Table 20-3 The Distribution of Income in Edgerton Group Bottom Quintile Second Quintile Middle Quintile Fourth Quintile Top Quintile Annual Family Income $28,000 and below $28,000-$43,999 $44,000-$75,999 $76,000-$87,999 $88,000 and above Refer to Table 20-3. Where would the government in Edgerton set the poverty line to have a poverty rate of 40 p O a. $76,000 b.$28,000 OC. $88,000 O d.$44,000

Table 20-3 The Distribution of Income in Edgerton Group Bottom Quintile Second Quintile Middle Quintile Fourth Quintile Top Quintile Annual Family Income $28,000 and below $28,000-$43,999 $44,000-$75,999 $76,000-$87,999 $88,000 and above Refer to Table 20-3. Where would the government in Edgerton set the poverty line to have a poverty rate of 40 p O a. $76,000 b.$28,000 OC. $88,000 O d.$44,000

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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