sale. Suppose that each owner of an orange Citrus values it at $12,000; he is willing to part with it for price of at least $12,000, but not lower than this. Similarly, each owner of a lemon Citrus values it $4,000. Suppose that potential buyers are willing to pay more for each type. If a buyer could be con dent that the car he was buying was an orange, he would be willing to pay $15,000 for it; if the car was known lemon, he would be willing to pay $5,000. Suppose that there are many buyers, but a limited number of used cars. What type of used cars lemons or oranges - will be offered for sale in the market, and at what prices?

sale. Suppose that each owner of an orange Citrus values it at $12,000; he is willing to part with it for price of at least $12,000, but not lower than this. Similarly, each owner of a lemon Citrus values it $4,000. Suppose that potential buyers are willing to pay more for each type. If a buyer could be con dent that the car he was buying was an orange, he would be willing to pay $15,000 for it; if the car was known lemon, he would be willing to pay $5,000. Suppose that there are many buyers, but a limited number of used cars. What type of used cars lemons or oranges - will be offered for sale in the market, and at what prices?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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