Concept explainers
In Problems 1 and 2, is the matrix game strictly determined?
Whether the matrix game
Answer to Problem 1RE
The matrix game
Explanation of Solution
Consider the following matrix game.
Now, a saddle value is a payoff value which is both a row minimum and a column maximum of a payoff matrix.
Locate the saddle values.
Circle the minimum value in each row.
So, the matrix game will become,
Place squares around the maximum payoff in each column of the matrix game.
In matrix game, none of the payoffs is both row minimum and column maximum.
So, the matrix game does not have a saddle value.
If the matrix game has a saddle value, then it is said to be strictly determined.
Hence, the matrix game is not strictly determined.
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