INTL301_Assg 1- Megan Patterson

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1 Strategic Intelligence Collection: Does More Data Mean More Answers? Megan Patterson Introduction to Intelligence Studies Course number: INTL301 23 Jan, 2022

2 Introduction Strategic intelligence collection and subsequent strategic forecasting is a delicate balance of policy-driven bias, in-depth knowledge and insight of the adversary, and some abstract understanding which subject matter experts assess to be future plans and actions. While some claim increased strategic intelligence collection enables more timely and accurate assessments, the overwhelming amount of information available, various stovepipes within the intelligence community (IC), and disconnect between policy and intelligence coupled with analyst bias has resulted in stagnation of an excess of information collected. With growing resources and capabilities, analysts must limit their scope in order to reasonably understand the information they are responsible for, ultimately leading to a lack in collaboration, missed information, and insufficient analysis for true strategic forecasting. The Case for Strategic Intelligence The Evolution of Intelligence and Bureaucratic Processes In order to understand the role and importance of intelligence, it is imperative that one understands the evolution of the IC and how decision-makers are integrated throughout the analytical process. The IC has a long history that can be traced back to the late 19 th century; however, more recent events following the 9/11 terrorist attacks have significantly impacted the way in which the IC operates. Reforms meant to better fuse the intelligence analyst with policymakers have instead resulted in “politicized” intelligence whereby policymakers lose trust in allowing analysts to competently operate without constant oversight (Heidenrich 2007, 13). In a role that serves best when partisan politics are checked at the door, balancing the relationship between intelligence and the consumer is paramount to ensuring objectivity in analysis (Johnson 2006a, 128).

3 Intelligence collection and strategic forecasting has a history fraught with ambiguous and at times partisan political direction and guidance as well as controversial methods and assessments. With the 2005 creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the IC underwent a fundamental shift in how it collects, analyzes, and delivers intelligence and counterintelligence information to America’s leaders (Office of the Director of National Intelligence n.d.). The shift from a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was a key component of IC reform and intelligence integration and collaboration (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2017). By design, such reforms were initiated with the intention of not only improving the capabilities of the IC, but also to ensure a higher degree of intelligence oversight and delivery of actionable intelligence to decisionmakers. Disconnects in Analysis and Policy During times of reform, immediate repercussions include the growing pains of navigating new layers of bureaucracy, overcoming doubt surrounding the establishment of new roles and perspectives, and budgetary concerns regarding congressional authorizations and prioritization of intelligence efforts (Clark 2007, 121-135). Despite efforts to improve the working relationship between intelligence analysts and political leaders, the long-term impact of the reform of U.S. security structures and the IC has long been an observed issue of national defense. More recently, this became apparent with the shift from counter-terrorism to great power competition. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which established the ODNI in 2005, was justified at the time in its focus on countering terrorism. However, this narrow scope of intelligence efforts and increased drive by decisionmakers for near-term intelligence has atrophied the IC’s skillset for strategic analysis and long-term forecasting of near-peer adversaries.

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4 In addition, there exists a growing policymaker perception that the IC consists of nothing more than news reporters providing unactionable intelligence. This mentality brings forth two possible outcomes. Coupled with concerns surrounding a lack of trust in long-term assessments, it drives a wedge between the IC and those policymakers who would question their ability to provide key judgments. For those policymakers who are more influential, or potentially during times when analysts are less sure of their assessments, it can lead to analytical production that is tailored to the personal interest and agenda of an elected official (Johnson 2006a, 143). Prioritizing “Now”: Reactionary Intelligence over Strategic Forecasting and Assessments Aside from both the short and long-term impacts of reforms, there also exists a strained relationship between national security policy and the IC most readily evidenced through the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). While policymaker interest in the NIE ebbs and flows based on the personalities in office and current events, the majority tend to focus on more immediate, pressing concerns and view the longer timelines needed to produce an NIE, along with the potential for bias and overall estimative language, as less than useful (Johnson 2008). “The production and use of strategic intelligence by the United States government has plunged to egregiously low levels. This decline is badly out of sync with the broader needs of the republic, fails to meet the nation's foreign policy requirements, ill-serves the country's many national security officials, and retards the developing prowess of its intelligence analysts” (Heidenrich 2007, 3). Political pressures often result in efforts to mold intelligence to fit policy instead of maintaining an objective stance of exposing the truth in the data. The desire to be first to the table with exquisite intelligence overrides long-term research and analysis, ultimately perpetuating the prioritization of “now” over strategic intelligence.

5 Information Management The NSA’s belief that more data is always good, and that it’s worth doing anything in order to collect it, is wrong. There are diminishing returns, and the NSA almost certainly passed that point long ago. - Bruce Schneier Navigating Information: Pitfalls of Never-Ending Data Advances in the technological era of the 20 th and 21 st century have presented the IC with an abundance of information collection capabilities and, therefore, an overwhelming amount of data to process (Kennedy 2008, 85-86). In a world of intelligence collection which never sleeps, the issue of too much information is often overlooked due to an insatiable desire from policy leaders to obtain as much information as possible. However, efforts by the IC to leverage emerging technologies for collection purposes often outpace exploitation capabilities. While artificial intelligence and automated processing have the potential to relieve the strain currently placed on analysts to overcome these shortfalls, it has only in recent years even been considered an option and has yet to be fully realized (Katz 2020). Currently, there exists a need for restructured processes within the intelligence cycle along with an entirely new set of skills in order to maximize utility of the amount of information which is constantly being collected and stored. These processes are long and consist of years of trial and error. The vast databases of information yet to be exploited could very well contain a critical piece of information that would change the tide in a war, but until the matter of managing the data is addressed, the U.S. runs the risk of failing to provide adequate strategic assessments. The Need for Human Review While Confronting Human Limitations Current limitations in artificial intelligence/machine learning as incorporated into processing of intelligence sheds light on the shortfalls of an understaffed intelligence agency

6 as more analysts are needed to sift through a seemingly endless mountain of information. This need for more analysts is a concern for funding as well as a talent consideration as the IC desperately needs to retain certain skills in order to ensure quality of analysis in defense of the nation. Unfortunately, there are those who measure success merely as the collection of data as opposed to the actual exploitation and successful analysis of relevant information; therefore, a critical examination of where the U.S. is spending its national intelligence budget is needed to ensure the focus is not solely on the apparatus used to collect and store data, but rather the quality of the human element in the analytical process (Schneier 2013). Aside from personnel issues, there’s also inherent human limitations that come into play with an overabundance of information and a heavy workload. It has been shown that an overwhelming flow of information often leads to an inability to distinguish relevant information and adequate focus on key elements to be passed to decisionmakers (Kimmelmann 2017, 38). Intelligence analysts are faced with a seemingly impossible task of not only processing vast amounts of information, but also interpreting that information with an intimate understanding of the intent of the nation’s policymakers to ensure relevancy and impact - all this while also working to incorporate strategic forecasts in an attempt to influence policymakers to consider issues yet to be brought to their attention (Kimmelmann 2017, 38). Juggling Act: Ensuring Public Transparency with Consideration for Sensitive Sources Throughout the IC and its multiple facts of intelligence collection, there are analytical components which are required to operate covertly. In some circumstances, the level of secrecy and need to protect sources and methods hinders the IC’s ability to be fully transparent to the public and, on occasion, with policymakers themselves. The concerns which this may cause are apparent in the various hearings and investigations into warrantless

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7 surveillance and overall lack of intelligence oversight within the U.S. Take, for example, the Church Committee Hearings of the 1970’s, or the actions of the NSA conducting electronic surveillance inside the U.S. following the September 11 th , 2001 attacks. Determining the relationship between secrecy, privacy, and efficacy is a challenge that has yet to be overcome. The danger behind a lack of proper policy to safeguard privacy while enabling security is defined by an inability to determine the efficacy of such covert actions and signals intelligence which ultimately may bring about more harm than good (Johnson 2006b, 36-37). Hence, efforts within the IC to retain such covert capabilities is often faced with public scrutiny and the information itself wrought with the dangers of false positives among a sea of data. Credible Probability Deception and Its Impact on Long-Term Analysis Denial and deception have long been tactics employed by militaries worldwide. However, deception in particular takes a much more proactive effort through disinformation and misinformation to mislead an opponent, potentially resulting in a nation reaching a false conclusion (Kennedy 2008, 88). Considering the vast amounts of information available to an analyst, the introduction of deceptive techniques only serves to further complicate strategic intelligence assessments. Not only is an analyst at odds to find the key elements for primary concerns of national defense, now they must also carefully navigate potentially false information and long-term implications of following the wrong lead. In the face of deception techniques, even a seasoned veteran of intelligence analysis is at risk of falling victim to misinformation (Grabo 2002, 119). Yet, deception still stands apart as one of the least understood and least researched aspects of intelligence and military operations. This is surprising considering even a primitive deception effort threatens

8 generating enough uncertainty in a nation’s decision-making process to distract already limited resources away from reliable intelligence (Grabo 2002). Verifying Credibility: A Case of Confirmation Bias Human nature is fraught with culture-bound preconceived notions, and the IC is certainly no exception to such cognitive biases. Understanding this inherent shortcoming within the human analytical process is essential not only for analysts to produce truly objective assessments, but also in their approach to establishing a deeper understanding of adversaries and their own culture-driven biases (Johnson 2006a, 132). The need for an independent, unbiased intelligence service that is removed from politics is the highest standard to which the IC can aspire in its efforts to meet the needs sets forth by policy makers (Grabo 2002, 140). When it comes to strategic intelligence, the outcome of long-term assessments influenced by biases and such subjectivity is a matter of great concern. The argument could be made that no analyst is capable of acting without some bias, and such analytical judgements that must be made with limited information are inherently going to carry over some degree of individual perspective (Grabo 2002, 147-148). These conditions of group- think and predispositions throughout the IC as well as American leadership present a truly insidious capacity to undermine interpretations of a given situation (Kennedy 2008, 90). Instead of pursing a topic and plausible intelligence assessment that may fall outside of previously known norms, analysts may cling to the comfort of the status quo, thereby squandering analytical prowess and advancement of actionable strategic intelligence (complexities of national intelligence, 91). “In general, the farther one proceeds in the indications process from the collection of raw data to the final judgment of the adversary’s

9 course of action, the greater the spread of opinion or interpretation is likely to be.” (Heidenrich 2007, 134) The Risk Matrix: Conveying Strategic Intelligence to Formulate Plans There is nothing a Government hates more than to be well-informed; for it makes the process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and difficult. - John Maynard Keynes The 9/11 Commission Report provided a critical look at the IC’s failure to provide assessments which could prevent the attacks; however, it is possible that this failure blamed on policymakers and the IC was actually a previously unrealized limitation of strategic intelligence as restricted by policy directives (Kimmelmann 2017, 22-24). Much like the cognitive bias that plagues an analyst’s ability to convey objective assessments, policy makers are inherently drawn to that information which would help them implement their policies and to address the crisis of the moment (Johnson 2006a, 143). Further complicating the policymaker psyche in consideration of strategic assessments was the perceived invincibility of the U.S. and its status of being impervious to outside attacks. Such resistance to a change in worldview that would require a significant shift in policy and plans exacerbates the issue of decisionmakers rejecting such information that doesn’t fit their preconceived mold, along with a high probability of scorning the messenger (the IC) for proposing such an assessment (Jervis 2010, 195). Regardless of bias, political stance, or desires for personal gain, leaders must take calculated risks in order to be successful. The tenuous relationship between the IC and policymakers is further strained by strategic intelligence which points out ambiguities, uncertainties, and the various risks of certain policies (Jervis 2010, 187). However, the best policy is one which incorporates intelligence early and often. Therefore, it is imperative that

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10 the IC be able to present such intelligence that would otherwise be dismissible by policymakers in such a way as to capture the extent of the risks involved. With the development and consistent use of a standard risk matrix framework, the IC is better equipped to present information that could otherwise be perceived as ambiguous in interpretation in a way that policymakers might be more willing to confront as logical and relevant. Conclusion In conclusion, in the current internet age of “immediate answers” and the need for instant access and rapid ingestion of information, strategic intelligence is often overlooked for the more timely and tangible tactical intelligence and policy solutions. The boom of the technological era brought increased and enhanced strategic collection capabilities, further driving a response for immediate reactions as opposed to long-term analysis and strategic planning . Meanwhile, uncertainty surrounding strategic collection and analysis leads to decision paralysis which is further exacerbated by an acute awareness of a potential for vast amounts of information yet to be exploited, incorporated, or fully vetted for inclusion. While the demand for strategic intelligence tends to ebb and flow depending upon the needs and interests of current policymakers, the skill itself is crucial to maintain in order to ensure the U.S. remains the predominant world force in future conflicts.

11 References Clark, J. Ransom. 2007. “CHAPTER 6: Where Do We Go from Here?” In Intelligence and National Security: A Reference Handbook , pp 115-139. Praeger: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. https://psi-praeger.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/Topics/Display/ 2014780?cid=137&sid= 2014780. Grabo, Cynthia M. 2002. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning . Joint Military Intelligence College Washington Dc Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. https://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Anticipating_Surprise_Analysis.pdf. Heidenrich, John G. 2007. “The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence.” Studies in Intelligence 51 no. 2 (2007). https://www.cia.gov/static/789d2c84e758c9111bdaaa2adb8c628a/the-state-of- strategic-intelligence.pdf Jervis, Robert. 2010. “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash.” Political Science Quarterly 125 no. 2 (2010): 185-204. doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2010.tb00672.x. Johnson, Loch K. 2006a. Strategic Intelligence: Volume 1, Understanding the Hidden Side of Government . Praeger: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. https://psi-praeger- com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/Topics/Display/ 2068893?cid=137&sid=2068893. Johnson, Loch K. 2006b. "2: The Challenge of Global Intelligence Listening." In Strategic Intelligence: Volume 2, the Intelligence Cycle, the Flow of Secret Information from Overseas to the Highest Councils of Government, pp 23-37. Praeger: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. https://psi-praeger-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/Topics/Display/ 2068894?cid=138&sid=2068822. Johnson, Loch K. 2008. “Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate . ” Intelligence and National Security 23:3, 333-370 (23 Jun 2008). DOI: 10.1080/02684520802121257. Katz, Brian. 2020. “The Collection Edge: Harnessing Emerging Technologies for Intelligence Collection.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. Posted on Jul 13, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/collection-edge-harnessing-emerging-technologies- intelligence-collection Kennedy, Robert. 2008. "4: Analysis: Torments of Sisyphus." In Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence, pp 77-110. Greenwood Press: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. https://psi-praeger-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/Topics/Display/ 2004672?cid=138&sid=2003963. Kimmelman, Susann. 2017. "Indications and Warning Methodology for Strategic Intelligence." Homeland Security Affairs (Dec 2017). https://www-proquest- com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/scholarly-journals/indications-warning-methodology- strategic/docview/2206253979/se-2?accountid=8289. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2017. “ODNI Factsheet.” Revised Feb 02, 2017. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FACTSHEET_ODNI_History_ and_Background_2_24-17.pdf Office of the Director of National Intelligence. n.d. “How the IC Works.” Accessed Oct 22, 2021. https://www.intelligence.gov/how-the-ic-works.

12 Schneier, Bruce. 2013. “The Limitations of Intelligence.” Blog: Schneier on Security. Posted on September 17, 2013 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/ the_limitations.html. https://www.cia.gov/static/d9628799b5dd4794df943aff16e838ce/revisiting-sherman-kents- defense.pdf https://www.cia.gov/static/aa47b490ac1c52c04c467a248c5cbace/Kent-Profession-Intel- Analysis.pdf 1012-1016-1021-1061-2001-4012-4013-5301-5401-6001-6602-6802- 7102- and, 7107 CRS Report summarizing the Act SEC. 1012. REVISED DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Sec. 1016. Information sharing. Sec. 1021. National Counterterrorism Center. Sec. 1061. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Sec. 2001. Improvement of intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Sec. 4012. Advanced airline passenger prescreening. Sec. 4013. Deployment and use of detection equipment at airport screening checkpoints. Sec. 5301. In person interviews of visa applicants. Sec. 5401. Bringing in and harboring certain aliens. Sec. 6001. Individual terrorists as agents of foreign powers. Sec. 6602. Receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization. Sec. 6802. Weapons of mass destruction. Sec. 7102. Terrorist sanctuaries. Sec. 7107. United States policy toward dictatorships. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) represents the most dramatic change to the Intelligence Community (IC)

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13 since the passing of the National Security Act of 1947. Following along the theme of the USA Patriot Act and brought forth following the 9/11 Commission report, IRTPA drastically expanded various powers across IC agencies under the guise of combating international and domestic terrorism despite concerns regarding the potential for adverse effects on civil liberties. Most of the IC-specific reforms were outlined in Title I of the Act: “Reform of the Intelligence Community”. Reforms included restructuring of the IC in an attempt to limit duplication of effort. Additionally, the IRTPA provided a framework for the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position and its National Counter- Terrorism Center (NCTC). The DNI position was a direct replacement for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) charged with integration of the IC through budgetary powers. Additionally, it is worth noting Title II and its call for improvements of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intelligence functions specifically regarding training in criminal justice and national intelligence matters. This is critical in understanding the importance of information-sharing across the IC, especially as it pertains to preventing domestic terrorism and threats from U.S. borders. Reforms striving to increase collaboration typically result in some form of database or task force assigned to a specific threat. For example, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) are headed by the FBI in a much larger collaboration effort that includes multiple organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Energy, and more (Pistole, 2007). Although the creation of such task forces and organizations such as NCTC (as brought forth by the IRTPA) stimulate interagency cooperation, such efforts to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the U.S. often fall short due to the redundancy in lines of effort – the exact opposite of what the IRTPA set out to do. These various organizations ultimately act as a band-aid over a bandage under which a festering wound has already bled through; while it may stop the bleeding from showing for a time, the wound is still not healing and eventually the proof will bleed through. Therefore, the unfortunate truth is that they do little to ensure effective and efficient information collection and sharing. Aside from major IC reforms, Titles V and VI of the IRTPA significantly altered the way in which law enforcement conducted border protection against the threat of domestic terrorism due to porous borders. Considering America’s vast expanse of border territory, steps in the IRTPA to increase the number of agents and enforcement investigators was one critical step in a positive direction. Couple that with approvements for advanced patrol techniques, such as through use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs), and on paper the IRTPA seems to provide a construct for improved security. However, technological advances continue to obscure terrorist movements and communications while the sheer size of the problem is further exacerbated by politics and an inability for analysts and

14 agents to see and be everywhere at once. As stated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “While DHS employs a number of concrete metrics to track border security operations, it is difficult to precisely quantify illegal flows because illegal border crossers actively seek to evade detection...” (Department 2018). This is not a new difficulty within intelligence realms, as measuring success is much more abstract than measuring failures. Ethically, this national security problem-set is made even more complicated by its divisive nature. While Title V, Section D includes requirement for an outreach program to educate the public on the risks of bringing in and harboring aliens, various administrations have done little to message the negative aspects of illegal border crossings. Despite efforts to ensure the safety of illegal aliens while also working to tamper such security threats, there exists a widespread national sentiment of just wanting to defend those who would cross our borders illegally with no regard for national security. References Congress.gov. “S.2845 - 108 th Congress (2003-2004): Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.” December 17, 2004. https://www.congress.gov/bill/108 th -congress/senate-bill/2845 Department of Homeland Security. 2018. “Measuring Effectiveness.” Last modified June 12, 2008. https://www.dhs.gov/measuring-effectiveness Pistole, John. 2007. “Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.” Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , January 25, 2007. https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/implementing-the- intelligence-reform-and-terrorism-prevention-act Shedd and Farraro recommend: Information-sharing between the Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Community remains elusive for several reasons: different bureaucratic cultures, an absence of clear data-sharing policy, and incompatible information technology within the Executive branch. We need to do better. Consider how a more integrated system might work: A foreigner entering the U.S. from Mexico arouses suspicion. Border patrol searches his cell phone, which reveals calls made to Syria. That information is passed to an intelligence analyst in Washington who identifies the numbers as associated with Islamic extremists. The foreigner is prevented from entering the country where he intended to

15 launch an attack. Connecting these kinds of data is critical to improving our ability to protect the homeland. David Shedd and Matthew F. Ferraro, “Intelligence Reform 2.0,” Defense One, April 21, 2015, accessed October 21, 2015, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/04/intelligence-reform- 20/110659/ https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/speeches/the-threat-of-homegrown-terrorism https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=honors-theses https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/implementing-the-intelligence-reform-and- terrorism-prevention-act https://www.cbp.gov/border-security https://www.dhs.gov/topic/border-security http://usbordersecurity.info

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