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Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 9 Introduction C hange is a constant in any organization. The emergence of new structures, the acquisition of new equipment with different capabilities, the adoption of new technology, or the development of new processes or doctrines are normal evolu- tionary changes for any organization. But fundamental change is rare. Institutions – in particular military institutions – tend to be conservative and to eschew new directions that create tur- moil and risk. Fundamental change occurs for a variety of reasons: new threats, the emergence of disruptive technologies, new doctrine or concepts, and changing resource pressures, to name a few. However, historically, such pressures exist for some considerable time, without anything but minor organiza- tional ‘tinkering’ having occurred. Real change requires a cata- lyst, either a significant military event, usually a defeat, or the emergence of a leader with a new vision and the courage to implement it. General Rick Hillier assumed command of the Canadian Forces (CF) on 4 February 2005. He arrived with a vision for a very different CF, a ‘transformed’ military institution that he commenced to implement immediately. What followed was the start of what may be the most significant change to the CF in over half a century. This article highlights the major points in a book-long case study on institutional leadership during CF Transformation – Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change . 1 The study took a ‘snapshot’ of the first two years of CF transformation, 2005- 2007. However, given that the year 2008 was a period of consolidation of the transformation, the conclusions, assess- ment, and future challenges are relevant as of 2008. As such, the study essentially reflects a three-year history, 2005-2008, of CF Transformation. This article focuses upon the CF institutional leader and intends to show how institutional leaders achieve real change. Equally, it addresses the difficulties and failures encountered. It provides an analysis of CF Transformation as an example of institutional leadership in action. It refers succinctly to the chronology of events, describes the changes, analyzes what worked and what did not, provides insight into the institu- tional leadership and change management lessons learned, and attempts to highlight the challenges that the CF will face as it continues to transform. Because that 43,000-word book is distilled here into a 6000-word article, readers are encouraged continually to cross-reference their review of this article with the book itself. CANADIAN FORCES TRANSFORMATION DND photo AR2007-A014-0006 by Sergeant Craig Fiander The CDS, General Rick Hillier, visits Afghanistan, 12 March 2007. Lieutenant-General Jeffery joined the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery in 1964, and was commissioned in 1967. Throughout the 1990s, he was intimately involved with organizational change, including a period as Chief of the Land Staff, during which he developed and imple- mented a strategy of change within the army. General Jeffery retired from regular service in 2003. INSIDE CANADIAN FORCES TRANSFORMATION by Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Michael K. Jeffery, CMM, CD

10 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 In building the case study, the CF manual, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution , was used as the doctrinal foundation. This work was supplemented with refer- ences on change management theory, with the principal change reference being John Kotter’s Leading Change . 2 The case study was not an exhaustive work; rather, it was a ‘snapshot’ of a process that continues to evolve. The case study is meant to be widely read, and attempts were made to frame it in a readable style. (In this vein, the male personal pronoun has been used throughout, vice an alternating approach, or the more cumbersome ‘he/she.’) Finally, while many senior lead- ers within the CF, including the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), were generous with their time and perspectives, the views and analysis in this case study are those of the author. In this context, where commentary reflects the position of the CF, the CDS or other senior officers, that is because it was assessed as such, and may not necessarily reflect CF policy or the opinions of any member of the CF. Context and Background I n order to understand the magnitude and importance of CF Transformation, it is vital to establish an understanding of what has gone before. The CF has not remained stagnant, but has undergone a considerable number of changes over the years. It has instituted new strategies and policies as required by government direction, adapted its operational structure and doctrine as required by changing threats, and adopted new technology as the operational environment demands and resources permit. Events as significant as the integration of the navy, army, and air force into the Canadian Forces and the end of the Cold War, as well as many incremental changes, were essential to creating the demand for more fundamental change, and for setting the conditions that made CF Transformation possible. Perhaps the most sobering era for the CF was the time frame 1990-2005, which witnessed the emergence of a new World Order; the First Gulf War; Canadian troops deployed to the Balkans in 1992; reductions to the defence budget in the 1990s; and a Second Gulf War. This period was characterized by significantly declining operational capabilities, serious equipment shortcomings, inadequate personal protective equip- ment, eroding morale of the troops, and a deplorable manner in which casualties, both physical and mental, were handled when personnel were repatriated. Events of this period also called into question the ethics and professionalism of the leadership. Most noteworthy was the ‘Somalia Crisis,’ which included the torture and murder of a Somali youth by Canadian soldiers. The government formed a Commission of Inquiry, which led to other investigations and inquiries on a range of issues, and to the condemnation of the military for its treat- ment of its personnel. It was a very bleak period for the CF. Accordingly, by the end of the 20 th Century, the CF faced an array of problems: it was structurally and culturally consti- pated; focused upon industrial age warfare; a hollow force with declining military effectiveness, after years of economies driven by ‘shaving the ice cube’; a high, indeed, unsustainable operational tempo exacerbated by the reduction in personnel capacity; a presumption of professionalism and a belief that specific failings were only aberrations; declining institutional cohesion; poor and declining morale; and the lack of a clear and positive vision for the future. There were a variety of internal and government-directed reforms and attempts to chart a more sustainable course for- ward. Most significant among these was the development of a new strategic framework ( Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020, or “ Strategy 2020 ”) that would guide efforts to shape a new and sustainable CF. 3 Regrettably, such work lacked a coherent and compelling vision for the future. Critically, it postulated the continuation of an industrial age model and doctrine for the CF that lacked credibility with the government and virtually guaranteed no appreciable resource improvements. However, confronted as it was with institutional failure and a continuing high tempo of operations, the army faced the most comprehensive challenge, and, argu- ably, became the leader in terms of self-reflection and change. Commencing in the late 1990s, it implemented a succession of pragmatic initiatives to improve the way it trained, generated force, and managed its resources, all with the objective of optimizing its limited capabilities. This effort reached its zenith with the development and implementation of the army strategy, beginning in 2000. The September 11 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. Reuter RTRPR00, photographer Sean Adair

12 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 a coherent and effective organization. This framework is com- monly referred to as Enterprise Architecture, a model repre- sentative of the various elements of an organization that will normally depict the organization both as it is today and as it is envisioned for the future. A more illustrative way of considering these organiza- tional elements is shown below. Any change will impact upon all of the elements of Purpose, Organization, Process, Command Philosophy, Technology, People, and Culture (see the detailed descriptions in the book) albeit to varying degrees and at different rates. Healthy organizations are those in which all elements of the organization are in balance and harmony. Maintaining a healthy balance of organizational elements during a period of change is difficult, and the progression of change must be carefully charted to ensure the maintenance of organizational balance over time. The following figure pro- vides a depiction of this progression, created to reflect balance over time. Organizational change, either planned or unplanned , can come in many forms, gen- erally identified by the principal change ini- tiative. 6 Modern Transformation is really the holistic change that results in a fundamental shift in either what an organization does, or the way in which it accomplishes its objec- tives. Central to this paradigm change is the development of a new or adapted organizational culture. Without a changed culture, transformation has not occurred. This is particularly true with strong cultures, such as the military, where doctrine and training inculcate members with values of loyalty to their comrades and their unit, and a strong sense of tradition. As a consequence, any attempt to change the organization or the way it operates is perceived as being in direct conflict with the underlying values of the culture. A model, guide, or template can be valuable, but there are many philosophies of how change is achieved within organizations. The CF was partial to John Kotter’s Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change , with its key steps, provided in detail in the case study. 7 Change leaders need a solid understanding of the underlying principles of organizational change in order to ensure success, such as offered by Kotter. But, above all else, they must be leaders . Canadian Forces Transformation A ttempting to provide an overall assessment of CF Transformation is far from easy. It is, after all, a work still in progress, and there is much more to be done before anyone can conclude with certainty that it has achieved its intended purpose. However, it is a superb case study of an institutional leader leading change. This is not to suggest that General Hillier as the change leader did everything either right or wrong. Rather, it shows a strong, visionary leader making reasoned judgments as he shaped the change process and the institution to his will. In so doing, he achieved considerable success, but not without difficulty or setback. On assuming his responsibilities as CDS, General Hillier immediately com- menced the process of institutional change. Analyses were conducted, and an overarch- ing framework and sequencing of change developed. This planning envisaged four phases of change; Phase 1 – the development of a vision, Phase 2 – the restructure of the CF operational command and control architecture, Phase 3 – the alignment of the strategic and operational enablers and Phase 4 – the evolution of force generation. In implementation, this sequence was generally followed, albeit the intended timings were disrupted by a variety of factors. At the time of this publishing, the first two phases are largely completed, while Phases 3 and 4 remain a work in progress. Perhaps an effective portrayal of the CF Transformation plan was the use of the ‘mis- sile’ metaphor that the CDS had developed dur- ing 2007 to explain the phases – a rocket or missile with each stage as one of the respective process elements – with change commencing at the tip by virtue of Force Employment (FE), and progressing in turn through the various stages of Force Generation (FG), to the fuel of Force Development (FD). Why Change? T here is little doubt that, during the early part of this century, the CF was facing major challenges that called into question its long-term viability and value to the nation. Indeed, General Hillier did not believe the sta- tus quo was either sustainable or viable for PROCESS PURPOSE E=MC 2 SHARED INTENT EXPLICIT EXPLICIT IMPLICIT IMPLICIT DIRECTIVE COMD MISSION COMD ORGANIZATION COMMAND PHILOSOPHY TECHNOLOGY PEOPLE CULTURE - THE SHADOW ORGANIZATION Figure 3: Organizational Elements “Implicit in this vision, General Hillier believed three fundamental changes were necessary to the modus operandi of the CF.”

Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 13 CANADIAN FORCES TRANSFORMATION Canada. Central to his sense of the need for change in the CF was his concern with respect to the institution’s operational effectiveness. While the CF had generally performed well in a variety of missions and environments, General Hillier saw the Canadian contribution as being increasingly rudimentary, unresponsive to mission needs, and providing Canada a poor return on investment. This he saw as a consequence of the CF’s traditional “industrial warfare” force structure and operational doctrine, a non-responsive and bureaucratic approach to C2, and an environment-oriented culture, all of which he believed was impeding the effectiveness and limit- ing the ability of the CF to meet the missions to be faced in the 21 st Century. When he was given an opportunity to change it, he had to decide, with very little time to assess all the factors, whether he would take the risk, inherent in the fast-paced approach to change, that he knew would be required. There is little doubt that his decisions to accept appointment as CDS, and to transform the institution, were taken together. Not by nature one to be a ‘caretaker,’ General Hillier came into the position because he felt strongly that the change was required. In his view, the risks were acceptable because the objective was so important. Some will argue that the time was not right, that the lack of clear resourcing and the certainty that operations in Afghanistan would take their toll on the CF should have predicated a delay in organizational change, or at least a more measured approach. As one commentator argued, the approach was misguided as the resources did not exist to achieve the ends – akin to departing on a 1000-kilometre journey with only 800 kilometres of fuel. However, the perspective of the CDS was that at no time would conditions be right for such levels of change. To delay or to slow down would only sac- rifice the opportunity pro- vided. An Inspiring Vision T o address his concerns, General Hillier foresaw a new kind of CF and shaped his vision statement accord- ingly. 9 It indicated that the CF “…will become more effec- tive, relevant and responsive, and its profile and ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased.” 10 Implicit in this vision, General Hillier believed three funda- mental changes were neces- sary to the modus operandi of the CF. These were a shift of institutional focus away from ELEMENTS COMMAND PHILOSOPHY CULTURE ORGANIZATION PEOPLE PROCESS TECHNOLOGY PROCESS ORGANIZATION CULTURE PEOPLE TECHNOLOGY COMMAND PHILOSOPHY PROCESS ORGANIZATION CULTURE PEOPLE TECHNOLOGY COMMAND PHILOSOPHY PROCESS ORGANIZATION CULTURE PEOPLE TECHNOLOGY COMMAND PHILOSOPHY PROCESS ORGANIZATION CULTURE PEOPLE TECHNOLOGY COMMAND PHILOSOPHY Figure 4: The Progression of Change FD FG3 FG2 FG1 FE DE-CENTRALIZED PERS PERS LOGISTICS VIMY EFFECT DECISIVE STRATEGIC EFFECT FOR CANADA CORE DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATED C3 INTEGRATED C3 SEA LAND AIR SOF JFG MEDICAL IM MIL POLICE • doctrine • Lessons Learned • capabiLity Focused • oversight • training • poLicy • structure • Force & Mos • recruiting • pd CDS PRINCIPLES • cF cuLture • ops Focus • coMd centric • auth, resp, acct • Mission coMd • integrated cF MISSION SPECIFIC LEAD BY DOMINANT ENVIRONMENT Figure 5: The CDS’ Transformation Missile 8

Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 15 he sought – an environment of “constructive chaos” – and the new structure was in place in a remarkably short time. Rapid change within the CF was an essential element of the strategy to set the conditions for achieving his long-term goal. For only by establishing the institution’s credibility as an organization willing and able to change, and demonstrating the value that it could have for meeting the nation’s interests, would the necessary support and resources be forthcoming. Achieving Unity B y far, one of the most important and difficult tasks for the change leader is that of developing the team, getting all on board with his vision and strategy, and keeping them engaged. There is little doubt that most were inspired by the vision and the style of this new CDS, and all looked forward with anticipation to the new world he promised. However, some of the more senior and experienced officers – those who understood well the limits that the institution was facing – had their doubts. In the final analysis, the degree of unity achieved was a direct result of the ability to achieve a shared vision and a level of trust between the CDS and his leaders. The vision was captivating but never fully understood, and it certainly was not shared by all of the leadership. This was caused primarily by concerns with respect to achievabil- ity and inclusiveness, which resulted in a fragmented vision and approach to achievement. Unquestionably, the vision was inspiring, and many saw it as a new and better world that they all could embrace and support. However, the CDS had not ‘operationalized’ it, that is to say, defined the details and the ‘how,’ with the result that such was not clear. Given the lack of time to conduct planning before launching transforma- tion, this lack of clar- ity with respect to the end-state was under- standable. But, with the passage of time, the problems were still not resolved. Many could not see themselves within the vision, or, if so, in a much-reduced role. The navy and air force were partic- ularly concerned over what some saw as an ‘army-centric’ vision that they perceived as minimizing their role to one of support. There was also a con- cern on the part of all Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECSs) with respect to their roles in the evolving DND/CF structure. There also persisted a genuine concern with respect to the ability to achieve the vision. Part of this worry came from the belief that the resources were not suf- ficient – and would not become sufficient – to achieve all that the CDS envisaged. The achievability issue was not a surprise, as all parts of the CF had been living a marginal existence for some time. The CDS saw the implementation of a new CF vision as an opportunity to resolve many of the shortfalls facing the CF, from which, by showing a willing- ness to change and truly embracing reform, all would bene- fit. He was a risk taker and he did not appreciate the degree of risk aversion that others would possess. However, the leadership concerns were not limited to the vision itself, but also involved problems of inclusiveness in the transformation process. Driven in part by the need to develop the vision early, the CDS relied largely on a small staff and some trusted advisers to shape the way ahead. For whatever reason, he did not take the ECSs into his confi- dence for some time, and they, for all practical purposes, did not play a major role in shaping the vision. As a conse- quence, the leadership did not come together early enough in the process, did not enthusiastically embrace the vision, and adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude. As implementation proceeded, given the urgency and in accordance with the “command centric” philosophy, change issues were nor- mally taken to the CDS for decision. Consultation was not the norm, with the consequence that the senior leadership was not always aware of the decisions being taken, and did not feel part of that process. CANADIAN FORCES TRANSFORMATION Canadian soldiers patrol through the village of Teymurian, Afghanistan, 7 December 2009. DND photo AR2009-5001-27 by Master Corporal Matthew MacGregor

16 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 In addressing this very difficult and sensi- tive subject, there is a danger in over-general- izing and misrepresenting the true chemistry present in a very challenging and dynamic situation. However, some degree of under- standing of the situation is essential for future leaders. The first and, arguably, the most influ- ential aspect of the command relationship was the CDS’s leadership style. General Hillier approached his role as CDS in a similar man- ner to that of an operational commander. In part, this was due to his background and expe- rience, but his approach was also the conse- quence of a conscious decision, as he believed it was just this aspect of command that the DND/CF corporate culture needed to change. Following this operational model, he anticipated that he would make clear his intent, he would seek the views and advice of his subordinates, and then he would decide how the CF would proceed. He was comfortable with others dis- cussing or even debating the elements of the emerging plan, but did not see himself engaging in that debate. However, this approach, in a consensus culture quite used to such debates, did not help his cause. This dynamic created an environment that set the stage for some difficulties in command relation- ships. The result was an erosion of mutual respect and trust. In the final analysis, the CDS was not able to achieve the level of unity or consensus that he would have preferred. To some degree, this was driven by factors beyond his control, as he could not promise the CF leadership that which he could not deliver. There was also some criticism that he did not invest the requisite time and effort building greater under- standing, or was not as open to compromise as he should have been to achieve a shared vision. There may be some merit in that view, but it is likely that the CDS saw this increasingly as too high an investment for the probable return. In the final analysis, he was prepared to work around people, if necessary, relying instead upon the great support of the members of the CF and the public to sustain him. Leading Change A s the change leader, General Hillier was the visionary , and CF Transformation was his initiative . As was his custom, he led CF Transformation from the front. He was the face of change within the CF, and his effect was motivational, particularly with respect to the troops and the Canadian pub- lic. Accordingly, it was here that he concentrated his effort, perhaps realizing that his ability to influence all aspects of the institution was limited. How people saw General Hillier very much reflected their sense of transformation, and his ability as a charismatic leader and communicator was the foundation of this credibility. General Hillier has become a public persona like no CDS who served before him. Much as with the troops in the front lines, the Canadian public was largely impressed with him and saw him as truly the face of the CF. General Hillier’s personal credibility counts for much in this dynamic, and it allowed him to accomplish a great amount. In the final analysis, his credibility with Canadians and the members of the CF provided a strong counterbalance to any lack of support among the senior leadership. Managing Change L eadership is by far the most vital compo- nent of effecting change within an organi- zation. However, management speaks to the requirements for organizational coherence, which is essential if transformation is to be sustained. This implies effective corporate planning and coordination to ensure the strat- egy and its objectives can be achieved, along with the constant balancing of the institution’s ambition against its capacity. The development of internal plans, vital to the under- standing and coordinating of the change intended, was not a strong feature of this period. While the vision was the focus, there was no clear strategy for getting there, and no such stra- tegic document was ever written. The result was that the “commander’s intent,” so strongly held by the CDS in his mis- sion command philosophy, was not always clear. In addition, the CF corporate structure was, as a result of the change, frag- ile and lacking requisite capacity. The consequence of this turmoil was a fracturing of the coherence essential to good organizational management. While much was accomplished, and major disconnects were avoided, this was primarily due to the hard work of a few key players. The old saying, “A man’s reach must exceed his grasp,” is a sound personal philosophy, but it has serious implications for an organization undergoing change. To maintain organiza- tional effectiveness and cohesion, the level of ambition must be carefully balanced with the capacity of the institution to implement and coordinate the actions required. Unquestionably, General Hillier’s expectations for change during his tenure were very high and he intentionally pushed the organization to do as much as he thought it could. However, there is some evidence that capacity is a problem that has impacted and will continue to impact the CF’s attempts to change. Two aspects of this issue added significantly to the degree of difficulty encountered. First was the increase in the tempo of operations. It was not just the number of troops deployed, but the change in intensity that had the greatest consequences. With the move to the Kandahar region, the CF’s Task Force Afghanistan now was undertaking major combat operations, and, significantly, incurring casualties. The effect of this was to increase the demands on the CF, its leadership, and the gov- ernment in managing the conflict, which, in turn, added con- siderable pressure to all activities of the CF. Second, with the change in government, a great amount of energy was con- sumed to respond to the political change in direction. As with any such change, harmonizing ongoing initiatives with the new government agenda was expected to take time, and there was always the potential for directed change to plans. However, the very different visions of the CF, held by the new Minister of National Defence and the CDS, created considerable ten- sion and resulted in an inordinate amount of time passing before an agreed-upon way forward was reached. The effects of this were to both slow and alter the CDS’s plans for trans- formation. Having launched a high risk venture, his political support was, at best, eroding. “The reality is that during a period of change, it is vital that the institution carefully balance its level of ambition with its capacity.”

18 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 1 Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Michael K. Jeffery, Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009). Access was provided to the author to hundreds of documents recording the intent, direction, actions, and concerns of CF leadership, and was complemented by wide access to the CF’s senior leaders and key staff, both military and civilian, consisting of more than 40 formal interviews, their conduct based upon non-attribu- tion. Additionally, the author participated in CF senior leader professional development sessions that provided a unique insight into the dynamics of the CF General and Flag Officer team. 2 John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996). 3 Department of National Defence, Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 , June 1999. 4 General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World . General Smith’s assessment of the evolving conflict envi- ronment is but one of many. See also Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century ; Colonel T. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone ; and Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era . 5 The author created Figures 1 to 4. 6 Ronald Lippitt, Jeanne Watson, and Bruce Westley, Organizational Transformation: Approaches, Strategies, Theories (Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood Publishing Group, 1958). The authors have distinguished between sponta- neous or evolutionary change, fortuitous or acci- dental change, and planned change. The first two types are unplanned. Unplanned change, accord- ing to their definition, originates outside the sys- tem experiencing change. Planned change, on the other hand, originates with a decision by the sys- tem to improve its functioning. 7 John P. Kotter, Leading Change , p. 21. He first put forward this Eight-Stage Process in John P. Kotter, “Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” in Harvard Business Review (March-April 1995), p. 61. 8 General Hillier first used the CDS’ Transformation Missile, a schematic, in his Transformation brief- ing at the General and Flag Officers Seminar, Spring 2007, after having visited Vimy Ridge in April. Later in 2007, the schematic was conceptu- alized in greater detail by the Chief of Force Development, and titled “Action Areas to Transform the Force for Effect.” 9 “ The Way Ahead for the Canadian Forces ,” CDS Transformation Brief addresses the vision, key enablers, force structure, etc., (Slide 27/32), (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 2005). Referenced in Major-General Daniel Gosselin, “Hellyer’s Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old - Part One,” in Canadian Military Journal , Vol. 9, No.2 (2008), pp. 6-15. 10 The Way Ahead for the Canadian Forces . 11 Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Ray R. Crabbe, Vice- Admiral (ret’d) Lynn G. Mason, and Lieutenant- General (ret’d) Fred R. Sutherland, A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure , 31 January 2007; and Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Ray R. Crabbe, Vice- Admiral (ret’d) Lynn G. Mason and Lieutenant- General (ret’d) Fred R. Sutherland, A Report on the Impact of Canadian Forces Transformation on Defence Strategic Enablers , 5 September 2007. NOTES It is said that changing an organization that has enjoyed a long period of relative stability is much like moving a large rock in a garden. The greatest challenge is getting it out of the mud so that it can be moved. Thereafter, moving it anywhere can be a relatively easy task. One may debate whether General Hillier has been able to get the rock moving, but there is no doubt that he has unleashed the suction around it and turned it over. Movement now is inevitable. DND Photo AR2009-0011-26