purpose of the visit is prohibited. ( Example: An individual possessing a valid Retiree Identification Card and using that credential for JBSA access for the purpose of performing actions as a Realtor or other private enterprise is not authorized access with the Retiree ID card.) This practice is a violation of DoDM 1000.13-M-V1 , DoD Identification (ID) Cards: ID Card Life-Cycle . 2.14.2.3. Establishing fitness for unescorted access to JBSA is prescribed in DoDM 5200.08_Volume 3_AFMAN 31-101_Volume 3, Installation Perimeter Access Control [Enclosure 2]. 2.14.2.3.1. Fitness for unescorted access onto JBSA consists of two separate elements: historical fitness and current fitness.

2.14.2.3.1.1. Historic fitness is determined, at a specific point in time, through review of an individual’s criminal history supplied from an approved authoritative database such as the NCIC III and relevant criminal justice systems or through previously established adjudication processes. Additional information regarding historic fitness determinations for unescorted access may be located within DoDM- 5200.08_Volume 3_AFMAN 31-101_Volume 3, Installation Perimeter Access Control. 2.14.2.3.1.2. Current fitness for unescorted access onto JBSA is determined through a recurring and continuing basis by authorized personnel identified in paragraph 2.15 of this instruction or through utilization of automated systems such as the Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) as credentials are scanned. Fitness reviews involve the screening of NCIC, III, the Terrorist Screening Database, JBSA Debarment Rosters and other relevant criminal justice systems. 2.14.2.3.2. Access to JBSA by any individual appearing on any U.S. Government Terrorist Watch is strictly prohibited. 2.14.2.4. Establishing purpose for unescorted access to JBSA is established by: 2.14.2.4.1. Presentation and validation of acceptable credential. 2.14.2.4.2. Presentation of bills of lading or event invitations. These documents may be in either electronic or hardcopy form. 2.14.2.4.3. Listed within trusted DoD systems such as, but not limited to, the Carrier Appointment System (CAS). 2.14.2.4.4. Guest lists, pick-up and delivery lists and other appointment lists. 2.14.2.4.5. Verbal discussion between the individual requesting access and the Security Forces member controlling access. 2.14.2.4.6. Once an individual’s identity, fitness and purpose are qualified, validated and approved, the individual will be issued a DBIDS access credential (either card or paper) by the servicing Visitor Control Center (VCC) or capable Installation Access Control Point (IACP). 2.14.3. Trusted Traveler Access . The trusted traveler program is an accepted DoD program allowing authorized individuals who have been granted unescorted access, based on low-or medium risk verified credentials as defined IAW DoDM5200.08_Volume 3_AFMAN 31-101_Volume 3, Installation Perimeter Access , Table 3, that permits the holder to simultaneously vouch for co-travelers (in the same vehicle or accompanied on foot) and enable those co-travelers to obtain trusted traveler access. The 502 ABW/CC authorizes trusted traveler access to JBSA provided the below provisions are adhered to. The 502 ABW/CC will suspend and/or terminate trusted traveler access to JBSA during periods of increased Force Protection Condition (FPCON) CHARLIE or higher, implementation of appropriate Health Protection Conditions (HPCONs) or other instances where the health, safety, and/or welfare of the JBSA community would be deemed at risk should trusted traveler processes continue. Suspension of trusted traveler access may occur with little notice or warning to the public. Anytime trusted traveler process is suspended, access will be permitted through established unescorted access or escorted access requirements as stipulated in paragraph 2.14.2 and paragraph 2.14.4 of this instruction. 2.14.3.1. The trusted traveler process requires the authorized individual to have knowledge of the co traveler sufficient enough to vouch for the identity, fitness, and purpose for base access of the co traveler(s). Authorized individuals may vouch for up to 5 individuals in the same vehicle or two individuals while on foot. Trusted traveler program does not apply to individuals traveling in separate vehicles. Trusted traveler does not apply for foreign nationals. 2.14.3.2. When trusted-travelers are not otherwise authorized unescorted access, the co-traveler must remain with the authorized individual for the duration they are on JBSA. Additionally, authorized individuals will be personally accountable for the conduct of the trusted traveler while on the installation and are responsible for ensuring the co-traveler departs the installation. 2.14.3.3. The JBSA trusted traveler program will be suspended anytime the DBIDS electronic physical access control system (ePACS) is non-operational at any or all locations of JBSA except for uniformed military personnel. Additional suspension circumstances of Trusted Traveler are contained within DoDM- 5200.08_Volume 3_AFMAN 31-101_Volume 3, Installation Perimeter Access Control.

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2.14.3.3.1. Any time the DBIDS system is inoperable, trusted travelers will be processed through unescorted access or escorted access requirements as stipulated in this instruction via the appropriate Visitor Control Center (VCC) or capable Installation Access Control Point (IACP). 2.14.3.4. Trusted travelers must be prepared to establish their identity, fitness, and purpose through presentation of acceptable credentials identified in paragraph 2.10 of this instruction upon request by JBSA Security Forces members. 2.14.4. Escorted Access. Individuals unable to meet the identity or fitness requirements for trusted traveler or under unescorted access may be granted escorted access. Escorted access requires an acceptable purpose for being on JBSA to be established before entry is authorized. 2.14.4.1. Provisions for Escorted Access to JBSA. Escorted access is implemented for those individuals unable to fulfill the requirements established in DoDM-5200.08_Volume 3_AFMAN 31 101_Volume 3, Installation Perimeter Access Control and prove identity or fitness. 2.14.4.2. For escorted access to be permitted on any location within JBSA, the organization or individual responsible for sponsoring (i.e. the escort), or otherwise associated with the visitor, must physically escort the visitor and remain within reasonable visual contact with the visitor throughout the visitors stay on JBSA. At the conclusion of the visit, the sponsoring organization and/or escort must escort the visitor off JBSA. 2.14.4.2.1. Authorized escorts of visitors may escort from separate vehicles (e.g. the visitor operating their own vehicle and the escort their own vehicle). Visitors under these circumstances must check-in to the appropriate VCC or IACP to verify driver’s license and insurance before escorted entry is authorized. Visitors may not be in more than one vehicle while under escort by a single individual while on JBSA. The accepted vehicle ratio is one escort for one vehicle of visitors (not to exceed a total of 5 visitors). If more than one vehicle is necessary for visitors, then an equal number of authorized escorts are required. 2.14.4.3. Escorts must report any conduct by the visitor that is deemed suspicious, detrimental to the safety and order of the JBSA community. The servicing location’s SFS will be notified of any incident that risks the safety and welfare of the JBSA community immediately. 2.14.4.4. Any escort functioning on behalf of an organization or through personal needs must be a U.S. citizen and be authorized unescorted access IAW DoDM-5200.08_Volume 3_AFMAN 31 101_Volume 3, Installation Perimeter Access Control , to JBSA. 2.14.4.5. Escorts are not authorized to escort more than 5 visitors at any one time onto any JBSA location. 2.14.4.6. DBIDS Card or pass holders CANNOT escort or vouch for personnel unless they have been granted escort authority and it is indicated on the DBIDS card or pass. Escort approval authority for DBIDS card or pass is the 502 SFG/CC or designee. All requests seeking escort authority will be coordinated through the 502 SFG. 16. 902 SFS IAC 16. Know and Perform Political Asylum Procedures TR: JBSA 31-101/Base Defense Plan, Volume 1, APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX G, para 1 - 3.2.2.6. APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX G TO JBSA BASE DEFENSE PLAN: (CUI) POLITICAL ASYLUM (SEVEN BRBDGES) 1. (CUI) SITUATION: A person requests political asylum/temporary refuge and/or expresses a desire to defect from another nation while under the jurisdiction of JBSA (on the installation). 2. (CUI) MISSION: To provide a secure environment for persons requesting political asylum/temporary refuge and ensure appropriate Federal agencies are notified. 3. (CUI) EXECUTION: 3.1. (CUI) Concept of Operations. This appendix includes information to guide JBSA personnel in protecting those seeking asylum and to minimize information released while under JBSA control. This appendix may be implemented in conjunction with other actions or contingencies. 3.2. (CUI) Tasks. 3.2.1. (CUI) Individual initially contacted will:

3.2.1.1. (CUI) Calmly isolate the person requesting asylum and obtain the person’s name and nationality (if possible). 3.2.1.2. (CUI) Notify BDOC, SFS/S2, and/or AFOSI/11 FIS. Relay only the term SEVEN BRBDGES and provide location. 3.2.1.3. (CUI) DO not allow anyone to speak to or have access to the asylum requesting person except AFOSI/11FIS or other personnel authorized specifically by the 502 ABW/CC. 3.2.2. (CUI) BDOC or SFS/S2 will: 3.2.2.1. (CUI) Notify the AFOSI/11 FIS duty agent. Other than identifying who is calling, state only “I have a SEVEN BRBDGES, I say again SEVEN BRBDGES.” 3.2.2.2. (CUI) Brief and dispatch the flight sergeant/flight chief to transport the requestor to BDOC. Request permission from the requestor to allow a simple frisk prior to transport. If the individual does not agree, do not transport to BDOC. Keep the individual at the contact location and maintain an SF presence with the individual pending arrival of other authority such as AFOSI/11 FIS. 3.2.2.3. (CUI) Provide a secure environment for the individual in an interview room at BDOC if transport occurred. Inform the individual an “installation official” is coming to speak with him/her. Do not mention the term AFOSI or other authority by position or title. 3.2.2.4. (CUI) Maintain discreet security protection of the requestor. 3.2.2.5. (CUI) Requests for information by anyone, including the media, will be referred to AFOSI and the 502 ABW/PA. 3.2.2.6. (CUI) If the person requesting asylum decides to leave prior to AFOSI arrival, do not attempt to restrain unless he/she has committed an offense requiring further investigation. However, attempt to maintain visual contact until off the installation. 17. 902 SFS IAC 17: Know and Perform SAFE HAVEN, SAFE REFUGE, and SECURE HOLDING AREA procedures TR: JBSA 31-101/Base Defense Plan, Volume 2, APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX A, para 1 - 3.1.2.7., and 3.1.2.8.3 - 3.1.7.2. APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX A TO JBSA BASE DEFENSE PLAN: (CUI) SAFE HAVEN, SAFE REFUGE, AND SECURE HOLDING AREA 1. (CUI) SITUATION: Departments of Defense, Energy, and Transportation have entered into agreements to support the movement of certain classes of arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E) and classified material by agreeing to provide security of the shipment and associated logistical support during any transportation disruption where the safety or security of the shipment may be in jeopardy. While the term SAFE HAVEN traditionally refers to DOE nuclear material shipments, the term might be used by non-DOE transporters to request support for other categories of AA&E (such as classified or sensitive munitions) or classified material. 1.1. (CUI) As used in this appendix, the term SAFE HAVEN refer to DOE shipments. The term Safe Refuge/Safe Hold refers to conventional, classified or sensitive munitions shipments. SAFE HAVEN/Safe Refuge/Secure Hold requests can be initiated in several ways; from a DoD and/or DOE higher headquarters notification to a request at the gate from an individual truck driver. This appendix provides emergency support requirements when a SAFE HAVEN/Safe Refuge/Secure Hold support is requested on JBSA. 1.2. (CUI) Assumptions: 1.2.1. (CUI) A direct request from a driver is based on a mechanical problem or actual/perceived threat to the cargo or the transportation process. Threats can consist of (but are not limited to) suspicious activity, actual or potential hostile events, natural disasters, hazardous road or adverse weather conditions, equipment breakdown, and other emergency circumstances which warrant the immediate entry to JBSA, or response support from JBSA forces to an off installation situation. When the shipment is off

installation, the 502 ABW/CC, in consultation with the 502 ABW/JA and the DFCs, will determine if off installation action/response is warranted. 1.2.2. (CUI) DOE couriers making SAFE HAVEN requests will normally have organic security forces, and will maintain custody and security of the resource. 1.2.3. (CUI) DOE couriers of materials that do not require organic security force support will explain security requirements, and may or may not request temporary transfer of custody (CUI) (for purposes of sleep, sanitation, etc.). The DFC will comply with security force support requirements to the best of his/her ability. Should requested support not be available for any reason, the 502 ABW/CC will request guidance from HQ AETC. 1.2.4. (CUI) Security support for non-DOE carrier requests will be provided based on the category of cargo, in accordance with DoD 5100.76-M, Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives , and DAFI 31-101, Integrated Defense . 1.3. (CUI) Limiting Factors: Availability of emergency response personnel at the time of the request/requirement. 2. (CUI) MISSION: Provide necessary security and logistical support to requests for SAFE HAVEN, Safe Refuge, or Secure Holding area support. 3. (CUI) EXECUTION: 3.1. (CUI) Concept of Operations: Upon request for SAFE HAVEN, Safe Refuge, or Secure Holding, the 502 ABW/CC will direct appropriate measures to verify the requirement and accomplish tasks outlined below. Once the requirement is verified, JBSA forces will ensure security of the supported resource until such time as the carrier is able to resume transport operations. 3.1.1. (CUI) Due to population density in the area of JBSA-Fort Sam Houston, all attempts will be made to facilitate SAFE HAVEN, Safe Refuge and Secure Holding requests at JBSA-Lackland or JBSA- Randolph only. 3.1.2. (CUI) Standards for JBSA’s SAFE HAVEN support to DOE: 3.1.2.1. (CUI) The 502 ABW/CP will receive prior notification of in-coming DOE shipments. The 502 ABW/CP will notify the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center for verification. This information will be passed to the SFS/BDOC, 502 ABW/SE and the ECC. 3.1.2.2. (CUI) DOE transport drivers may directly request SAFE HAVEN based on mechanical problems, hostile acts or other emergencies. After verifications are accomplished, JBSA will provide required security and logistics support. 3.1.2.3. (CUI) JBSA will provide SAFE HAVEN support to authorized DOE couriers transporting DOE cargo, i.e. nuclear weapons/components, SNMs, or other classified materials when needed. 3.1.2.4. (CUI) When a decision is made to seek a SAFE HAVEN, DOE will provide all pertinent information related to the request to either the installation, the 502 ABW/CP directly or through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (CUI) (DTRA). If information is relayed directly to the installation, the 502 SFG/CC will notify 502 ABW/CP and 502 ABW/CC. 3.1.2.5. (CUI) Provide a temporary holding area for DOE transport carriers and their cargo. 3.1.2.6. (CUI) Assume temporary responsibility for the security of the transport carrier(s) and cargo if DOE couriers are to become incapacitated. 3.1.2.7. (CUI) Provide security, fire services, medical, communications, and logistic support and any other emergency assistance available. In the event of an accident, DOE shall retain responsibilities as the lead coordinating agency. 3.1.2.8.3. (CUI) JBSA-Randolph: 3.1.2.8.3.1. (CUI) Primary Route: Enter the installation via the South Gate and park the vehicle inside the gate. 902 SFS personnel will secure the South Gate once the vehicle has entered and cones will be placed around the vehicle. SFS personnel will secure the area and wait the arrival of the Cargo Movement Element (CME) and munitions personnel. After release to the CME and/or munitions personnel, escort the vehicle directly to the NMSA. Departure is completed in reverse sequence.

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3.1.2.8.3.2. (CUI) Alternate Route: Enter the installation via the East Gate and park the vehicle inside the gate along the perimeter road. The gate will be secured once the vehicle has entered and parked. SFS will secure the area and await the arrival of CME and (CUI) munitions personnel. After release to CME and/or munitions, escort the vehicle directly to the NMSA. Departure is in reverse order. NOTE: Vehicle may not be parked on perimeter road during flying operations. The Fire Department “burn pit” training area will be used. 3.1.2.8.3.3. (CUI) The designated parking area for these vehicles is the NMSA inner-area road between building 1127 and 1124. 3.1.2.9. (CUI) DOE will remove the shipment from JBSA as soon as possible. 3.1.3. (CUI) If the DOE SAFE HAVEN/Safe Refuge/Secure Hold request is submitted down channel via higher headquarters, the 502 ABW/CP will notify the appropriate BDOC, 502 SFG/CC and 502 ABW leadership. 3.1.4. (CUI) If request is initiated at an installation ECP, BDOC will implement immediate response actions and notify the 502 ABW/CP. 3.1.5. (CUI) If the SAFE HAVEN/Safe Refuge/Secure Hold is requested pursuant to an on-going hostile action that follows the carrier to the installation, the 502 ABW/CC will declare FPCON DELTA, and appropriate measures implemented. 3.1.6. (CUI) Drivers requesting SAFE HAVEN/Safe Refuge/Secure Hold due to suspected/actual hostile attack will enter one of the pre-approved gates identified above. NOTE: Because of the location along major interstate highway, JBSA-Fort Sam Houston could possibly receive a SAFE HAVEN/Safe Refuge/Secure Hold request under these circumstances. Supporting a SAFE HAVEN may, if determined by the 502 ABW/CC, required additional SF support from the 802/902 SFS. 3.1.6.1. (CUI) Immediately escort the shipment to a location out of sight from off-installation before processing actions begin. 3.1.6.2. (CUI) Location(s) of staging will be dependent on circumstances surrounding the event. The most direct route from the designated staging area to the holding area will occur to secure the shipment following processing. 3.1.7. (CUI) Upon notification of a SAFE HAVEN/Safe Refuge/Secure Hold request, BDOC will immediately implement a SF key personnel recall and simultaneously dispatch patrols to the installation ECP to meet the carrier. Depending on the nature of the request, the 502 ABW/CC will consider increased FPCONs. 3.1.7.1. (CUI) If the request is made as a result of suspicious activity or any type of hostile act, the carrier will be led by SF patrol to a position just inside the active barrier system, or a location deemed secure. Once the carrier has cleared the barriers, the barriers will be raised. When the security situation is stabilized, (CUI) the validity of the request will be established in accordance with the appropriate tasks outlined below. 3.1.7.2. (CUI) If the request is made on a non-hostile basis, the carrier will be directed to the commercial vehicle inspection station. If the vehicle is unable to maneuver to the inspection station, it will be inspected in place or escorted to the closest feasible inspection area. 18. 902 SFS IAC 18: Know and understand Active Attack Response Mission TR: JBSA 31-101/Base Defense Plan, Volume 2, TAB C TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A para 3.3.2 & TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A para 3.1 TAB C TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO JBSA BASE DEFENSE PLANVOLUME 2: (CUI) ACTIVE ATTACK LOCATION LOCKDOWN PROCEDURES

3.3.2. (CUI) Access Control Points (ACPs). Upon notification of lockdown, ACPs will immediately secure inbound and outbound traffic. ACPs will remain closed until directed otherwise by the Incident Commander (IC), ECC or the DFC. TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO JBSA BASE DEFENSE PLANVOLUME 2: (CUI) ACTIVE ATTACK MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LISTING (METL) 3.1. (CUI) Concept of Operations. This tab is designed to provide a structured framework of response protocols for Active Attack incidents. Understanding each incident of an active attack will have its own characteristics and unique dynamics, the structured response provided in this tab is a guide to drive objective priorities. Ultimately, the situation will dictate the response measures employed. The three principal priorities for Active Attack response are; Stop the Killing, Stop the Dying, and Rapid Casualty Evacuation. Other priorities such as reunification and recovery operations are covered in Tab B. 902 SFS Patrol (PAT) 797 Duty Task List (DTL) 19. 902 SFS IPAT 15: Know and Understand Wants and Warrants Processes and Procedures -- TR DAFI 31-115, Para 2.3.7. - 2.3.7.4. 2.3.7. SF personnel must follow the following procedures for in the event of a positive “Hit” for code 4/Wants and Warrants: (T-0) . 2.3.7.1. The operator of the system must ensure privacy is adhered to at all time and all radios are secured and away from the subject before any information can be transmitted across the net. (T-1) . 2.3.7.2. Any agency that receives a record in response to an NCIC inquiry must confirm the “hit” on the record. (T-1) . Confirming a hit means to contact the agency that entered the record to: ensure that the person or property inquired upon is identical to the person or property identified in the record. Hit confirmation must be made prior to taking any action based upon the hit, such as detaining a wanted or missing person, or seizing the stolen property. (T-2) . 2.3.7.3. Once the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC)/Emergency Control Center (ECC) controller or SF personnel receives the initial notification of a hit, he/she will then direct the patrolman/recipient to “secure your mics”. (T-1) . This warning will advise the patrolman to turn his/her radio down, indicating the subject may have criminal history or pose a threat. Also, this will ensure the radio transmission is not overheard by non-LE personnel alerting them of a possible warrant situation. While receiving the information, the SF patrolman will take appropriate measures to get in a position of advantage behind the vehicle/personnel. (T-1) . Simultaneously, the BDOC/ECC controller will direct another patrol to respond code 2 to assist the patrolman on scene. Once an additional patrolman is on scene, they will take appropriate actions to detain the subject until the situation is resolved. (T-2) . 2.3.7.4. Ensure that the warrant, missing person report, or theft report is still outstanding. Obtain information regarding: (1) the extradition of a wanted person when applicable, (2) the return of a missing person to the appropriate authorities, (3) the return of stolen property to its rightful owner, or (4) the terms and conditions of a protection order.

IAC STUDY GUIDE - Final

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