None An investment counselor calls with a hot stock tip. He believes that if theeconomy remains strong, the investment will result in a profit of $30,000.If the economy grows at a moderate pace, the investment will result in aprofit of $20,000. However, if the economy goes into recession, theinvestment will result in a loss of $30,000. You contact an economist whobelieves there is a 20% probability the economy will remain strong, a 70%probability the economy will grow at a moderate pace, and a 10%probability the economy will slip into recession. What is the expectedprofit from this investment?The expected profit is 9 (Type an integer or a decimal.)

To determine the expected profit from this investment, we need to calculate the weighted average of…

Answered: An investment counselor calls with a…

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4MC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Q25
A principal is considering hiring a lawyer to represent him or her in a lawsuit. The principal gets $ 250 000 if the suit is won and $0 otherwise. If the agent works hard (100 hours), there is a 50% chance that the principal will win the suit. If the agent does not work hard (10 hours), there is a 15% chance that the principal will win the suit. Without a lawyer, the principal is sure to lose the suit. The principal can monitor the agent, and both parties are risk neutral. The agent's utility function is m-50e, where m is money in dollars and e is effort in hours. The agent's fee for this case is $100 per hour, and the outside opportunity is worth $500. Write down the game in extensive form and solve it.
Wanda works as a waitress and consequently has the opportunity to earn cash tips that are not reported by her employer to the Internal Revenue Service. Her tip income is rather variable. In a good year (G), she earns a high income, so her tax liability to the IRS is $5000. In a bad year (B), she earns a low income, and her tax liability to the IRS is $0. The IRS knows that the probability of her having a good year is 0.6, and the probability of her having a bad year is 0.4, but it doesn’t know for sure which outcome has resulted for her this tax year. In this game, first Wanda decides how much income to report to the IRS. If she reports high income (H), she pays the IRS $5000. If she reports low income (L), she pays the IRS $0. Then the IRS has to decide whether to audit Wanda. If she reports high income, they do not audit, because they automatically know they’re already receiving the tax payment Wanda owes. If she reports low income, then the IRS can either audit (A) or not audit…
K An investment counselor calls with a hot stock tip. He believes that if the economy remains strong, the investment will result in a profit of $30,000. If the economy grows at a moderate pace, the investment will result in a profit of $10,000. However, if the economy goes into recession, the investment will result in a loss of $30,000. You contact an economist who believes there is a 30% probability the economy will remain strong, a 60% probability the economy will grow at a moderate pace, and a 10% probability the economy will slip into recession What is the expected profit from this investment? The expected profit is $ (Type an integer or a decimal.)
Gavin Jones’s friend is planning to invest $1 million in a rockconcert to be held 1 year from now. The friend figures that he will obtain $2.8 million revenue from his $1 million investment—unless it rains. If it rains, he will lose his entire investment. There is a 50% chance that it will rain the day of the concert. Gavin suggests that he buy rain insurance. He can buy one unit of insurance for $0.50, and this unit pays $1 if it rains and nothing if it does not. He may purchase as many units as he wishes, up to $2.8 million.(a) What is the expected rate of return on his investment if he buys u units of insurance? (The cost of insurance is in addition to his $1 million investment.)(b) What number of units will minimize the variance of his return? What is this minimum value? And what is the corresponding expected rate of them? [Hint: Before calculating a general expression for variance, think about a simple answer.]
Lukas is a risk-averse farmer. He grows barley on his 1000 acre farm. In a typical year his farm yields 100 bushels of barley per acre. However, in a wet season, the farm only yields 40 bushels per acre. The probability of a typical season is 0.8 and of a wet season is 0.2. Regardless of the productivity of his farm, he expects to earn $3 per bushel (net of all costs of farming). Assume that Lukas has no other income. Write an expression for Lukas's expected utility.
Describe and use techniques that apply to decision making under uncertainty.
A risk averse individual will always choose the safe but less profitable activity instead of the riskier but more profitable activity. True or False
A fair health insurance contract means that the expected payout is equal to the premium the expected income is equal to the difference between the expected loss and the expected payout the expected loss is equal to the expected payout the premium is equal to the expected income Consider an individual who has a healthy state income of $10,000 and a sick state income of $2,000. The probability of illness is 30%. If the individual is going to be better off with an insurance contract, it must be that their expected income does not change the insurance contract is full there is not enough information their expected utility does not change
Consider the following example. A risk-neutral worker can choose high or low effort. The worker's outside option is 0. The manager cannot observe the worker's action, but the manager can observe the realized revenue for the firm (either $100 or $200). The probability of each revenue depends on the worker's effort: Low effort: cost of effort : $0 probability of low revenue ($100): 75% probability of high revenue ($200) : 25% High effort: cost of effort : $11 probability of low revenue ($100): 25% probability of high revenue ($200) : 75% The manager offers a contract which gives the worker a flat wage of $10 and a bonus of $20 if revenue is high. Given this payment scheme, the worker will put in ✓effort. The contract (is/is not) ✓incentive compatible. The firm's expected profit is $ The firm is considering an investment that would increase worker morale. By making work more enjoyable, the program would reduce the worker's cost of effort from $11 to $9. If it costs the firm $20 to…
An individual has the utility function U(I) = I^(1/2), where I is their net income. (Note that I to the exponent/power of 1/2 is the same as the square root of I.) The individual starts with $1600 in income. The individual has a 20% probability of being very sick, 30% probability of being slightly sick, and 50% probability of being healthy. If the individual is sick, they lose net income because they need to pay healthcare costs. The healthcare costs are $1600 if they are very sick, $700 if they are slightly sick, and $0 if they are healthy. Please use this information for the following parts of this question unless otherwise specified. What is the individual's expected utility? Suppose a health insurance company offers the individual a full insurance contract. What is the actuarially fair, full insurance premium for this individual? What is the individual's expected utility if they purchase a full insurance contract at the actuarially fair, full insurance premium?
Suppose that there is asymmetric information in the market for used cars. Sellers know the quality of the car that they are selling, but buyers do not. Buyers know that there is a 30% chance of getting a "lemon", a low quality used car. A high quality used car is worth $30,000, and a low quality used car is worth $15,000. Based on this probability, the most that a buyer would be willing to pay for a used car is $ 25500. (Enter your response rounded to the nearest dollar.) Which of the following would best "solve" the asymmetric information problem in this market? O A. Prohibiting the sale of low-quality cars. O B. High-quality sellers could offer warranties or product guarantees. OC. Low-quality sellers could establish industry standards. O D. It is not possible to solve the asymmetric information problem in this market.

SEE MORE QUESTIONS

Recommended textbooks for you

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

Economics

ISBN:

9781337106665

Author:

Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Microeconomic Theory

Economics

ISBN:

9781337517942

Author:

NICHOLSON

Publisher:

Cengage

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

Economics

ISBN:

9781337106665

Author:

Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Microeconomic Theory

Economics

ISBN:

9781337517942

Author:

NICHOLSON

Publisher:

Cengage

SEE MORE TEXTBOOKS