4 players (Ale, Boris, Cate, David) are on the reality show. The prize is 4 gold coins. Each coin cannot be divided into perts, so player can only win some integer number of coins. In the first stage Alex offer some sharing of 4 coins to players (for Cx., 3 21 0). If strictly more than a half of players (accounting for the proposcr) vote for this sharing then game ends and cach player takes the number of coins as in the offer. If a half of players or more vote against the sharing then Alex leave the island with O coins and then Boris offers a sharing of 4 coins across the rest 3 players and so on. If only David will survive, he will gain all 4 coins. Note0: player's payoff is equal to the number of coins he gets Notel: if some player in some vote is indifferent about the vote, he will vote against a sharing.

4 players (Ale, Boris, Cate, David) are on the reality show. The prize is 4 gold coins. Each coin cannot be divided into perts, so player can only win some integer number of coins. In the first stage Alex offer some sharing of 4 coins to players (for Cx., 3 21 0). If strictly more than a half of players (accounting for the proposcr) vote for this sharing then game ends and cach player takes the number of coins as in the offer. If a half of players or more vote against the sharing then Alex leave the island with O coins and then Boris offers a sharing of 4 coins across the rest 3 players and so on. If only David will survive, he will gain all 4 coins. Note0: player's payoff is equal to the number of coins he gets Notel: if some player in some vote is indifferent about the vote, he will vote against a sharing.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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