the question is attached as a photo and answer typed below. please help me show the calculations to support the answer the answer Administrator theorem equilibrium is an associate degree equilibrium conception relevant for dynamic games with incomplete info it’s a refinement of Nash equilibrium. The ways and beliefs are; the action rely on the history this is often almost like a sequent game and the belief could also be likelihood distribution over the nodes within the info set. Formally a belief system is associate degree assignment of likelihood of each node within the game such the total of possibilities in any info set. The ways and beliefs ought to satisfy the subsequent condition they're as follows; sequent rationality, every strategy ought to be optimum in expectation given the beliefs. Consistency, every belief ought to be updated per the ways and Bayes decree each path of zero likelihood

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the question is attached as a photo and answer typed below. please help me show the calculations to support the answer

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Administrator theorem equilibrium is an associate degree equilibrium conception relevant for dynamic games with incomplete info it’s a refinement of Nash equilibrium.

The ways and beliefs are; the action rely on the history this is often almost like a sequent game and the belief could also be likelihood distribution over the nodes within the info set.

Formally a belief system is associate degree assignment of likelihood of each node within the game such the total of possibilities in any info set.

The ways and beliefs ought to satisfy the subsequent condition they're as follows; sequent rationality, every strategy ought to be optimum in expectation given the beliefs. Consistency, every belief ought to be updated per the ways and Bayes decree each path of zero likelihood of the equilibrium the beliefs will be arbitrary as this is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.

4. (professor - TA game) Professor Hahn can give a TA scholarship to Gong Yi for maximum 2
years. At the beginning of each year professor Hahn decides whether he will give a scholarship
to Gong Yi or not. Gong Yi can get a scholarship in t=2, only if he gets it in t=1. Basically,
professor Hahn and Gong Yi will play the following game twice.
Prof. Hahne
No scholarship
Give scholarship
\TA Gong Yie
(0,0)
Work
Don't work
(3.X)
(-2,3)
Gong Yi can be a Hard working type with probably 0.3 and can be a Lazy type with probability
0.7 Professor Hahn does not know Gong Yi's type. If Gong Yi is hard working, it will be X=5
and Gong Yi will always work if he gets a scholarship. If Gong Yi is lazy, it will be X= 1.
There is no time discount for t=2.
Find out a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game.
Transcribed Image Text:4. (professor - TA game) Professor Hahn can give a TA scholarship to Gong Yi for maximum 2 years. At the beginning of each year professor Hahn decides whether he will give a scholarship to Gong Yi or not. Gong Yi can get a scholarship in t=2, only if he gets it in t=1. Basically, professor Hahn and Gong Yi will play the following game twice. Prof. Hahne No scholarship Give scholarship \TA Gong Yie (0,0) Work Don't work (3.X) (-2,3) Gong Yi can be a Hard working type with probably 0.3 and can be a Lazy type with probability 0.7 Professor Hahn does not know Gong Yi's type. If Gong Yi is hard working, it will be X=5 and Gong Yi will always work if he gets a scholarship. If Gong Yi is lazy, it will be X= 1. There is no time discount for t=2. Find out a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game.
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