2. Consider the two-person zero-sum game with the following 2x2 pay-off matrix:
1 2
1 а11 а12
2 a21 a22
Show that if the game has no pure strategy and saddle point, player II should play
strategy 1 with the following probability;
a22-a12
(a1-a12)+(a22-az1)
91
Suppose that we further alter the game from question 2 as follows: now whenever
both players select the same strategy, both receive a payoff of 2. Note that this is
no longer a zero-sum game.
(a) Give the payoff matrix for this game. As usual, you should list Rosemary's
payoffs first and Colin's payoffs second in each cell.
(b) Underline the best responses for each player to each of the other players' strate-
gies in your payoff matrix. Then, find and give all Pure Nash equilibria for the
modified game.
A three-finger Morra game is a game in which two players simultaneously show one, two, or three fingers at each round. The outcome depends on
a predetermined set of rules. Here is an interesting example: If the numbers of fingers shown by A and B differ by 1, then A loses one point. If they
differ by more than 1, the round is a draw. If they show the same number of fingers, A wins an amount equal to the sum of the fingers shown.
Determine the optimal strategy for each player. (Enter your probabilities as fractions.)
Player A should show one finger with probability
, two fingers with probability
and three fingers with
probability
Player B should show one finger with probability
, two fingers with probability
, and three fingers with
probability
Find the expected value of the game.
The expected outcome is the player A will win
points per round, on average.
Chapter 11 Solutions
Finite Mathematics for Business, Economics, Life Sciences and Social Sciences
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