Two oligarchs, A and B had an argument about the money they "earned", K billion US dollars. In order to solve the problem, they went to a court. Instead of using a court in city L (which was a common practice), they opted for a court in city M. A justice system of city M is famous for its transparency: a judge collects "contributions" from both parties. The party which made the largest "contribution" wins the case, another looses, "contributions" are not returned. In case of a tie, the judge flips a coin. 1. Formulate this situation as a strategic game 2. Show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium 3. Show that the lower bound of the support of contributions is 0 4. Derive mixed strategy equilibrium of the game

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Two oligarchs, A and B had an argument about the money they "earned", K billion US dollars. In order to
solve the problem, they went to a court. Instead of using a court in city L (which was a common practice),
they opted for a court in city M. A justice system of city M is famous for its transparency: a judge collects
"contributions" from both parties. The party which made the largest "contribution" wins the case, another
looses, "contributions" are not returned. In case of a tie, the judge flips a coin.
1. Formulate this situation as a strategic game
2. Show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium
3. Show that the lower bound of the support of contributions is 0
4. Derive mixed strategy equilibrium of the game
Transcribed Image Text:Two oligarchs, A and B had an argument about the money they "earned", K billion US dollars. In order to solve the problem, they went to a court. Instead of using a court in city L (which was a common practice), they opted for a court in city M. A justice system of city M is famous for its transparency: a judge collects "contributions" from both parties. The party which made the largest "contribution" wins the case, another looses, "contributions" are not returned. In case of a tie, the judge flips a coin. 1. Formulate this situation as a strategic game 2. Show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium 3. Show that the lower bound of the support of contributions is 0 4. Derive mixed strategy equilibrium of the game
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