Analysis of Terrorist Group Activity

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ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST GROUP ACTIVITY Analysis of Terrorist Group Activity Shelby Sanchez EMM - 442 Professor Smith 1
ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST GROUP ACTIVITY Analysis of Terrorist Group Activity After reading John Parachini’s risk management perspectives concerning chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons of mass destruction (WMD), there are many explanations as to why this group, Aum Shinrikyo, used WMD, these include: the mindset of leadership, opportunity, and technical hurdles. Before the risk management perspectives of Parachini help explain the threat of this type of attack, it is crucial to explain, in detail, the Tokyo subway attack that occurred on March 20 th , 1995. Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack In 1995, the religious group, Aum Shinrikyo, attacked the Tokyo subway in hopes to kill as many people as possible. The attack involves five Aum Shinrikyo men that entered the Tokyo subway system, each carrying a bag of sarin, an extremely toxic gas. This is a colorless, odorless liquid that is used as a chemical weapon due to its extreme potency as a nerve agent (Pangi, 2002) . This deadly nerve gas is so potent that the United Nations acknowledged it a “weapon of mass destruction”. Each of the five members boarded individual subway lines all traveling toward central Tokyo. The attack was directed against trains headed towards “the Diet” or Japanese parliament in Tokyo (Pangi, 2002) . The men placed the packages on the ground and punctured them before they exited the train and station, leaving the scene in a getaway car. The bags began to leak and passengers felt the throbbing vapors hitting their eyes. These poisons struck victims down, leaving people choking and puking, some became visionless and paralyzed (Pangi, 2002) . At each station victims would come off and new victims would come on the subway, therefore spreading the sarin gases to many more people. From this terrorist attack 13 individuals were killed, while over a thousand suffered from injuries. 2
ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST GROUP ACTIVITY Risk Management Perspectives The Aum Ahinrikyo, a Japanese doomsday cult, is known to secretly manufacture chemical weapons such as Sarin and VX gas (comprised of ethyl methyl phosphonate, methylphosphonic acid, and diisopropyl-2-ethylamine) (Pangi, 2002) . There are many explanations as to why Aum Shinrikyo used WMD, these include: the mindset of leadership, opportunity, and technical hurdles. The presumed reasoning for the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is because the Leader, Shoko Asahara, prophesized about the destruction of the Japanese government with the creation of a future world in which Aum Shinrikyo would rule (Parachini, Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective, 2003) . This accelerated their use of (CBRNE), which are unconventional weapons in order to spark an apocalyptic change. The Japanese doomsday cult’s obsession with (CBRNE) weapons of mass destruction is largely in relation to their leader’s obsession with deadly poison (Parachini, Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective, 2003) . Another reason why the Aum Shinrikyo cult uses weapons of mass destruction is because they operate in a permissive environment, where they can use the unconventional weapons without facing much interference from Japan. The police agency of Japan was unproductive at investigating the cult so much that they cult was able to hide behind laws defending religious organizations from government interference (Parachini, Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective, 2003) . The Japanese police waited to get enough information for an overwhelming case, instead of investigating and arresting group members right away like most other agencies would do. Lastly, one of the main reasons this cult uses unconventional weapons programs is because they are one of the only groups that have been able to achieve the scale of operations 3
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ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST GROUP ACTIVITY required to mount serious unconventional weapons programs. Despite all the resources to help create the most destructible (CBRNE) weapons of mass destruction, the group failed all 10 known attacks (Parachini, Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective, 2003) . Instead of killing hundreds to thousands of people using the unconventional weapons, they killed a significantly smaller amount. Terrorist attacks using unconventional weapons have inflicted far less casualties than terrorist bombings and suicide hijackings (Parachini, Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism, 2001) . With all this being said, Parachini’s risk management perspectives point out that the use of (CBRNE) weapons of mass destruction are rare occasions, primarily because of the need for funding, scientists, materials, and past outcomes. In order to create unconventional weapons, groups need a lot of funding, the materials to make the weapons, and intelligent scientists that can create deadly weapons (Parachini, Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism, 2001) . That alone is hard enough, but on top of that, groups have seen that the outcomes of these attacks are not substantially successful because of the complexity of the materials they are working with. This is not to say that government agencies should not look for (CBRNE) weapons of mass destruction attacks, however until technology is more advanced and these materials become more user friendly, there will still be a decline on this type of attack. 4
ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST GROUP ACTIVITY References Pangi, R. (2002). Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway System. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs . Parachini, J. (2001). Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism. Combating Terrorism . Parachini, J. (2003). Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective. Washington Quarterly, 26 (4), 37. 5